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This dissertation traces debates about reservation policy in India. Reserved quotas 
in public institutions for communities stigmatized on the basis of caste comprise an 
enduring and comprehensive form of affirmative action. However, the policy provokes 
deep resentment among upper castes, manifested in virulent protests, judicial challenges 
and failed implementation. The purpose of this dissertation is to understand how 
meanings of caste, community and nation are shaped within and through debates about 
reservation and in turn, how the politics of reservation contribute to the formation of 
political subjectivities.  
Drawing on a variety of sites, including the Constituent Assembly debates, the 
English press and government reports, I chart the development of a dominant discourse 
about reservations. I interrogate this discourse in relation to anti-caste perspectives on the 
issue, found in creative and activist writings and studies of Dalit activism. I argue that 
dominant discourses conflate the issue of caste discrimination with a series of terms that 
designate inequality more broadly, such as poverty and unemployment. This enables the 
portrayal of “lower caste” beneficiaries of reservation as inferior subjects that are unable 
to understand their “real interests”. Thus trivializing discrimination, the discourse 
naturalizes caste privilege and conceals the historical contestations over the meaning of 
the quota. In anti-caste discourse, advocacy of reservations is articulated to a critique of 
the domination of upper caste interests in Indian democracy and the hegemonic vision of 
the nation through which this domination is naturalized. Thus, power and representation 
are underscored as integral to assessments of reservation policy.  
Attending to the affective registers of the debate, I demonstrate that statements 
about the quota are also statements about history, nationalism and political subjectivity. 
Reading dominant discourse through anti-caste analytics reveals that the anger against 
reservations as a threat to the nation is historically related to the antagonism of 
institutionalized nationalism towards Dalit politics. Through rights claims, Dalit activists 
contest dominant meanings of caste and in turn, the meanings of community and nation. 
This epistemological challenge illustrates the contingent relations of group rights and 
social transformation, as struggles against discrimination generate novel understandings 
of difference, commonality and personhood.  
iii	  
Acknowledgments 
I have written this dissertation with the support of many individuals and 
institutions. I would like to thank my dissertation supervisor, Ananya Mukherjee-Reed 
and my committee members, Radhika Mongia and Gerald Kernerman. Since I began 
graduate studies at York University as an M.A. student, Ananya has encouraged and 
inspired my research interests and provided guidance throughout. Her advice that I be 
patient with the research process and the formation of arguments, rather than attempt to 
make premature conclusions, has been invaluable. Radhika has taught me the importance 
of engaging the arguments of others with care, of approaching writing as a craft and 
revising with rigor. Her commitment to teaching and learning is a source of inspiration. 
Thank you for your critical comments and for encouraging me to run, which renewed my 
energy in the final months of writing. Gerald provided me with the opportunity to explore 
new ideas in his course and challenged me to read and ask questions differently.  I would 
also like to thank Anna Agathangelou, whose graduate classes greatly influenced my 
thinking. The knowledge and perspectives I gained from her have critically shaped my 
approach in this project.  
In New Delhi, the kind staff at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library helped me 
access a vast amount of research materials. I am grateful for the resources and insights 
provided by the Dalit Foundation, the National Confederation of Dalit Organizations, and 
the Indian Institute of Dalit Studies. Members of the Backward and Minority 
Communities Employees Federation generously shared experiences and knowledge. The 
staff of the Press Archives division of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library provided a 
wealth of information for Chapter 3. I could not have written Chapter 4 without the 
important documents of the Pasmanda Counter-Public Archive, collected by the Patna 
Collective. I am deeply grateful to Khalid Anis Ansari and Sanjay Ingole for sharing their 
invaluable knowledge and critical insights on the politics of caste, culture and knowledge 
production. Many thanks to Amita Joseph and Mohamed Ali for helping me navigate 
Delhi. My love and gratitude to Suman Sachdev, Durgesh Sachdev and Dhruv Sachdev 
for welcoming me into their home and making me a part of their family.  
In Mumbai, I had the privilege of learning from the late Dr. Ashgar Ali Engineer, 
whose passion and commitment were truly moving.  Thank you to the Centre for Society 
iv	  
and Secularism for providing me with space and access to research materials. Aruna 
Bhatia and Alka Bhatia generously hosted me. Thank you for your kindness.  
 I am grateful to Omme-Salma Rahemtulla, Vanessa Rosa, Alejandro Campos 
Garcia, Salima Vaiya, Zahir Kolia, Nashwa Salem, Beenash Jafri and Ian Hussey for 
their comments on various aspects of the dissertation, especially in the formative stages. 
Thank you to Nishant Upadhyay for carfully reading various chapters, pointing to 
connections I missed and asking engaging questions.  
 Apeksha Kumar, Shivani Dhawan and Ruby Sadera joined me in Mumbai and 
Delhi, and have taken care of me in innumerable ways. Lina Nadar has been listening 
patiently and sharing her energy since the day I started graduate school. Thank you to 
Jaspall Sidhu for listening and making me laugh.  
I could not have completed this dissertation without the love and support of my 
parents, Ajay Virmani and Monica Virmani. Their strength and devotion to family is 
unwavering. Thank you for everything you have given me.    
 My best friend, toughest critic and greatest champion, Razaq Shaikh, has seen me 
through every phase of this project. He has given me strength in times of self-doubt and 
exhaustion, encouraged me to reflect on this process as a journey and accept my 
limitations with a sense of humor. I cannot imagine my life without him. Thank you for 














Chapter One. Feeling Difference, Differentiating Feelings: Caste and Minority Rights in 
the Constituent Assembly Debates…………………………………………………....54 
 
Chapter Two. Representing Reservations: Caste, Class and Untouchability in Narratives 
of Social Mobility……………………………………………………………………..98 
 
Chapter Three. Waging Caste Wars: Imagining Community and Nation in the Mandal 
Commission Debate…………………………………………………………………...145 
 
Chapter Four. Interrogating Minority: Difference, Discrimination and the Muslim 








On 8 July 2012 the popular Sunday morning talk show Satyamev Jayate (Truth 
Alone Prevails) explored the issues of untouchability and caste-based discrimination in 
Indian society. As a guest on the program documentary filmmaker Stalin K. Padma 
informed host Aamir Khan that this was the first time these issues were being discussed 
on national television. “It took us 65 years to get here. Shame. However, 
Congratulations.” Satyamev Jayate aired its first episode on the subject of sex selective 
abortions and female feoticide on 6 May 2012. Over the following weeks it presented a 
range of problematic social issues, such as domestic abuse, child abuse, alcohol addiction 
and medical malpractice, with the intention of raising awareness and inspiring social 
change in society. The program’s ability to discuss difficult subject matter and attract a 
wide audience is attributed to its narration of social issues through a number of “affective 
tropes” that include cathartic revelations, shocking testimonies, interviews with experts 
and cutaways of shocked or tearful studio audiences.1 In the 90 minute broadcast 
dedicated to untouchability, Professor Kaushal Pawar described the meager income that 
her family earned sweeping and removing waste from the homes of upper castes, and the 
segregation and exclusion she faced in her village as a child. She had experienced 
constant harassment and humiliation by fellow students and professors as a graduate 
student at Jawaharlal Nehru University, an institution reputed for its commitment to 
progressive politics. Several portions of Stalin K. Padma’s film India Untouched were 
included in the episode to show how caste discrimination affected children stigmatized as 
untouchable from a very young age.2 A twelve year old interviewed in the film explained 
that he had dropped out of school because it was too humiliating to be made to sit 
separately from other students during meals. Other children Padma interviewed were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Shohini Ghosh, “Dil Se Nahin Dimag se Dekho: Thoughts on Satyamev Jayate Episode 
1”, Kafila: Media, Politics, Dissent, 9 May 2012, http://kafila.org/2012/05/09/dil-se-
nahin-dimaag-se-dekho-thoughts-on-satyamev-jayate-episode-1-shohini-ghosh/.	  2	  The entire film can be viewed online at 





forced to sweep and clean toilets by their teachers. India Untouched demonstrated that 
caste discrimination was pervasive both in rural villages and, despite their assumed 
modernity, in urban cities. Further, that it affected the community practices of Hindus, 
Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. A large segment of the program was devoted to the work 
of activist Bezwada Wilson to end the occupation of manual scavenging. The episode 
concluded with one audience member claiming that he had decided he would not 
“differentiate” between people, and another wishing that the modernity of Indian cities 
would no longer be gauged by its malls or metro systems, but by the presence of caste. 
Both responses were received with resounding applause, as if to echo Stalin’s statement. 
“Shame. However, Congratulations.”  
 In his critical review of this episode S. Anand, a prominent writer and publisher 
on issues of caste, noted that during the 90 minute broadcast any mention of two 
significant issues had been scrupulously avoided.3 First, the work of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, 
who was not only the chief architect of the Indian Constitution and India’s first Law 
Minister, but the most significant leader of the struggle for rights, dignity and political 
power by Dalits, groups stigmatized as “untouchable” by Hinduism’s caste hierarchy. 
Secondly, there was no mention of the word Reservations. Enshrined in the Constitution, 
the policy of quota-based reservations is the principal form of affirmative action in India. 
This policy “reserves” a fixed percentage of seats in legislatures, public employment and 
educational institutions for stigmatized communities in order to address the historically 
entrenched discrimination that conditions their lives. Anand interrogated the politics that 
motivated these exclusions:  
How did Kaushal Pawar get a BA, MA, PhD and land a job with Delhi 
University? What is it that facilitates access to hitherto-excluded spaces for 
Dalits?...The one weapon that helps them get an education? Get a job? 
Reservation. And who made this policy possible? Ambedkar.4  
Upon contacting Bezwada Wilson about his interview on the program, Anand learned 
that he had discussed the work of Ambedkar. These portions of his interview had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 S. Anand, “Silence Eva Jayate,” Outlook Magazine, July 23 2012, 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?281646.	  
4 Ibid. 	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edited out. With the exception of Wilson’s discussion of how the legislation passed in 
1993 to eliminate manual scavenging had been largely neglected, there was no mention 
of the existing legal and political measures that dealt with caste violence and 
discrimination, let alone their efficacy. Throughout the episode host Aamir Khan 
implored his audience to change the way they thought, to stop seeing people as “high” 
and “low” and to teach their children good values.  His own emotive responses to the 
suffering his guests had endured due to their caste location – he was often moved to tears 
– suggested that sympathy was necessary for social change. By using images of suffering 
and painful personal testimony to shock and sadden the audience, the program 
highlighted the agency of non-Dalits in social change. Khan wanted his viewers to realize 
that the ugly reality of entrenched caste discrimination prevented India from becoming a 
strong nation.  
What was it that made the issue of reservation policy so disruptive to this 
mobilization of sympathy that it could not even be mentioned? Why and how would it 
prevent the viewers – primarily middle class and upper caste – from identifying with the 
objective of ending caste discrimination in Indian society? While Satyamev Jayate may 
have been the first nationally televised discussion about caste discrimination, these 
exclusions indicate how it drew upon and was structured by particular ways of knowing, 
speaking about and relating to caste. The program reflected what D.R. Nagaraj describes 
as the fragmented response to the injustices of the caste system among liberal supporters. 
Nagaraj argues that although these supporters are moved by lofty philosophical talk 
against caste and touched by the spiritual beauty of the revolt, Dalit efforts to secure jobs 
and other material benefits in the name of justice and positive discrimination are met with 
horror, and seen as mean and ignoble faces of their struggles.5  Even Gandhi, credited 
with making the fight against untouchability a key priority in the anti-colonial nationalist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 D.R. Nagaraj, The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: The Dalit Movement in India, ed. 
Prithvi Datta and Chandra Shobhi (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010), 29-30. Nagaraj’s 
description of the revolt against caste in terms of spiritual beauty refers to the perception 
among upper caste social reformers that the purification of Hindu religious practice 
would replace caste hierarchy with harmonious social relations. Gandhi’s emphasis on 
atonement for the past sins of untouchability and compassion for the untouchable 
designated the upper caste self as the primary site of struggle. Gandhi’s views on caste 
will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter. 	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movement, could respond deeply to the spiritual beauty of the revolt, but recoiled in utter 
embarrassment when confronted with its material demands.6 Hence, the deliberate 
exclusion of the topic of reservations on national television is related to a broader history 
in which certain ways of approaching the caste question are dismissed on the grounds that 
they provoke hostility among upper castes and prevent their ability to empathize with the 
pain of the “untouchable”.  
 This dissertation traces this history through an examination of debates about 
reservation policy in India. I trace the multiple discursive positions, forms of knowledge, 
and mobilizations of affect that shape and are shaped by debates about reservation over 
time. My reading of these debates will show that their content exceeds the immediate 
question of policy, marshalling passionate views on the legacies of colonialism, the 
foundations of nationhood, the politics of identity and structures of inequality. I am 
guided by two main questions: 1) how are the meanings of caste, community and nation 
shaped within and through debates about reservation? 2) how do the politics of 
reservation contribute to the formation of political subjectivities? Through a variety of 
sites including the Constituent Assembly of India, the mainstream English press, 
scholarly literature and government reports on caste, social and educational disadvantage 
and religious minorities, I chart how particular understandings of reservation policy, and 
the subjects it is intended to benefit, occupy a dominant position across different 
discursive spaces. I consider this in relation to Dalit and anti-caste perspectives on the 
issue found in creative literature, activist publications and studies of Dalit and anti-caste 
movements. Juxtaposing these different discursive positions and forms of knowledge 
brings into relief the conflicting political objectives and social imaginaries that circulate 
in debates about reservation, and in turn, contribute to their intractability.7  
My dissertation highlights the ways in which Dalit and anti-caste writings pose a 
stark challenge to entrenched assumptions about caste, community and nation that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid.	  7	  My method aims to understand the connections between different forms of speech and 
writing in order to demonstrate the pervasiveness of particular assumptions in different 
discursive arenas. I am interested in questioning the distinctions between formal political 
spheres, such as law or policy-making and spaces of the imagination, such as creative 
writing and opinion pieces in newspapers. My method attends to the circulation of affect 
and emotion across these sites.  
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underpin dominant discourses about and (largely) against reservation policy. In the 
former, the advocacy and analysis of reservations is rooted in the historical trajectory of 
Dalit struggles for rights as an autonomous, non-Hindu community and the experiential 
structure of caste discrimination. However, dominant discourses are marked by the 
persistent marginalization of Dalit political thought and activism. This enables 
reservation to be represented as an ineffective and divisive policy and its beneficiaries as 
dependent and parochial subjects. Through this enduring representation, reservation 
quotas and the political subjects who support them are framed as detrimental to the 
nation-state. My dissertation will argue that these discourses are constructed through a 
conflation of the historically specific question of caste-based discrimination with a series 
of terms that designate social inequality more broadly, such as poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment and landlessness. These terms are deployed interchangeably as the “real 
problems” that reservations has failed to resolve. Thus trivializing the question of 
discrimination while claiming sympathy for the “masses” afflicted by these problems, 
dominant discourses constitute a site in which caste privilege is naturalized.  
I will provide a brief outline of the contours of these discourses and their relation 
to Dalit and anti-caste thought below. The remainder of this introductory chapter is 
organized as follows. I will review the existing scholarship on reservation policy and 
identify the limitations that my project aims to address. I outline my approach, which 
attends to the affective and emotional registers of the debate. This approach contributes to 
understanding the ways in which claims about the quota are also always claims about 
history, nationalism and the kinds of political subjects that are produced by the quota. 
Next, I discuss the relevance of my project in relation to two areas of scholarship: 
inquiries into the multiple deployments of caste in the modern nation-state, especially its 
novel political functions, and epistemological questions about the production of caste as a 
modern category during British colonialism. While these areas of scholarship remain 
distinct, I argue that a productive engagement between them will contribute to 
understanding how colonial knowledge continues to uphold caste privilege in post-
colonial India. Finally, I provide an overview of the transformations to caste relations 
during the colonial period and the various responses these engendered. The unresolved 
6	  
contestations of this period continue to animate debates about reservation in post-
partition India.   
 
Reservation Policy and Anti-Reservation Discourse: Colonial Legacies 
and Post-Colonial Transformations  
A policy of reservations was implemented during British colonial rule in response 
to demands from various communities that their educated members be given 
opportunities in the institutions of the colonial state.8 For the colonial state reservations 
were an instrument of governance and a tool of pacification.9 In the post-colonial nation-
state, reservations were redefined towards the objective of creating a constitutional 
democracy committed to social, economic and political justice. The principle of 
representation of community interests as a basis for reservation was abandoned in favor 
of the problems of socio-economic inequality and discrimination. The post-colonial 
nation-state thus limited the communities eligible for guaranteed representation in 
legislatures, public sector employment and educational institutions to the Scheduled 
Castes (Dalits) and Scheduled Tribes.10 Together with the abolition of untouchability, 
Scheduled Caste reservation represented a dual mandate: national integration and the 
amelioration of social inequality. The framers of the Constitution expected that in time 
the principles of revolutionary social transformation as the foundation for the modern 
nation-state would result in the demise of the various forms of oppression related to 
untouchability. Hence, quotas were seen as a temporary provision. However, the 
Constitution also authorized the state to identify other “socially and educationally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Susie Tharu et al., “Reservations and the Return to Politics,” SocialSciences.in, August 
3, 2011, http://socialsciences.in/article/reservations-and-return-politics.	  
9 Ibid. 	  
10 The term Scheduled Castes refers to the so-called “untouchable communities” 
historically subjected to economic exploitation and social segregation within the Caste 
Hindu social hierarchy. The term Scheduled Castes was coined by the British government 
in 1935 when these communities were listed in a schedule for the purposes of electoral 
representation. These communities were also referred to as Depressed Classes during 
colonial rule. These rights were also extended to indigenous communities, categorized as 
Scheduled Tribes. The focus on Scheduled Castes in this project is guided by the 
emphasis on this category of subjects in the Constituent Assembly debates as well as in 
ongoing debates about caste discrimination and social policy in India. 	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backward classes” and devise special measures to address their conditions, which may 
include reservations. Beginning in the 1960s, various state governments created social 
policies for this category of the population, referred to as Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs). A national level policy guaranteeing reservation for OBCs in government 
employment was implemented in 1993. Taken together, close to 70% of India’s 
population meets the criteria for one of the three categories under which quotas are 
reserved.11 Reserved quotas for SCs, STs and OBCs are 15%, 7.5% and 27% 
respectively.  
Since the 1990s demands have emerged to further expand the framework by 
creating a separate category for Muslims, to address the discrimination they face as a 
religious minority community.12 My interest in this project developed in the context of 
debates about the possibility of reservation for Muslims, which had become more 
prominent after the release of the Sachar Committee Report on the Social, Educational 
and Economic Status of the Muslim Community in India in 2006. The Report presented 
damning evidence of widespread poverty and marginalization of the community. 
However, as a religious minority group, Muslims are not eligible for reservation - 
reservation on the basis of religion is unconstitutional. Moreover, numerous 
commentators oppose instituting a “Muslim quota” due to the fear that this would 
polarize society on religious grounds, leading to violent riots between Hindus and 
Muslims. As I studied these debates, it seemed to me that the issue of Muslim inequality 
had posed renewed challenges to a long-standing framework by raising questions about 
who the appropriate subject of reservations should be. I sought to understand why quotas 
were provided on the basis of caste but not religion. To address this question, it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Scheduled Castes constitute 16% of the national population, Scheduled Tribes 
constitute 8% and Other Backward Classes approximately 52%. The latter figure is 
unclear because the Indian census does not collect information on caste for the entire 
population. 	  12	  Significantly, working class and artisan Muslims have opposed such proposals on the 
grounds that caste based discrimination among Muslims would be concealed by a quota 
for Muslims as a singular category. Although there are Muslim and Christian groups 
engaged in exploitative and stigmatized occupations that result in their being subjected to 
practices of untouchability, they are excluded from the category Scheduled Caste and 
eligibility for the social policies associated with it. The issue of discrimination against 
Muslims and caste-based discrimination amongst Muslims is the focus of Chapter 4. 	  
8	  
necessary to explore how a dominant understanding of reservation policy had taken shape 
historically. I was especially interested in how certain categories of subjects were seen as 
more suitable to reservation than others, based on specific notions of caste, community 
and nation.   
 The historical trajectory described in many accounts of the policy seemed to 
confirm my assumption that the acceptability of quotas as a means to redress 
discrimination differed based on the subject in question. These accounts held that the 
guarantee of reservation for Scheduled Castes as a means of compensation for the 
segregation, violence and exploitation to which they have been subjected is a key 
achievement of the Indian Constitution in pursuit of its mandate to achieve social, 
economic and political justice for all citizens. Also referred to as “compensatory 
discrimination”, “protective discrimination” and “preferential treatment”, reservations 
were perceived as necessary for re-defining the relationship between privileged and 
marginalized groups in Hindu society. Thus, the policy is described as having emanated 
from the collective sense of guilt among the colonized elite who were “confronted with 
critiques of their society as uncivilized, and vis-à-vis subaltern castes, unjust”.13 It 
represented a “collective expression of regret, a long overdue gesture of historical 
reconciliation, a form of loyalty and an attempt to take the moral sting out of the past”.14 
Reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were considered to be a full and 
final settlement of historical debt, after which caste would cease to be a political issue.15 
However, the temporal and demographic expansion of the policy to different categories 
of subjects, particularly Other Backward Classes (OBCs), has been marked by strikes, 
demonstrations, arson and violence. In tandem with these anti-reservation protests, 
national media outlets promptly mobilized alarmist discourses about declining national 
cohesion and the death of merit and efficiency in state institutions. The extension of 
reservation policy to these subjects has been described as a violation of the Constitution’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Walter Fernandes, “Reservations as a Tool of Social Change,” in Protective 
Discrimination: Ideology and Praxis, ed. A.K. Lal (New Delhi: Concept Publishing 
Company, 2001), 19-32.	  
14 Bhiku Parekh, “A Case for Positive Discrimination,” in Democracy, Difference and 
Social Justice, ed. Gurpreet Mahajan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 380-
389.	  
15 Tharu et al., “Reservations and the Return to Politics.”	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socio-political vision: “compensatory discrimination has become India’s new mantra for 
each and every caste clamoring for removal of backwardness. It has brought India to a 
state of compensatory backwardness.”16 Thus it appears that the limits to tolerance for 
reservation – the limits to the guilt of the privileged castes – are drawn on the basis of the 
subject in question. Participants in the debate identify which category of the population is 
truly deserving of this form of empathetic compensation and offer dire assessments about 
the kinds of political subjectivities that are forged by expanding the framework to include 
the undeserving.   
As my survey of the literature expanded from scholarly texts to journalism, 
government reports and the Constituent Assembly debates, my initial assumptions began 
to shift. I noticed important commonalities across these different sites, which indicated a 
set of dominant discourses about reservation that persisted over time. These can be 
broadly organized in terms of concerns for national unity, the general ineffectiveness of 
the policy and the defense of individual merit.  First, by offering benefits and preferential 
treatment on the basis of caste, reservations encourage attachments to pre-modern, 
divisive identities, thus compromising national integration. Secondly, since reserved 
quotas actually offer a very limited amount of employment they are an ineffective means 
to address the overwhelming socio-economic inequality of Indian society. Finally, caste-
based reservations create opportunities for unqualified, inferior applicants in public 
institutions while punishing hardworking, meritorious (upper caste) individuals that are 
not eligible for the policy. Taken together, while reservations are hailed as an enlightened 
gesture of the anti-colonial nationalist movement, they are simultaneously criticized for 
producing the inadequate, parochial and dependent subjects that represent a soiling of 
that legacy. The continuity of these arguments across time suggests that the limits to 
tolerance for reservation policy are not staged at the question of the appropriate subject – 
the deserving and exceptional Scheduled Caste versus the myriad of other groups that 
disingenuously demand a quota be reserved for them. I argue that the continuity indicates 
how deeply rooted assumptions about the inferiority of subaltern caste groups underpin 
dominant discourses about reservation regardless of the subject in question. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Sachidananda, “Rethinking Scheduled Caste Reservation,” in Protective 
Discrimination: Ideology and Practice, 32-40.	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 To be sure, dominant discourses emphasize that caste is a horrific, vile institution 
that must be eradicated from the nation-state. Their point is that reservations policy is not 
only inadequate to this task, but may also serve to reverse the progress that has already 
been made. Existing progress towards the achievement of a caste-less society is attributed 
to the social reform efforts spearheaded by Gandhi, the secular values of the Constitution 
and the processes of modernization, development and urbanization that have loosened the 
grip of traditional religious authority on the population. Pressed into service of an anti-
reservation discourse, this trajectory illustrates the relative insignificance of quotas to 
social change. Moreover, the contributions of Dalit and anti-caste activism are rarely 
acknowledged. Dalit, meaning “ground down” or “broken to pieces” in Marathi, is a term 
of politicized self-identification selected by communities designated in the Constitution 
as Scheduled Caste. Ambedkar first used the term in his journal Bashishkrit Bharat 
(Outcaste India) in 1928. Ambedkar described being Dalit as the experience of 
deprivation, marginalization and stigmatization.17 The term came into wider usage in the 
1970s with the emergence of the militant Dalit Panther movement, which drew 
inspiration from the Black Panther Party in the US, and the flourishing of Dalit literature 
in the state of Maharashtra. As defined by Gangadhar Pantawane, the founder-editor of 
Asmitdaarsh (Mirror of Identity), the chief organ of Dalit literature:  
To me, Dalit is not a caste. He is a man exploited by the social and economic 
traditions of this country. He does not believe in God, rebirth, soul, holy books 
teaching separatism, fate and heaven because they have made him a slave. He 
does believe in humanism. Dalit is a symbol of change and revolution.18 
As a form of identification that rejects caste and the religious concepts through which it is 
sanctioned, Dalit is not simply a term that is interchangeable with “untouchable” or 
“Scheduled Caste”. However, the experience of being recognized as “untouchable” by 
Caste Hindu society and subject to discriminatory practices on this basis is a structuring 
aspect of Dalit identity. Scholarship on Dalit politics highlights the relationship between 
self-transformation and new ways of imagining community in the struggle for social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India (Ranikhet: 
Permanent Black, 2010), 15.	  
18 Quoted in Eleanor Zelliot, From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar 
Movement (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), 268.	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equality. Nagaraj defines the category Dalit as a state of consciousness that seeks to 
interrogate and challenge the stereotypes that Caste Hindu society employs to describe 
untouchable and near-untouchable communities.19 Attending to the politics of (re) 
naming self and community as an emancipatory practice, Rao argues that the term Dalit 
is at once analytic and prescriptive. That is, it defines the historical structures and 
practices that experientially mark someone as Dalit and identifies the Dalit as someone 
seeking to escape those structures.20 A distinguishing feature of Dalit activism is the 
rejection of upper caste social reformism, which aims to integrate “untouchables” into 
Hindu society. Ambedkar was convinced that caste could not be eradicated without the 
repudiation of Hinduism. He regarded Hinduism as a religion of rules, commands and 
prohibitions that could not be reflected on or used to guide responsible action.21 
Accordingly, the political orientation of Dalit activism has been towards a firmly 
autonomous movement that seeks to build alliances between socially and economically 
marginalized groups based upon non-religious conceptions of community and nation.22 
The question of how to build a broad social base for the struggle against upper caste 
hegemony while remaining focused on the specific experiences of untouchability is an 
important aspect of Dalit political thought. In this project I use the terms “Dalit” and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Nagaraj, The Flaming Feet, 94.	  
20 Rao, The Caste Question, 16.	  
21 B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste,” in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and 
Speeches Volume 1 (Bombay: Education Department Government of Maharashtra, 1979), 
75.	  
22 My use of the term “autonomous” in relation to Dalit politics and activism follows 
from the work of scholars who have traced the formation of anti-caste movements in 
South Asia. The term registers the historical contestations between Gandhi and 
Ambedkar on the question of caste inequality. In particular, the latter’s insistence on an 
independent movement of the untouchables. The term “autonomous” is also used to 
describe the creation of a distinct Dalit counterpublic in the 1920s, due to their exclusion 
from the colonial public sphere. I use the term to indicate the historical antecedents of 
more contemporary expressions of Dalit activism, which includes the question of self-
determination. This suggests that anti-caste thought and politics inspired by Ambedkar’s 
movement is not only an alternative means of achieving the same objective, that of caste 
equality. Rather, the movement challenges the politics of upper caste social reform and 
insists on both equality and independent selfhood. See Sharmila Rege, Writing 
Caste/Writing Gender: Narrating Dalit Women’s Testimonios (New Delhi: Zubaan 
Books, 2005); Eva-Maria Hardtmann, The Dalit Movement in India: Local Practices, 
Global Connections (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009). 	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“anti-caste” interchangeably in order to register the historical and ongoing struggles to 
build alliances between marginalized castes differentiated by region, language, religion, 
occupation, class and gender.23  
  Attending to the ways in which reservations have been experienced, advocated 
and critiqued by its intended beneficiaries, my project illustrates that support for 
reservations is articulated to a critique of the domination of upper caste interests in Indian 
democracy and the hegemonic vision of the nation through which this domination is 
naturalized. The policy is represented as one aspect of a broader assertion of the rights to 
power and representation for Dalits. Therefore, an important political objective against 
which it is assessed is its potential to politicize marginalized communities and catalyze 
alliances between them. In this analysis the expansion of the reservation framework 
would not perpetuate the caste structure, “it would devour it from within”.24 Studying the 
ways in which reservation policy is framed in Dalit political discourses shows that in the 
process of claiming rights and recognition activists contest the meaning of caste and in 
turn, the meanings of community and nation that underpin dominant discourses. 
Moreover, the stakes of the debate are not limited to upholding the principles of the 
policy itself. Rather, anti-caste activists confront both the explicitly offensive stereotypes 
of Scheduled Castes and OBCs and the subtle, implicit ways that caste privilege is 
defended in dominant public discourses. Engaging with these perspectives sheds light on 
the contingent effects of constitutional rights and their interaction with other aspects of 
social transformation. Specifically, I am interested in the intersection of quota politics, 
caste discrimination and Dalit activism in the production of political subjectivities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Since the colonial period Dalits have led broader anti-caste struggles in alliance with 
groups inferiorized as “lower caste” but not stigmatized as “untouchable”. Due to this 
difference in status important tensions have also marked these relations, making alliances 
untenable in particular times and places. See V. Geetha, “Durban: The Local Contexts of 
a Global Movement,” in Against Stigma: Studies in Caste, Race and Justice since 
Durban, ed. Balmurli Natrajan and Paul Greenough (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 
2009), 204-229; Gail Omvedt, “The Anti-Caste Movement and the Discourse of Power,” 
in Caste and Democratic Politics in India, ed. Ghanshyam Shah (Ranikhet: Permanent 
Black, 2004), 454-475. 	  
24 Gopal Guru, “Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Reservations,” (Surat: Centre for Social 
Studies, 1991) in Omvedt, “The Anti-Caste Movement”, 470.	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Studying debates about reservation through Dalit political discourses provides an 
analytical vantage point from which dominant discourses can be critically interrogated. 
My dissertation demonstrates that dominant discourses about reservation are constructed 
through a conflation of the purpose of reservation, that is, the elimination of caste 
discrimination, with various conditions of inequality that result from discrimination. This 
conflation enables the argument that reservation policy has miserably failed to resolve the 
“real challenges” of national development: poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. The 
implication is that either caste discrimination is less real, less damaging to people’s lives, 
or that it would resolve itself if only there were sustained action on these latter issues. As 
such, ongoing efforts to defend and/or extend the existing reservation framework only 
serve to distract the most marginalized sections among the SCs, STs, and OBCs from 
recognizing their actual material interests and participating in a broad based project of 
national development. Each chapter of my dissertation highlights that while reservation 
quotas for different categories of the population are debated in their specificity over time, 
a prominent space always exists for arguments about the overall illegitimacy of the 
existing policy, its failure to resolve socio-economic inequality and the inadequate 
subjects it produces. In this way, dominant discourses deflect questions about the ongoing 
concentration of economic, political and symbolic power among upper castes. Hence, I 
argue that reservation debates constitute an integral site in which “upper caste” 
subjectivity is produced and naturalized in the figure of the secular, caste-less national 
citizen. The constitution of this subjectivity relies on representations of the beneficiaries 
of reservation, Dalits and other “lower castes”, as unqualified, underperforming and 
parochial subjects who pose a hindrance to national development goals. The very policies 
intended to eliminate caste discrimination become the object around which discourses 
about the inferiority of the “reserved category candidate” are mobilized in the service of 
upper caste privilege. My argument suggests that through particular ways of participating 
in these debates, discursive and corporeal claims to caste-less subjectivity are made.  
 
Evaluating Reservations: Principles, Policy, Politics  
A key concern in the existing scholarship on India’s reservation policy involves 
its reconcilability with the principles of liberalism. In his exhaustive study of the topic, 
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Marc Galanter describes India’s policy of preferential treatment as predicated on an 
enlightened departure from liberal principles of formal equality.25 In particular, it is a 
departure from the principles of merit, evenhandedness and indifference to ascriptive 
identities. Galanter argues that policies of preferential treatment embody an acute 
awareness of historically entrenched inequalities as characteristic of society and have 
been pursued with remarkable persistence and generosity since 1950.26 As a test case for 
liberal theory, the Indian experience proves that conflicts between group identity and 
individual equality can be contained, that they do not inevitably produce divisive effects 
in society or compromise the building of a meritocratic society.27  
A second area of focus in the existing literature is the accuracy of existing criteria 
for identifying beneficiary groups. While reservations can be accommodated despite the 
prioritization of individual freedom and equality in liberal democracies, determining 
which subjects are genuinely in need of this accommodation has been a more difficult 
question to resolve. Most accounts of the policy begin from the premise that at the 
moment of Constitution making there was a widespread consensus about the need to 
provide reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in legislatures, 
employment and education. This is distinguished from the lack of consensus among the 
political elite about the criteria that would accurately identify the Other Backward 
Classes or whether or not they require reserved quotas of any kind.28 Whereas the stigma 
of untouchability makes the identification of Scheduled Castes seemingly self-evident, 
establishing the criteria for what constitutes social, educational and economic 
backwardness is open to interpretation. The first round of serious debates on the effects 
of caste in politics emerged in the late 1960s and were directly related to the 
establishment of the Backward Classes Commission in 1953, which was to determine the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India 
(Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 1.	  
26 Ibid.	  
27 Ibid.; Partha Ghosh, “Positive Discrimination in India: Political Analysis,” Ethnic 
Studies Report 15, no.2 (1997): 136-172; Laura Dudley Jenkins, Identity and 
Identification in India: Defining the Disadvantaged (London: Routledge Curzon, 2001); 
Rochana Bajpai, Debating Difference: Minority Rights and Liberal Democracy in India 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011).	  
28 Ghosh, “Positive Discrimination in India: A Political Analysis,” 136.	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criteria for social and educational backwardness.29 That the most widespread and violent 
anti-reservation protests have occurred in the context of state efforts to devise a policy for 
OBCs also suggests that the principal problem is that of criteria. The debate engages the 
question of whether the criteria for eligibility should include caste at all, or whether 
economic status should be the primary criteria because it is a more accurate index of 
inequality.30 The question of whether discrimination on the grounds of religious 
difference should be addressed by affirmative action has also been raised.31 In these 
accounts Scheduled Castes feature as part of the background historical context for 
contemporary debates about OBCs and Muslims. Since the stigma of untouchability 
results in an exceptional level of oppression, their experience is assumed to have little 
relevance for ongoing debates about whether quotas are an effective measure for 
addressing the socio-economic inequality of other social groups. The exceptionality of 
SC reservation is further related to the significance of the intent with which it was 
devised, even if the record of implementation has left much to be desired. The original 
intent is reflected upon as a unique expression of commitment to subjects that have 
experienced the worst forms of discrimination and oppression on the basis of caste. By 
contrast, reservation for OBCs and religious minorities are contentious aspects of the 
debate because they threaten to turn an exceptional, limited measure into a permanent 
feature of Indian politics. 
A third aspect of the existing literature concerns issues of implementation and 
overall effects of the policy. This involves questions such as the extent to which quotas 
have been filled, the percentage of SCs in government service, their distribution across 
different levels of service, and rates of enrollment in higher education. The record of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ishita Bannerjee-Dube, “Introduction: Questions of Caste,” in Caste in History, ed.  
Ishita Bannerjee-Dube (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), xxvii.	  
30 Galanter, Competing Equalities; P.C Chatterji, “Reservation: Theory and Practice,” in 
Region, Religion, Caste, Gender and Culture in Contemporary India, ed. T.V. 
Satyamurthy (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 293-313; V.A. Pai Panandiker, ed., 
The Politics of Backwardness: Reservation Policy in India (New Delhi: Konark 
Publishers, 1997); Zoya Hasan, The Politics of Inclusion: Caste, Minorities and 
Affirmative Action (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009).	  
31 Jenkins, Identity and Identification; Hasan, The Politics of Inclusion. Jenkins and 
Hasan engage with the debate on whether reservation policy can address discrimination 
against Muslims. 	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implementation is marked by a continual shortfall in filling reserved vacancies and the 
concentration of SCs in the most low paying, low status categories of government 
service.32 However, there has also been a discernible improvement in literacy, 
educational enrollment and placement in government jobs resulting in a significant 
increase in the presence of SCs in public institutions. Reservations are also assessed in 
terms of the extent to which the general conditions of life have improved for Dalit 
communities, the majority of which are impoverished landless laborers in rural areas. 
Overall, reservations are portrayed as an extremely limited policy that has created a 
sizeable middle class of SCs but has been virtually meaningless for the majority of rural, 
landless laborers.33 Such assessments raise questions about why this policy continues to 
be pursued and expanded: “In a country where poverty and deprivation are so 
widespread, it is a questionable proposition to think in terms of upliftment for particular 
social groups, that too by reservations alone”.34 Thus it is argued that land reforms, 
educational facilities, libraries and other distributive measures with obvious material 
benefits would be of greater benefit. The attraction of reservations despite their limited 
effectiveness in addressing poverty is explained by their use as a populist measure that 
enable political parties to secure the votes of marginalized castes.35 As a substitute for 
more substantive measures, the reservation framework is held responsible for the failure 
of the state to undertake the massive program of redistribution that would actually be 
required to tackle historically accumulated disadvantage.36  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Galanter, Competing Equalities; Ghosh, “Positive Discrimination in India: A Political 
Analysis,” 138-145; Hasan, The Politics of Inclusion, 41-78. The literature also notes the 
difficulty in obtaining information on implementation and thus making definitive 
conclusions about the policy’s effectiveness. 	  
33 Galanter, Competing Equalities, 551; Sachidananda, “Rethinking Scheduled Caste 
Reservation,” 35.	  
34 Ghosh, “Positive Discrimination in India: A Political Analysis,” 161.	  
35 Ibid.; P.C Chatterji, “Reservation: Theory and Practice”; Sunita Parikh, The Politics of 
Preference: Democratic Institutions and Affirmative Action in the United States and 
India (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1997); Bhiku Parekh, “Limits of the Indian 
Political Imagination,” in Political Ideas in Modern India: Thematic Explorations, ed. 
Vrajendra Raj Mehta and Thomas Pantham (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), 437- 
459. 	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My dissertation departs from the problematic of individual equality versus group 
recognition as well as the focus on policy evaluation. The Indian Constitution guaranteed 
the rights to protection of religio-cultural difference and representation for marginalized 
groups decades before liberalism’s prioritization of the individual was challenged in 
North America and Europe. However, theoretical debates continue to be predominantly 
informed by the experiences of these latter contexts. In particular, by the political 
mobilizations that linked rights claims to forms of identity such as gender, sexuality and 
race. These claims underlined that liberal theories of justice failed to recognize how 
group difference structures relations of power and inequality.37 Coinciding with the 
adoption of the policies and values of multiculturalism by nation-states such as Canada 
and the UK, liberal theorists also affirmed group differences as valuable in and of 
themselves, framing the right to culture as an expression of individual freedom.38 Within 
such frameworks, the analysis and re-interpretation of liberalism’s normative principles is 
directed towards justifications for minority rights given the established primacy of the 
individual in these contexts. Thus, as Jayal argues, a key concern arising in the 
framework of individual equality versus group difference is the potential for the 
entrenchment and hardening of minority identities, which is seen as threatening to 
national integration39. In other words, the debates address minority rights in terms of their 
potential deviance and harmful impact on the social fabric. This overlooks the possibility 
for minority and historically stigmatized groups to challenge the exclusionary terms of 
nationhood and articulate inclusion differently. Further, it forecloses the question of how 
privileged identities, naturalized as “mainstream” or “unmarked”, can be hardened in 
response to assertions of difference.  
My interest is in delineating these dual processes in relation to the trajectory of 
reservation policy. For this kind of inquiry, the issue of justification is less important than 
understanding the power relations that structure the terrain of reservation debates. While 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990).  38	  Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991).  39	  	  Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents: An Indian History (Ranikhet: 
Permanent Black, 2013), 202.	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the group differentiated framework of rights in the Indian Constitution recognizes the 
historical marginalization of certain social groups, it is not often acknowledged that 
public debates about group rights are characterized by the near complete absence of 
Dalits and other marginalized castes in the mainstream media. In an incisive critique of 
the academic-bureaucratic framework in which reservation debates unfold, Tharu et al 
argue that a focus on policy evaluation further reinforces these exclusions. As the 
question of the right policy measures is already assumed to be the shared ground on 
which to stage the debate, the actual beneficiaries of reservation are assumed to be 
“passively available for slotting into various objectively defined categories of deprivation 
and eligibility.”40 The implications of this are seen in the lack of focused engagement 
with the issues of caste-based oppression and discrimination, which I argue is enabled 
through a conflation of the purpose of the policy in dominant discourses. The former 
issues are obfuscated through the presentation of a proliferating list of factors. Based on 
refinements and generalizations of the Indian discourse, Galanter identifies twelve 
different indicators that are used in assessing the policy, from more jobs, better housing 
and better treatment of SCs by government officials, to social integration and 
secularism.41 As such, my project interrogates how specific modes of assessment both 
enable the exclusion of Dalit perspectives and frame Dalit political claims as illegitimate, 
which then inform the ways in which claims of other groups are received. I pursue this 
objective by attending to the emotional and affective registers of the debate.  
 My dissertation illustrates how assessments of reservation are framed in affective 
and emotional terms, and thus, work to re-produce a social imaginary in which 
marginalized castes are portrayed as inferior subjects. My approach is informed by 
Elizabeth Povinelli’s analysis of liberal multiculturalism in Australia. Taking Australia as 
an example of the “liberal diaspora”, Povinelli examines how liberal discourses and 
identifications are elaborated in postcolonial worlds. Specifically, how the liberal 
aspiration for a society based on rational, mutual understanding informs assessments of 
indigenous claims to material compensation for colonial violence. Importantly, Povinelli 
argues that affective investments in this aspiration produce a social imaginary in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  “Reservations and the Return to Politics.” 41	  Competing Equalities, 81. 
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“certain violences appear incidental to a social system rather than generated by it.”42 
Departing from accounts of group recognition which unfold in conversation with an 
existing set of liberal principles, this approach focuses on the role of affect, feelings and 
sensibility – that which cannot be articulated in the parameters of rational discourse – to 
show the irresolvable tensions within settler colonial national institutions.  This reveals 
how celebratory national narratives in which a history of racism and genocide is relegated 
to a shameful past continue to be inflected by the conditional – the recognition of 
subaltern claims is dependent on expectations that subaltern groups act and identify in 
certain ways.43  
Drawing from Povinelli, I highlight how anecdotes, axioms and assumptions 
naturalized as truth are used in the construction of arguments in dominant discourses 
about reservation. This reveals an enduring tension between, on the one hand, the 
recognition of reservation policy as evidence of the substantive commitment to justice for 
historically oppressed groups and on the other, its ongoing identification as a highly 
contentious, emotionally charged and unresolved issue. This paradoxical status indicates 
that in certain contexts the aim of public debate is “not to understand, let alone agree, but 
to sequester some inexpressible felt-thing from reflexive judgment.”44 My contention is 
that this “inexpressible felt-thing” registers an entrenched resentment towards the 
existence of reservation policy, which is implicated in the re-production of caste privilege 
and prejudice.  
 I trace the operation of affect in debates about caste, minorities and reservation in 
three ways. First, how claims about and against reservation come to be articulated as 
claims in defense of the nation through the mobilization of particular emotions. As my 
reading of the Constituent Assembly debates in Chapter 1 shows, members described the 
inclusion of reservations in the Constitution as an unfortunate concession that violated 
their moral sense. For Assembly members to accept the provision, it had to be re-framed 
as a sign of the generosity of the (Hindu) “majority community”, a sign of their 
willingness to sacrifice their moral convictions to integrate politically inadequate “others” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Cunning of Recognition, 7. 43	  Ibid., 17 44	  Ibid., 16 
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into the nation. This framing of reservation as an exercise in tolerance served to 
naturalize the caste privilege held by subjects that claimed to speak on behalf of the 
nation.  As I discuss in Chapter 2, representations of the middle class Dalit subject 
function as a site in which the limits to the tolerance of upper castes is staged. At this 
limit, tolerance is transformed into justified resentment of a class of Dalits whose 
attachment to quotas hinders national progress. Among scholars and journalists, 
resentment is described as an inevitable consequence of admitting unqualified candidates 
into universities and government service; the presence of “quota candidates” 
compromises the quality and standards of these institutions. Indeed, the violent rage of 
upper caste students who protested against the Mandal Commission Report, which is the 
subject of Chapter 3, was justified in the media as a defense of the values of the anti-
colonial nationalist movement.  
 Second, drawing upon Sara Ahmed’s work on the cultural politics of emotion, I 
consider how “emotionality is produced as a claim about a subject or a collective through 
relations of power.”45 Ahmed notes that while emotion has been viewed as beneath the 
faculties of thought and reason, the hierarchy between emotion and reason also gets 
displaced onto a hierarchy between emotions; while some are elevated as signs of 
cultivation, others remain lower as signs of weakness, frustrating the formation of the 
competent self.46 As I discuss in Chapter 1, members of the Constituent Assembly 
grounded their opposition to reservation in a sense of concern for the kinds of affective 
dispositions they would produce among the recipients. Specifically, quotas would 
produce feelings of difference from and mistrust of the Hindu majority among Scheduled 
Castes and Muslims, thereby preventing their emotional integration into the nation. 
Chapters 2 and 3 highlight the portrayal of SCs and OBCs as irrationally attached to 
quotas and thus to parochial identities. Similarly, Chapter 4 explores the production of an 
explanatory discourse that describes inequality among Muslims as the result of an 
emotional resistance to Indian citizenship. Thus constituting the community as an 
affective formation of fear and anxiety, the issue of discrimination is deflected and 
Muslim marginalization is framed as an “internal” problem. Against these infantilizing 	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claims, Dalit writers and activists have underscored the significance of affective work in 
their struggles to challenge power relations. As discussed in Chapter 2, Dalit literature 
foregrounds the collective experience of caste-based humiliation. Literature is conceived 
as a medium for transforming humiliation into collective anger, a defiant expression of 
political consciousness.  
 Finally, the historical contestations that have shaped post-colonial reservation 
policy come to be expressed in a condensed and visceral form through the repetition of 
certain affective tropes. By interrogating these tropes and connecting them to the histories 
they gesture to, I contribute to understanding the social imaginary that produces, and is 
produced by, the discursive terrain of reservation debates. I draw from Ahmed’s proposal 
for a method of analysis that is attentive to “how metonymy and metaphor work to stick 
different figures together through past histories of association that often work through 
concealment and displacement.47” I will show how meaning is attributed to reservation 
policy through its historical association with the colonial structure of political 
representation, which is identified as responsible for empowering the separatist politics of 
Muslims. Thus, post-colonial reservations are portrayed as an extension of colonial 
policies of divide and rule that led to the devastatingly violent partition of Pakistan and 
India. In this way, reservation policy signifies as a wound that refuses to heal, and 
implicates divisive “others” whose historical propensity to act on narrow self-interest 
continues to threaten the nation-state. Such arguments were pervasive in the Constituent 
Assembly Debates and continued to animate anti-reservation arguments during the 
Mandal Commission controversy in the early 1990s. These claims are historically 
associated to and re-produce a social imaginary in which anti-caste and minority politics 
signify as antithetical to anti-colonial nationalism. The anger generated against the quota 
as a threat to the nation-state conceals its historical relation to the portrayal of anti-caste 
politics as divisive and threatening to the national (Hindu) majority by the anti-colonial 
nationalist movement. As Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate, these mobilizations of memory 
have been countered in the historical writings of lower caste Hindus and Muslims. Their 
interventions reveal the historical contestations over the meaning of reservations, in 
particular as an expression of claims to power and representation. These meanings are de-	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legitimized in dominant discourses through the association of group representation with 
the colonial state.  
  In their respective texts, Povinelli and Ahmed engage affect to illuminate the 
politics of race and multiculturalism in settler colonial nation-states. The relevance of 
their research for this project indicates the need to counter the treatment of race and caste 
as distinct analytical objects. Caste is often assumed to be a form of power that is 
exceptional to South Asia. It is described as a social category to differentiate it from the 
purportedly physical, biological basis of racial categories.48 This neglects the significant 
historical connections between struggles against racism in the US and those against caste 
discrimination in India. These include the use of race/caste analogies to theorize 
oppression in both contexts, expressions of trans-border solidarity, and the drawing of 
inspiration for visions of social justice. Recent scholarship on these themes underscores 
the affective dimensions of trans-national solidarity in catalyzing resistance to a 
hierarchically ordered world system, and the nuanced understandings of the affective 
experience of social discrimination that emerge from comparative studies of race and 
caste.49 My dissertation contributes to these debates through a different vantage point for 
comparative analysis. Namely, how national narratives premised on the transcendence of 
a shameful history of discrimination and violence are deployed to trivialize the 
experiences of marginalized social groups. In outlining a history of resentment towards 
reservation policy, I show that this mode of feeling is accommodated by and expressed 
through such narratives. Thus, mobilizations of affect act upon and re-produce social 
relations of caste and religion in post-colonial India. Notably, the resentment of quotas is 
linked to discourses that emphasize the relative insignificance of caste in contemporary 
society; caste is a historical relic that only survives in residual pockets. Similarly, anti-
racist scholars in the US have observed that the successful attacks on race-based 
affirmative action programs are part of a discursive context marked by notions of 	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colorblindness and a post-racial America, which announce the transcendence of a history 
of racial inequality.50 In India and the US, it is precisely on the basis of a particular way 
of telling history that attacks on anti-discrimination policies are mounted, producing 
contemptuous figures who “play the race card”, hold onto a “victim mentality” and “fear 
hard work and open competition”. Strangely, these attacks can then be framed not as 
signs of ongoing casteism/racism, but as a confirmation of India and the US as tolerant 
and pluralistic societies. In this conjuncture, methods of analysis that attend to 
expressions of feeling, naturalized assumptions and “common sense” are an important 
intervention to disrupt dominant national narratives.  
Notably, the dismantling of race-based affirmative action in the US, while 
premised on the arrival of a post-racial era, has coincided with intensified Islamophobia 
in the context of the War on Terror. The production of “Muslim” as a racialized category 
through techniques of surveillance and civilizational discourses is connected to the 
historical processes of colonialism in South Asia and the Middle East. However, the 
relationship between Islamophobia and the historical trajectory of anti-black racism 
requires further exploration. My research suggests that we can understand how relations 
of power are both clarified and challenged when differently “othered” social groups are 
discussed in relation to each other. In Chapter 1, I argue that the exclusion of Muslims 
from the reservation framework reveals the problematic grounds of Scheduled Caste 
inclusion. My engagement with Dalit and anti-caste critiques of dominant nationalism in 
subsequent chapters shows that challenges to caste-based power relations urge a re-
thinking of the interrelations between caste and religion. In the Dalit activist literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3, the aggressive othering of Muslims by Hindu right wing parties 
was squarely identified as a desperate upper caste response to the political assertion of 
historically marginalized castes. As I discuss in Chapter 4, lower caste Muslim activism 
has generated alternative readings of the history of Indian Muslims and in turn, 
challenged the assumption that religion is the principal marker of difference in the nation-
state. While the contemporary construction of Muslims as deviant and irreducibly 
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different in both India and the US is connected to longer histories of colonial domination, 
my dissertation suggests the need to explore the intersecting histories and experiences of 
differently unequal social groups.  
 
Caste and Knowledge Production: Hierarchy, Difference, Inequality   
 Within and beyond India, Orientalist discourses continue to heavily influence 
popular understandings of caste as an essentially religious hierarchy and a marker of 
South Asian exceptionalism. This perception gained credibility with the publication of 
Homo Hierarchicus by French anthropologist Louis Dumont in 1970. Dumont’s 
objective was to study the systematic properties of the ideology of the caste system. He 
argued that the organizing principle of caste was hierarchy. This was a difficult concept 
to grasp for scholars in modern egalitarian societies and even for much of the Indian 
intelligentsia brought up in the European tradition.51 Dumont defined hierarchy as the 
principle by which elements of a whole are ranked in relation to that whole. In India, 
hierarchy was purely a matter of religious values.52 It was linked with the opposition 
between the pure and impure. In order to understand how religious hierarchy structured 
power, it was necessary to link the principle of purity with the classical theory of the 
varnas. That is, the division of society into four unequal, stratified groups outlined in 
Hindu scriptures.53 The Brahmin, ritually the purest in terms of both his profession and 
practices, stood at the apex of this system with each succeeding caste ranked in 
accordance with the degree of purity in relation to the Brahmin. Caste hierarchy required 
differential treatment of the varnas, the separation of the pure and the impure, and the 
subordination of power to status. Thus the secular power of kings was subordinate to the 
ritually pure status of the Brahmins. However, they were also united in their opposition to 
other “impure” castes constitutive of society. In submitting to priesthood, royalty shared 
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in it.54 Dumont prioritized the scriptural categories of varna over those of jati, a much 
more complex order of hundreds of castes and sub-castes organized by hereditary 
occupation and endogamy. The varna model was preferred for its universal acceptance 
throughout India, which could facilitate the comparison between regions.55 While 
allowing for regional variations in status rankings and discrepancies between ideology 
and observable practices, Dumont maintained the essential characteristic of the system 
was the subordination of power to status. Conceptualizing caste as stable and 
ideologically self-sustaining, he placed it at the center of Hindu social life.    
Since the 1980s Dumont’s totalizing conception of caste as religious hierarchy 
has been challenged by scholarship on caste politics in post-colonial India. This 
scholarship emphasizes the variability and fluidity of caste identities and their 
deployment in modern institutions to demonstrate that there is no consistent hierarchical 
caste ordering in Indian society. Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma propose that a post-
Dumontian approach should treat caste as a system of action that is flexible and mutable 
– something which people “do” rather than something which they “are.”56 Mitra’s 
contribution to the same volume makes a case for an instrumentalist view of caste to 
replace Dumont’s essentialist view. That is, caste as a resource that political actors use in 
order to negotiate their status, wealth and power.57 Mitra argues that this view will enable 
us to see caste as a vehicle for communities to participate in the political process after 
1947. Disconnected from its religious roots, the consciousness of caste has become 
purely formal, “a badge of politically convenient self-classification to be manipulated and 
waved when necessary.”58 As the market economy, modern administration and expanded 
communication networks have eroded the traditional hierarchy premised on purity and 
pollution, ritual status and social status can be considered as separate issues. Stressing the 
variability of caste identification, Shah notes that the same person will identify differently 
in the context of marriage and kinship, in economic interactions and for political 	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purposes.59 Indeed, even the association of stigma with ritually impure identities appears 
to be eroding. For example, the mobilization of groups to be recognized as “backward 
classes” for the purposes of affirmative action suggests that economic considerations 
have gained priority over concerns about being perceived as “lower caste.”60 In light of 
these socio-political processes the contemporary political landscape has been conceived 
as one of a plethora of assertive caste identities, each privileging an angular hierarchy of 
its own. According to Gupta, in his argument that all castes lined up neatly behind the 
Brahmin in complete ideological concordance, Dumont failed to see how each caste had 
deep pockets of ideological inheritance from which it could draw continuous symbolic 
energy for both political activism and economic competition.61 The most important 
refutation of Dumont’s argument about the essential supremacy of status that ensured 
Brahmin dominance is found in the powerful assertions of Dalits since the 1990s.62 
Accordingly, scholarly inquiries have shifted from the question of how to conceptualize 
caste as an overarching system to the conditions and modes of its existence. This has 
contributed to understanding how the politicization of caste identities has influenced 
processes of democratization after 1947.63  
Studies of the multiple uses and deployments of caste in the modern nation-state 
emphasize its political functions in order to undermine the totalizing religious view. 
However, Dumont’s framework has been critiqued in a different way in scholarship 
concerned with caste, knowledge production and the colonial encounter. Whereas the 
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arguments reviewed above seek to correct the distortions produced by the assumption of 
ritualistic hierarchy as essential to caste, this scholarship examines how such distortions 
were produced during colonial rule and the specific purposes that they served. In his 
seminal work on these questions, Nicholas Dirks argues that caste as we now know it is 
not a survival of ancient India but a specifically colonial form of civil society.64 That is, 
the configuration of caste as an encompassing social system that organized India’s 
diverse forms of social identity and community occurred in the context of colonial rule. 
Moreover, this configuration of caste was dependent on the constitution of Hinduism as a 
systematic, confessional, all-embracing religious identity.65 The production of caste as a 
modern category of identification and governance served a variety of the colonial state’s 
economic and political interests. Under the authority of the British East India Company 
the collection of revenue was of primary interest in establishing the village as the basic 
unit of administration.66 In turn, principles were needed for ordering that society without 
reference to political structures larger than the village. These were provided by Hindu law 
codes and caste prescriptions in consultation with native authorities on religious texts, 
namely the Brahmins. With the shift from Company to Crown rule after 1857, caste and 
religion became the basis upon which the relationship between the colonizer and the 
colonized was elaborated. On the one hand, the state maintained a policy of non-
interference in matters of native religion and customary practices. On the other, colonial 
knowledge about Indian society as comprised of antagonistic caste and religious groups 
informed policies for the inclusion of natives in structures of governance. Bernard Cohn 
argues that alongside the development of anti-colonial nationalism in the late nineteenth 
century, colonial rule became explicitly premised on the theory that India was a land of 
groups (castes), races, languages, religions, communities and interests that would lead 
inevitably to a Hobbesian war of all against all if it were not for the strong but even-
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handed rule of the British.67 Although colonial administrators and ethnographers debated 
about the precise origins and nature of the caste system and what methods would 
accurately identify and rank different caste groups, there was an overarching sense that 
the existence of caste proved the impossibility of nationhood in India.68  
By and large inquiries into the ways in which caste mediates democratic 
processes, struggles for equality and the politics of difference in post-colonial India and 
epistemological concerns about the modern production of caste through the colonial 
archive are distinct trajectories of scholarship. Within the former, scholars have 
questioned the usefulness of the “colonial invention of caste thesis” for understanding 
contemporary socio-political transformations, pointing to some problematic implications. 
For example, that the emphasis on the colonial context minimizes the devastating 
experiences of caste violence ongoing in India, and denies the agency of Indians in their 
own history.69 It has been argued that the focus on the colonial obsession with caste is 
implicitly protective of the present order and lacking sympathy with the struggles of 
subordinated communities.70 Moreover, the theoretical position is uncomfortably close to 
contemporary Hindu rhetoric, which by appropriating the polemics of nationalism, argues 
that caste arose from the pernicious British policy of divide and rule.71 To be sure, these 
critiques are not claiming the irrelevance of colonialism in shaping the social relations of 
caste. The concern is that the prioritization of the critique of colonial power comes at the 
expense of other kinds of inquiries, and reduces caste to an effect of colonial 
governmentality.72  
Reservation policy provides a rich site for the exploration of the persistence of 
colonial categories of classification in the nation-state. Public debates continually return 
to the unresolved nature of the key concepts at stake. They ask, what is a caste? What is 
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discrimination? Can these terms be rendered quantifiable and objective? Can a 
representative framework devised by the colonial state be repurposed towards more 
progressive objectives in the nation-state? In this way, the debates constitute a site in 
which the varied consequences of colonial rule are reflected upon. Going beyond the 
question of how colonial forms of knowledge persist in the nation-state, they show how 
colonial history itself is produced as an object of knowledge. However, Srirupa Roy 
argues that post-colonial theory has been limited by its lack of attention to the political 
and institutional dynamics of post-coloniality as a historically specific, contextual project 
of establishing a sovereign nation-state73. This is seen in the post-colonial approach to 
caste, where the representation of caste as an all-encompassing religious hierarchy based 
on ritual purity and pollution has been connected to the nexus of colonial 
knowledge/power, however, the epistemological analysis has not been engaged to 
demonstrate how caste informs practices, subjectivities and relations of power in the 
context of nation-state formation. My dissertation illustrates that an engagement between 
studies of colonial knowledge/power and post-colonial caste politics contributes to 
understanding caste privilege. I extend the critique of Orientalist representations of caste 
as totalizing, essentialist and static to the question of how privilege and prejudice are re-
produced and transformed in the nation-state. That is, how is upper-caste subjectivity re-
produced in the absence of the ritual hierarchy previously assumed to be central to 
understanding the caste order? To address this question I attend to the secular forms of 
knowledge that are available to these subjects in the naturalization of historical privilege.    
In contrast to the colonial pre-occupation with caste as essential to understanding 
and ruling Indian society, the relationship of the post-colonial elite to caste has been one 
of disavowal.74 Therefore, production of knowledge about caste has focused on how it 
continues to produce structures of exclusion, violence and discrimination. This is an 
important disruption to the disavowal through which an unmarked upper caste middle 
class subjectivity is constituted. However, this focus also has the effect of limiting studies 	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of caste in modern India to studies of “lower castes”, thus foreclosing questions about 
how “caste also privileges and includes certain subject positions”.75 Ramesh Bairy 
suggests that the starting point for such an inquiry is to recognize that for “upper castes” 
the only acceptable way of public presentation of the self was/is in terms of rendering 
one’s caste location as insignificant in one’s public deliberations and enactments, leading 
to the domestication and privatization of caste.76 As such, caste prejudice and 
discrimination persist despite the general illegitimacy accorded to these practices through 
state strictures and by public disavowal of casteism in popular life.77  My dissertation 
foregrounds how upper caste elites denounce caste based reservations as a damaging 
legacy of the colonial state and its forms of knowledge, and simultaneously, rely upon 
colonial discourses about caste society as static, pre-modern and antithetical to 
nationhood in order to represent themselves as unmarked caste-less citizens. Specifically, 
this colonial coneptualization of caste underpins the representation of Scheduled Castes 
and OBCs in dominant discourses about reservation. These subjects are variously 
represented as deeply invested in irrational caste rituals, upholding discriminatory 
practices of segregation and untouchability amongst themselves and the main perpetrators 
of caste violence in rural India. Taken together, “lower castes” are represented as the 
principal agents of contemporary casteism in the modern nation-state and thus, 
fundamentally incapable of self-transformation. By foregrounding the essential, 
antagonistic differences between different lower castes, the historical and ongoing 
struggles of Dalit and anti-caste movements to forge political consciousness among 
marginalized groups and articulate an expansive conception of community in non-caste, 
non-religious terms are rejected as an impossibility. These discourses buttress the claim 
that caste mobilization as expressed in quota politics is a distraction from the real issues 
of poverty and education, to which the unmarked subject is committed. Colonial 	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discourses about the native as incarcerated to his place and confined to his mode of 
thought78, combined with the idioms of national development - uplifting the poor, 
empowering the backward masses – are secular resources through which upper caste 
privilege is naturalized in the figure of the casteless citizen whose opposition to 
reservation is for the general welfare of the impoverished population. Consequently, 
questions about the caste based distribution of power, resources and privileges raised by 
Dalit activists are marginalized from public debate.  
By bringing the post-colonial epistemological critique to bear on how “lower 
castes” are represented in dominant discourses which are decidedly secular in orientation, 
I contribute to understanding how the processes of nation-state formation generate 
distinct pressures on the meanings of caste and community, simultaneously working with 
and working over colonial forms of knowledge. In addition to illustrating the connections 
between colonialism and nationalism, this requires explicating the specific interests and 
anxieties that are maintained through unequal relations of knowledge production. The 
thrust of critical scholarship drawing from Edward Said’s Orientalism has been to 
interrogate the ways in which colonial epistemology upholds Western domination of non-
Western bodies and spaces. As my study shows that dominant ways of knowing and 
speaking about caste in reservation debates persist in spite of the challenges posed by 
Dalit and anti-caste critique, it requires a different vantage point. For this, I draw from 
Lati Mani’s observation that the “West” as ideological and political presence articulates 
with such a density of indigenous institutions, discourses, histories and practices that its 
identity as Western is refracted and not always salient.79 David Ludden’s problematic of 
the epistemological detachment of Orientalism from colonialism is instructive in this 
regard. In the essay “Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowledge”, 
Ludden defines Orientalist knowledge as   
a venerable set of factualized statements about the Orient, which was established 
with authorized data and research techniques and which had become so widely 	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accepted as true, so saturated with excess plausibility that it determines the 
content of assumptions on which theory and inference can be built.80  
This definition suggests that the reproduction of Orientalist knowledge has also 
transformed its meanings and composition over time. Ludden reminds us that even the 
most instrumental knowledge produced to serve colonial rule was produced under the 
rubric of objective science, its methodologies authorized by scientific standards of the 
day. The development of methodologies was historically shaped by the political objective 
of the East India Company to loosen the grip of Brahmins, the most influential native 
informants, on legal and religious knowledge.81 Due to colonial skepticism about the 
objectivity of native informants, the key sources of empirically sound and useful 
knowledge were assumed to be texts and direct observation by colonial ethnographers. 
While the enduring representations of non-Western societies as primitive, stagnant and 
irrational are a significant consequence of colonial knowledge practices, Ludden points to 
another consequence, namely, the expanding scope of empiricism. Empiricism enabled 
Orientalist knowledge to serve diverse political purposes and receive new sustenance 
from many quarters.82 Thus, he argues that it is in nationalism that we find the vitality of 
Orientalism today. Nationalism has appropriated the positivist logic of Orientalism that 
assumes there is a true, authentic image of India and Indian tradition, which signify the 
unity, autonomy and permanence of Indian nationhood.83 Like the colonial state, the 
government of India represents itself as an impartial protector of all people, standing 
above conflicts between communities and deploying science for modernization and 
development.  
This intervention serves as an important reminder that while one aspect of the 
modern production of caste in colonial knowledge was its representation as a marker of 
stagnation and irrationality, another was the assumption that categories like caste could 
be understood objectively and systematically – in other words, independent of competing 
interpretations and divergent experiences. I show that this latter aspect of knowledge 
production has shaped debates about reservation in two ways.  First, in the ongoing quest 	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for objective and reliable data about caste and the forms of disadvantage that it generates 
among different groups in Indian society. This is part of a broader concern to replace the 
subjective, politicized nature of caste with objective indicators of inequality in policy 
making. The desire for a primarily (if not solely) economic conceptualization of 
inequality is articulated as a means to increase the efficiency of the policy by ensuring 
those most in need will benefit, and to reduce the threat that divisive caste identities pose 
to national integration.  Second, and somewhat paradoxically, the Orientalist assumption 
that caste is a fundamentally Hindu social institution justifies the non-recognition of 
Muslim and Christian Dalits as subject to untouchablity, resulting in their exclusion from 
Scheduled Caste status. The validity of their experiences of caste discrimination in non-
Hindu communities is subordinated in judicial rulings and popular discourse to the 
authority of Islamic and Christian religious texts which do not sanction caste. In both 
cases, the search for legitimate beneficiaries of reservation is conducted without reference 
to different interpretations of social justice, or to the ways in which Dalits understand 
caste. The procedure is over-determined by an epistemological structure in which 
particular kinds of statistical and textual knowledge – human development indicators and 
non-Hindu religious scriptures – are privileged in arriving at certain truths.  In this way, 
scholars, politicians, judges and policy makers in post-colonial India continue the 
unfinished work of colonial ethnographers and administrators who sought to build a 
uniform system of classification for caste, even as they denounce the existence of caste 
categories as preventing identification with the nation. Indeed, the expression of anxiety 
about the damaging effects of reservations on the nation presupposes the essential 
permanence of the nation. In the following section I provide a historical overview of the 
efforts to define caste objectively during colonial rule and their relation to the growth of 
anti-caste politics in that context.  
 
Caste, Colonialism and Anti-Caste Politics  
Colonial knowledge practices in India reflected the deeply held belief among 
British officials that caste and religion were the sociological keys to understanding the 
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Indian people.84 Of particular significance for the collection of information on caste and 
religion was the institution of the census, which was the most wide-ranging and detailed 
examination into native life and organized this information into discrete categories that 
could be utilized for governance. Census reports formalized the meaning of religion as a 
community comprising individuals bound to a stable definition. Colonial knowledge 
worked to fix practices that were often fluid between communities and overrule the 
indeterminate beliefs by which many people chose to live their lives.85 It was through this 
transformation in the meaning of religious community that caste became a single term 
capable of expressing and organizing India’s diverse forms of social identity and 
community. Caste was configured as an encompassing Indian social system in relation to 
the constitution of “Hinduism” as a systematic, all-embracing religious identity.86 In this 
way, the complexity and dynamism of social relations was obscured in order to situate 
the colonized on an evaluative scale of civilizational progress that highlighted their 
fundamental inferiority to the West.87 The resulting representation of native society as 
infinitely divided into antagonistic castes and religions legitimized the presence of the 
colonial administration as a neutral arbitrator of competing interests.  
The Orientalist perception of caste as a marker of the fundamentally religious and 
group-based nature of Indian society upheld what Chatterjee has described as the “rule of 
colonial difference”: the representation of the colonized as radically Other, which 
legitimized the infinite deferral of the possibility of self-governance.88 There was 
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considerably less certainty about the specific meaning of caste as a category for 
classifying the population.  Many census officials aimed to organize the extremely 
diverse social identities across India according to the four hierarchical categories of varna 
as defined in Hindu religious texts.89 It was assumed that the thousands of communities 
defined by jati/hereditary occupation – status in the division of labor - could be classified 
in terms of their scriptural status. In their attempts to develop a uniform system of 
classification census officials relied almost entirely on upper caste religious leaders and 
scholars who reaffirmed the authority of sacred textual knowledge in determining the 
content of caste categories. The colonial and upper caste views thus aligned in their 
understanding of caste as an essentially religious institution defined by ritual practices 
and scriptural authority. The varna model was also accorded a scientific basis through the 
application of race theory. Using anthropometry, cranial measurements were used to 
classify castes and tribes based on race and prove the existence of racial difference 
between northern and southern Indians and between high castes and low castes.90 Thus 
scientific evidence strengthened the belief in hierarchy according to varna and the 
immutability of caste. However, officials were often frustrated by the way statistical data 
revealed the importance of subcaste groupings, “producing a relentless proliferation of 
caste groups and impeding efforts to collapse titles into single groups”.91 Census officials 
questioned the categorization of “untouchables” as Hindus because as “outcastes” they 
remined outside of the four scriptural categories of varna hierarchy. The Commissioner 
of the 1911 Census suggested that untouchables be enumerated separately under the 
category “Depressed Classes”. In this way, shifts in colonial perceptions about caste over 
time also came into conflict with upper caste interests.  
Census operations became a crucial factor in the increased conflict and 
contestation between caste groups in the first decades of the 20th century.92 Communities 
classified as the Shudras/laboring castes of the varna hierarchy challenged their 
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categorization according to colonial and upper caste perceptions. The institution of the 
census gave rise to thousands of petitions filed by such communities that claimed a 
higher social status within the caste hierarchy. This process led to the formation of 
numerous caste based associations and the production of historical knowledge in support 
of the petitions, thus politicizing caste identities in novel ways. Apart from the fact that 
groups felt it necessary to negotiate a higher ranking to avoid discrimination, caste-wise 
inventory of the population underlined the huge discrepancy between numbers and 
privilege as it made groups aware of their numerical strength.93 For example, it was seen 
that “in Madras Presidency Brahmins comprising barely three percent of the population 
occupied more than 80 percent of administrative posts, while in the princely state of 
Mysore they monopolized all the jobs”.94 Western and Southern India, where Brahmin 
representation far exceeded its numerical proportion, were the first regions to see the 
growth of non-Brahmin movements aiming to challenge this dominance. Colonial 
knowledge projects generated news sets of questions and political projects among the 
colonized that variously re-produced and challenged Orientalist representations of their 
societies. Due to the complicated process of adjudicating the claims of thousands of 
groups for higher status in the census the administration ceased collecting data on caste 
after 1931.  
The politics of caste shaped and were shaped by, shifts in colonial governance, 
the development of nationalism and the rise of anti-caste movements and political 
thought. M.S.S. Pandian argues that the historical conditions of colonialism facilitated the 
emergence of two competing modes of talking about caste, which continue to shape the 
post-colonial public sphere.95 In the first mode caste is spoken of by other means, while 
the second mode talks of caste explicitly and on its own terms. The former is achieved 
through a process of transcoding caste and caste relations into something else. 
Transcoding is an act of acknowledging and disavowing caste at once.96 Pandian traces 
its development to the political-discursive arena of dominant anti-colonial nationalism, 
specifically, its designation of the domain of culture/spirituality as sovereign. What 	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becomes encoded as the national culture uncolonized by the West is the culture of 
Brahmins and upper castes. Thus, the very domain of sovereignty that nationalism carves 
out in the face of colonial domination is simultaneously a domain of enforcing 
domination over the subaltern social groups such as lower castes, women and marginal 
linguistic regions by the national elite.97 Not only are the diverse cultures of these groups 
excluded from the category of the nation, the notion of caste inequality and 
discrimination becomes defined as a cultural matter and thus excluded from the public 
sphere. The second mode of speaking about caste, on its own terms as a system of 
exploitation and domination, emerged among Dalit and non-Brahmin communities. In 
response to the opportunities for education opened up by colonial rule a class of 
intellectuals formed among marginalized castes, most prominently, Jyotirao Phule (1827-
1890) and Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956). Phule inaugurated a new 
discourse and understanding of Indian history from the viewpoint of the Shudra and Ati-
Shudra (Dalit) peasantry.98  An analysis of the interdependence of caste and gender 
oppression in the maintenance of Brahminical rule grounded Phule’s political thought 
and the activities of his radical organization the Satyashodak Samaj (Society of Truth 
Seekers), established in 1873. Rege describes the Satyashodak Samaj as a discursive 
arena in which members of the Shudra and Ati-Shudra castes formulated and circulated 
counter discourses on the importance of education, the situation of the peasantry and 
women, and their exploitation by moneylenders and Brahmins, thus facilitating the 
development of a distinct counter public in colonial Maharashtra.99 As Pandian points 
out, the efforts of anti-caste leaders like Phule and Ambedkar can be read as an effort to 
unsettle the boundaries between the spiritual and the material, the very boundaries upon 
which dominant nationalism defined itself. It is important to stress that marginalized 
groups were not simply excluded or rendered invisible in the political discourse of 	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dominant upper caste nationalism. As the former challenged the claim of upper castes to 
represent the nation, they were actively delegitimized as collaborators with British 
imperialism. This mode of representing “lower caste” political subjectivity persists in 
post-colonial anti-reservation discourse which positions the beneficiaries of quotas as 
perpetuating colonial tactics of divide and rule.  
In the early 20th century the colonial government established representative 
structures to facilitate the partial inclusion of natives in politics. In line with the view of 
Indian society as comprised of distinct antagonistic communities, a system of separate 
electorates was devised.  This system allocated seats in legislatures for the representation 
of community interests, thus naturalizing the categories of majority and minority based 
on religion. During negotiations for these political reforms Muslim elites voiced concern 
over the loss of their former preeminence due to British colonialism. This sense of 
community decline was compounded by official statistics that revealed the greater 
representation of (upper caste) Hindus in modern education and employment. Hence it 
was argued that the interests of Muslims as a historically and politically significant 
minority must be safeguarded in the legislatures through reserved seats and the principle 
of weightage. This principle ensured a percentage of seats greater than their proportion of 
the population, signifying that the importance of the community was in excess of their 
demographic status as minority. The acceptance of these demands in 1909 categorized 
Muslims as a politically significant minority and in turn, “normalized Hindus as a 
distinctive religious community and numerical majority liable to dwarf any electoral 
grouping”.100 In the politics of number and representation unleashed by this governance 
structure, the status of “untouchable” communities gained political significance. It is in 
this context that the notion of Hindus as a numerical majority became dependent on the 
religious categorization of “untouchable” communities. As census reports revealed that 
the latter comprised a significant portion of India’s population, upper caste Hindus began 
to assert that they belonged to the Hindu community.101 This claim was buttressed by the 
adoption of social reform programs aimed at changing Hindu religious practices that 
sanctioned the social segregation and ritual untouchability of Depressed Classes. In 1917 	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the Indian National Congress reversed its earlier stance that social reform be excluded 
from the political agenda and passed a resolution calling upon the people to remove “all 
disabilities imposed by custom upon the Depressed Classes, the disabilities being of a 
most vexatious and oppressive character.”102 Public recognition of the discriminatory 
practices of caste Hinduism was motivated by instrumental interests in maintaining a 
numerical Hindu majority in a context of increasing politicization of the categories Hindu 
and Muslim.   
Social reform programs were also informed by the epistemological shifts related 
to the colonial encounter. Bernard Cohn has argued that it became imperative for the 
Western educated colonized elite to develop a knowledge of their own past, the form of 
which was couched in Western historical terms but the intent of which was to provide a 
counter rationale to the pressures of Western cultural imperialism.103 These projects of 
historical reconstruction emerged in relation to processes of objectification: the ability of 
intellectuals to stand back and see their culture as a distinct entity, where previously 
culture was embedded in a whole matrix of custom, ritual and textual transmission. The 
political imperative of developing historical knowledge under the conditions of 
colonialism is then linked to questions of reform, whereby aspects of tradition can be 
selected, polished and reformulated for conscious ends.104 Reformist and nationalist 
articulations of the caste problem underlined the ills of untouchability while upholding 
the division of labor based on the varna order as a division based on differential qualities 
and skills.105 Social reform related to untouchability was underpinned by historical 
arguments about caste in the golden age of Hinduism: prior to Muslim and British 
conquest, caste had been a harmonious and complementary system of hereditary 
occupations and it was necessary to restore it to its original religious and cultural form.106 
The reform of abhorrent practices and attitudes towards untouchables was thus linked to 
the development of a Hindu nation and/or social unity. The uplift of untouchables to 	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higher Hindu standards of diet and hygiene and the amelioration of caste hatred under 
Brahmin leadership would unify the community in the nationalist struggle.107  
This historical narrative and conceptualization of caste was countered in anti-caste 
movements and political thought. Beginning with Phule, anti-caste activists framed caste 
hierarchy as a form of exclusion and inequality rather than religious order. By the 1920s, 
their struggle for rights had translated caste into terms such as “public exclusion” and 
“segregation,” described by Rao as secularized terms with expanded political range.108 
Phule’s critique of the caste system countered the nationalist theory of a golden age by 
historicizing caste as an exploitative division of labor imposed on the indigenous 
inhabitants of South Asia, the Shudras (laboring castes) and Atishudras (untouchables) by 
the conquest of Aryan invaders from central Asia, whose descendents were the 
Brahmins.109 The Brahmins imposed their religion and its institution of caste as an 
instrument of social control: “in order to fulfill their plan that those people should remain 
perpetually in slavery…the Brahmins set up the fiction of caste divisions, and made up 
several books on it for their own selfish ends”.110 A key aspect of Phule’s thought was the 
critique and rejection of Brahminical ideology. He critiqued the consolidation of upper 
caste interests due to the dominance of Brahmins in the colonial bureaucracy and the 
colonial state’s exploitation of the peasantry through the appropriation of land and 
imposition of taxes. He emphasized the need for Shudras and Atishudras to forge 
alliances and acquire modern, scientific knowledge as a basis for the formation of a 
common front against Brahmin domination. As Omvedt notes, this was in contrast to 
upper caste efforts to acquire scientific knowledge while maintaining “traditional values” 
under colonial rule, as education for Phule was a weapon to change values and initiate 
cultural revolution.111 Establishing a common historical identity among distinct caste 
groups as indigenous, non-Aryan and resistant to Brahmin conquests over time, Phule 
asserted the right to self-representation of the bahujan samaj (majority community) of the 	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downtrodden and toiling castes, and revalued them as key political actors against alien 
interlopers.112  
The thematic of original inhabitance prominently figured in various anti-caste 
movements during the colonial period. In the 1920s numerous Adi (Original) movements 
that explicitly rejected the identification of untouchables with Hinduism were active in 
Northern and Southern regions.113 Nearly all regionally diverse Dalit movements had 
both an economic and a social thrust: they tried to acquire land for Dalits and freedom 
from caste specific imposed labor, fought for education and tried to generate internal 
social reform, such as marriage between subcastes.114 The autonomous anti-caste position 
crystallized in opposition to upper caste social reformers under the leadership of 
Ambedkar. Like Phule, Ambedkar’s critique of Brahminical domination emphasized the 
immoral sanction of inequality in Hindu texts and the re-invention of the Brahmin subject 
under the conditions of colonial modernity. Countering nationalist and reformist claims 
about the value of divinely ordained duties according to varna, he argued that most 
Brahmins no longer followed the occupation of their ancestors and continually broke 
caste rules on railways journeys and foreign travels. However, they refused to denounce 
caste hierarchy or the sanctity of the Shastras. The Brahmin “breaks caste at one step and 
proceeds to observe it at the next without raising any questions.”115 The selective 
negotiation of caste was meant to enable advancement within colonial institutions. 
However, Brahmins continued to depend on the existence of “lower castes” against 
which superiority could be asserted.    
Ambedkar’s political thought also departed from previous anti-caste leaders. 
Ambedkar did not claim higher status for untouchables, as such claims implied an 
acceptance of upper caste superiority, or that they were pre-Aryan inhabitants. He argued 
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that the status of untouchables was social, not racial, and therefore subject to change.116 
Ambedkar defined the caste system as at once a division of labor and a division of 
laborers. Laborers were unnaturally separated into rigid compartments through a graded 
hierarchy. As caste hierarchy was foundational to Hinduism, Hindu society was merely a 
collection of castes. Caste was a mechanism for withholding sociality, and caste society 
characterized by a lack of associated living: “That is the reason why Hindus cannot be 
said to form a society or nation.”117 In their refusal to work towards the abolition of the 
caste system, upper caste nationalists demonstrated their inability to exercise political 
power in a democratic nation-state. Ambedkar argued that, “democracy is not merely a 
form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint 
communicated experience…it is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence towards 
fellowmen.”118  Democratic social transformation was impossible within the framework 
of Hinduism, howsoever the upper castes attempted to undertake social reforms from 
within. As the annihilation of caste was the only path to an egalitarian society, its 
continued existence in any form implied the political and moral illegitimacy of the nation.  
Confronted with Ambedkar’s unflinching critique of the undemocratic character of 
dominant nationalism, upper castes portrayed him as an ally of the British who upheld the 
colonial view of Indians as unable to constitute a nation.  
Ambedkar “reconceived Dalit activism in terms of democratic thought and action, 
and positioned Dalit disenfranchisement as a complex, experiential structure of 
oppression, exploitation and dehumanization”.119 Caste degradation had to be challenged 
through a struggle for civil rights and the articulation of an alternative political identity.  
Ambedkar’s ideal for the Depressed Classes was to “raise their educational standards so 
that they may know their conditions, have aspirations to rise to the level of the highest 
Hindu and be in a position to use political power as a means to that end.”120 Therefore, he 
advocated a separatist policy accentuating caste distinctions as an initial stage in creating 
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a society in which identities would be unimportant.121 This position was strengthened 
through the organization of campaigns for equal access to public spaces and resources 
through direct nonviolent actions, which were not supported by Gandhi and the Congress. 
In December 1927 public action for equal access to public water sources drew 10,000 
people to the town of Mahad. Here Ambedkar publicly burned the Manusmriti, the book 
of Hindu law prescribing violent maintenance of caste segregation and gender inequality. 
In subsequent actions for equal access to temples, Dalit activists equated temples with 
other enclosed public spaces, such as schools and hostels. Rao argues that this challenged 
the nationalist framing of the temple as an exceptional structure and clarified the basis of 
their claim as the legal principle of equal access.122 The entanglement of the secular and 
the religious in civil rights struggles demonstrates Ambedkar’s commitment to social 
transformation through multiple registers, thereby unsettling the boundaries between 
material and spiritual domains. These campaigns constituted the basis of what was to 
emerge in the 1930s as a distinct Ambedkarite counterpublic. Rege describes these 
counterpublics as adopting a dual strategy. That is, of separate modes of publicity, 
independent institutions, media and organizations, alongside the articulation of claims 
through a rights discourse for access to unmarked public spaces.123 These alternative 
discursive arenas developed alongside and against the dominance of institutionalized 
nationalism represented by the Indian National Congress.  
Gandhi “inherited the Congress position and personalized it by emphasizing the 
caste Hindu’s obligation to the untouchables as the major tenet of his teaching”.124 In his 
first strong public statement on untouchablity Gandhi claimed “Swaraj is as unattainable 
without the removal of the sin of untouchablity as it is without Hindu-Muslim unity.”125  
As Gandhi aimed to bring together divergent interests into a unified opposition to the 
British, it was necessary to pursue social reform without upsetting the social fabric of 
Indian society. Gandhi perceived untouchability as a primarily religious and spiritual 
problem internal to the Hindu community, and described it as a “sinful excresence” that 	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could only be removed through the atonement, self-purification and penance of the caste 
Hindu.126 He referred to untouchables as “Harijans”, or Children of God and asked that 
Hindus accept them within their community in the way they did the Shudras. That is, he 
firmly believed in varnashadharma, the divinely ordained division of society into four 
varnas/categories according to duty. Gandhi argued that “the callings of a Brahmin and a 
scavenger are equal, and their due performance carries equal merit before God”.127 While 
the treatment of untouchables as polluting was reprehensible, they should remain in the 
occupations to which their ancestors had been assigned. In this socio-political vision the 
need for a change of heart among upper castes towards untouchables was prioritized, 
while autonomous leadership and direct political action of the latter was discouraged.128 
Ambedkar opposed Gandhi’s patronizing position that social reforms must take place 
through upper caste leadership and maintain Hindu unity:  
Let me ask those who would change hearts – how much change do you want to 
achieve? If every Hindu, then untouchables will wait forever…No untouchable 
believes that his humanity will be recognized after independence just because 
caste Hindus argue that they can only live up to their humanity then.129 
From this perspective the struggle against caste hierarchy was not a means to something 
else – whether Hindu unity or nationalist solidarity. Rather, it was to achieve dignity and 
self-respect for marginalized caste communities, for which alterations to upper caste 
behavior and the social practices of untouchability were insufficient.  
 The respective approaches of Gandhi and Ambedkar to the problem of 
untouchability have been described in terms of a difference in definition and a difference 
in objective. Gandhi’s definition of untouchability as a spiritual-religious problem 
enabled his prioritization of the objective of self-rule in colonial India. The problem 
required voluntary private action, which would “enable uplifted untouchables and 
repentant Hindus to join together in a purified and redeemed Hinduism”.130 Ambedkar’s 
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expansive definition of untouchability as a political, social and economic structure meant 
that the objective of social justice had to precede political independence. Gandhi’s 
religious approach is thus contrasted with the secular orientation of Ambedkar, seen in 
the emphasis on civil rights, political action and government intervention.131 In a recent 
essay Gopal Guru has introduced the category of experience to interrogate these 
differences in a way that moves beyond the terms of religious versus secular. 132 Guru 
describes Ambedkar’s experience of untouchability as an ontological wound and the 
epistemological source for the production of specific categories of thought: self-respect, 
humiliation, rights and power. In contrast, Gandhi’s engagement with caste and 
untouchability represents an attempt to identify with and speak for the experience of the 
“other”. His distinct modes of thought and the categories he deploys, such as seva 
(service), trusteeship and care, must be situated in relation to this historical-experiential 
problematic. This problem of experience is linked to Gandhi’s definition of the 
movement to eradicate untouchability as one of self-purification and spiritual cleansing. 
According to Nagaraj, this resulted in the glorification of the upper caste reformer in 
confrontation with the Hindu orthodoxy.133 To encourage reform, untouchables had to be 
transformed from objects of disgust and revulsion to objects of pity and sympathy.  In 
this way, Gandhi not only prioritized self-rule/political independence over social justice. 
Rather, he prioritized the ability to empathize with the untouchable over the lived 
experience of untouchability. Thus, the project of spiritual-affective transformation, tied 
to the claim that untouchables undoubtedly “belong” to the Hindu community, is not 
simply aimed at uplifting subjects oppressed by caste hierarchy. Importantly, this project 
is also aimed at establishing the authority to speak for these subjects.  
These conflicting positions were dramatically staged during the Round Table 
Conferences held in London between 1930 and 1932. The conferences were held to 
ascertain Indian opinion on political reforms for a revised imperial constitution, what 
came to be the Government of India Act, 1935. For the first time untouchables were 	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represented separately in political negotiations with the colonial state. Before his 
departure to London Ambedkar told a meeting of the Depressed Classes League, that 
while he agreed with the Congress that no country was good enough to rule over another, 
it is equally true that no class is good enough to rule over another class.134 His submission 
to the Minorities Committee of the Round Table Conferences proposed a scheme of 
political safeguards for Depressed Classes that included the right to elect their own 
representatives by adult suffrage and by separate electorates for the first ten years, 
adequate representation in the services and in the cabinet, protection from discrimination 
through the guarantee of civil rights and means of redress in the case of prejudicial 
treatment. Ambedkar argued that the Depressed Classes constituted a political minority 
due to their subjection to material exploitation and civic exclusion.135 In this way, he 
challenged the colonial conceptualization of minority as a category designating essential 
religious difference. In Rao’s analysis, Ambedkar asserted the primacy of the political to 
oppose preexisting organic definitions of community, which by assimilating Dalits to the 
category Hindu delegitimized their need for separate representation.136 If Hindus, 
Muslims and Depressed Classes were seen as three distinct groups, this disturbed the idea 
that only “fixed permanent communities” existed as political categories137. Political 
safeguards had to be provided before the colonial state transferred its power because 
Hindu majority rule would be the rule of the orthodox. Moreover, the economic 
exploitation to which Depressed Classes were subjected could not be resolved without 
tackling the specific conditions of social discrimination that structured their lives:  
it is not enough to say of their economic condition that they are poverty stricken 
or that they are a class of landless laborers, although both these statements are 
true. It has to be noted that the poverty of the Depressed Classes is due largely to 
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the social prejudices in consequence of which many an occupation for earning a 
living is closed to them.138  
As the representative of the Congress at the Round Table Conference, Gandhi maintained 
that distinct community interests could only be recognized and protected on the basis of 
religious difference. While the Congress had accepted special treatment of the “Hindu-
Muslim-Sikh” tangle, it would not extend this doctrine in any shape or form.139 He 
argued that whereas religious difference was an essential and permanent feature of group 
identity, untouchablity was a difference that had to be transcended through social reform 
and unification of the Hindu community. Ambedkar’s insistence on safeguards for the 
distinct interests of untouchables was thus conflated with the notion of protecting and 
perpetuating the practices of untouchability. The assertion of political subjectivity was 
not only disruptive to the affective constitution of a reformed Hindu community, but the 
political subject was necessarily inadequate and inferior. In Gandhi’s analysis, one of the 
damaging effects of untouchability was the inability of the Depressed Classes to 
understand what their interests were or how to protect them. Gandhi suggested that it was 
because the bitter experiences of untouchablity had “warped” Ambedkar’s judgment and 
saturated his person with such fear and suspicion that he insisted on separate political 
safeguards for the Depressed Classes.140 Therefore Ambedkar was incapable of 
adequately representing their interests and nor could he claim the legitimacy to do so.   
In their settlement on the issue of group representation in August 1932, the British 
accepted Ambedkar’s demand for separate political representation. Referred to as the 
“Communal Award”, the settlement gave Depressed Classes a double vote: the first as 
part of a joint electorate with a portion of constituencies reserved for DC candidates and 
the second as part of a separate electorate in which only DCs could vote. Gandhi 
described the settlement as an “injection of poison that is calculated to destroy Hinduism 
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and do no good whatsoever to the Depressed Classes.”141 He announced his decision to 
go on a perpetual fast until death or until the British withdrew their scheme of separate 
electorates for Depressed Classes. Gandhi explained: 
What I am against is their (Depressed Classes) statutory separation even in a 
limited form, from the Hindu fold… if your decision stands…you arrest the 
marvelous growth of the work of Hindu reformers, who have dedicated 
themselves to the uplift of their suppressed brethren in every walk of life.142 
 Gandhi equated the autonomous anti-caste politics of Ambedkar with the loss of any 
incentive among upper castes to atone for their practice of untouchablity. The conditions 
of violence and exclusion of DCs that Ambedkar sought to foreground as a basis for 
minority status were thus displaced by the suffering of Gandhi for the untouchable, the 
Hindu community and the nation. Significantly, “Gandhi’s fast staked his life on the 
question of tackling untouchability in a particular way and to resist other modes of 
tackling the same question.”143 While the process of upper caste atonement was elevated 
above any other mode of social transformation it was also the most fragile. It was by 
insisting on the significant momentum of this process that Gandhi could state, “I claim 
myself in my own person to represent the vast mass of untouchables…let the whole 
world know today there is a body of Hindu reformers who are pledged to remove this blot 
of untouchability.”144 The fast placed Ambedkar under immense pressure to re-negotiate 
the terms of political representation due to fear of the massive retribution upon DCs in 
the eventuality of Gandhi’s death.145 He accepted the alternative settlement known as the 
Poona Pact, which eliminated separate electorates for DCs and increased the number of 
reserved seats as part of a joint Hindu electorate. In this way, the community was re-
subordinated to the logic of enumeration that made possible the notion of a Hindu 
majority. According to Galanter, the political effect was to dramatize the issue of 
untouchability while preventing arrangements that would foster an independent 	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movement sufficiently strong to belie the Congress claim to represent all of India.146 
However, the technologies of colonial governance were but one means through which 
anti-caste politics could realize a break from the caste Hindu order. At a meeting of the 
Depressed Classes in October 1935 Ambedkar declared, “it is an unfortunate fact that I 
have been born a Hindu…but I can promise you this. I will not die a Hindu.”147 
Ambedkar ultimately fulfilled this promise in his public conversion to Buddhism along 
with half a million others on 14 October 1956.  
 After 1932 both Gandhi and Ambedkar strengthened their distinct methods of 
dealing with untouchablity. Gandhi’s fast was memorialized in the book The Epic Fast by 
Pyarelal Nayyar. Nayyar described the fast’s tremendous significance in awakening the 
collective conscience of the nation:  
the entire Indian nation with its three hundred millions of people…was thrown 
into one long, unbroken convulsion of anguish, terror, grief and despair. When it 
emerged from the spasm…The age old citadel of untouchability had been leveled 
to the ground, and strong, eager hands were busily at work clearing away the 
debris of the crumbled edifice.148   
Gandhi’s strength and resilience amidst this atmosphere of upheaval was a testament to 
his conviction that the machinery of law would not bring the untouchables’ salvation. 
This could only come if the caste Hindus felt ashamed and did penance for their 
practices. As a public rite of self-purification, Gandhi’s fast sought to consolidate the 
guilt it had released in the hearts of upper castes, and reduced untouchables to the status 
of passive spectators.149 Accordingly, the new anti-untouchability organization formed by 
Gandhi in September 1932, the Harijan Sevak Sangh (Servants of Untouchables Society), 
was quickly closed to untouchable leadership. The decision was defended on the grounds 
that it was an organization for penitents, for the expiation of the guilt of the caste Hindus. 
The aim of the Sangh was limited to the “constructive work” of social, economic and 
educational uplift of the Harijans, which was expected to go a long way towards 
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combating untouchability. Social reforms such as inter-dining, inter-marriages and the 
objective of abolishing caste were explicitly outside of the scope of the organization.   
Ambedkar outlined the historical development of the Congress outlook towards 
untouchability and how this culminated in its position at the Round Table Conferences in 
What Gandhi and the Congress Have Done to the Untouchables. The text is an account 
of how “Mr. Gandhi and the Congress opposed, inch by inch up to the very last moment, 
every one of their (the Depressed Classes) demands for political safeguards.”150 
Ambedkar argued that the increase in the number of overall seats provided by the Poona 
Pact could never be deemed as compensation for the loss of separate electorates and the 
double vote. These would have been political weapons beyond reckoning, as they placed 
the Untouchables in a position to influence the results of general elections.151 Under the 
Communal Award the caste Hindus would have been dependent on the votes of 
Untouchables and thus unable to neglect their interests. Under the joint electorate system 
caste Hindus outnumbered Depressed Classes in reserved constituencies by a ratio of ten 
to one. Thus, the Poona Pact transferred the right of the latter to select their own 
representatives to the former. The destructive implications of the Pact for the independent 
struggle were evident from the very first elections held under the Government of India 
Act, 1935. Undertaking a detailed discussion of the 1937 elections to the Provincial 
Assemblies, Ambedkar argued that the Congress had mobilized their considerable 
financial resources to nominate candidates from the Depressed Classes who pledged to 
the Congress program in reserved constituencies, successfully gaining 51% of these 
seats.152 However, Depressed Class members of the Congress were deprived of any share 
in the cabinet and subjected to rigorous party discipline that prevented them from raising 
issues and introducing legislation that was not approved by the executive. The Congress 
followed a system of selection that laid down different qualifications for different classes 
of candidates. In particular, Depressed Classes with few qualifications were preferred 
over those more qualified. This secured for the Party the support of a “docile 
unintelligent crowd of non-Brahmins and Untouchables who by their intellectual 
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attainments…would be content to follow the lead of Caste Hindus for no other 
consideration except that of having been raised to the status of members of the 
Legislatures.”153 Ambedkar argued that the objective of forming a docile constituency 
among the untouchables was being simultaneously pursued through Gandhi’s Harijan 
Sevak Sangh: “The Sangh is intolerant of any movement on the part of the untouchables 
which is independent and opposed to the Hindus”. The Sangh’s program of constructive 
work for the uplift of untouchables was ultimately a plan to “kill them by kindness.”154 
This direct and concise dismantling of the affective politics of upper caste reform 
registers that to become the object of pity and uplift is the death of an assertive political 
subject.  
Anti-caste and Dalit political discourse continually returns to the consequences of 
the Poona Pact of 1932 for the struggle of untouchables to assert autonomy from Caste 
Hindu society and attain political power. Nagaraj describes this crucial historical moment 
in terms of the metaphorical origins of the Dalit movement. As such, entire parameters of 
the Dalit movement are an attempt to build the cultural politics of disidentification vis-à-
vis Gandhian models of reasoning and feeling.155 The renewed upsurge of anti-caste 
struggles in the 1970s marked by the founding of the Dalit Panthers in 1972 explicitly 
rejected the co-opted political leadership beholden to the Congress. Since then the theme 
of internal degeneration of the movement and the subjectivity of Dalit political elites 
have been critical points of reflection for activists. On 24th September 1982, the 50th 
anniversary of the signing of the Poona Pact, the highly influential political leader Kanshi 
Ram released his manifesto for Dalit liberation, entitled The Chamcha Age: An Era of the 
Stooges. He argued that the Poona Pact reduced the Depressed Classes to nominal 
representatives of their community, as “no untouchable who did not agree to be a 
nominee of the Caste Hindus, and be a Chamcha (stooge) in their hands, could be elected 
in a joint electorate in which the untouchable voter was outvoted in a ratio of five to 
one.”156 The Poona Pact had inaugurated the era of the stooges and political power was 	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the “master key” for the creation of a new era of Dalit emancipation. The Chamcha Age 
sought to familiarize the Dalit-Shoshit-Samaj (Society of the Oppresessed) with the 
significance of the encounter between Ambedkar and Gandhi in 1932 and underscored 
the need to continue this historical struggle for political power. The return to 1932 in anti-
caste discourse undermines the representation of the reservation framework enshrined in 
the Indian Constitution as a settlement of historical debt and a marker of upper caste 
tolerance and benevolence. Rather, the policy is located within a longer trajectory of 
duplicity, betrayal and imposition. In this historicization, reservations did not emerge 
from the progressive ideals of the anti-colonial nationalist leadership.  The policy was a 
negotiated outcome of the tensions between the Congress led nationalist movement and 
the anti-caste movement led by Ambedkar in the context of colonial rule. Omvedt argues 
that since this time, Dalit and anti-caste movements have been seen as diversionary both 
from the perspective of economic class struggle and the national struggle against 
imperialism because of their willingness to treat the Indian elite, not foreign powers, as 
the ‘main enemy.’157 Over the course of these historical contentions the representation of 
Dalit demands for political representation and economic opportunities as instrumental 
and short sighted were critically shaped. When evaluated in relation to this historical 
perspective, descriptions of reservation policy in terms of national disintegration and 
caste wars are not simply rhetorical embellishment. Such claims betray deep investments 
in a particular understanding of the nation-state in which Hindus constitute the 
demographic and moral majority.  
Chapter Breakdown 
In Chapter 1, I trace the affective and legal discourses about caste, minority rights 
and reservation in the Constituent Assembly Debates. The provisions for caste based 
reservation and rights for religious minorities are hailed as a significant achievement in 
the literature on Indian Constitutionalism. However, my reading of the debates illustrates 
that there was considerable resentment about the inclusion of these rights in the 
Constituent Assembly.  A dominant argument in the Assembly was that reservation was a 
divisive colonial policy that produced agonistic feelings of difference among Scheduled 
Castes and Muslims. Its continuation would prevent the development of trust, goodwill 	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and love between majority and minority groups.  Assembly members thus framed their 
acceptance of reservation and minority rights as a gesture of generosity of the Hindu 
majority towards irrational and inferior subjects. The acceptance of reservation for SCs 
was being temporarily tolerated due to the socio-economic backwardness of the 
community and with the expectation that this would achieve their assimilation into the 
Hindu community. Thus, the use of reservation to advance different, autonomous 
interests would not be tolerated. This discourse delegitimized the meaning of reservation 
as the right to representation and portrayed those who claimed this right as divisive 
subjects who breached the limits of upper caste tolerance.  
In Chapter 2, I examine how a novel political subjectivity became central to the 
evaluation of post-colonial reservations policy, namely, that of the educated middle class 
Dalit. I explore the representation of this subject in three narratives about class mobility, 
discrimination and untouchability, drawing attention to the contrast between liberal 
modernist accounts and those emerging from the creative literature connected to the Dalit 
Panther movement. I locate these texts within the trajectory of reservation politics prior to 
1991, that is, prior to the national crisis over the extension of reservations to Other 
Backward Castes in central government services. Prior to 1991 anti-reservation practices 
had taken a variety of forms, including violent protests, the formation of explicitly anti-
reservation worker’s organizations, failed implementation and harassment of Dalits. The 
discrimination and humiliation faced by professional Dalits in institutions from which 
they had been historically excluded revealed that the violence of the caste system was 
firmly entrenched in structures of modernity and urbanization. Critical awareness of 
upper caste perceptions about lower castes, in particular their expectations that the latter 
be docile, compliant and grateful for the former’s benevolence, was linked to 
articulations of militant, confrontational Dalit subjectivity. The politicization of Dalits in 
the 1970s involved an explicit rejection of their constitution as objects of upper caste pity 
and guilt, and asserted the rights to power and self-representation. Against this context, 
critical reflection on Dalit middle class subjectivity in creative literature represented class 
mobility as an isolating, ambivalent and painful process. Dalit literary activism thus 
refused the representation of the middle class Dalit subject as a marker of the nation’s 
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progress towards a modern casteless society. That is, as a subject that enables the 
conversion of upper caste guilt into national pride.  
In Chapter 3, I turn to the fierce public debate in 1990-1991 over the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report (1980), which recommended reserved 
employment for OBCs in central government services. The contents of the Report called 
attention to the glaring dominance of upper castes within public institutions and raised 
the question of the caste privileges of the “secular elite”. Reviewing the anti-Mandal 
discourse in the national English language media, I highlight the historical and cultural 
resources that were used to produce alternate explanations for this dominance that 
rendered caste privilege irrelevant. Ranging from narratives about caste under Mughal 
and British (i.e. non-Hindu) rule to affirmations of the principles of merit and efficiency, 
anti-reservation discourses reconciled the elite claim to be beyond caste in the secular-
public sphere with blatantly casteist stereotypes about Dalits, OBCs and “reserved 
category” students and workers. Drawing upon a static, colonial understanding of caste 
groups as infinitely and irreducibly divided, it was claimed that OBC reservations would 
result in national disintegration, “caste wars” and a second partition of the nation.  In 
contrast, support for reservations among Dalit activists was articulated to an expansive, 
non-essentialist notion of community based on the concept of “Bahujan” (majority). 
Alliances between SCs, OBCs and religious minorities were envisioned in terms of a 
“majority of the oppressed”, thus challenging the concept of a “Hindu majority” as 
fabrication of a privileged minority. Attending to the alternative meanings of community, 
caste and nation in anti-caste, pro-reservation discourses underscores the inability of 
upper castes to come to terms with the autonomous politicization of subaltern castes.  
Opposition to the Mandal Commission extended beyond the defense of employment 
opportunities. This opposition betrayed investments in a vision of the nation in which the 
Caste Hindu is the normative citizen-subject and inspirational ideal for the masses.  
In Chapter 4, I attend to the debate on reservation for Muslims, which revolves 
around two different but entangled sets of questions. First, about whether Muslims in 
India face discriminatory treatment as a distinct religious minority community and 
whether this treatment requires redress through affirmative action quotas. Second, about 
the extent to which caste based discrimination and specifically untouchability structures 
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internal inequalities among Muslims.  Reviewing the production of knowledge about 
Muslims in post-partition India, I highlight the prevalence of discourses of fear, suspicion 
and nostalgia that constitute the community as an affective formation that borders on the 
pathological. In this way, the solution to the “Muslim problem” in India has been defined 
in terms of the community’s willingness to transcend emotions that prevent national 
integration and modernization. I then examine the development of organizations 
representing the interests of lower caste, or Pasmanda Muslims, which emerged in the 
context of political mobilizations around the Mandal Commission in the 1990s. In 
contrast to modernization, Pasmanda activists call for the democratization of their 
community and reject the authority of historically privileged, upper caste Muslim elites to 
represent their interests under the rubric of minority rights. Pasmanda discourse illustrates 
how Dalit and anti-caste politics pose an epistemological challenge to established 
categories of majority and minority in terms of religious identity. While government 
commissions and the judiciary have acknowledged the existence of caste discrimination 
in non-Hindu communities, they refuse to extend the provisions for Scheduled Castes to 
Muslims subjected to untouchability. As such, they maintain the overarching assumption 
that religion is the principle marker of difference and sacred text the principle site of 
religious meaning.  
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Chapter One. Feeling Difference, Differentiating Feelings: Caste and 
Minority Rights in the Constituent Assembly Debates  
On 4th November, 1948, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar introduced the Draft Constitution for 
consideration to the Constituent Assembly of India. The Draft Constitution had been 
circulated eight months prior to this motion. Therefore, members of the Drafting 
Committee were aware of the reactions to its provisions, in particular the criticisms 
against it. In his address to the assembly, Ambedkar identified and engaged with the 
following points of critique as most commonly raised against the document: 1) its lack of 
originality, especially its re-production of large sections of the Government of India Act, 
1935, 2) its failure to represent the ancient (Hindu) polity of India which could be 
expressed through village panchayats (councils) and 3) the extent of political safeguards 
for minorities. Ambedkar’s defense of the Draft Constitution against these critiques 
underscored the pervasive forms of inequality that structured Indian society and within 
which it would be necessary to cultivate a “constitutional morality”: “democracy is only a 
top-soil on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic.”158 On the issue of village 
panchayats, he challenged in stark terms the fascination of the colonized elite with village 
society as a site of authentic nationalism. Ambedkar attributed the love of the 
“intellectual Indian” for the village to its colonial representation as a self-preserving and 
self-sufficient unit that had survived wars and revolutions. However, he argued that mere 
survival had no value. These romanticized representations ignored the relations of power 
and violence through which village units were organized: 
I am therefore surprised that those who condemn provincialism and communalism 
should come forward as champions of the village. What is the village but a sink of 
localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad 
that the Draft Constitution has discarded the village and adopted the individual as 
its unit.159 
The dominant discourse about communalism in the Assembly defined the term primarily 
as the minority ideology of the Muslim League against the secularism of the Congress. 
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Members endlessly invoked the communalism of minorities as that evil which had been 
nurtured by the British and resulted in the partition of their “motherland”. To give further 
rights to the Muslim minority in the Constitution would perpetuate communalism and 
separatist politics. In contrast, Ambedkar’s deployment of this term served as a 
commentary on the hypocrisy of Caste Hindus in their approach to the question of 
religious community. For Ambedkar, communalism could not be isolated to the specific 
political agendas and mindsets of minority communities. He argued that the minorities 
had in fact loyally accepted the rule of the majority “which is basically a communal 
majority and not a political majority.”160 Thus highlighting the dominance of Caste 
Hindus within the Congress, he challenged the claim of the party to be representative of 
all groups in Indian society. Romanticized representations of the village obscured the 
ways in which the particular interests of (upper caste) Hindu communities were 
maintained through land relations, social segregation and untouchablity within and across 
village units.  
For days following this speech, assembly members responded in anger and 
resentment to Ambedkar’s characterization of village society and his neglect of the 
political and spiritual traditions of the Indian people. These traditions were coterminous 
with Gandhi and the Congress Party: “In the whole Draft Constitution we see no trace of 
Congress outlook, no trace of Gandhian social and political outlook.”161 That the Draft 
Constitution failed to incorporate ideas originating from the authentic nation came to be 
articulated as an affront to Gandhi’s philosophy and further, a failure to capture the 
affective aspirations of the freedom struggle. Ambedkar had failed to identify with “those 
who had been fighting for the freedom of this country for 30 long years…he had been 
attacking the whole system and the programme of Gandhi and the Congress all his life 
time.”162 The Drafting Committee was described as incapable of understanding the spirit 
of the freedom struggle with their hearts. The Draft Constitution neglected the “turmoiled 
birth of our nation after years of travail and tribulation. That is why the tone of Dr. 
Ambedkar’s speech yesterday with regard to our poorest, the lowliest and the lost was 
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what it was.”163 Members rejected the suggestion that they had been influenced by 
colonial knowledge. They spoke of the deep affections they had developed for village 
communities through their engagement with the nationalist movement: “Sir, I may say 
that it is not owing to Metcalfe but…to a far greater man…our master and father of the 
nation, that this love of ours for the villages has grown.”164 In these responses 
Ambedkar’s comments on the village were explained as a result of his disengagement 
from the (Congress) nationalist movement. His critique of the village unit was read as 
contempt for the village people, imagined as uniformly poor, lowly and lost. This 
contempt was a reflection of his urban location and Western education (not his anti-caste 
position), factors in a more general malaise among elites whose position vis-à-vis 
colonial education resulted in their rejection of traditional sources of knowledge found in 
India’s villages. It was “our leader, Mahatma Gandhi, who advised the intelligentsia to go 
back to the villages…as far as knowledge of nature and wisdom gathered from Shastras 
and Puranas are concerned…there is more wisdom and knowledge in the villages than in 
our modern cities.”165 Ambedkar’s interlocutors in the Assembly had overcome this 
alienated condition through an embrace of Gandhian philosophy that linked love for the 
village and Hindu culture with national integration. Their task as educated political 
representatives was to bring “light and knowledge” to villages so they could become “the 
most potent forces for holding the country together and for its progress towards the ideal 
of Ram Rajya.”166 
These contestations over the meaning of the village in the emergent nation – 
imagined variously as a site of communalism, as the authentic source of nationalist 
sentiment and as a space to illuminate with modern knowledge – are indicative of the 
contending and contradictory political projects circulating in the debates of the 
Constituent Assembly. As participants in this key process of nation-state formation, 
members saw themselves as doing much more than producing a legal document. Rather, 
they were responsible for drafting a framework for the further cultivation of nationalist 	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feeling, for enshrining collective memory and for deciphering which forms of social life 
should be valued. As an unwavering critic of the upper caste leadership of the Congress 
and the entrenched caste inequality of Indian society, Ambedkar was deemed incapable 
of producing this framework.  This was captured in the argument that “the real soul of 
India is not represented by this Constitution…(it) cannot give a true picture of what many 
people would like India to be”.167 The national future envisioned by the people of India 
could not be realized through legal frameworks and institutional arrangements alone. 
Assembly members countered Ambedkar’s argument that the Congress was not a 
political majority by claiming legitimacy as “representatives of the will, emotions and 
ambitions of the people…though our representation is not based on numbers.”168 The 
debates thus reflect Povinelli’s argument that the state struggle for hegemony depends on 
representing and working through liberal practices and intentions on two different 
registers: 1) a principled, universalizing language of law, citizenship and rights and 2) a 
language of love and shame, of traumatic and reparative memory and haunted dreams.169 
In this chapter I am interested in how these affective and legal registers of liberal 
constitutionalism shape, and are shaped by, the forms of (mis) recognition extended to 
Scheduled Castes and religious minorities, particularly Muslims.  
Tracing discourses about caste, minorities and reservation in the Constituent 
Assembly Debates, I interrogate how the status of Scheduled Castes and Muslims in the 
nation-state was conceived and the objectives to which this status was linked. I will focus 
primarily on one aspect of group rights, namely, the reservation of seats in legislatures. In 
the existing literature on Indian Constitutionalism reservations for Scheduled Castes are 
assumed to be an outcome of the collective commitment to the elimination of caste based 
inequality. The Indian Constitution is considered an expression of commitment to the 
revolutionary social transformation of a highly unequal society stratified on the basis of 
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caste, class, gender and religion.170 One of its most unique features is the recognition of 
caste inequality, represented by the legal abolition of untouchability and the 
entrenchment of reservation as a key modality of affirmative action.171 Thus, a concern 
for liberal justice is “nowhere more evident than in constitutional provisions for 
affirmative action programs.”172 Provisions enabling the reform of Hinduism further 
demonstrate the resolve to transform religiously sanctioned hierarchy.173 Similarly, 
studies of India’s reservation policies generally adhere to the premise that their inclusion 
in the Constitution was the result of a widespread consensus about justice for SCs in the 
Constituent Assembly.174 The consensus, it is held, was based on the recognition that the 
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form of historical oppression experienced by SCs would not enable them to avail of 
opportunities for education, employment and political participation.  
This is contrasted with the exclusion of Muslims from the reservation framework. 
While the right to political representation was initially extended to Muslims, it was 
eliminated in the final stages of Constitution making. The principal argument supporting 
this decision was that the political recognition of religious difference was incompatible 
with the establishment of a secular nation-state.  In the context of the mass displacement 
and violence of partition that was “the material condition for statehood in South Asia”175, 
it was impossible for members of the Muslim League to press for separate political 
representation in the Assembly. Instead, the status of Muslims as a religious minority 
would be protected through the Constitutional declaration of secularism as well as 
provisions for rights to religious freedom, the right to protect their language, script and 
culture and the right to administer their own educational institutions.  
Such accounts of the seamless incorporation of reservation policy into the 
Constitution dovetail with portrayals of Constitution-making as a rational, deliberative 
and representative process. The atmosphere of the Constituent Assembly has been 
described as one of trust in the leadership and compromise among the members.176 Thus, 
the Constitution is held to stand as a testament to the extraordinary vision of its framers, 
“who disagreed hardly at all about the ends they sought and only slightly about the means 
for achieving them”.177 By attending to the affective registers through which discourses 
about caste, minorities and rights were shaped, this chapter departs from the assumption 
that the differentiated framework of group rights was primarily the outcome of a 
principled commitment to liberal justice. While the literature describes these rights as an 
achievement, my reading of the debates in the Assembly reveals considerable anxiety 
about their harmful implications for the future nation. A common refrain of Assembly 
members was that at best, legal provisions were temporary measures with limited 
effectiveness when compared to the cultivation of genuine feelings of love, trust and 
goodwill between the majority and various minority groups. At worst, these provisions 	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exacerbated difference and worked against the cultivation of these affective bonds. Their 
inclusion in the Constitution was an unfortunate reminder that caste and religious 
differences had not been transcended.  
My reading of the Constituent Assembly debates shows that this specific 
understanding of group rights as obstructive to emotional integration was deployed to 
prioritize a particular vision of the nation-state and its majority community and in turn, 
marginalize alternative visions. The existence of reservation was seen as a continuation 
of the divisive policies of the colonial state. These policies were held responsible for the 
false perception among minorities that they required protection from the majority. 
Opposition was thus articulated in terms of the kinds of affective dispositions that the 
colonial system of representation had created among Scheduled Castes and Muslims. 
That is, separate representation produced agonistic feelings of difference among these 
subjects, leading them to mistrust the majority and in turn, preventing the emotional 
integration of the nation. In the debates of the Assembly reservations were continually 
referred to as a “concession”, an unfortunate means of national integration and a 
“necessary evil” – a technology ultimately irreconcilable to the collective (upper caste) 
national conscience. Although Assembly members did not mount a sustained campaign to 
eliminate political representation for Scheduled Castes over the course of the debates, 
they continually expressed ambivalence and resentment about its inclusion in the 
Constitution. I will argue that Assembly members sought to deal with this anxiety in two 
ways. First, by re-framing group rights in general and reservations in particular as a 
gesture of generosity and compromise of the Hindu majority towards marginalized 
(Scheduled Caste) and minority (Muslim) groups. Members that spoke for and with the 
majority framed their acceptance of reservations as an exercise in tolerance of the 
irrational demands of inferior subjects, thus naturalizing Caste Hindu interests as the 
national interest. As a display of generosity these concessions would allay their 
unfounded fears about Hindus and the Congress, fears that the colonial powers had 
nurtured. Second, members placed temporal and conceptual restrictions on the meaning 
of reservation. They insisted that the policy was only being accepted as a temporary 
measure for Scheduled Castes due to the socio-economic disadvantages of these 
communities. However, the use of reservations to advance different, autonomous 
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interests would not be tolerated. The elimination of political safeguards for Muslims 
served as a key process through which these temporal and conceptual restrictions were 
articulated.  
 My analysis highlights the relationship between the exclusion of Muslims from 
the reservation framework and the problematic grounds of Scheduled Caste inclusion. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Ambedkar asserted the right to separate political 
representation for Scheduled Castes as a distinct minority community. By insisting that 
reservations were only being temporarily accepted to redress the socio-economic 
backwardness of SCs, Assembly members delegitimized the meaning of reservation as 
the right to representation. Eliminating these rights for Muslims was not meant to suggest 
that SCs were the only appropriate subjects of political rights. Rather, this exclusion was 
held to inaugurate a broader trajectory in which all forms of reservation would be 
dispensed with and replaced by relations of trust and goodwill between communities. In 
the conceptual narrowing of reservations as a means to address socio-economic 
backwardness only, SCs were represented as intellectually and politically inadequate 
subjects. They had been manipulated (by Ambedkar, the Muslims and the British) into 
perceiving their interests and identity as separate from the majority community. 
Attending to the representation of Scheduled Castes in dominant discourses illustrates the 
contradictory mobilizations of the concept of untouchability in the Constituent Assembly. 
As the principal reason for the historical oppression and structural disadvantages of these 
communities, untouchability required Assembly members to accept the inclusion of 
(temporary) reservation in the Constitution. On the other hand, these same disadvantages 
– poverty, illiteracy and economic exploitation – meant that the SCs were vulnerable to 
manipulation and incapable of understanding their “real interests”. Thus, debates about 
caste, minority and reservation were as much about undermining Ambedkar’s vision of a 
separate identity and political power for Scheduled Castes as they were about concern for 
uplifting the “backward”.  
This chapter is organized into three sections. In section one, I begin by outlining 
the context of the negotiations for the transfer of power between the British colonial 
administration, the Congress Party and the Muslim League that led to the formation of 
the Constituent Assembly. Next, I examine debates about untouchability and religious 
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conversion that emerged in the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights. Discussed in 
April 1947, this report is representative of attempts by the Assembly to establish the 
parameters through which caste discrimination would be recognized by the state. I will 
illustrate how discourses of protection and vulnerability were mobilized to prevent 
Scheduled Caste rejection of Hinduism through religious conversion. In section two, I 
attend to the ways that the concepts of minority, reservation and community were defined 
during the debate on the first Report on Minority Rights, in August 1947. The first Report 
on Minority Rights extended political reservation to both Muslims and Scheduled Castes. 
Reviewing efforts by SCs and Muslims in the Assembly to link the purpose of reservation 
with the representation of different, autonomous interests, it will be seen that for most 
assembly members, such attempts suggested that the generosity of the majority was being 
taken advantage of. In section 3, I turn to the revised Report on Minority Rights, 
discussed in May 1949. This report eliminated all political safeguards for religious 
minorities. This resolution came to be hailed as part of a broader trajectory in which 
safeguards for all communities would eventually be eliminated and replaced with 
affective bonds of trust, goodwill and love among national citizens.   
 
Framing the Scheduled Caste Subject: Untouchability, Religion and Rights  
 During the Round Table Conferences held in London between 1930 and 1932 that 
led to the Government of India Act, 1935, Ambedkar was forced to concede his demand 
for separate political representation for Depressed Classes/Scheduled Castes due to the 
immense pressure generated by Gandhi’s fast unto death against it. The resulting 
settlement known as the Poona Pact eliminated separate political representation for SCs, 
subordinating them to the logic of enumeration that made possible the notion of a Hindu 
majority. However, the articulation of a separate political identity continued to be a 
significant aspect of anti-caste politics. After 1942, the Scheduled Caste Federation 
repeatedly included in its resolutions the demand for separate representation and 
recognition as a separate community.178 In statements made by various Viceroys, the 
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colonial authorities concurred that the Scheduled Castes were a separate community 
whose consent was necessary in the transfer of power.179 The colonial authorities had 
already stated that power would not be transferred to “any system of government whose 
authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life.”180 
This was in recognition of the concerns of the Muslim League, which stressed the 
inseparability of constitutional issues from those of community representation. 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah argued that a constituent assembly formed without recognition of 
the demand for Muslim autonomy would simply mean a “second and larger edition of the 
Congress” and was out of the question.181 Thus, minority representation was the key 
point of contention in the formulation of a Constitution. However, the Cabinet Mission 
established in 1946 to initiate the Constitutional process and mediate between different 
groups did not include the Scheduled Caste Federation, nor did its settlement provide any 
specific safeguards for SCs.182 The arrangements for elections to the Constituent 
Assembly from the provincial assemblies recognized only three communities: 1) General, 
2) Muslim and 3) Sikh. Moreover, elections were held by limited franchise subject to 
property, tax and educational qualifications. Only 28.5% of the adult population could 
vote in the provincial assembly elections of 1946.183 This further restricted the minimal 
scope for participation of subaltern castes in the negotiated transfer of power.  
 Due to the breakdown of negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim 
League on community representation, the latter boycotted the first session of the 
Constituent Assembly held in December 1946. Gandhi and representatives from the 
Princely states were also absent. “As the preparations for the transfer of power began, the 	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new nation appeared at the very moment of its birth as a threatened entity”.184 Under the 
terms of the Cabinet Mission Plan, this restricted the Assembly to the preliminary work 
of adopting an objectives resolution and electing committees to begin drafting 
fundamental rights and a federal system. Reports were prepared on Constitutional articles 
that were debated, amended and adopted by the Assembly. The Scheduled Caste 
Federation rejected the Cabinet Mission settlement and organized civil disobedience 
throughout India to protest against the British and the Congress. They demanded separate 
electorates and a blueprint on the position of SCs in independent India.185 In meetings 
and demonstrations speakers warned of the undemocratic character of the caste-Hindus 
and their party, the Congress, citing the Poona Pact as a prime example.186 Another 
significant development in this context was the building of an alliance between the SCF 
and the Muslim League. Ambedkar was elected to the Bengal Legislative Assembly as an 
independent candidate supported by the Muslim League. According to Nigam, this 
alliance indicated that at least to the two biggest minorities, the threat of upper caste 
Hindu rule being instituted in the name of swaraj was now as real as ever.187 Emphasizing 
the similarity of their struggles against the Congress further legitimized the SCF’s claim 
to minority status. The Congress sought to undermine this alliance in order to isolate the 
Muslim League as anti-national and solely responsible for pushing the nation towards 
partition. Rawat describes the response of the Party to Scheduled Caste politicization as 
ranging from disrupting SCF meetings, urging SCs to join the Congress and promising 
religious reform. SCs were warned about the nefarious designs of Ambedkar and Jinnah, 
characterized as agents of imperialism and feudalism respectively, and as urban leaders 
lacking a mass base among the people.188 Refusing to acknowledge the political agenda 
of the SCF, the Congress viewed the alliance as a manipulation of SCs by Muslims to 
fulfill their own communal aims.  
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After the announcement of the partition of India and Pakistan in June 1947, the 
members of the Muslim League that joined the Constituent Assembly of India were 
greatly weakened in numbers and lacked strong leadership. The partition resulted in the 
increase of Congress Party representation from 69% to 82% in the Constituent 
Assembly.189 As the horrific violence of partition unfolded, Muslims and the Muslim 
League were increasingly singled out as divisive and anti-national forces in the 
Constituent Assembly. Thus in the second phase of the proceedings, between November 
1948 and January 1950, the issue of minority rights was intensely debated. Many 
members argued that if the Constitutional provisions were too generous, they would 
perpetuate divisive politics. The very possibility of security and cohesion in the nation 
was seen to hinge on an adequate resolution to the “Muslim question”. Provisions for 
group rights were evaluated not only in relation to formal principles of justice and 
equality as the basis for nationhood. Rather, they were debated through historical 
memories that linked certain kinds of political arrangements with the amplification of 
difference. The role of the separate electorate in producing particular kinds of 
dispositions and affective relationships between different groups was continually 
elaborated in the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, members remained haunted by the 
possibility of the collective exit of Scheduled Castes from the Hindu community. In this 
context of Caste Hindu, Congress dominance and grave concern for national unity, 
Ambedkar’s aim to secure a strong framework for minority rights confronted a 
membership that was hostile to his political vision.  
The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly suggest that the legal abolition of 
untouchability was expected to dissolve any grounds for a distinct Scheduled Caste 
identity. Therefore, additional entitlements such as political representation were 
evaluated against concerns that caste based identities should not be perpetuated through a 
differentiated framework of rights. It was recognized that provisional measures were 
required to enable Scheduled Castes and Muslims to transition into an abstract national 
citizenship, a subject position they could not presently occupy due to differing historical 
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factors. However, the Constitution would be revisited after ten years and it was expected 
that all political safeguards would be eliminated at that time.190  
 The abolition of untouchability was integral to the process of transcendence of 
caste and religious difference. The form of recognition extended by the nation-state was 
underpinned by expectations that the Scheduled Caste subject would be replaced by a 
Hindu national subject over time, and thus, cease to exist. The clause for the abolition of 
untouchability then operates on two registers: 1) the removal of a fundamental condition 
of inequality in Indian society and 2) the removal of the difference that separates 
“untouchables” from the larger Hindu community. However, the term “untouchability” 
itself remained undefined. There was considerable divergence among Assembly members 
about how, if at all, it should be defined, as well the extent to which it should anchor the 
discourse of rights in the Constitution.191  
The Interim Report on Fundamental Rights was intended to be provisional in 
character, as it was expected that suggestions would arise for additional rights and 
alterations over time. While the Drafting Committee would be responsible for formally 
drafting the clauses at a later stage, the purpose of discussing the Interim Report was to 
accept the general principles of each of the clauses.192 At the onset of the debate on the 
Interim Report on Fundamental Rights, many members pointed out that without a 
definition of untouchability, it would be difficult for state institutions to implement anti-
discrimination laws. Srijut Rohini Kumar Choudhary noted the vague definition in the 
document and proposed that it could be defined as “any act committed in exercise of 
discrimination on, grounds of religion, caste, or lawful vocation of life mentioned in 
Clause 4.”193 Other members expressed concern that the approach to untouchability was 
disconnected from the larger issue of caste, which was inadequate because the former 
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was merely a symptom of the root cause: “unless we can do away with the caste system 
altogether there is no use tinkering with the problem of untouchability superficially”.194 
Amendments to include a definition into the abolition of untouchability clause were 
withdrawn on the basis that the legislature and judiciary were to define the content of and 
prescribe the punishment for the practice. However, attempts to define rights of equality 
with more explicit reference to the same continued in these debates. For example, the 
non-discrimination clause specifically listed access to restaurants, hotels, wells, tanks, 
roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or in part by public funds.195 The 
clause thus recognized the socio-spatial negotiation of caste bodies that structured 
everyday life. Some assembly members sought to extend this further by including 
schools, hostels and, significantly, temples and places of worship into the non-
discrimination clause. However, concern was also raised about the extent to which the 
Constitution should bear the imprints of caste and community. K.M. Munshi opposed 
these amendments on the grounds that untouchability was dealt with in a separate clause. 
There was no need to extend the scope of the definition of untouchability by bringing it 
into a more general non-discrimination clause.196 P.S. Deshmukh argued that, “in drafting 
such a long clause we are throwing a long shadow of untouchability over the whole 
Constitution of India.”197 This position ultimately prevailed as all amendments to expand 
the language on caste discrimination were rejected in the Assembly. These debates reflect 
the tension between the abstract equality of citizenship guaranteed by liberal rights 
frameworks and the specific, concrete forms of inequality to be addressed in any given 
context. Deshmukh’s argument suggests that explicitly referencing the latter would chain 
the nation to a shameful past. Shifting the responsibility of giving meaning to 
“untouchability” to the judiciary ensured that the Constitution would not be read as a 
permanent testament to the violence and hierarchy of Indian society. By refusing to 
abolish “caste” or “caste distinction” more broadly, the various ways in which the upper 
caste subject was constituted escaped scrutiny. As Gopal Guru argues, the framing of 	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untouchability in Constitutional provisions insulates the source of untouchability – the 
upper caste with the ability to inflict insult - and captures only the sites of 
untouchability.198 Thus, “upper caste” identity is rendered unproblematic while the 
untouchable becomes an object of classification and regulation.   
That the classification and regulation of the untouchable was considered 
necessary for the realization of a particular vision of the nation was demonstrated by a 
lengthy debate in this session over a proposed clause on religious conversion brought 
about by “coercion or undue influence”. This clause was representative of the anxieties of 
Caste Hindus about their status as a majority community, which was threatened by 
Scheduled Caste conversion to Islam, Buddhism and Christianity.199 In the proposed 
clause the state would protect the rights of vulnerable citizens, especially minors, from 
the encroachments of “other” (i.e. non-Hindu) communities. The form of protection was 
non-recognition – the conversion brought about by coercion or undue influence would 
not be recognized by law. If the centrality of untouchability is an integral aspect of the 
constitution of Dalits as vulnerable citizen-subjects200, the attempt to regulate religious 
conversion reveals how vulnerability is also extended to represent Dalits as politically 
and intellectually inadequate subjects. Assembly members made a distinction between a 
rational, knowledgeable basis upon which some individuals convert to a different 
religion, and those that result from the devious intentions of minority communities taking 
advantage of the differences and disputes within the majority community. The main point 
of contention in this session was an amendment that the clause should include an age of 
consent, below which the conversion of children would not be recognized. Supporters of 
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the clause argued that the state must protect the rights of children whose parents had 
converted to a different religion.201  
 Although this was framed as a clause with general applicability, the debate around 
it makes clear the specific subject imagined by its supporters:  
you know well, Sir, that the victims of these religious conversions are ordinarily 
from the depressed classes. The preachers of other religions approach these 
classes of people, take advantage of their ignorance, extend all sorts of 
temptations and ultimately convert them.202  
Therefore, the children of Scheduled Caste parents who had opted out of Hinduism 
required state protection, as their conversion would be “coercion and undue influence 
under all circumstances.”203 The juxtaposition of the innocence of children with the 
representation of Scheduled Caste conversion due to ignorance suggests that assembly 
members sought to extend the scope of state protection of vulnerable subjects in such a 
way that posited an intellectual vulnerability of the Scheduled Caste subject.  The nation 
imagined here was not concerned with the emancipation of stigmatized marginal subjects, 
but with the protection of the innocent poor tempted by money. In this way, the 
historically specific vulnerability to violence and exclusion arising out of caste stigma is 
circumvented by an appeal to the concept of backwardness – conversion is due to poverty 
and illiteracy and thus lacks any real moral conviction. Moreover, religious conversion is 
of no use to Scheduled Castes because their backwardness is ultimately economic, and 
requires state intervention. These debates gesture to a paradox in the concepts of 
backwardness and untouchability. Although these concepts legitimized certain rights for 
SCs they could also be pressed into service of upper caste benevolence and protection – 
these subjects required protection from themselves.  	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 These debates also contain a commentary on minority communities as motivated 
by the desire to divide and weaken the Hindu majority: “people of other faiths have 
exploited our differences in order to increase their own numbers. The consequence is 
that…such castes as Bhangis and Chamars are converted, and with them their children 
also go into the fold of the new religion.”204 The proposed clause imagined SCs and their 
children as the victims in need of state protection and religious minorities as the 
perpetrators of forced conversion. In other words, the debate was framed in terms of the 
right to convert others rather than the individual right to select one’s religion.  Many 
assembly members took this opportunity to remind the minorities of the already 
demonstrated generosity of the majority community in granting extensive rights to 
freedom of religion. They should be grateful for this generosity and concede to the 
regulation of proselytizing activity implied in this clause. The proposed clause on 
conversion then sought to regulate Scheduled Caste and minority communities 
simultaneously. Vulnerability renders the former an object to be claimed. As will be seen 
in the following sections, this concern about the ability of different communities to 
“claim” SCs came to animate the definition of the term minority itself. Rendered 
inconceivable in such discourses were alternative political possibilities for SC subjects in 
which symbolic and cultural struggles, including those enacted through religious 
conversion, posed a challenge to power relations. This was not only a question of 
futurity, but rather, was a way of marginalizing the anti-caste struggles that took place 
during the colonial period from the historical narrative of nationalism. The dominant 
discourses of caste and community assumed that Caste Hindu social reform was 
sufficient to enable national integration. This integration was tied to the consolidation of 
an undifferentiated Hindu majority.  
 
Framing the Scheduled Caste Subject: Reservation, Minority, Community  
The document that has been produced by the Advisory Committee, I consider to be the 
Magna Carta for the welfare of Harijans of this land. Sir…it was due to the third man 
residing in this country that brought out several minority communities. I do admit that, 
but Sir, it was given to Mahatma Gandhi as a great Avatar to find the disabilities of a 
section of the Hindus, namely, depressed classes known by various names, to come to 	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their rescue and to take that great epoch-making fast which evoked all the Caste Hindus 
in the whole realm of India to think what is ‘Untouchables’, what is ‘Depressed Classes’, 
what is ‘Scheduled Castes’ and what should be done for them…The very inclusion of Dr. 
Ambedkar in the present Dominion Cabinet is a change of heart of the Caste Hindus that 
the Harijans are not any more to be neglected.205 
 
 The Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities, Tribal and 
Excluded Areas presented the first Report on Minority Rights in late August 1947.206 The 
discourses in the Constituent Assembly about the Report suggest that members saw 
themselves as participating in a process of (re) making history. This process crucially 
involved correcting the mistakes of the past vis-à-vis minority representation as a basis 
for national unity. In this context the emergence of the nation-state from colonial 
subjugation required a profound break with history. Mehta describes this break as an 
opposition to “universal” history that posits India as unfit for nationhood.207 The colonial 
characterization of Indian society as comprised of antagonistic caste and religious 
communities had been translated into an extensive system of communal representation 
and separate electorates by the British administration. In this system, the latter 
legitimized its presence in the subcontinent as a neutral arbitrator of the interests of 
conflicting communities. The consideration of this report thus involved much discussion 
about what the concept of “minority” had implied in the colonial context and the 
alterations it would require in the emergent nation-state to prevent the divisive politics 
that had culminated in partition. Determining the political status of subjects classified as 
minority was thus a significant aspect of a more general process in the making of modern 
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nationalism: the forgetting of certain pasts in order to posit a collective future. 208As such, 
these debates about minority rights constitute a dense site of meaning in which 
determining the status of minority as political subject unfolds in tandem with the 
production of a particular understanding of the legacies of colonialism in India.  
 In his submission of the report before the House Sardar Patel, Chairman of the 
Advisory Committee, described a document produced in a climate “free of ill-feeling or 
hitch” and requested the House deal with the report in a similar spirit of friendship: “let 
us hope that we will leave the legacy of bitterness behind and forget the past and begin 
with a clean slate.”209 To determine the rights of minorities in such a manner would be a 
testament to the magnanimity of assembly members according to Patel, due to the 
devastating consequences of the partition unfolding in the same moment. Rights were 
being debated for those subjects identified as the cause of partition. The Report proposed 
a system of joint electorates with guaranteed representation for communities in 
proportion to their population for a period of ten years. It also contained a number of 
provisions aimed at enhancing the representation of minority communities in government 
and the civil services.210   The most noted and welcomed departure from colonial policy 
in the Report was the elimination of separate electorates and the principle of weightage, 
which guaranteed representation for Muslims in excess of their demographic share. This 
was anticipated within the questionnaire circulated by the Minorities Sub-Committee in 
preparation for the Report, which included the question “How is it proposed that the 
safeguards should be eliminated, in what time and under what circumstances?”211 
Separate electorates were a key characteristic of the colonial state’s framework for 
including Indians in structures of governance. Based on the assumption that the primary 
unit of Indian society was the community (and not the individual), representatives were 
elected solely by members of their particular community. This system ensured political 
representation to distinct groups in provincial legislatures.  Separate electorates for 	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Muslims had been instituted in 1909, however, were also extended to other religious 
communities, Anglo-Indians and important socio-economic groups – landholders, trade 
associations and universities - over time.  
Throughout the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly members identified 
separate electorates for Muslims as the principal cause of partition. Members thus 
participated in the production of a particular narrative of partition with a distinct 
causality: the provision of separate electorates and weightage during colonialism 
constituted Muslims as a political minority. This created separatist sentiments among the 
community, culminating in the violent territorial partition of India and Pakistan. As such, 
the Report articulated minority rights to the re-making of political subjects through a 
process of forgetting colonial arrangements. In this way, it departed from the assumed 
trajectory of liberalism in which the excluded “other” is extended recognition as a form 
of inclusion. In this trajectory, liberal democracies are assumed to extend equal individual 
rights to all citizens regardless of their religious and racial affiliations, thus incorporating 
difference through the guarantee that difference shall not be grounds for discrimination. 
Here, the Muslim is constituted as “other” and “minority” through a specific reading of 
the colonial legacy of group rights. In this reading Muslims used their political rights to 
advance separatist, anti-national interests. As such the “minority question” was not seen 
as one of incorporating the excluded, but of re-negotiating the terms of inclusion in line 
with the objective of national unity. The expansion of a liberal framework of rights was 
thus simultaneous to the curtailment of group rights. In this process, the Muslim as 
minority emerged as a subject in need of urgent regulation, the first step of which was to 
eliminate the “excessive” privileges extended by the colonizer.  
 Importantly, the first Report on Minority Rights deemed the abolition of separate 
electorates as largely sufficient to the task of ensuring that the modalities of minority 
rights would be consistent with the objective of national unity. As mentioned above, the 
Report recommended political reservation of seats for religious minorities and Scheduled 
Castes on a joint electorate for ten years. Discourses about these provisions registered the 
assumption that temporary reservation would cultivate trust between different 
communities. The Hindu majority would demonstrate their generosity towards minorities 
by accepting this concession. The latter would, in turn, demonstrate their loyalty to the 
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nation-state. Speaking in appreciation of the Report, F.R. Anthony described how the 
generous display by the majority had allayed the fears of injustice among minorities: 
“you have helped to harness completely the loyalty of the minorities to the task of nation-
building which face us.”212  Identifying himself as a “representative of the majority”, 
Govind Pant claimed that all provisions would be guided by “genuine feelings of regard” 
for the minorities, and all decisions “actuated by understanding and sympathy”. This 
would have a transformative effect on the minorities themselves: “I want them to have a 
position in which their voice may cease to be discordant and shrill but may become 
powerful.”213  
 In discussion of the transition from separate electorates to temporary reservation 
there were two key ways in which the concept of minority was articulated. The first was 
the view that the very term was a fabrication of British policy intended to perpetuate 
colonial subjugation under the premise of minority protection. The British were 
responsible for the creation of a lack of trust between communities, and in particular the 
minority fear of the majority. Dr. Deshmukh claimed,  
there is no more monstrous a word in the history of Indian politics than the word 
minority…this was a creation of British policy, but it succeeded so well that it is, 
in my view, essentially the work of the Satan of minority that our beloved country 
united for over a century has been divided into more parts than one. That this 
minority should at long last have been shorn of its terrors is an achievement 
worthy of note.214  
This understanding of minority illustrates that in the collective purging of the past in the 
formation of the nation, not all citizens are required to undergo the same type of public 
cleansing, the same type of psychic and historical reformation.215 As long as Muslims 
continued to benefit from identification with the fabricated concept of “minority” they 
would remain a terrorizing presence in the nation-state. It was expected that without the 
privileges of excess representation, Muslims would have to forge a relation of trust with 
the majority. Their pursuit of any additional rights henceforth would be taken as an 	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expression of mistrust: “it is only the heart that is wanted on behalf of the minorities to 
adjust themselves…the phrase minorities should be wiped out from history… (I hope 
that) within ten years, these minorities will come and say ‘we are happy’, ‘we do not 
want anything.’”216 In such discourses political safeguards indicated a lack of affective 
bond between majority and minority communities. The temporary reservation – a 
political expression of “apartness” from the nation - was being conceded by the majority 
as a gesture of goodwill with the expectation that such a bond might be forged in the 
future. However, framing this gesture in terms of benevolence and generosity also 
enabled the majority to demand certain performances from minority groups: of 
gratefulness for their rights and acceptance of a perpetually subordinate position. The 
forms of rights and representation for minorities were evaluated through an uneven 
distribution of guilt, fear and trust to produce and define relationships between 
communities and the nation-state.    
 This understanding of “minority” as a fabrication marked with a ten year expiry 
date was linked to the second way in which the concept was articulated: the minority 
figure as one who unjustly hinders the progress of those truly deserving of state 
recognition and representation. The righting of historical wrongs embodied in the 
provisions for religious minorities was linked to the clearing of the political and 
conceptual space needed to identify those in most need of socio-economic uplift. 
Deshmukh made this connection in his argument that only when minorities are content 
with a fair share of power and reasonable proportion in government services could 
national leaders “pay some attention to the oppressed and neglected rural population…it 
is self-evident that if anybody enjoys more than he deserves, he must of necessity deprive 
someone else of his legitimate share.”217 The illegitimate claims of a community 
“pampered” under colonialism were thus linked to territorial partition and socio-
economic inequality, eliding any discussion of caste privilege in these processes. 
 If shearing the minority of its terrors – the separate electorate – constituted one 
aspect of clearing the space for the “real oppressed”, another was to distinguish the 
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clause on political reservation concerned the definition of the Scheduled Caste as a 
section of the Hindu community. K.M. Munshi explained to the assembly that the term 
minority had been incorrectly and mischievously extended to the SCs in preparation of 
the Government of India Act, 1935. He clarified that “they are not minorities in the strict 
meaning of the term…the Harijans are part and parcel of the Hindu community, and the 
safeguards given to them are to protect their rights only till they are completely absorbed 
into the Hindu community.”218 It was argued that since untouchability had been abolished 
in the fundamental rights, the artificial barrier between one section of the Hindu 
community and the other had been removed. To define SCs as a minority would prevent 
their complete absorption into the Hindu fold. The regulation of the term Scheduled Caste 
through the category Hindu imagined the former in two ways: 1) as a temporary subject 
that would one day become indistinguishable from the larger Hindu community and 2) as 
an object that was in danger of being falsely claimed by different religious communities. 
Thus in his defense of this amendment Saksena reminded the assembly that “Mr. Jinnah 
often tried to include the Scheduled Castes in the minorities…they are not a minority, 
they have always formed a part of us.”219 Concerns with the maintenance of a Hindu 
majority were at work here in a way similar to the discussion of “forced conversions”. In 
both cases caste was treated as a pressure point sought out by deviant minority 
communities to divide a Hindu majority community, thus denying the political agency of 
Scheduled Castes.  
In this amendment the scope for self-definition of Scheduled Caste subjects and 
the possibilities this might hold for problematizing the notion that “community” must 
mean “religious community” were foreclosed. While Saksena explicitly identified Jinnah 
as responsible for falsely naming SCs as minorities, support for the amendment was 
implicitly aimed at undermining Ambedkar’s political vision. It is instructive to contrast 
the arguments above with the conceptualization of minority in the Scheduled Caste 
Federation’s memorandum to the Assembly, drafted by Ambedkar. In this document 
Scheduled Castes are defined as a minority for the purposes of electoral representation. In 
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the discourses above, minority is defined through traits of essential difference. Munshi 
argued that SCs could not be considered a minority on racial, linguistic or religious 
grounds. By contrast Ambedkar argued that separation in religion is not a good or 
efficient test in determining what constitutes a minority. The real test is social 
discrimination. Moreover, the only basis on which SCs can be distinguished from the 
term minority is that their social, economic and educational condition is so much worse 
than other groups that “any protection given to the citizens and to the minorities will not 
be adequate to the Scheduled Castes.”220 The protections for SCs envisioned in this text 
do not culminate in the absorption of the former into Hinduism. Rather they must ensure 
protection from Hinduism as manifested in caste sociality.  
 The distinction of the Scheduled Caste category from the concept of minority was 
thus an important step in developing a constitutional framework for rights to equality and 
rights to religious difference in line with a particular Caste Hindu political vision.  
However, the result of the amendment that defined SCs as Hindu was that the same type 
of political safeguard was extended to two different kinds of political subjects – their 
historical relationship to colonialism and the nationalist movement was different. The 
historical and political differences between SCs and Muslims were elaborated at length in 
the final year of the debates in order to justify the elimination of reservation for the latter. 
However, this stage of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly reveals considerable 
ambivalence about the purpose of reservation because it had not yet been disconnected 
from the term “minority”. There was lack of consensus about the purpose of reservation, 
not the appropriate subject of it. Scheduled Caste reservation is not explicitly articulated 
to the concept of backwardness or socio-economic disadvantage here, as it is in 
subsequent stages. Since reservations for SCs and Muslims were expected to expire in 10 
years, both groups were expected in some sense to “merge” with the majority-nation. 
Thus the argument that protection for the former will last only until they are absorbed 
into the Hindu community does to some extent recognize that they had autonomous 
interests that needed to be represented prior to such absorption. It is this recognition that 
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caused disagreements about the objectives and implications of reservation.  Specifically, 
would reservation facilitate national integration or ensure representation of difference? 
Were these goals mutually exclusive? Did reservation represent the right to equally 
participate in national affairs or the right to (temporary) difference in the nation-state?  
 These questions were raised with intensity over a clause ruling out minimum 
polling in reserved constituencies. As framed in the Minority Report: “There shall be no 
stipulation that a minority candidate standing for election for a reserved seat shall poll a 
minimum number of votes of his own community before he is declared elected.”221 This 
eliminated the provisions of the Poona Pact, in which primary elections were held 
separately by SCs to select the candidates that would contest a reserved seat in general 
elections.  Patel explained that minimum polling was separate electorates in disguised 
form. The purpose of the clause was to ensure that any right resembling separate 
electorates did not persist. This clause provoked disagreement from both Scheduled Caste 
and Muslim members of the Assembly. For these members minimum polling in reserved 
constituencies would be an important safeguard against a tokenistic representative 
structure. S. Nagappa, a close associate of Ambedkar, explained why minimum polling 
was necessary for SC political representatives: 
when the Harijans and agriculturalists are at loggerheads and when we go appeal 
to these Harijans they say ‘get out man, you are the henchmen and show-boys of 
caste Hindus. You have sold our community and you have come here on their 
behalf to cut our throats. We don’t accept you as our representative.’222  
To ensure a minimum basis of support from the Scheduled Castes in a reserved 
constituency would allow candidates to “face the people of our community and tell 
them…we are not show boys.”223 Similarly, Bahadur argued on behalf of the Muslim 
League that this provision would protect the democratic rights of citizens to have their 
views and opinions represented in the legislatures. Reservation without minimum polling 
would be an imposition upon citizens of a minority community since the candidate could 
be virtually elected by another community. Bahadur challenged the notion that the term 
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“minority” was a colonial fabrication: “it is too late in the day to contend that there are no 
minorities and that there are no special interests of minorities to be safeguarded.”224 
Nagappa, Bahadur and others seeking to amend this clause thus articulated a specific 
understanding of the purpose of political reservation as the right to representation. 
Reservation was a means to ensure that distinct interests of different communities would 
be represented. The primary responsibility of a politician from a reserved constituency 
should be to the community in whose name the seat has been reserved.  
 The Assembly dismissed these amendments as anti-national. The majority of 
responses to the amendments illustrate how the object of separate electorates stuck to a 
myriad of other demands made by Muslim and Scheduled Caste members, thereby 
creating a chain of associations in which all become read as a divisive sign of “mistrust” 
of the majority.225 Dakhayani Valayuden dismissed Nagappa’s concerns about how SC 
politicians were perceived by their community as an inability to adequately participate in 
politics. She challenged the latter’s argument that SC communities mistrusted politicians 
elected by Caste Hindu votes. These arguments were simply a reflection of Nagappa’s 
own insecurity and inadequacy: 
…if anybody thinks that he is unfit to speak for the community when he comes on 
the vote of the people in general, the best way to do service to the community is 
to…not take part in any political activities whatsoever…if we analyze the 
demand…it is nothing but unadulterated separate electorates.226 
This response indicates that although the separate electorate often operated as a shorthand 
for the discourse of Muslim disloyalty, it could be successfully deployed to de-legitimize 
expressions of autonomy of Scheduled Castes as well. However, in the case of the latter 
the shorthand of separate electorate was articulated not to disloyalty but to political 
inadequacy stemming from their educationally and economically backward conditions. It 
was argued that such an amendment would be particularly harmful to SCs because their 
candidates were especially susceptible to bribery: 
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as long as the scheduled castes, or harijans, or by whatever name they may be 
called, are economic slaves of other people, there is no meaning demanding either 
separate electorates or joint electorates (cheers)…Personally, I am not in favor of 
any kind of reservation in any place whatsoever (hear, hear). Unfortunately, we 
had to accept all these things because the British imperialism had left some marks 
on us and we are always feeling afraid of one another.227 
Ambivalence about the political implications of reservation was based on an infantilizing 
representation of Scheduled Caste political subjectivity. In this discourse the socio-
economic location of SCs cast doubt on their representative character in any electoral 
system. Their identity then becomes reduced to the fact of economic exploitation – their 
self-perception or what anyone else chooses to call them is insignificant. In this way, 
members carved out a space in which an opposition to reservation for any community 
could be articulated. Underlying the seeming acceptance of political safeguards lay the 
sentiment that at best reservations were being tolerated as a necessary evil. Framing 
reservation as an exercise in tolerance of inferior subjects thus naturalized caste privilege 
in the position of the nationalist subject.  
The categorical rejection of these amendments illustrates how tolerance of 
reservation for Scheduled Castes and Muslims became linked with a particular vision of 
the national project. To use these reservations for other kinds of projects or towards 
alternative understandings of community breached the limits of tolerance. The meaning 
assigned to reservation in this political vision was linked to the need to marginalize other 
projects, in particular the project of autonomy of Scheduled Castes articulated by 
Ambedkar through the concept of minority.228 For example, it was argued that the 
amendment exposed the real interests of Dr. Ambedkar, who “from the time of the 
second round table conference till the minority sub-committee…continued the demand 
for separate electorate” and spread the message to Harijans that they were not within the 
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fold of Hindu religion.229 It was due to this false ideology that Ambedkar and Nagappa 
had put forth this amendment: “if they think they can better their lot by standing apart 
from other communities, they are in the wrong.”230 The parameters of reservation had to 
be carefully regulated and defined in line with the objective of national unity, which was 
seen as synonymous with trust in the “Hindu majority”. Moreover, the majority 
community of this nation had to remain a fixed, stable object. The arguments against 
minimum polling in reserved constituencies were then not abstract or theoretical claims 
about the inherent divisiveness of particularistic community attachments. Indeed, they 
were driven by fears that reservation could provide a means for SCs to dis-identify with 
the Hindu community. The expression of these fears re-animated existing archives of 
public memory, prejudice and sensibility.231 The point was underscored by bringing 
Ambedkar’s political project in line with that of Jinnah’s: “if this is accepted either for 
Harijans or for our Muslim brothers, then it would mean the fulfillment of what my friend 
Mr. Jinnah has always said: ‘Muslims of India and Muslims of Pakistan’ – which means 
the preparation for Pakistan within India.”232 Ambedkar was seen as another figure in the 
history of imperialism whose interest was in dividing the Hindu community and by 
implication India. Any demands that posed a challenge to the dominant nationalist vision 
were read as the persistence of religious and communal elements despite the generosity 
of the majority. As argued by Nigam, it was only by denying any agency to other 
subordinate social groups and communities that nationalism could represent other 
assertions of selfhood as creations of “divide and rule” policies.233 The political inclusion 
of minorities in the Constitution thus relates to the need for their regulation until such 
assertions are discarded. Reservations as concessions to such elements was seen as an 
unfortunate means to facilitate national integration: “we have agreed to the reservation of 
seats just for…the next ten years to allow those who cannot think of themselves as 
Indians to adjust themselves.”234 Claims to the right to representation were a distraction 
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from the “real problems of ignorance and ill health, hunger and want.”235 Rejecting these 
claims was then a form of identification with the real subjects of inequality, the masses 
presumably unmarked by caste and religious distinctions.   
This lengthy debate concluded with an address by Sardar Patel. In his intervention 
Patel embodied a national citizen whose generosity and tolerance had been pushed far 
beyond its “reasonable” limits by the irrational demands of SCs and Muslims. Bahadur’s 
amendment was taken as evidence that the Muslim League had failed to see the 
“reasonableness” of the Congress and to adjust to the changed conditions of post-partition 
India. “Therefore, I regret to say that if I lose the affection of the younger brother 
(Muslims), I am prepared to lose it because the method he wants to adopt would bring 
about his death. I would rather lose his affection and keep him alive.”236 The very 
audacity of the demand signaled to Patel that the reservation on the basis of population 
within a joint electorate system should be eliminated, as the Muslim League was unable 
to understand its altered meaning. In his familial representation of the nation, the terms 
majority and minority were not simply reflections of demographic imbalance between 
different groups. Majority and minority were conceived in terms of a naturalized 
hierarchical differentiation in which only some possessed the capacity to act and think for 
the general interests of the nation. As the “elder brother”, Patel had conceded temporary 
reservation even though it was already perceived as over-generosity to the minorities. But 
it was equally his duty to prevent the “young” from acting in ways harmful to themselves 
and to the family unit. He presented Muslims with two choices. Forgetting the privileges 
of the colonial era or migration to Pakistan: “Forget the past…you have got a separate 
state, and remember, you are the ones who were responsible for it, not those who remain 
in Pakistan.”237 Scheduled Castes were similarly instructed to forget “what Dr. Ambedkar 
and his group had done… you have very nearly escaped partition of the country on your 
lines”. Separate representation was held responsible for the inability of SCs to know what 
is good for them and in turn, to see the sincere commitment of Caste Hindus:  
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You have seen the result of separate electorates in Bombay, that when the greatest 
benefactor (Gandhi) of your community came to stay in bhangi quarters it was 
your people who tried to stone his quarters…It was again the result of this poison 
and therefore I resist this only because I feel that the vast majority of Hindus wish 
you well. Without them where will you be? 238 
In his remarks directed at Muslims and SCs respectively, Patel instructed both groups to 
forget the past even as he reminded them of their historical record of “separatist” politics. 
Due to Ambedkar’s separatist politics, Scheduled Castes misrecognized Gandhi and his 
intentions to liberate them from untouchablity. The rejection of Gandhi’s “love” is here a 
rejection of Hindu love, the community to which SCs “naturally” belong. The rejection of 
caste Hindu benevolence by Scheduled Castes is seen as a result of their ignorance and 
the “inferiority complex” of their representatives239 rather than political critique. The 
political position articulated by Ambedkar was thus reduced to the persistence of the 
irrational emotions of fear and mistrust. Given the overwhelming opposition to the 
minimum polling provision in the Assembly, Patel’s speech was certainly unnecessary to 
ensure that the amendment would not be passed. His decision to intervene appears to be 
aimed at a broader purpose, of clarifying the relations of power between different 
communities in tandem with the enshrining of certain readings of the past. He 
emphasized that group rights in the nation-state would be dependent on an acceptance of 
these power relations. In Patel’s reading Muslims and SCs had been misguided by the 
colonizers and their own representatives into perceiving their interests as distinct from the 
national interest. As the familial authority of the nation, Patel demonstrated that a family 
must be held together as much through love as through the imposition of discipline. 
Hierarchy between groups was thus reestablished as the minority subject was being 
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Revisiting Minority Rights: Secularism, Backwardness, Caste 
There are two kinds of minorities, as you all know in India. There is one kind of minority 
which…of the fact that they can take care of themselves in any part of the world, 
generally inspires terror in the minds of other minorities and even in the minds of the 
majority. There is another kind of minority, which inspires pity in our minds who 
constantly remind us of the folly we had committed in the past, for which, they have lots 
of reasons to complain.240  
  
In August 1947 the assembly approved the decision to defer all discussion of 
reservation in the provinces of West Bengal and East Punjab due to uncertainties about 
the impact partition would have on these provinces. When the revised Report on Minority 
Rights was introduced in May 1949, Sardar Patel explained that as the effects of the vast 
migration across newly constituted borders had become more clear, a shift occurred in the 
attitudes of the minorities. This enabled important changes to be made to the report as a 
whole, not only for the provinces of Bengal and Punjab. In a significant revision to the 
previous report all political safeguards for minority communities were eliminated, 
retaining the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as the sole recipients of reservation. 
In addition, the category Scheduled Caste was revised to include converts to Sikhism. 
Although there were always “doubts” about the consequences of political reservation for 
minorities, Patel argued that they had been initially accepted in order to allay the fears of 
these communities. What enabled the revision was that they had realized “after great 
reflection the evil effects of such reservation on minorities themselves, and the 
reservation should be dropped.”241 The decision to include Scheduled Caste Sikhs in the 
reservation framework had been made in recognition of “Sikh sentiment”. In particular, 
the sentiments of Sikh representatives who feared that without SC status, marginalized 
caste groups would convert back to Hinduism and thus weaken the community in 
demographic terms. The members of the committee had “always felt a sort of 
responsibility for the susceptibilities of the Sikh community which has suffered vastly by 
the partition of the Punjab.”242 Patel clarified that this was a “concession” to SC Sikhs 
and thus the primary objective was still to drop as rapidly as possible all classifications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Rohini Kumar Chaudhary, CAD, vol. 8, 26 May, 1949, 327.	  
241 CAD, vol. 8, 25 May, 1949, 270.	  
242 Ibid. 	  
87	  
and differences and bring all to a level of equality.243 As such, the decision did not flow 
from the recognition of caste-based discrimination across religious communities. It was 
not intended to facilitate the claims of other groups to protection from caste-based 
discrimination. Patel’s narration of these changes registered a sense of relief – the 
Committee had finally reached a sound resolution to the minority question. The new 
framework was articulated in terms of political arrangements that would best secure the 
transcendence of community difference and the establishment of a state based purely on 
nationalist principles. 
The ongoing processes of inclusion and exclusion that structure the terrain of 
inequality in post-partition India are widely debated in relation to these important 
decisions of the Constituent Assembly.244 As Tejani argues, the question of how the 
disenfranchised castes were categorized would ultimately determine what place 
“community” would have in the future nation.245 By accepting caste as a basis for 
reservation members also sought to restrict its meaning to the removal of socio-economic 
disadvantage, rather than representation of distinct community interests. The debate on 
the revised Minority Rights Report illustrates how the elimination of political safeguards 
for minorities facilitated this shift in meaning. However, disadvantage and backwardness 
are not neutral categories. The ambiguity of these terms enables them to function, 
simultaneously, as a means to justify and oppose caste-based reservation. In this section I 
extricate from the debates how the Scheduled Caste subject became the grounds upon 
which the status of religious minorities was debated. 
The proposed changes to minority rights received overwhelming support due to 
their perceived significance in the establishment of a genuinely secular state. The 
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relationship between the state and religious minorities: “if our idea is to have a secular 
state it follows inevitably that we cannot afford to recognize minorities based upon 
religion.246 This relationship was conceived of as a novel and necessary departure from 
colonial relations of rule, identified as the main agent in generating mistrust between 
communities that culminated in partition. Although Muslims were giving up the right to 
political reservation they would be gaining in its place a much better guarantee of 
community security – the goodwill of the Hindu majority. Eliminating political 
safeguards would contribute to the elimination of affective distance between 
communities. This was endorsed by some Muslim representatives in the Assembly, who 
expected that unreserved joint electorates would facilitate cooperation between religious 
communities in service of the national interest. Nazirrudin Ahmad advised, “the safety of 
Muslims lies in intelligently playing their part and mixing themselves with the Hindus in 
public affairs.”247 Safeguards only kept alive the “spirit of separatism and 
communalism”, and thus it was “necessary that the Muslims living in this country should 
throw themselves upon the goodwill of the majority community, should give up separatist 
tendencies and throw their full weight into building up a truly secular state.”248 Members 
sought to replace divisive communalism with a future of inter-communal cooperation as 
expressed through electoral arrangements. Begum Aziz Rasul envisioned that this would 
result in a more meaningful futurity in which Hindus would actively campaign amongst 
their co-religionists to return Muslims to the legislatures. Reservations were an artificial 
barrier preventing the organic development of such relations. In this way, the articulation 
of secularism ran together with a specific imagining of the separatist Muslim political 
subject in need of reform.  
The responses of other Muslim assembly members to these changes can be 
categorized according to the purpose of reservation assumed– representation of difference 
or backwardness. Notable in the different sets of responses is the shifting ground of 
comparison with Scheduled Caste reservation. As the arguments reviewed above suggest, 
reservation for Muslims generally meant reservation as representation of difference. 
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Opposition to their elimination also operated on this assumption. Therefore it was 
necessary that religion be recognized as the fundamental marker of difference in the 
subcontinent, as race was in other parts of the world: “the difference in religion creates a 
difference in life and in outlook on matters and things connected with life. Man here in 
this country is measured in terms of his religion.”249 The extension of the right to 
difference (ie reservation) to SCs but not to Musilms could not be justified. The SCs had 
also become a minority community on account of a difference in religious beliefs.250 On 
the other hand, if they were part of the Hindu community as members of the Assembly 
claimed, there was no basis for reservation. It would be hypocrisy to retain safeguards for 
SCs if, according to the majority community, they formed part of that community and 
were of the same culture, religion and race. Z.H. Lari argued:  
if the electorate is aware of the necessity of having representation of every portion 
of that (Hindu) community then you cannot say that reservation is necessary (for 
Scheduled Castes). The reservation shows that you are not feeling strong on the 
point…the Muslims will say ‘you have not got that confidence in regard to the 
Scheduled Castes who have always been part of you. What about the Muslims 
who are still regarded in certain places with suspicion?’251  
Nagappa responded to this line of questioning by qualifying that the SC constituted a 
different type of minority: “we are not a religious minority. We are an economic, political 
and social minority.”252 However, the correction of the Muslim political subject through 
the process of constitution making was part of a broader trajectory of transcendence of 
community-based difference that included SCs. Thus it was envisioned that “in time, 
even the Harijans will…rise to the occasion and give up this right to reservation…At that 
time service, merit and ability alone will win votes and all the relics of our past will have 
been buried deep.”253 This kind of statement raises questions about how the historical and 
moral basis of Scheduled Caste reservation was understood in the debates. If SC 	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reservations were qualitatively distinct from those for religious minorities, why does 
elimination of the latter function as a template for the former?  
 This question can be addressed with reference to Nehru’s intervention in this 
debate. Nehru’s address exemplifies the meaning of reservation in the nationalist 
imaginary – as undesirable but tolerated - regardless of the historical and moral claims of 
the community in question. At the outset, Nehru acknowledged that there was no lack of 
support for the changes to minority rights. However, he wanted to speak about them due 
to a desire to associate with such a historic turn in the nation’s destiny. Affirming his 
support for the proposed revisions, Nehru rehearsed the developments of the Constituent 
Assembly in its efforts to expel separatist elements from the national body inaugurated by 
the abolition of the separate electorate. However,  
…reluctantly we agreed to carry on with some measure of reservation…because 
in our heart of hearts we were not sure about ourselves nor about our own people 
as to how they would function when all these reservations were removed…but 
always there was this doubt in our minds, namely, whether we had not shown 
weakness in dealing with a thing that was wrong.254   
The address unfolds as the inner dialogue of the nationalist self, uncertain about how 
different communities will relate to one another in the absence of colonial mediation. 
Departing from the dominant discourse of Muslim separatism, Nehru identified all 
subjects as tainted with some form of separatist tendencies. Part of becoming a nation 
was learning not to surrender to those tendencies. For minorities in particular, it was 
learning not to make demands that signify desire to keep apart from and mistrust the 
majority. The transformation of majority-minority relations here is part of a process of 
replacing past ideas and suspicions with a rational, cosmopolitan worldview. From this 
perspective the proposal did not go far enough. Nehru stated his preference to see all 
remaining reservations eliminated. That Scheduled Caste reservation remained was an 
unfortunate but necessary departure from this trajectory from communalism to 
cosmopolitanism.  Why then should this provision for SCs remain? In this address a clear 
connection between SC reservation and backwardness was established and indeed 
insisted upon:  	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I try to look upon the problem not in the sense of religious minority, but rather in 
the sense of helping backward groups in the country. I do not look at it from the 
religious point of view or the caste point of view, but from the point of view that a 
backward group ought to be helped and I am glad that this reservation will also be 
limited to ten years.255 
This statement indicates how the grudging acceptance of reservation for Scheduled 
Castes involved non-recognition of the historical specificity of caste discrimination and 
caste privilege on the part of the nationalist self. Making available an understanding of 
SC reservation that is devoid of caste analysis facilitates the shift in meaning that renders 
the former a vehicle for social mobility but not for political representation or the 
expression of autonomous interests disruptive of hegemonic nationalist politics.  
 Nehru’s address marks a shift in the ways in which the figure of the SC is evoked 
as a means to come to terms with the elimination of political reservation for religious 
minorities. As reviewed above many Muslim League members objected to the Minority 
Report on the basis that Muslims were more different from Hindus than SCs. It is 
instructive to note how the grounds of comparison shift when the criteria of 
backwardness is mobilized to resolve this line of objection. Betraying the entrenched 
assumptions about caste that Muslim assembly members shared with their Caste Hindu 
counterparts, the need to give up safeguards came to be expressed in terms of the 
essential weakness and inadequacy of the Scheduled Caste subject. With the principle of 
difference removed from the definition, reservations “imply a kind of inferiority…a kind 
of protection that always has a crippling effect upon the object protected.”256 Unlike 
difference, backwardness cannot be articulated as something that SCs and Muslims have 
in common from the perspective of Muslim elites in the Assembly. Thus, following 
Nehru’s address Tajamal Hussain warned Muslims that if they did not forego these 
safeguards they would be treated as alien and their position would be reduced to that of 
the Scheduled Caste. Clarifying this argument Hussain pressed on:  
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You are not poor. Like the Scheduled Castes, you are not weak, you are not 
uneducated, you are not uncultured; you can always support yourself. You have 
produced brilliant men. So do not ask for protection or safeguard.257  
The premise of Scheduled Caste reservation on the basis of backwardness is here isolated 
from any reference to untouchability and caste-based discrimination. While Nehru’s 
conceptual distinction seeks to de-link caste from backwardness, the social imaginary 
within which the latter concept is embedded is pervaded by assumptions about caste, 
class and ability. This indicates the difficulties of “secularizing” the category of caste and 
the varied implications of doing so.258  
 As the Scheduled Caste came to function as the object upon which the status of 
Muslims was debated, members were able to articulate their continued uncertainty about 
reservation for the former. Excluding Muslims from reservation did not mean that SCs 
were the only rightful subjects of such a policy. In their arguments one can detect the 
anxiety of Caste Hindus that the criteria of backwardness could not be completely sealed 
off from that of difference. If at certain points Caste Hindus anticipated that the 
alleviation of backwardness would facilitate the absorption of SCs into the Hindu 
community, at other times they saw reservation as a divisive form of recognition that 
would prevent this process. To accept reservation on the basis of backwardness could not 
be a simple adjustment in definition. Ambedkar’s movement continued to emphasize 
difference from Hindu society, not as an essential trait but as a political claim. Despite 
the exclusion of religious minorities from reservation, the consensus around caste 
remained unstable: “I have no hesitation in saying that had we removed even this 
provision from the constitution it would have been for the better…It has been done 
because they (SCs) are not capable of lifting themselves.”259  Mahavir Tyagi took this 
opportunity to remind the house of Ambedkar’s attempt to have SCs represented as a 
non-Hindu minority during the 1932 Round Table Conference in London. Reminding the 
Assembly of the fast unto death undertaken by Gandhi in opposition to this, he 
questioned how something that had once been so contentious was now being accepted 
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and extended. In this reading of the Round Table Conference, it was not possible to even 
acknowledge Ambedkar’s political agenda vis-à-vis transformation of caste hierarchies.  
In this address we see how the principle of representation and the principle of 
backwardness continually collide with each other. Tyagi questioned the continuation of 
SC reservation because after the Round Table Conferences, “the intention was that it (SC 
reservation on joint electorate) should last only for twenty years. After that period they 
were expected to become absolutely one with the Hindus…why are we now giving it a 
further lease of ten years?”260 The concern here was not with the removal of 
backwardness – whether defined as caste stigma or economic status – but with the 
perpetuation of a political identity that threatened the notion of a Hindu community.  
 Tyagi went on to remind the assembly that Scheduled Caste is a fictional term, 
encompassing “some castes who are depressed, some who are poor, some who are 
untouchables and some who are down-trodden”. Hence the reservation could not be 
justified by the principle of community difference – the category did not signify a 
community, it is too diverse – or from the principle of backwardness – not all castes 
listed in the Schedule were poor. The latter point was emphasized with reference to 
Ambedkar’s own accomplishments:  
How is Dr. Ambedkar a Scheduled Caste? Is he illiterate? Is he ill-educated? Is he 
untouchable? Is he lacking in anything? He is the finest of the fine intellectuals in 
India and still he is in the Scheduled Castes. Because he is in the list and because 
he is a genius, he will perpetually be member and also a Minister…Moreover, Sir, 
he has lately married a Brahmin wife. He is a Brahmin by profession and also 
because his in-laws are Brahmins…There are thousands of Brahmins and 
Kshatriyas who are worse off than these friends belonging to Scheduled Castes. 
So by the name of Scheduled Caste, persons are living a cheerful life, and a 
selected few of these castes get benefit.261 
These arguments illustrate how the shift form difference to backwardness in justifications 
for reservation did not entail a straightforward acceptance of the caste criteria among 
Assembly members. Tyagi referred to Ambedkar’s specific education and class position 	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to highlight how his “cheerful life” had come at expense of the plight of thousands of 
“worse off” upper castes. The educated SC is identified here as the subject responsible 
for abusing caste privilege to exclude the uneducated masses from political participation. 
Thus it was suggested that in place of SCs, “landless laborers, the cobblers or 
persons…who do not get enough to live should be given reservation”. The categories of 
landless or poor were not seen as having a caste dimension. Scheduled Caste reservation 
should be eliminated because it would not fulfill its stated purpose, namely, to ameliorate 
conditions of backwardness. It would fail to do so because, as Ambedkar’s experience 
demonstrates, not all SCs are “backward”. At the same time, Ambedkar’s experience 
calls into question his caste location - by education, occupation and marriage he is a 
“Brahmin”.  
 This speech raises a number of questions that continue to circulate in debates 
about reservation policy. At what point and through what means does a Scheduled Caste 
cease to be a Scheduled Caste? What are the features of this novel subject position? If 
such a subject continues to insist on “difference” from the Caste Hindu citizen, what is 
this difference an effect of? In Tyagi’s speech, educational attainment and class location 
imply the absence of caste stigma. These attainments are not considered in the context of 
pervasive discriminatory practices in caste society. Rather, they are taken as evidence of 
the lack of discrimination. Such discourses stage the limits of Caste Hindu guilt and 
moral obligation through the figure of the educated, middle class SC. Further, they call 
into question the legitimacy of this subject as representative of SC communities: by 
getting an education and access to political institutions, one ceases to be an 
“untouchable” and thus ceases to be representative of Scheduled Castes in general. From 
this perspective the educated SC who continues to identify with his or her caste 
community is seen as claiming a false victimhood. However, as seen in various passages 
above, economically marginalized SCS are also considered incapable of adequately 
participating in politics, due to the fact of their economic marginalization. This framing 
obscures the relationship between discrimination and inequality through a strictly 
economic understanding of backwardness. Moreover, it implies that the interests of SCs 




Compensatory discrimination embodies the brave hopes of India reborn that animated the 
freedom movement and was crystallized in the Constitution.262 
 
The provisions made in the Constitution for safeguarding the position of the Scheduled 
Castes were not to my satisfaction. However, I accepted them for what they were worth, 
hoping the Government will show some determination to make them effective.263  
 
 Did India’s policies of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
emerge out of the momentous force of intention among nationalist leaders to create a 
casteless society?  How does this crystallized intention relate to the post-colonial politics 
of caste marked by resistance to and under enforcement of reservation policies, siphoning 
of funds allocated for SC and ST communities, ongoing discrimination across secular and 
religious spaces and increasing violence against SCs? Is this discrepancy a familiar one 
of good intentions and ineffective implementation? The optimism expressed by scholars 
such as Marc Galanter suggest that participants in the nationalist movement and the 
Constituent Assembly shared a common understanding of the severity of caste based 
oppression and a determination to eliminate it from Indian society. In the analysis 
presented above I have attempted to demonstrate that the intentions vis-à-vis caste, 
minority and community circulating in the Assembly and which culminated in the 
Constitution of India were not homogenous or harmonious. Rather, there were conflicting 
understandings of these terms as they circulated in different political-affective 
imaginaries. Discourses in the Assembly indicated acute ambivalence and uncertainty 
about the purpose reservation would serve in the nation-state, especially its effect on 
relations between the majority and minority groups. The political positions of the latter, 
particularly on the question of representation, were reduced to the persistence of 
irrational emotions that had been nurtured by the colonial state and its divisive policies of 
divide and rule. Thus, reservations were re-framed as a temporary measure intended to 
address the socio-economic backwardness of SCs. In this process, their acceptance was 
portrayed as an act of generosity of the majority community, a gesture of compromise to 
allay the irrational fears of inferior subjects. As such, the use of reservations to advance 	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interests that were different from those of the majority necessarily constituted an act of 
bad faith. Such attempts showed that the generosity of the majority was being taken 
advantage of. My argument implies that in order to account for the uneven results of 
reservation policy since 1950 and the extent of resentment it continues to generate, 
assumptions about the enlightened, progressive intentions of the Constituent Assembly 
must be challenged. The sentiment expressed in contemporary debates that reservations 
are abhorrent and merely being tolerated was pervasive in the Assembly.  
 The understanding of minority rights and reservations as a barrier to emotional 
integration served to prioritize a particular vision of the nation-state and the national 
majority in the Constituent Assembly. In this way, alternative political visions were 
marginalized. While Ambedkar did oversee the framing of the Constitution, many 
significant aspects of his political vision remained unrealized. These included “an 
impassioned belief in separate electorates for SCs, the nationalization of land and its 
redistribution as cooperative, collective farms and multi-member constituencies and 
cumulative voting within the framework of parliamentary democracy.”264 In the years 
following the completion of the Assembly’s work, Ambedkar lost two elections in 
reserved constituencies of Maharashtra to relatively unknown Congress candidates. That 
reserved constituencies are those in which SC communities rarely exceed 20-30 percent 
of the population facilitated Congress strategies of mobilizing non-SC voters around their 
own compliant and accommodating SC candidates.265 The restriction of minority rights to 
rights to religious freedom and the discursive connections between the terms Muslim, 
separatism and Pakistan also marginalized alternate political possibilities. Both Abdul 
Kalam Azad in the Congress and Mohahmmed Ali Jinnah in the Muslim League sought a 
basis other than minority for the participation of Muslims in the life of modern India. 266 
Jinnah and the Muslim League opposed the reduction of Muslim politics to religious 	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concerns. According to Jinnah, “a Hindu Raj would… be established not by making 
Hindus more religious, since the presence or absence of religiosity among a political 
majority was irrelevant to its power”, but rather, by confining Muslims to the 
“demographically and constitutionally powerless, degraded and impossible position of a 
religious minority.”267 The resistance of Azad and Jinnah to Muslim politics as minority 
politics also represented a specific social location and imaginary of the North Indian elite, 
as illustrated by the shifting grounds of comparison with Scheduled Castes in the 
minority rights debate. Indeed, both members of the Muslim League and the Congress in 
the Assembly seemed unable to conceive of Muslim political subjectivity outside of the 
figure of the North Indian Ashraf (nobility) – there was virtually no reference to socio-
economic inequality and Muslims.268 The elimination of political safeguards for Muslims 
in the assembly was part of a broader process of disempowerment of this pre-British elite, 
which included the redistribution of feudal lands and decay of Urdu language and culture 
in North India.   
Ambedkar resigned from his position as Law Minister in Nehru’s cabinet in 1951 
after the thwarting of the Hindu Code Bill, which was intended to provide a civil code in 
place of the body of Hindu personal law. He considered the bill to be the greatest social 
reform measure ever undertaken by the legislature in India. In his resignation speech 
Ambedkar described his experience of continued marginalization from Committees in 
which his education and experience could have been effectively utilized and the 
personalized, non-transparent character of decision making in the government. He also 
observed the general disregard within the government for actualizing the Constitutional 
commitments to address discrimination against Scheduled Castes. He had reached his 
limits upon the burial of the Hindu Code Bill because “to leave inequality between class 
and class, and between sex and sex which is the soul of Hindu society untouched and to 
go on passing legislation relating to economic problems is to make a farce of our 
Constitution and build a palace on a dung heap.”269   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  267	  Devji, “The Minority as Political Form,” 88.	  
268 The question of caste and Muslim communities will be the focus of Chapter 4.	  269	  “Resignation Speech to the Cabinet.” October 10, 1951. Accessed from, 
http://ambedkarism.wordpress.com/2011/03/10/dr-ambedkar’s-resignation-speech/ 	  
98	  
 Backwardness and untouchability – the key concepts around which a political 
trajectory for SCs in the nation-state came to be organized – were left deliberately 
undefined by the Constituent Assembly. The discourses about Scheduled Caste subjects 
indicate, however, that most members privileged the economic and educational 
dimensions of the caste problematic over that of social discrimination. They assumed that 
social discrimination had already been substantially eliminated due to Gandhi’s message 
of love for the Harijans. However, their continuing educational and economic 
backwardness made them politically and intellectually inadequate subjects. If the Muslim 
minority urgently required regulation due to the perceived historical propensity for 
separatist politics, Scheduled Castes figured as objects to be manipulated by missionaries 
and falsely claimed by those who aimed to divide the Hindu community. Their economic 
backwardness made them incapable of understanding their real interests.  
This understanding of backwardness aligns with the political vision of secular 
nationalism that came to dominate the post-colonial nation-state. This vision is based on 
the agency of the enlightened elite in delivering the inert and backward masses from 
darkness to light.270  In this vision community and caste identities are expected to 
inevitably dissolve through the spread of modern, scientific education and a scientific 
temper.271 Secular-nationalism enables the elite to draw upon discourses of modernity, 
science and development to constitute themselves as having transcended the 
particularities of caste and community. As such post-colonial debates about caste have 
been animated less by the question of how to eliminate caste inequality than by the 
concern to eliminate caste as a criteria for measuring inequality. The acceptability of an 
undefined backwardness for the purpose of social policy making thus reflects a political 
vision in which abstract social uplift becomes the grounds of national unity. Uday Mehta 
argues that in this vision of Indian Constitutionalism history comes to be translated in the 
language of politics. In other words, history gets translated into a medium where it is 
available for political modification. In this way, the challenge of caste injustice becomes 
analogous to that of building industry or large dams.272 Further, this vision is underpinned 
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by a particular affective relation of pity to the object of social uplift. Mehta argues that 
relations of compassion operate through a commitment to co-suffering. By contrast, pity 
maintains distance and can thus conceive of its object as an abstraction or type, such as 
the poverty stricken or the disadvantaged castes.273 In this relation, uplift of the objects of 
pity is required to assuage the “bad feelings” of the privileged. This capacity to be 
affected by the poor, to feel sorrow and unease for their conditions stands as a testament 
to the good intentions of the latter and of their ability to work in the service of national 
development. This forecloses questions of caste, power and the uneven distribution of 
privilege in society. Indeed the generation of this affective response depends on the 
existence of stark disparity, of social locations from which objects of pity can be 
constituted in the first place.  
 Positing a relation of pity between Scheduled Caste and Caste Hindu constitutes 
the grounds for national unity in this vision because it conceals the ongoing relations of 
social, economic and epistemic violence through which these subject positions are co-
produced. Rendering Scheduled Caste bodies as an abstracted object of social uplift 
implies that the agential subject of social transformation is elsewhere. The object is 
dependent on the agential subject. Thus Sardar Patel’s “appeal” to Scheduled Castes that 
“the majority of Hindus wish you well. Without them where will you be?” From this 
perspective, imagining a future for Scheduled Castes outside Hinduism amounts to 
imagining Scheduled Castes outside the nation. Political safeguards are only a temporary 
replacement for affective bonds of goodwill.  In the next chapter, I examine the ways in 
which discourses of pity merge with the politics of resentment to continually constitute 
the difference of caste in the post-colonial nation-state. As theorized from the perspective 
of Dalit activists, this difference is constituted through novel experiences of caste 
sociality that reservations have produced.  	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Chapter Two. Representing Reservations: Caste, Class and Untouchability in 
Narratives of Social Mobility  
In the previous chapter it was seen that members of the Constituent Assembly 
sought to regulate the purpose of reservation through temporal and conceptual 
restrictions. The policy was accepted as a temporary measure to ameliorate backwardness 
and in turn facilitate the absorption of SCs into the Hindu community. However, the use 
of political reservations to express different, autonomous interests would not be tolerated. 
In their attempts to evacuate from reservation the principle of representation of 
difference, Assembly members marginalized social discrimination and untouchability in 
their understanding of backwardness. Contrary to expectations in the Constituent 
Assembly, reservations were not eliminated ten years after the Constitutional Order, 
1950. Scheduled Castes did not become indistinguishable from the Hindu community. 
Nor have practices of untouchability been eradicated across the diverse regions of India. 
In short, caste did not disappear from the body politic. Whereas it was believed that 
reservation as a temporary measure would dissolve caste-based difference, the seemingly 
indefinite continuation of the policy has shifted this perception to one in which 
reservations are held responsible for the persistence of caste identities in the nation-state. 
In this dominant discursive position, caste is understood as a pre-modern archaic identity 
that was reinvigorated by the colonial state’s policies of divide and rule. As long as caste 
remains a category of social policy, the colonial legacy will continue and national 
integration will be compromised. This implies that due to the advantages of reserved 
quotas, attachment to parochial caste identity is more prevalent among the “lower castes”.  
 This position fails to recognize how the meanings of caste, community and nation 
have been contested within Dalit movements. This process is linked to shifts in the 
political consciousness of SCs, and subsequent changes to the ways in which they 
negotiate Caste Hindu society, thus producing different kinds of encounters between 
Dalits and upper caste subjects.274 Across different genres of anti-caste literature it is seen 	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that identification as Dalit signifies a rejection of caste categories as well as the concept 
of a Hindu majority. The mass conversion to Buddhism among Dalit communities after 
Ambedkar’s death exemplified that affirmative action did not diminish the importance of 
identity formation outside the Caste Hindu order.  Patterns of violence against Dalits in 
post-colonial India reveal that efforts to secure new rights and assert new forms of social 
presence provoke upper caste retaliation.275 Hence, anti-caste discourses attend to the re-
production of caste identities through multiple forms of violence and discrimination. In 
these discourses reservations are a necessary but insufficient condition for social 
transformation. From this perspective, caste cannot be reduced to a pre-modern belief 
system or an instrument of colonial domination. The processes of post-colonial 
transformation generate their own distinct pressures on the meanings of caste and 
community, simultaneously working with and working over colonial forms of knowledge 
and power.  
 In this chapter I examine how representations of Scheduled Caste subjectivity 
shape and are shaped by the politics of reservation. During the controversy over the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report on Backward Classes in 1991, which 
is the focus of Chapter 3, opponents of extending reservation to new social groups 
claimed that SCs were the only subjects deserving of guaranteed representation in state 
institutions. They emphasized that they were against the demographic extension of the 
policy, not the policy itself. However, this chapter will illustrate that anti-reservation 
actions had taken a variety of forms prior to 1991, ranging from violent protests, the 
formation of explicitly anti-reservation worker’s organizations, failed implementation 
and harassment of Dalits. I further highlight three key developments after 1950: 1) the 
formation of a Dalit middle class, 2) the intensification of atrocities against Dalits and 3) 
the increased militancy of Dalit activism. Tracing these socio-political developments vis-
à-vis caste and reservation politics prior to 1991, I argue that a novel political subjectivity 
became central to evaluating the impact of reservation policy in India, namely, the middle 	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class, educated Dalit. This subject position is inconceivable without the constitutional 
guarantee of reservations that is Ambedkar’s legacy, thus indicating the deeply 
entrenched nature of caste discrimination. However, the association with reservation 
policy also stigmatizes Dalits as inferior subjects who require the assistance of the quota 
to access education and employment.  
 I explore the representation of this subject in three narratives about caste, 
untouchability and class mobility: 1) “Scheduled Caste, Unscheduled Change” in Shashi 
Tharoor’s India: From Midnight to Millennium, 2) “Promotion” by Arjun Dangle and 3) 
“The Story of My Sanskrit” by Kumud Pawde. Dangle’s short story and Pawde’s 
autobiographical work are taken from the edited volume Poisoned Bread: Translations 
from Modern Marathi Dalit Literature. Attending to the divergent representations across 
these texts, I consider the significance of the middle class Dalit subject in contending 
political projects. In Tharoor’s liberal modernist account of national progress, this subject 
signifies the successful movement of India towards a modern casteless society. However, 
the existence of the middle class Dalit and his privileged children also prove that the 
reservation policy has outlived its purpose. By linking state benefits to caste identity, its 
continued existence threatens to reverse national progress. In contrast, the selections from 
Poisoned Bread show that far from enabling the transcendence of caste, reservations have 
facilitated novel encounters between upper caste and Scheduled Caste subjects that reveal 
the pervasiveness and adaptability of discriminatory practices. Class mobility among the 
latter is represented as a process marked by isolation and humiliation, thus revealing the 
limits of individual success in the absence of collective community mobilization.  
 If evaluated as a measure to address economic backwardness, the emergence of a 
Dalit middle class suggests the (qualified) success of constitutionally mandated 
reservations. On the other hand, an oft-heard critique of affirmative action policies within 
and beyond India is that the upward mobility of a handful of individuals does not 
contribute to greater equality and social justice in society. Both of these assessments 
foreclose the question of how Dalits navigate shifts in class, caste and spatial locations, 
and what contingent political possibilities emerge from these shifts. Gyanendra Pandey’s 
essay “Can There be a Subaltern Middle Class? Notes on African American and Dalit 
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History” provides a useful entry point into this line of inquiry.276 Pandey’s interest is in 
the particular political and psychological challenges that come with the emergence of an 
“ex-slave” or “ex-untouchable” middle class. He asks what the history of these struggles 
can tell us about the conditions necessary for the consolidation of particular groups as 
middle class, modern and unmarked. The article thus interrogates the normative aspects 
of the category “middle class” and the idea of “middle-classness” which go beyond 
designation of economic status. Historically the middle class has been affiliated with the 
principles of meritocracy, equality and individualism. Having neither the benefit of 
aristocratic wealth nor the afflictions of inherited poverty, middle classes have been 
portrayed as the makers of their own destiny through self-improvement, education, moral 
reform and individual effort.277 Those who do not attain this class location are simply not 
determined or talented enough. Notions of middle class respectability are built around a 
group of individuals who supposedly pursue their private interests in well designated 
public and private spaces, leaving the task of organizing society to “experts”, themselves 
ordinary middle class individuals in another capacity.278  
Pandey argues that a major difference between the European and North American 
middle classes of the nineteenth century and the colonized middle classes in Asia and 
Africa in the twentieth century is the widespread participation of the latter in anti-colonial 
nationalist movements. Formed under the imperial gaze, the colonized middle classes 
spoke not only for themselves, but also for their people who had been marked as 
“backward” and whom they must represent and lead into the modern.279 However, this 
markedly political orientation was temporary. With the naturalization of nation and 
nation-state, the colonized middle classes assumed unmarked citizenship. They became 
the mainstream of modern, national development.280 Class mobility among the internally 
colonized – Blacks in the United States and Dalits in India – took place at a later stage, in 
altered historical and political conditions. Experiences such as racial profiling, protests 
against affirmative action and segregation in housing markets continually mark these 	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subjects as different from the normative middle class citizen. Their historical, cultural and 
familial connections to rural and working class communities also generate distinct 
political commitments that prevent assimilation into an undifferentiated class identity. 
Thus, the anonymity of unmarked modern subjectivity is unavailable to the subaltern 
middle classes. Pandey notes that wider society often calls on Dalit writers and 
intellectuals to “remember what ‘we’ have done for you”, while members of their 
community urge them not to forget where they came from, to stay close to the 
community’s experience and foreground it wherever possible.281 This has resulted in a 
history of struggle in which Dalits are confronted with the choice between inhabiting an 
insistently political identity linked to caste and a seemingly non-political location of class 
privilege.282 Pandey highlights the feelings of guilt, anxiety and betrayal that mediate the 
individual choices of Dalits as they negotiate the contradictions of their caste-class 
location. These affective responses indicate the inherently political nature of the subaltern 
middle class, denied the luxury of apolitical private individualism because their success is 
always related to the broader status of their community.   
Dalit activists and writers have widely chosen creative literature and 
autobiography as sites for reflection on and theorization of these experiences. The subtle, 
visceral aspects of power relations captured in literature provides insight into how class 
mobility intersects with discrimination and community obligations in the production of 
political subjectivities. For example, in the introduction to his memoir, Arvind Malagatti 
considers his identity as a Dalit in terms of his appearance as an urban professional in 
crisp, white clothes. The class privilege signified by white clothing alienates him from his 
village community. He is seen as a “big man” and friends and neighbors are no longer at 
ease with him. However, his caste identity is an unspeakable difference amongst the 
“white-clad” in urban academic settings:  
If I were to go to my old friends as a white-clad gentlemen, they would not accept 
me as they did before. And with my white-clad friends, if I were to talk about my 
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Mali-ness, they would stare at me, bewildered. This contradiction mocks me. 
Whenever I am gripped by such thoughts, I chuckle instantly despite the pain.283 
In Malagatti’s text the “choice” between a politicized Dalit identity and a non-political 
class location is rarely a matter of individual preference. The anonymity of unmarked 
modern subjectivity is unavailable to him even as the authenticity of his experience as 
Dalit is called into question, both by other Dalits and by upper-caste, white clad society. 
The difficulty of speaking about caste among the latter without provoking skepticism and 
discomfort suggests that Dalits are expected to minimize their “Dalit-ness” in public 
spaces. In these encounters the burden of transcending caste identity is disproportionately 
transferred to Dalit bodies, while upper caste privilege is naturalized as unmarked 
subjectivity. Malagatti does not attempt to reconcile or transcend the contradictions of his 
class-caste location. Rather, contradiction and pain constitute the space from which his 
political interventions are made. Thus he points to a different kind of political choice 
made by Dalits, namely, to “live with dignity and pride before the eyes of those who 
mock them. Therefore, I flash a victorious smile whenever questions about my existence 
are raised in seminars and workshops”. This suggests the political potential of disrupting 
and de-naturalizing spaces of caste privilege.284 Dalit middle-classness can then serve as 
a location from which new critiques of casteism in Indian society are generated.    
 My analysis will show how representations of the middle class Dalit constitute a 
site for the re-production of upper-caste subjectivity, which informs the articulation of 
anti-caste subjectivities. In the writings of elite, seemingly unmarked national citizens, 
the middle class Dalit is the object through which the terms and limits of upper caste guilt 
are staged. Guilt is subsequently transformed into justified resentment of a policy that 
creates “reverse discrimination” towards upper castes. The politicization of Dalits in the 
1970s involved an explicit rejection of their constitution as objects of upper caste pity and 
guilt, and asserted the rights to power and self-representation.  Forms of political protest 
and literature that emerged in this context showed how these affective responses 
sustained caste based power relations. At the same time, the discrimination and 
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humiliation faced by professional Dalits in institutions from which they had been 
historically excluded revealed that the violence of the caste system was firmly entrenched 
in structures of modernity and urbanization. Critical awareness of upper caste perceptions 
about lower castes, in particular their expectations that the latter be docile, compliant and 
grateful for the former’s benevolence, was linked to articulations of militant, 
confrontational Dalit subjectivity.  
 The chapter is organized into the following sections. First, I outline the 
developmental project institutionalized by the post-colonial nation-state. In this project it 
was assumed that the transcendence of caste identity was an inevitable consequence of 
modern national development. I highlight how this assumption structured the production 
of knowledge about caste in academic scholarship and in Shashi Tharoor’s chapter 
“Scheduled Caste, Unscheduled Change”. The next section reviews early assessments of 
reservations in order to chart the ways in which the policy was implemented, perceived, 
opposed and strategized around. I then consider two prominent forms of Dalit 
politicization emerging in this context: the Dalit Panther movement and Dalit literature. It 
will be seen that limited class mobility took place against heightened economic 
insecurity, landlessness, and the re-constitution of caste discrimination in the modern-
secular spaces of the nation-state. Re-visiting these decades in which Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes were the only communities eligible for reservation reveals links 
between upper caste resistance to the policy and Dalit political assertion. The policy of 
reservation was seen as fueling this assertion as it emboldened Dalits to reject the upper 
caste terms of national integration. In this context middle class subjectivity became a 
critical point of reflection among Panther and literary activists. I attend to their analysis 
of the fragmentation of Dalit communities along class lines through a reading of Dangle’s 
and Pawde’s contributions in Poisoned Bread. 
 
Modernization, Development and the Nehruvian Nation-State 
 One of the principal arguments of the anti-colonial nationalist movement was that 
colonial rule obstructed the modern economic development of Indian society. It was only 
through a sovereign nation-state that such development could be meaningfully carried 
out.  The traumatic experiences of the India-Pakistan partition further strengthened the 
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emphasis on economic development as a basis for national unity capable of cutting across 
community differences. Expressing a commitment to science and secularism, the 
Nehruvian state would be an agent of modernization for structures and sentiments. As 
Partha Chatterjee argues, economic development connected the legal-political 
sovereignty of the state with the sovereignty of the people - state power would be 
exercised for the wellbeing of the people.285 Chatterjee theorizes the politics of national 
development through Gramsci’s concept of the passive revolution. The objective of a 
passive revolution is to contain class conflict within manageable dimensions and to 
control and manipulate dispersed power relations in society to further accumulation. In 
the passive revolution the state as mobilizer and manager of national resources had to 
plan development in a way that avoided the unnecessary rigors of social conflict, such as 
agrarian political mobilizations and land reform.286 Accordingly, the new nation-state 
barely altered the basic structures and institutions of colonial rule, nor did it mount a full-
scale assault on all pre-capitalist dominant classes. State elites explained development 
and modernization to national audiences in terms of bold ambitions, but also stressed the 
necessarily partial and gradual nature of these processes.287  
The modernizing and developmental vision of the Indian nation-state rested on 
the sharp differentiation of society from polity and of elite from the masses.288 The 
modalities of development reflected the image of a rational state and national elite that 
stood above the parochial interests of civil society. Chatterjee argues that the constitution 
of the planning commission exemplified the perceived need for a body of experts 
removed from the “squabbles and conflicts of politics” to determine the material 
allocation of productive resources within the nation.289  According to Roy, discourses 
about the backward masses and the need for science to remove backwardness provided a 	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means of staging national consent to and acceptance of the state’s decisions and actions. 
Thus, the developmental state held the lack of science to be the primary national problem 
and the “need for science” as the most urgent and palpable.290 Science here signified both 
as production of expertise and the widespread diffusion of a “scientific temperment” 
among the people. Correspondingly, science as a modality of improvement was targeted 
at two significant challenges: 1) the lack of basic essentials of life and 2) the persistence 
of narrow mindedness and resistance to change. Particularly in rural India, statist 
discourse translated all expressions of popular discontent and social unrest into one of 
these overarching problems.291 The idea that India was predominantly rural, poor, 
illiterate and locked into pre-modern social hierarchies justified the upper caste takeover 
of the institutions of capitalism, science and technology. The scientific expert was 
envisioned as different from the rest of the Indian population - in Nehru’s words, one 
who was dispassionate, objective and without the propensity to “froth and foam.”292 The 
need to produce trained and qualified individuals was thus balanced with the imperative 
of exclusivity.293 The latter was linked to the assumption that the quality of scientists 
could only be maintained by limiting the number of research institutes. Nehru stated “I 
am all for democracy but normally democracy means mediocrity too.”294 Thus the newly 
emerging centres of modern development created a system of collaborative mechanisms 
with the privileged castes – as ideal scientists and ideal planners - which allowed 
subaltern castes only a marginal role.295  
 The Nehruvian elite claimed a pan-Indian identity which seemed to be place-less, 
caste-less and class-less; an elite that spoke the language of secularism, technology, 
modernization and economic development.296 Reservations were implemented in a 
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context where mentioning one’s caste was considered a retrograde, un-modern practice. 
In the assumed differentiation of modern elites from backward masses, religious and 
caste-based conflicts were perceived as 1) remnants of pre-modern, unscientific belief or 
2) the products of false consciousness masking objective economic realities.297 That is, 
these identity-based conflicts were generated among the backward masses and not the 
modern secular middle class. In Bannerjee-Dube’s analysis, the confinement of caste to 
the domain of religion and ritual allowed planners to share Nehru’s belief that the project 
of nation building – the spread of education, democratic rights and developmental 
measures – would gradually erode the structures of caste.298  Caste and community got 
marked as what lay outside of, was other than, middle class and became excessively 
identified with “lower” or “backward” caste. Thus the subject position of the unmarked, 
caste-less citizen was imagined from the perspective of Brahaminical superiority. 
Tellingly, Nehru described the ideal scientist as one who cared little for individual gains 
and devoted himself to what “we in India consider the Brahminic spirit of service”.299 
This statement indicates the concentration of structural and symbolic power among a 
privileged minority.   
The relations of power enabling this particular formation of unmarked secular 
citizenship also organized the production of knowledge about caste. It is perhaps 
unsurprising then, that two of the most influential scholars of caste, G.S. Ghurye and 
M.N. Srinavas, both argued strongly against the policy of reservation. For example, 
Srinavas expressed his sympathy for the Brahmins of Mysore and their distress about 
caste quotas for appointments in the administration and in scientific and technological 
courses. He could not help being sensitive to 
the steady deterioration in efficiency and the fouling of interpersonal relations in 
academic circles and the administration – both results of a policy of caste 
quotas…conflicts between castes and castes prevented concentration on the all-
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important task of developing the economic resources of the state for the benefit of 
all sections of the population.300  
The reference to deterioration and fouling of spaces by Dalit presence registers how 
notions of lower caste bodies as polluting persisted in secular elite discourse. 
Significantly, Srinavas’ theory of Sanskritization is one of the most influential 
interpretations of social mobility among subaltern communities. It was intimately tied to 
the rhetoric of “modernization” and “development” of the newly independent state of 
India.301 Sanskritization refers to processes whereby a caste group with “low” ritual status 
changes its customs, rituals and way of life in the direction of a “high” or twice born 
caste.302 It involves claims for upward social mobility through status emulation with 
Brahmanical codes of conduct setting the standard. Srinavas observed that this process 
accelerated during British colonialism but did not theorize the connections between 
colonial relations of rule and contestations over caste status.303 Rather, he argued that 
Sanskritization unfolded across variations in time and space: “the process is a traditional 
medium of expression for change within the caste system and directs change in such a 
way that all-India values are asserted and the homogeneity of the entire Hindu society 
increases.”304 In the previous chapter, it was seen that the integration of subaltern castes 
was considered necessary for the consolidation of a Hindu community.  This is reflected 
in Srinavas’ framework, as the community is defined in relation to Brahminical values, 
which are presented as “all-India” values. As Pandian notes, the teleological scheme in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Social Change in Modern India, 152-153. Cited in M.S.S. Pandian, “One Step Outside 
Modernity: Caste, Identity Politics and Public Sphere,” Economic and Political Weekly, 
May 4 2002, 1738.	  301	  Banerjee-Dube, Caste in History, xxii. 	  
302 For example, in changing to a vegetarian diet, abstaining from alcohol and enforcing 
gender norms associated with upper castes – ban on widow remarriage, restriction of 
women’s labor outside the home.	  
303 Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks have discussed the petitions for changes in caste 
status in the census during colonialism in relation to the material benefits of employment 
and scholarships distributed on a caste basis. A key reason for the abandonment of caste 
as a census category in 1931 was due to the large amount of petitions for change in caste 
status. 	  
304 M.N. Srinavas, “ A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization,” The Far Eastern 
Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1956): 494.	  
111	  
Srinavas’ work moved from lower caste practices, to sanskritization to westernization.305 
The theory thus assumes harmonious social transformations among castes through ritual 
adaptation and neglects the question of the material violence involved in the maintenance 
of caste: “Sanskritization embodied the hope of independent India that in every way the 
subordinated castes would become more like those above them and that would be the end 
of the problem.”306 For the secular elite, social mobility was unimaginable outside of the 
cultural politics of Brahminical superiority.  
 A similar concern with the consolidation of a Hindu community and the position 
of subaltern castes is reflected in G.S. Ghurye’s essay “A Casteless Society or a Plural 
Society”, published in the 5th edition of his seminal text Caste and Race in India.307 The 
thesis of the essay is that the state’s inability to eliminate reservations is contributing to 
the entrenchment of caste politics in India and thus defeating the objective of achieving a 
casteless society.308 The essay proposes that population groups should be gradually 
disqualified from quotas. It argues that the Constitution has created ambiguity about the 
category “backward class”, which frustrate attempts to phase out the policy. Alongside 
and animating this legalistic mode of critique, however, are the passionate articulations of 
the modern nationalist distressed by the heightened visibility of caste in public spaces. 
Ghurye argues that the problem of caste in independent India arises mainly out of caste 
patriotism, which inhibits the development of national consciousness. The spread of 
journals, trusts and associations by different caste communities in the post-independence 
period is identified as evidence of the growth of caste sentiment and solidarity. Moreover, 
the Congress Party is held responsible for encouraging such trends. Ghurye supports this 
claim with reference to Nehru’s attendance at a Scheduled Caste legislator’s convention. 
He finds this a particularly distressing moment as Nehru had otherwise shown himself to 
be a staunch critic of caste patriotism. Recalling this moment Ghurye states: 
I should point out that it was worse than a one-caste conference. It was a 
conference of a group of castes, which, though inter se socially opposed to one 
another and insistent on social segregation inter se, had come together to secure a 	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larger size of the national cake by reservation, which may be leisurely divided and 
distributed amongst themselves.309 
In this passage Scheduled Castes are identified as the principle agents responsible for 
perpetuating caste identity and thus preventing national unity. The SC legislators 
organizing across divisions of their sub-castes are read as greedy and disingenuous. They 
mask their own discriminatory practices for the sake of reservation. The investments in 
Brahmanic superiority are betrayed in this inability to see SCs apart from their sub-caste. 
By arguing that their actual interests are derived from sub-caste identity, Ghurye 
essentializes these identities. All signs of political organizing are seen as an assault on 
Hindusim: “the enterprise of turning a caste into a total community and of atomoizing the 
Hindu society is…a vigorous growth of the post-independence era.”310 It is not 
conceivable for the author that these collaborations could be an attempt to overcome the 
graded hierarchy of caste by identifying common struggles among different SC 
communities, or that such processes might create more expansive forms of identity.    
D.R. Nagaraj describes the caste system as a mosaic of different contestations of 
descriptions of dignity, religiosity, and entitlements; total consensus on all issues has 
never existed in theory or practice. However,“ the brahminical view is a statement of the 
monolithic unity of all the three realms: lower castes have no dignity, their religiosity is a 
sham, and their right to entitlements is next to nothing.”311 The texts of Ghurye and 
Srinavas reflect such a unity. In Sanskritization theory a dignified existence can only be 
grasped at through emulation of a higher caste. The subaltern’s actions are motivated by a 
desire for and thus belief in ritual status. Insofar as reservations create “investments in 
backwardness”, they are disruptive of the organic processes of Sanskritization. By linking 
state resources to a lower caste identity, the policy discourages the status emulation of 
upper castes. In Ghurye’s essay SC political organizing indicates the extent of greed for 
entitlements.  Assigning primacy to the sub-caste identity of SC subjects in interpreting 
their political motivations, Ghurye retains the power of naming and classification for the 
Brahminical subject. A telling indication of how such views extend across scholarly and 
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anecdotal registers is the emergence of the term “Government Brahmin” to refer to SCs 
in the post-colonial reservations system. The insult is an expression of caste Hindu 
resentment that characterizes the SC as an undeserving recipient of state resources and an 
artificially constructed respectability that the subject does not inherently possess. It also 
exposes the inability of the modern middle classes to think beyond caste. The next 
section will examine the limits of the secular subjects tolerance for reservation through a 
reading of Shashi Tharoor’s account of the nation-state’s assault on caste.     
 
Caste and the Politics of Guilt in “Scheduled Caste, Unscheduled Change” 
The central challenge of India as we enter the 21st century is the challenge of 
accommodating the aspirations of different groups in the national dream…the battle for 
India’s soul will thus be between two Hinduisms, the secularist Indianism of the 
nationalist movement and the particularist fanaticism of the Ayodhya mob. 312 
 Published in 1997, India: From Midnight to Millennium commemorates the 50th 
year of independence through affirmation of an irreducibly plural vision of Indian 
society. It is written primarily for a Western audience unfamiliar with India’s 
overwhelming diversity as well as its relevance for key global debates on democracy, 
globalization and religious fundamentalisms. As the passage above suggests, however, 
the commitment to a secular, pluralist national vision also represents a political 
intervention specific to the political conditions of 1990s India. Tharoor devotes much 
space to lamenting how the exclusionary politics of Hindu right wing parties has gained 
ground at the expense of the India of tolerance and accommodation in which he had 
grown up. Narrating his visit in 1992 after the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 
Ayodhya, he observes how “educated people uttered thoughts that once they would not 
have considered respectable to formulate, let alone express.”313 The significance of the 
Masjid affair is linked to the other key episode emblematic of the political upheavals of 
the 1990s, the Mandal Commission controversy over the extension of reservation to 
“Other Backward Classes” in central government employment, which is the subject of 
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Chapter 3. Both are implicated in a divisive politics that threaten identification with 
India. From Tharoor’s liberal perspective right wing upper caste Hindus and marginalized 
caste groups converge as threats to a united nation-state. The difference in power and 
political objectives between the two groups is irrelevant for him.  This analysis depends 
on a specific understanding of caste as a transitory aberration bearing no relevance to the 
secular nation-state or to the category “Hindu”. Indeed, Tharoor’s plural vision relies on 
the notion of India as essentially Hindu:  
The sad irony is that India’s coexistence was paradoxically made possible by the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of Indians are Hindus…As a Hindu, I claim 
adherence to a religion without an established church or priestly papacy, a 
religion whose rituals and customs I am free to reject…I belong to the only major 
religion in the world that does not claim to be the only true religion.314 
 No other religion and thus religious community, is capable of such tolerance. This 
passage echoes the arguments made in the Constituent Assembly about the benevolence 
and goodwill of the majority community as the best guarantee for the protection of 
minorities in the nation-state. Secular nationalists distinguish themselves from Hindutva 
politics based on their tolerance for minorities, especially Muslims. However, Tharoor 
shares with the right wing politics he rejects the belief that the basis of the nation is a 
stable Hindu majority community. Both ignore the alternative spiritual-political 
trajectories of Dalit communities. The implications of this for the text’s approach to the 
caste question are illustrated in the chapter “Scheduled Caste, Unscheduled Change”.  
 The chapter is distinguished from others in the book by Tharoor’s decision to tell 
a story about social transformation vis-à-vis caste almost entirely from his own personal 
experiences. The chapter situates affirmative action within a narrative of national 
integration from the perspective of an (upper caste) urban middle class subject. The 
narrative unfolds as a series of pedagogical encounters that are formative to his 
knowledge of caste relations. All of these moments take place during annual visits to his 
ancestral village in Kerala - caste does not exist in the modern cosmopolitan city of 
Bombay. The rural landscape is completely alien, causing disorientation and discomfort 
for the urban subject. This is felt in the absence of electric lights, ceiling fans, cars and 	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other amenities of urban life. More importantly, Tharoor is disoriented by the pervasive 
relations of power that structure social life, rendering oppressive the intimacy and 
familiarity of the village. In this context an eight-year old English speaking Bombayite 
encounters Charlis. Charlis is a quiet Dalit boy who the other children insult and exclude 
from their social activities. Tharoor senses that the treatment of Charlis has something to 
do with the “complicated hierarchies that everyone seemed to take for granted…but since 
he was neither female nor particularly young, I couldn’t fit him into what I already knew 
of Kerala village life.”315 Although he is repeatedly instructed to avoid Charlis, the young 
Tharoor is unsettled by this form of exclusion he cannot name, expressing a child’s sense 
of pre-political justice. Considering this retrospectively, he assumes that his discomfort 
with the treatment of Charlis was likely due to an urban, “Bombayite” sense of fairness.  
 The rural here represents a space of pre-modern hierarchy where rules are 
understood and unquestioningly obeyed. As the narrative progresses the increasing 
presence of the state begins to reorganize life in the village. The modern development of 
Kerala parallels the incremental inclusion of Charlis into upper caste spaces. The arrival 
of schools, medical clinics and electricity signal the transformation of rural life. Amidst 
these changes Tharoor notices that Charlis now plays football with his cousins, but is still 
unable to enter their home. The restriction is temporary however. With the appearance of 
tube lights, plastic mugs and flush toilets marking the passing of time, “one year, one 
day, quite naturally, Charlis stepped into the house with the other kids after a game.”316 
However, “he can’t sit at our table or be fed on our plates…even the servants would not 
wash a plate off which an Untouchable had eaten.”317 To circumvent this segregation of 
meals, he and his widowed aunt - who is also constrained by religious tradition and hence 
sympathetic - feed Charlis on a disposable banana leaf near the back door. In this way, 
the urban secular (upper caste) subject can simultaneously assuage his guilt and maintain 
Brahminical norms of segregation in his home. Indeed, throughout these moments in 
which the reader is shown the many exclusions endured by Charlis the urban subject 
never explicitly challenges the practice of untouchability within his family. He notes that 
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his parents changed their surname in rejection of the caste system, but does not question 
why they are unmoved by these ongoing practices. It is the nation-state, manifested in 
modern infrastructure and commodities, that is the primary agent of social reform. In this 
way the narrative expresses the frustration of a modern liberal subject with pre-modern 
irrationalities but also stresses the patience required from this subject for incremental 
changes in society.  
 The suitability of this liberal-reformist approach to caste sociality for the rural 
Indian context is supported by the representation of Charlis, the only Dalit subject of the 
narrative. He exists in isolation from Dalit social spaces, communities and importantly, 
the growing political movements of the 60s and 70s claiming dignity for Dalits and 
rejecting the Hindu social order. The prominent anti-caste intellectual traditions of 
Southern and Western India are absent from his educational experience. Rather, Charlis 
quotes from the imperial canon of Shakespeare and Kipling about the timeless bonds of 
humanity that exist beyond markers of difference. In this he is seen as innocently inferior: 
“But who cares, Charlis? He’s (Kipling) just an imperialist old fart. What does anything 
he ever wrote have to do with any of us today, in independent India?”318 Throughout the 
narrative Charlis waits with patience and docility for integration into the national 
mainstream. Through quiet dedication and “thanks to India’s extraordinary affirmative 
action programs” he is admitted to Trivandrum University and recruited as an officer in 
the Indian Administrative Service. In this way, Charlis embodies the vision of progress 
articulated by the upper-caste elite: the removal of caste stigma through the route of 
access to modern institutions of the university and government office. This process 
enables his acceptance in upper caste hearts and homes. This moment is captured in 
Charlis’s last appearance in the narrative. As an IAS officer, Charlis is requested by 
Tharoor’s family to help protect their land amidst Kerala’s program of land re-
distribution. Upon helping them regain some of their land Charlis is finally invited to 
dine at their home. The author remembers this moment with pride and satisfaction, which 
signifies the transformation of the untouchable body:  
…Charlis steps down, in his off-white safari suit and open toed sandals, and 
walks to our front door…we greet him there, usher him into the house, but 	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Balettan stops us outside. For a minute all the old fears come flooding back into 
my mind and Charlis’s, but it is only for a minute, because Balettan is shouting 
out to the servant, “Can’t you see the Collector-Saare is waiting? Hurry up!” I 
catch Charlis’s eye; he smiles. The servant pulls a bucketful of water out of the 
well to wash Charlis’s feet.319 
If the body is a vehicle for the naturalization of power, the transformation of Charlis in 
this passage indicates the transfer of authority from the pre-modern caste system to the 
modern nation-state. The removal of caste stigma from the Dalit body involves 
association with those markers of modernity so desirable that upper castes can no longer 
practice untouchablity. IAS officer Charlis is integrated into the re-constituted rural space 
as seamlessly as roads and electricity. However, the respect Charlis receives is 
simultaneous to the assertion of control over the family servant. 
The chapter concludes by placing these personal experiences in a broader context:  
“This is a story about change, democratic change, the kind that India has sought to 
promote for fifty years since independence.”320 For the benefit of the reader for whom 
caste is probably as foreign a concept as it was for the young Tharoor himself, a brief 
introduction is given to its scriptural basis and corresponding division of labor. The key 
shift accelerating the transformation of this centuries old system is the nationalist 
movement: “…it is easy to see why Gandhi and the more enlightened of India’s 
nationalists, anxious to unite the country against the foreign colonizer, campaigned 
passionately against the caste system.”321 Dalit struggles have no place in this trajectory. 
It is modernity and particularly the anonymity of urban life that renders caste practices 
unsustainable.  
…it is hardly possible to know the caste of the straphanger rubbing shoulders with 
you on the bus or jostling past you on the street, or for that matter of the cook who 
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made the meal you ate in an anonymous restaurant…the stigma of caste is 
disappearing more rapidly in Indian cities than that of race in the United States.322  
Inability to confirm caste equates to inability to practice untouchability. Accordingly, a 
descriptive list of caste atrocities is presented by the author and swiftly dismissed as 
lingering vestiges of pre-modern attitudes in rural India. Rape, lynchings and burning 
bodies are “not cause for despair” about the prospects of social change. 
  After celebrating “independent India’s determination to compensate for millennia 
of injustice to its social underclasses”323, Tharoor’s confidence in this mode of social 
change begins to subside, giving way to fears that affirmative action is extending beyond 
its justified limits. While the progress of Charlis represents the nation’s enlightened 
constitutional commitments to justice, the temporal and demographic extension of this 
commitment has increased “caste consciousness and casteism throughout Indian 
society.”324 The politics of guilt and pity have morphed into upper caste resentment of 
middle class Dalits. This class unjustifiably continues to retain their caste identities in 
order to get ahead. Inevitably then, “Caste Hindus have increasingly come to resent the 
offspring of cabinet ministers, for instance, benefitting from reservations and lower entry 
thresholds into university and government that were designed to compensate for 
disadvantages these scions of privilege have never personally experienced.”325 Further, 
with the implementation of the Mandal Commission, “lower middle castes” have 
contaminated the electoral system by mobilizing voters through identity politics. It is 
numerical strength rather than any meaningful political platform that accounts for their 
electoral success. The upper caste elites who long ago rejected their caste identities now 
confront a reality in which “caste is suddenly all important again. You can’t go forward 
unless you are a backward.”326 The limits of upper caste guilt are staged in this moment 
of intensified assertion of subaltern castes, subjects that were expected to disappear in the 
secular liberal vision of social transformation. The imagined middle class Dalit subject 
marks the parameters of upper caste guilt because class mobility implies the absence of 	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discrimination. “In other words, if you think Charlis has made it, wait till you see his 
son.”327  
 
Assessing Reservations in the Context of Nehruvian Developmentalism  
 In “Scheduled Castes, Unscheduled Change” Tharoor explains the extraordinary 
nature of reservation policy through the case of political representation: “…it means that 
a caste Hindu (or for that matter, a Muslim or a Christian) from a reserved constituency 
cannot seek to represent his own neighbors in parliament, because only Scheduled Caste 
candidates are eligible to contest the seat.”328 This image of the earnest caste Hindu 
deprived of the opportunity to represent his neighbors exemplifies how the secular 
subject’s pride in the constitutional commitment to an egalitarian society can be 
reconciled with the sense that reservation does injustice to the upper caste subject. It 
assumes that the SC politician represents the interests of his/her particular community, 
whereas the Caste Hindu seeks to represent the general interest of the constituency. The 
latter sees all as neighbors not as castes.  
A closer look at the trajectory of political reservations complicates this 
understanding of caste relations and forms of exclusion in reserved constituencies. In 
most reserved constituencies SCs constitute a minority, rarely exceeding 20-30 percent of 
the population. This significantly compromises the ability of SC communities to elect 
independent and assertive candidates because caste Hindu votes ultimately determine 
election results. Moreover, 75 percent of SCs reside in non-reserved constituencies329. SC 
politicians also lack the group and individual economic resources with which to fight 
elections. In the 50s and 60s such barriers to harnessing reservations towards autonomous 
Dalit politics were further compounded by the well-honed Congress strategy of co-opting 
SC leaders and mobilizing caste Hindu votes to secure their election. The Congress 
strategy sought to contain Ambedkarite anti-caste politics through the promotion of SC 
candidates that subscribed to a Gandhian framework of social reform. The success of this 
strategy was seen in the defeat of Ambedkar himself against relatively unknown 	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Congress candidates in 1952 and 1954. “The Congress had been able to prove that even 
political nonentities could humble the mighty leader.”330  
 The political possibilities of reserved constituencies were also shaped by the shift 
in conditions from colonial rule to nation-state formation. During colonial rule claiming 
minority status for SCs was necessary in order to gain separate representation in 
governance structures. The potential gains of claiming minority status were curtailed after 
the transfer of power due to the hegemony of the Congress Party and the particular 
delimitation of reserved constituencies. The political realities of independent India 
required coalition and alliance politics.331 This lesson was illustrated by the Scheduled 
Caste Federation’s lack of success in the first general election of 1952.  The realization 
that SCs would be unable to gain political power without alliances with other social 
groups led to the formation of the Republican Party of India in 1957. The RPI sought a 
deliberate dilution of Dalit identity in order to “engage itself in organizing the down 
trodden masses of India particularly the Buddhists, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes 
and other Backward Classes.” 332 The RPI took pains to establish itself as a non-
communal party dedicated to the cause of social and economic equality, avoiding specific 
references to untouchability except in relation to broader notions of inequality in Indian 
society.333 This re-orientation towards coalition politics managed to yield initial results in 
Maharashtra and subsequently Uttar Pradesh (UP).334 The party’s election manifesto of 
1962 focused heavily on economic issues including land nationalization and collective 
farming, control of the distribution and prices of food grains, implementation of the 1948 
Minimum Wage Act and increase in recruitment of SCs and STs in government 
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services.335 However, significant disagreements existed among Dalit communities as to 
the implications of marginalizing caste specific issues, particularly untouchability, in 
favor of a class basis of organization. Tensions around caste and class were exacerbated 
by the heterogeneity of Dalit sub-castes, rural-urban divisions and generational conflict. 
Thus, Rao argues that initial struggles of this movement were over who had the authority 
to represent the Dalit as political subject.336 These tensions manifested in electoral 
politics and by 1974 the RPI had split into four factions.  This further enabled Congress 
strategies of cooption of militant Dalit leaders.  
Assessments of SC politicians in parliament often relate performance to the issue 
of Congress cooption. For example, in his thorough study of reservation policy Marc 
Galanter notes the widespread belief that reserved seat legislators are less articulate, less 
assertive, and less independent than their Caste Hindu counterparts.337 In the first two 
decades after independence, SCs in legislatures did not forcefully articulate the cause of 
their communities since they were not accountable to them: there was not even one 
constituency with a majority of SC voters.338 Assumptions about the meekness of SC 
politicians contributed to an understanding of political reservations as resulting in the 
creation of a de-politicized, privileged elite isolated from Dalit communities and only 
interested in preserving their own quotas. However, Barbara Joshi reminds us that in this 
line of argumentation, any positive developments in the status of untouchables since 
independence are regarded as the result of basic changes in Indian society and/or the 
efforts of reform-minded leaders from the dominant castes.339 Alternate studies have 
shown that support for redistributive policies such as ceilings on rural land and urban 
property and cooperative farming were considerably higher and more consistent among 
SC Congress MPs than those of Caste Hindu background.340  Also given the early onset 
of opposition to reservation policies and attempts to eliminate them completely and/or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution, 110.	  
336 Rao, The Caste Question, 185. 	  
337 Galanter, Competing Equalities, 51. 	  
338 Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution, 113. 	  
339 “‘Ex-Untouchable’: Problems, Progress and Policies in Indian Social Change,” Pacific 
Affairs 53, no. 2 (Summer 1980): 213.	  
340 Stanley Kochanek, “The Relation between Social Background and Attitudes of Indian 
Legislators,” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 6, (1968): 34-53. In Ibid., 216. 	  
122	  
disqualify millions of sub-castes from the Schedule, the former’s role has often been that 
of defending and improving existing provisions. Thus the relationship between strategies 
of cooption and necessarily meek and ineffective political elites should be complicated 
with consideration of the structural constraints of participation in electoral politics, a 
broader context of caste inequalities and the regional, political and linguistic differences 
between SCs themselves.  
 The terrain of reservations in education and employment further illustrates the 
uneven and contradictory impact of reservations in the production of a Dalit middle class. 
The record of implementation shows that there has been no sincere effort by the elite or 
political parties to respect the Constitutional provisions.  Significant variation exists 
among government agencies in time of implementation, ranging from 7 to 23 years.341 
Numerous agencies are exempt from implementation on the premise that expertise and 
national security outweigh issues of equity in their cases. Exemptions are permitted for 
positions in the ministries of Defense, Law, Finance, the Planning Commission and in the 
Prime Ministerial and Presidential offices. The Reserve Bank of India rejected the policy 
as early as 1954 and it took 13 years for the government to persuade the institution to 
adopt it.342 At the same time a large number of reserved seats were (and continue to be) 
left unfilled on the premise that a suitably qualified candidate could not be recruited. 
Galanter argues that because there is a lack of thoughtful awareness of the intentions and 
purpose of reserving government posts, arguments about unavailability of candidates are 
accepted as a matter of course.343 The general trend of SC employment also reveals their 
concentration in the lowest categories of government service. In some cases this 
recruitment corresponds to rather than subverts the relation between caste and 
occupation. For example, sweepers employed by the administration in category 4 come 
mostly from the caste group historically assigned to this occupation.344  
 Despite this dismal record of promoting equity in government service through 
reservation, the very existence of the policies breed widespread resentment among Caste 
Hindu workers that is disproportionate to its actual impact. Resentment towards SCs 	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entering spaces historically seen as Caste Hindu domains took institutional form well 
before the spectacular protests against the Mandal Commission. For example, in the 
formation of the following organizations: Himachal Pradesh Anti-Reservation Employees 
Union (1979), All India Non Scheduled Caste Welfare Association (Punjab, 1980) and 
All-India Non-Reserved Employees Association (1980). 345 As such, the very policies 
expected to eliminate caste discrimination through occupational de-segregation became 
the object around which upper-castes organized to protect their interests in the modern-
secular spaces of government and public sector offices. This undermines the notion of the 
secular, caste-less middle class of the Nehruvian nation-state. In particular its self-
representation as a meritorious, hardworking class in contrast to undeserving Scheduled 
Caste bodies bloated on government resources. 
 Studies on the impact of reservation in education conducted in the 1970s lent 
support to such expressions of caste Hindu resentment. For example a study by Chitnis 
states that the purpose of education for SCs is 1) to enable occupational and economic 
mobility, and 2) to equip them for a social structure in which status is determined not by 
ascription but by individual achievement and worth.346 That this pedagogical necessity is 
assigned specifically to SCs assumes that other subjects reach higher education solely on 
the basis of individual merit, thus dismissing the issue of caste-class privilege. It is the 
SC and not the middle class Brahmin or Kshatriya that must unlearn ascription based 
privilege. This study with particular reference to Maharashtra and Bombay city observes 
high drop out rates of SC students and their concentration in inferior colleges of the state. 
The data is interpreted to argue that reservations admit unqualified students who then 
perform poorly in these institutions. Chitnis argues that enrolment in higher education 
serves merely to draw SCs out of their segregation and offer possibilities for integration. 
However, “unless SC students can stand on their own merit and face competition with 
others…they are in danger of becoming isolates who cannot merge with the mainstream 	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of life in the circle”.347 In such entrenched interpretations, reserved seat candidates drop 
out or perform poorly because they are unqualified, inferior subjects whose entry is 
premised on Caste Hindu guilt. There is no place in this interpretation for the structural 
barriers that students from these communities continue to face after enrolment or the 
discriminatory practices within educational institutions. Moreover, echoing Srinavas’ 
comments on reservation, the presence of inferior subjects stands to lower the standards 
of educational institutions themselves. The presence of the subject of reservations poses a 
threat to the academic integrity of educational institutions. Thus resentment towards them 
is explained as an inevitable consequence of the policy’s recruitment of “sub-standard” 
students in a context of limited facilities.   
 It is against this pattern of political cooption, systemic resistance to 
implementation and caste Hindu resentment of reservation that the fragmentation of SC 
communities through class mobility and rural-urban migration has taken place. One 
dominant representation marks the middle class SC subject as inarticulate, meek and 
unqualified – a subject inferior to and dependent on the unmarked (caste Hindu) subject’s 
tolerance of his/her presence in spaces where he/she does not truly belong. A second 
trend in representation concerns the alienation of elite SCs from their communities 
through higher education and economic mobility. In this frame it is the middle class SC 
monopolizing the quota system that is held responsible for the fact that the majority of 
SC communities continue to live in conditions of poverty. Unaccounted for in these 
representations is the increasing militancy of Dalit political assertion and anti-caste 
critique, which reject normative middle class values and the affective politics of upper 
caste pity. These politicizations are also linked to the fragmentation of SC communities 
through class mobility and rural-urban migration. They are further related to a broader 
context of intensified caste violence, economic insecurity and the re-constitution of caste 
prejudice in modern urban spaces. The following section will illustrate how these 
conditions contributed to critical engagements with the question of Dalit middle class-
ness in the Dalit Panther movement and Dalit literature.  
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“Their Traditional Pity is no Better Than the Pimp on Falkland Road”:348 
Reservation and Anti-Caste Politics  
 Opponents of caste-based reservation often argue that economic criteria should be 
made the only basis for quota based affirmative action. This argument relies on images of 
middle class Dalits who protect themselves from open competition by falsely accusing 
Caste Hindus of discrimination. Class mobility functions as evidence of the absence of 
discrimination and subjective de-politicization: “if you think Charlis had made it, wait til 
you see his son”. However, Dalits came to access education and employment in 
precarious conditions. The post-colonial context did see a significant increase in the 
number of Dalits in these facilities. This process unfolded simultaneously with increasing 
landlessness among and violence against Dalit communities. According to Murugkar, 
while the promise of equality had created high expectations for better treatment, 
expectations grew more rapidly than changes in living conditions.349 In the Milind 
College of Arts, Maharashtra the majority of SC students came from rural families. 73 
percent of these families belonged to the category of landless workers and 52 percent of 
parents had taken loans from village moneylenders at exorbitant rates to finance their 
children’s education.350 In the 1970s Maharashtra was marked by inflation, contraction of 
the job market and rural distress. Severe famines occurred in 1972-1973. Students 
belonging to rural families discontinued their studies to seek work as manual laborers in 
scarcity centres, where they confronted caste discrimination in access to public resources. 
These experiences contributed to the radical politicization of SC youth as economic 
insecurity and untouchability confronted empty promises of progress and social 
advancement.351 From this perspective, class mobility facilitated by reservation was far 
from a linear, uninterrupted process that de-linked educated SCs from rural communities.  
 The anti-caste politics emerging in this context responded to the ineffectiveness of 
the political leadership of the RPI and the Left. Although the RPI had participated in land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Namdeo Dhasal, “Their Eternal Pity,” An Anthology of Dalit Literature, ed. Mulk Raj 
Anand and Eleanor Zelliot  (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1992), 52. Poem 
written in 1975. 	  
349 Lata Murugkar, Dalit Panther Movement in Maharashtra (Mumbai: Popular 
Prakashan, 1991), 10.	  
350 Gokhale, From Concession to Confrontation, 244.	  
351 Ibid.; Murugkar, Dalit Panther Movement, 10. 	  
126	  
struggles in earlier decades, by the 1970s it was characterized by stagnation, factionalism 
and disinterest in rural issues.352 The RPI focused its energies on the extension of 
reservation to SCs who had converted to Buddhism.  The traditional Indian Left did not 
provide a meaningful alternative as it rarely spoke of untouchabilty or critiqued Hindu 
society. Omvedt argues that for young Dalit activists, economic and cultural exploitation 
were interwoven from the beginning.353 The apathy of political parties was especially 
striking given the widespread atrocities committed against Dalits. After UP, Maharashtra 
had the second highest number of registered complaints about caste violence.354 Targets 
of violence included recent converts to Buddhism, increasingly assertive landless laborers 
and those who had challenged village authorities about caste relations. In this context 
existing collectives of Dalit writers and poets located primarily in Bombay began to 
organize a militant politics. Arjun Dangle, one of the founders of the Dalit Panthers, re-
calls: 
We were painfully aware of the ineffectiveness of the RPI factions despite the 
growing social injustice and atrocities. The left parties were inherently aloof from 
social questions…we young dalit writers had realized that writing angry poems 
would not be enough to combat these injustices.355  
The Panthers argued that no single ruling or opposition party had any definite program to 
solve or even ameliorate the miserable conditions of the Dalits. Warnings were issued in 
1972 to the Maharashtra government that if steps were not taken to curb atrocities they 
would take the law into their own hands and commence an armed revolt. Semi-educated 
lower middle class and working class youth were organized by Panther activists initially 
in the chawls of central Bombay and subsequently in other major cities such as 
Aurangabad, Poona and Nasik.356 A key target of Panther politics was the established 
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elite of the RPI, deemed incapable of advancing Dalit struggles. Panthers declared the 
separation of all ties from the party and claimed to represent the masses that the RPI had 
abandoned in their subordination to the Congress Party and single point agenda of 
reservations. The scathing critiques and violent confrontations between Panther activists 
and RPI members indicate the significance of political subject formation for Dalit 
politics. Panther writings explored the internal degeneration of the RPI and rejected its 
political elite. However, it has been noted that prominent Panther organizers were also 
beneficiaries of the reservation system and shared middle class locations with the RPI.357 
While their ability to represent the interests of rural and working class Dalits was thus 
called into question, the movement opened up middle class identity to different political 
possibilities.   
The Panther Manifesto stated: “we do not want a place in Brahman alley. We 
want the rule of the whole land. We are not looking at persons but at a system.”358 The 
militant political organizing and literature of the movement rejected tokenistic forms of 
accommodation, claiming political power and the right to self-representation. Their 
assertive presence in middle and working class neighborhoods as well as universities and 
offices confronted the perceptions of privileged castes that reservations was a concession 
they had afforded to a vulnerable and backward group. The Panthers exploded the myth 
of the Dalit subject as mute and passive.359 Thus cultural and symbolic politics 
deliberately antagonistic to Caste Hindu values constituted a significant mode of Panther 
politics. Dalits identified themselves as modern and proletarian and saw their enemy – 
Hinduism – as feudal backwardness.360 However, the demands for power also enhanced 
the visibility of Dalit bodies as targets of violence. A prominent struggle representative of 
these connections between cultural politics and violence was the Namantar (re-naming) 
agitation in the Marathwada region. This region contained a large rural, landless 
population of Dalits as well as highly politicized and militant professors and students of 
Marathwada University. The agitation concerned the re-naming of Marathwada 	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University to Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University. Supporters of re-naming 
sought to commemorate Ambedkar’s efforts to make higher education available to Dalits 
and demanded symbolic representation within the institution: “The Milind campus in 
Aurangabad is now an educational and cultural centre thanks to the efforts of Babasaheb 
Ambedkar. We now want to convert it into a power centre.”361 Upper caste opposition to 
this resulted in ongoing violence in the region between 1977-1978 and the murder and 
displacement of thousands of Dalits. In Murugkar’s study of the agitation, it is noted that 
the protracted violence and its disproportionate effect on rural Dalits also raised questions 
about the extent to which students could act in the interest of Dalit communities. That the 
struggle was not about economic issues delegitimized it as having nothing to do with 
basic problems of rural Dalits. For the agitators, however “the struggle was not for bread 
and butter but it was for equality, civic rights and human treatment.”362  
 Significantly, Rao situates the namantar agitation as a struggle over the social 
mobility of Dalits and their right to self-representation in the post-colonial order.363 It is 
telling that the opposition to re-naming the university swiftly developed into an anti-
reservation protest. The opposition demanded the abolition of reservation in education 
and employment on caste basis and the use of economic criteria for affirmative action. 
Murugkar describes how the urgency of the demands was expressed in the language of 
cultural takeover. Organizers claimed that after the re-naming degrees from Marathwada 
would contain photos of Ambedkar and Buddhist prayers would be introduced in the 
college.364 The extent of violence provoked by the agitation thus reflected ongoing 
resentment among caste Hindus over the militant visibility of Dalits and the system of 
reservations that enabled their access to the university. The cultural politics of re-naming 
threatened the idea of reservation as an upper caste concession, thus revealing how any 
consensus on reservation among the privileged was linked to this specific meaning. Rao 
notes that as “Dalits came to be stereotyped as militant, injured people with an insatiable 
appetite for government recognition, any effort to establish identity for self and 
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community became a potentially incendiary demand.”365 The extent of violence in rural 
areas was also connected to these perceptions; politicized Dalits and symbols of 
economic accumulation and social mobility were distinctly targeted in the villages. Many 
of the Caste Hindu students in Aurangabad belonged to rich and middle peasant families, 
hence the issue of reservations and land relations were entangled for them.366 The 
violence of Marathwada was not an isolated incident; it preceded the spread of anti-
reservation violence in Gujarat and Bihar in the 1980s.  Reservation served to focus 
corporeal and discursive violence around the Dalit subject, uniting localized forms of 
resistance to changes in caste relations.  The riots also exposed the inability of both the 
state and the Panthers to provide protection to rural Dalit communities. At the same time, 
the linking of re-naming with reservation in Marathwada and subsequent anti-reservation 
riots in Gujurat focused Panther activities around reservation – the same issue they had 
accused the RPI of exclusively focusing on.  
The formation of the Dalit Panthers and the Dalit literary movement are 
historically interlinked. In the late 1960s Milind College in Aurangabad emerged as a 
central site for the movement. M.N. Wankhade, the principal of the College, had travelled 
to the USA for higher education. There he had been inspired by “the mordancy of Black 
literature, its feelings of revolt, the shocking experiences reflected in it and the forms in 
which it manifested itself”.367 In 1967 Wankhade presided over the conference of the 
Maharashtra Bauddha Sahitya Parishad (Maharashtra Buddhist Literary Society). 
Reviewing the Hindu epics the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the literature of the saints 
and modern Marathi literature he argued that Dalit literature had no place in it.368 Dalit 
literature was explicitly conceived as a forum for the revolt against caste inequality and 
the promotion of social change. It would be constitutive of a rebellion against the 
suppression and humiliation suffered by the Dalits, in past and present, in the framework 
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of the varna system.369 Battle lines drawn into the streets, offices and universities of the 
post-colonial nation-state thus extended into the realm of cultural production. This was 
probably the first time in India that creative writers became politically active and led a 
movement.370 Writers such as Namdeo Dhasal, Arjun Dangle and J.V. Pawar were central 
figures in the establishment of the Dalit Panthers.  
Debates about the historical antecedents of contemporary Dalit writing often 
focus on the figure of the 14th century saint-poet Chokha Mela, the only recorded voice of 
the untouchable Mahars before the 19th century.371 Chokha Mela was part of the 
Maharsashtrian Bhakti (devotional religion) movement. As with other Bhakti movements 
in India, it was anti-orthodox, inclusive of women and shudras and based on the 
experience of God rather than on traditional piety and formal ritual.372 Although aspects 
of Chokha Mela’s poetry include protest against caste hierarchy, there is an overall 
acceptance of divinely ordained social distinctions in his work. Thus he is rendered a 
tragic figure reflective of a system of inequality so deeply entrenched that even the 
compassionate saint-poets remained bound to it.373 The most significant historical figure 
for Dalit writers is Dr. Ambedkar, whose political vision and intellectual framework is 
recognized as the crucial condition that made a new political subjectivity possible. 
“Ambedkar’s struggle againt untouchability and socio-economic inequality liberated 
Dalits from mental slavery and abject wretchedness, thus giving them a new self-
respect”.374 Dalit writing is the literary manifestation of this social awareness as seen in 
its unequivocal rejection of caste Hindu society and Brahminical supremacy. These are 
explored in a myriad of guises, from the orthodox priest to the patronizing reformer, as 
well as in the forms of degrading labor, poverty and sexual violence experienced by 
Dalits. The memorialization of Ambedkar as an inspirational and enabling force for an 
entire community is a prominent feature of Dalit poetry. The Maharashtra Bauddha 	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Sahitya Parishad’s literary conference in 1969 was held in Mahad, the place of 
Ambedkar’s agitation for the right of Dalits to draw water from Chavadar Lake and his 
public burning of the Manusmriti.375 Mahad is remembered for its galvanization of a 
movement and for the bitter resistance of upper castes376. Ambedkar’s name is also 
invoked in poems addressed to a collective subject that must mobilize and continue his 
struggle. Other poems dedicated to Ambedkar unfold as a conversation and a means to 
reflect on his struggles in light of the violence and inequality surrounding the poet: “this 
is the proclamation of bread/this is the Parliament’s brothel/this country we call 
Mother/sleeps with the God of wealth/and time is becoming more Orthodox”.377  
Interestingly, Rao distinguishes between the literature that developed alongside 
the Dalit Panther movement and earlier works written by participants in Ambedkar’s 
movement. The latter’s work was so closely tied to the movement that Ambedkar was 
made the protagonist of narratives of a heroic struggle for self-respect and social 
recognition.378 In contrast the new generation of writers foregrounded the brutality of 
Dalit life-worlds across rural and urban spaces. These accounts “addressed the violence 
of the Dalit intimate, remarked on regnant cultural practices and depicted the culture of 
desperation and self-degradation to which Dalits’ low status had given rise”.379 Baburao 
Bagal’s collection of short stories entitled Jevha Mi Jaat Chorli Hoti (When I had 
Concealed My Caste), released in 1963, marked a turning point in the development of a 
distinctive literary form. Along with Namdeo Dhasal’s book of poetry Golpitha (1973) 
and Daya Pawar’s autobiography Baluta (1963), Bagul is associated with stark depictions 
of suffering through the use of an unflinching and violent language. In the story after 
which Bagul’s collection is named, the character refuses to identify his caste to his upper 
caste landlord. When his caste location is revealed, he is nearly beaten to death. In the 
conclusion he identifies Manu, the Hindu lawmaker, as the perpetrator of the assault. 
Thus the individual violated body and localized forms of discrimination are rendered in 
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structural and historical terms. In the character’s naming of Manu the possibility for a 
militant political consciousness is seen.  
Dalit literature portrays structures of caste, class and gendered oppression as 
complex and intertwined. Depictions of family life and relationships between parents and 
children feature as a prominent site for interrogating the contradictions and complicities 
in which stigmatized communities are located. In Bagul’s story “Mother”, a widowed 
Dalit woman is continually subject to sexual humiliation, harassment and attempted rape 
within the untouchable quarter of the urban slum. These violations, often enacted while 
her son is present, occur with such regularity that self-protection becomes an 
unremarkable part of routine life. Her young son is subjected to untouchability through 
the language of sexual violence – he cannot be touched because his mother is stigmatized 
as sexually promiscuous. However, the complex violence of caste structures their 
understanding of each other, as the son burns with shame and views his mother’s 
sexuality as responsible for his humiliation. Similarly, his mother sees in his contempt the 
brutality of those who surround her. In numerous narratives children bear witness to the 
violence and humiliation of their parents and are themselves stigmatized in schools and 
streets. Their centrality in Dalit literature also suggests a generational and political shift. 
Depictions of village life are marked with the tension between the dependent location of 
Mahars in the village economy, their exchange of labor for a share in the harvest (baluta), 
and the further violence that comes with rejecting this location. Daya Pawar remembers 
that the Mahar community he saw as a child did not have the character of beggary. Their 
share in the harvest was a right and collected with pride. However, the smallest of 
perceived transgressions or disrespect was met with the denial of the harvest, an assertion 
of upper caste power. In Bandhumadhav’s short story “Poisoned Bread”, a family is 
deprived of food due to the young boy’s challenges to the landlord, causing his 
grandfather to beg for molding bread that even the livestock would not go near. Poisoned 
by consuming it, the grandfather finally rejects the baluta on his deathbed. He implores 
his grandson to “never depend on the age-old bread associated with our caste…this 
poisonous bread will finally kill the very humanness of man…”380 His death is then 
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rendered as the wound that inflames the collective, replacing sorrow with fury and 
disgust.  
Namdeo Dhasal’s poems are most associated with the deployment of brutal 
imagery and vivid depictions of embodied and symbolic violence. In his translation of 
Golpitha Vijay Tendulkar describes Dhasal’s poetry thus:  
In the calculations of the white collar workers, “no man’s land” begins at the 
border of their world, and it is here that the world of Namdeo Dhasal’s poetry of 
Bombay’s Golpitha begins. This is the world of days of nights; of empty or half-
full stomachs; of the pain of death; of tomorrow’s worries; of men’s bodies in 
which shame and sensitivity have been burned out; of overflowing gutters; of a 
sick young body; knees curled to belly against the cold of death…Mercy-grace-
peace do not touch Golpitha. Dhasal says, here all seasons are pitiless, here all 
seasons have a contrary heart.381 
The use of the language of the slum, much of which is barely recognizable to upper 
castes, refuses the reader transparent access to Dalit existence. Moreover, it assaults the 
sensibilities of middle class respectability, rejecting the aesthetics that reduce Dalits to 
objects of distant pity. Golpitha deliberately destroyed every fond notion of poetry 
nurtured by upper caste writers.382  
The mother is a prominent figure in Dhasal’s renderings of caste and gender 
oppression. She is an anchor amidst dire poverty, a target of violence and imprisoned by 
gendered notions of sacrifice and respectability.  
Can you tell me the purpose, the reasons for your suffering? All your life you 
were sucked dry and even now you bow before the system…Mother, your 
woman’s life story lives in a house in my heart. It makes me see you clearly. 
That’s why I don’t kill you, don’t rip out your innards. Because – just as I have 
been stripped bare, so have you. I want to rip out his innards.383 
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Dhasal’s complex poetry scathes with the pain of working through how caste penetrates 
the most intimate relations. The revolutionary poet is enraged by his mother’s complicity 
in her own oppression and yet emancipation can only be a collective project. Exhausted 
and deteriorating bodies are products of caste violence and new ways of life require 
violent destruction of the caste order. Dhasal’s poem “Man You Should Explode” reads 
as a breathless stream of graphic and nauseating acts of intoxication, enslavement, abuse, 
illicit sex and cruelty, which bleeds into the destruction of roads, monuments, knowledge 
and temples.   
Man, one should tear off all the pages of all the sacred books in the world/And 
give them to people for wiping shit off their arses when done…Man, you should 
drink human blood, spit roast human flesh, melt human flesh and drink it…Wage 
class wars, caste wars, communal wars, party wars, crusades, world wars…384 
The incitement to revulsion, violence and murderous rage are brought to a pitch, a 
moment of ultimate destruction, after which notions of black and white, Brahmin, 
vaishya and shudra can cease to exist.   
  Rao identifies the significance of the language of Dalit literature not only as a 
form of social realism or a more “authentic” representation of Dalit life; it implicates the 
caste Hindu and constitutes an ethical challenge.385 The notions of upper caste empathy 
and social reform are targets of derision. Portrayals of upper caste bodies and spaces 
underscore their attachment to the scriptures through which they are exalted, their 
investments in their own sense of superiority and self-understanding as repositories of 
national culture and tradition. Dalit suffering is consumed as a spectacle in homes 
adorned with photos of Lord Ganesha.386 Upper castes are intellectually incapable of 
understanding Dalit revolt:  
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“I cursed another good hot curse/The university buildings shuddered and sank 
waist-deep/All at once, scholars began doing research/into what makes people 
angry.387  
Such poems foreground the language of rage as collective assertion aimed at the 
destruction of upper caste ego. The claim to language and self-representation is 
connected to the emergence of a militant political subject.  
 Finally, a significant characteristic of Dalit literature is a critical self-reflexivity 
around and mediations on emerging class divisions in Dalit communities. Class mobility 
is represented not as a celebratory individual achievement, but as a process producing 
notions of false superiority and security amongst white collar Dalits. As noted by 
Gokhale, the sympathetic treatment of rural and working class Dalits contrasts sharply 
with the contempt the literature evinces for the middle class and political elite that pursue 
personal wealth at the expense of community struggle.388 The ferocity of the critique is 
related to the factionalism and opportunism displayed by the elites of the Republican 
Party of India, which informed the militancy of the Panthers. In “Ambedkar: 1979”, 
Dhasal describes the political leaders that spoke in Ambedkar’s name: “Your followers 
act like false gurus/They use a loin cloth for a tie and babble/Their heritage is mother-
fucking…These impotent Arjuns of countless generations – all they can do is pop some 
Virgin’s cherry”.389 The RPI’s alignment with the Congress Party is represented as an 
alignment with the disempowering politics of Gandhi and Hindu scriptures through the 
language of sexual dysfunction and emasculation. These critiques were also aimed more 
broadly at those who sought security in trying to speak and live like the Brahmins, thus 
upholding their social and moral universe. The “white collar Dalit” is represented in 
literature as an isolated subject whose material comforts are a thin guise for his ultimate 
powerlessness in a casteist social order: “When there is fire everywhere, how can you be 
safe in your own house?”390 Middle class apolitical anonymity is a betrayal of the labor 
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of those relations and communities that have made the subject’s social mobility possible. 
The conception of reservation as a means of individual advancement is thus critiqued:  
The educated Dalit is really of two minds. In order to enter the higher class he 
wants to turn his back on his own society; his relatives and even at times his 
parents. He is ashamed of them. To assure his own security, he is prepared to kick 
aside and sever all relations with those who made possible his education. In 
becoming white collar, he has created his own mental turmoil…he has totally 
forgotten that reservations are only one aspect of a total revolution.391  
As this passage suggests, betrayal of the community and personal “mental turmoil” are 
interlinked aspects of class fragmentation. The point is not that class privilege makes one 
an inauthentic Dalit subject. Indeed many of the writers occupy the class location that 
they critique. Rather, the literature raises the question of how politicized consciousness 
can forge different kinds of relations and engagements across class locations. Tied to this 
mode of self-reflexivity is an implicit critique of secular nationalist discourses that posit 
education as a solution to backwardness and pre-modern beliefs. The experiences of 
Dalits in educational institutions reveal how caste prejudice thrives among the educated 
classes. Emerging through the modern institutions of the nation-state, the Dalit is an 
ambivalent subject at once co-opted by a casteist society and exposed to different forms 
of caste discrimination. To explore these themes further, I turn to Dangle’s and Pawde’s 
narratives in the volume Poisoned Bread.  
Untouchablity and Urban Space in Arjun Dangle’s “Promotion”  
 “Promotion” works through similar themes as Tharoor’s “Scheduled Castes, 
Unscheduled Change” discussed above: the anonymity of urban life, class mobility and 
generational change among Dalit communities. The reader is taken into those secular 
spaces of work and travel which Tharoor claims force upper castes to shake hands with, 
lunch with and take orders from, lower castes. National integration is enabled by the 
inability to confirm caste and in turn the inability to practice untouchablity. “Promotion” 
presents a very different understanding of these spaces of interaction as well as of the 
personal and political choices available to middle class Dalits.  The narrative illustrates 	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Sarukkai’s insightful argument that the experience of untouchability produces caution 
towards touching in general: “in a casteist society, the very act of touching becomes 
problematical because every act of touching becomes reflective”.392 “Promotion” 
registers the dynamic aspects of untouchabilty through its central character Waghmare, 
an officer in the Indian Railways who has recently been promoted through reservation. A 
series of exchanges in the office introduce the officer as unsuccessfully struggling to 
maintain authority and respect among his employees. The story opens with an argument 
between Waghmare and a junior officer, Godbole (a Brahmin surname), rudely refusing 
to complete an assignment that falls under his purview. He takes up the work himself, 
having learned from experience that “no action would be taken against Godbole. The 
entire department knew that Godbole was Joshi Saheb’s emissary and carried his tribute 
every month – to appease the powers that be”.393 Next, Waghmare calls for his assistant 
several times with no response. Later another employee firmly announces her plans to 
take leave despite there being a staff shortage. The isolation and timidity of Waghmare in 
the office enables one to consider the complex ways in which caste stigma manifests 
across Dalit bodies, defying simple notions of the relation between occupation and 
untouchability. It is the possibility of humiliation that grips Waghmare’s body with 
anxiety throughout the day, as if he is under constant surveillance.     
 If Waghmare represents the “mental turmoil” of the middle class Dalit the 
narrative also points to other possibilities through the character of Awale Saheb, another 
Dalit employee who the former “always remembered…whenever he was tormented by 
problems concerning his caste. Awale lent him firm support but also distressed him 
further.”394 The two discuss the situation with Godbole, particularly the latter’s 
resentment about Waghmare’s promotion. Awale encourages him to be assertive and 
refuse to take on the extra work of others:  
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You’re a timid bugger…remember, no one has obliged you by promoting you in 
the reserved category…these other people have enjoyed the privilege of being in 
the 100% reserved category for centuries. Doesn’t that mean anything to you?395  
Waghmare refuses to engage in a discussion about the meaning of reservation. He accepts 
the resentment that his presence in a position of authority produces in others and adjusts 
accordingly to protect himself from the explicit articulation of this resentment. His 
decision to accept the power relations in the office is a thoughtful one – any confrontation 
holds the risk of being identified by his caste. The exchange between the two officers 
thus illustrates the divergent possibilities of occupying spaces from which Dalits have 
been historically excluded. Awale insists on respect and collective engagement. He urges 
Waghmare to attend meetings of the Backward Class Workers’ Association, but without 
success. The officer is certain that “there was no point in tagging behind Awale. He 
would only make matters worse and people would humiliate him. Waghmare reminded 
himself that he was an officer now and had to maintain a certain standard.”396 Class status 
is performed through disassociation with political engagement in general and from others 
of his caste in particular.  
 Despite this seemingly firm conviction the possibility of humiliation intensifies 
throughout the day, informing Waghmare’s negotiation of urban space. He takes a later 
train home to avoid old friends who continue to travel second class. This preference for 
the comfort of first class is contrasted to Awale’s preference for connections with others. 
Despite having a first class pass the latter continues to travel second class with their 
friends. “Not only that, he had noisy discussions with them in the train.”397  Awale’s 
assertive presence in public space reminds Waghmare of an old friend who used to greet 
him loudly with “Jai Bheem!” in the office.398 Such vocalizations of Dalit presence make 
him shudder: “Whenever Gaekwad thundered thus, Waghmhare got the feeling of being 
closely watched by those around.”399 Yet even in the first class compartment there is no 
respite from this sense of surveillance. He is panicked by the comment of a fellow 	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passenger that he seems to have “reserved” the window seat on a permanent basis. “He 
wondered whether this fellow commuter knew that he belonged to a scheduled 
caste…once again he felt he ought to change his surname.”400 In this moment the 
inability to confirm caste in urban space does not eliminate untouchablity, but gives it an 
unpredictable quality such that anonymous encounters hold the possibility of violation. 
Anonymity is a historically produced condition that requires the disciplining of particular 
bodies to minimize presence in public space. In this way the transcendence of caste 
through class identification disproportionately places the burden of transcendence on the 
Dalit subject. However, Waghmare carries this burden not in the service of achieving a 
national ideal but through knowledge of pervasive casteism and the need for self-
protection. 
This burden follows Waghmare to his middle class home in the Railway Officer’s 
Quarters, where he is offended by the presence of his wife’s “dirty, shabbily dressed” 
relatives. Through this exchange Dangle expresses a key critique of the middle class Dalit 
subject whose social mobility is acquired through rejection of community. The 
prioritization of acceptance in a casteist society indicates the subject’s alienation from 
community. In the space of patriarchal domesticity Waghmare is able to displace the 
burden of transcending caste onto his wife. “Next you’ll have the entire slum visiting you 
– what will our neighbors say?”401 This is the only moment of the narrative where 
Waghmare articulates authoritatively, without internal struggle: “Don’t talk too much. 
Learn to maintain your status. After all, you’re an officer’s wife.”402  However, Dangle 
refuses to his character the security of class privileges or patriarchal authority. The 
poignant conclusion to this narrative highlights the futility of Waghmare’s constant 
attempts to shed any indication of his caste. This is communicated in an exchange 
between Waghmare and his 5 year-old son who, bearing bruises on his leg, comes to rest 
his head in his father’s lap.  
“How did you get hurt, Pappu?” 
“D’you know that Pramod, who has a super Ganpati? His Grandma pushed me.” 
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“Why? Did you beat him?” 
“No. We were playing and I drank from his water pot.” 
Waghmare’s mind is filled with the image of Godbole. His newly sprung wings of 
promotion fall off and a mere mortal named Pandurang Satwa Waghmare crashes 
helplessly into the abyss below.403 
The image of Waghmare’s son being pushed to the ground in an enactment of ritual 
segregation suggests the stubborn attachment of stigma to Dalit bodies across time and 
space. The visceral level on which Waghmare is haunted by this stigma in public space is 
as much a manifestation of casteist society as his son’s bruises. In different but connected 
ways their bodies bear the burden of facilitating “pure”, “unoffending” spaces of caste 
sociality.  The efforts to distance himself and his family from politically expressive and 
working class Dalits does not render them less vulnerable to casteist violence. Indeed, his 
son’s injury conjures the image of Godbole, whose behavior Waghmare earlier justified 
as a natural resentment at not having been promoted. In this way their experiences of 
injury become blurred – the grandmother’s violent enactment of ritual segregation in her 
own home operates through the Dalit body as both physical injury and, as Waghmare 
“looses his wings”, subjective disintegration. Finally, the narrative rejects the idea of the 
middle class home as space of private, apolitical domesticity. As Gopal Guru points out, 
in the urban context the inability to confirm caste increases the importance of ritual purity 
in the home: the domestic sphere provides an opportunity for the resolution of upper caste 
anxiety.404 Having avoided the pollution of their water pots, anxiety is transferred to the 
home of the middle class Dalit. The distinction between public secularism and private 
religiosity, rural intimacy and urban anonymity and occupation and stigma, cannot be 
maintained from the perspective of Dalit embodiment.  
The Government Brahmin in Kumud Pawde’s “The Story of My Sanskrit”  
 In her autobiography Kumud Pawde writes with an acute sense of the effects her 
presence has on others. Extracted from her larger Marathi text Antasphot, “The Story of 
My Sanskrit” describes how an educated Dalit becomes an object of fascination and 
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attraction. As a scholar and teacher of a language which those of her caste have 
historically been excluded from learning she speaks of the attraction based on acceptance 
that comes from her community. Her achievement is a victory for those whom “religion 
has considered to be vermin.”405 Simultaneously, Pawde is an object of attraction based 
on devastating rejection by privileged castes that view her achievement as transgression. 
Describing this rejection, Pawde writes of the contradictions between the words of praise 
and the tonal inflections, gazes and bodily comportments that communicate insult:  
the sensation is that of walking on soft, velvety carpet – but being burnt by the hot 
embers hidden in someone’s breast, and feeling the scorching pain in one’s 
soul…the one who’s speaking thinks the listener can’t understand – for surely a 
low caste person hasn’t the ability to comprehend. But some people intend to be 
understood, so that I’ll be crushed by the words.406 
The narrative thus renders an incisive critique of the “caste-less urban middle class” 
through attention to the affective and corporeal production of this subjectivity. The 
meaning articulated through tone and gestures generate in Pawde a constant awareness of 
her caste. There are those gestures and inflections that express resentment of the 
reservations that have led to the contamination of sacred knowledge by Dalit presence: 
“…After all, they’re the government’s favorite sons-in-law! We have to accept it all.”407 
Others express disbelief at a contradictory subject, whose education and mannerisms defy 
their essentialist understandings of caste. People constantly assume that she is Brahmin. 
Simultaneously, Pawde has come to signify for this class the progress of the nation. She 
recounts an event where she is asked to introduce distinguished scholars of the Vedas, 
with the following speech:  
Whereas our traditional books have forbidden the study of Sanskrit by women and 
Shudras, a woman from those very Shudras, from the lowest among them, will 
today, in Sanskrit, introduce these scholars. This is the beginning of a progressive 
way of thinking in independent India.408 
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Pawde describes this moment as one of drowning in feelings of inferiority and anxiety. In 
those modern spaces and amongst the modern citizens for whom speaking of caste is 
regressive traditionalism, it is Padwe alone who must identify through caste. She stands 
on the stage as an object of the nation’s enlightened secular principles. However, 
reflected in the eyes of the audience is a mixture of frustration, fury, hostility and disgust. 
“Some gazes ask me, ‘why did you need to make the introductions in this manner? To 
humiliate us?”409 The embarrassment of the upper caste subject at being implicated in this 
history of exclusion identifies the educated Dalit as source of discomfort. Upper-caste 
embarrassment displaces the pervasive humiliation within Dalit life-worlds, even as 
Pawde is humiliated by this encounter.  Moreover, the subject is cut off from the histories 
of struggle and revolt of Dalit communities. In assumptions about the state as agent of 
reform the Dalit can remain an object of revulsion. Thus, Pawde’s narrative presents 
modern state institutions as spaces in which it is impossible to forget her caste.  
 The author attributes her ability to sense the ways in which she is perceived by 
caste Hindus to the experience of growing up in a ghetto encircled by caste Hindu houses. 
Through this experience she developed an extreme familiarity with the display of disgust 
and “…it was this disgust that inclined me towards Sanskrit.”410 Pawde’s reflection on 
being treated as an object of disgust provides insight into the affective politics of caste. In 
her work on the performativity of disgust, Sara Ahmed argues that disgust involves a 
relationship of touch and proximity between surfaces of bodies and objects – the object 
must get close enough to make us feel disgusted. Thus, the production of disgust is 
related to transgression: “Borders need to be threatened in order to be maintained, or even 
to appear as borders.”411 The affective constitution of the border hierarchizes spaces and 
bodies. This theorization of disgust as enacted in moments of transgression is a useful 
interpretive frame with which to think through Pawde’s emphasis on the sense of disgust. 
She recalls in her childhood how “so-called educated, civilized mothers”412 from higher 
castes would warn their daughters to stay away from her, not to touch her. In another 	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episode, absorbed by the Vedic chanting at the site of a Brahmin thread ceremony, she is 
chased away by a woman whose “nose was wrinkled in disgust, like a shriveled fig.”413 
In both cases upper caste disgust is performed to subvert the potential transgression of 
caste hierarchy. Similarly, Pawde’s encounters in the modern university indicate how 
tone, gaze and bodily comportment re-produce borders by recognizing her caste as a 
contaminating presence. The subject position “upper caste” requires the object of disgust 
for its own re-production. However, the narrative also shows the contingent effects of this 
performativity in shaping Dalit politics of self-respect: “So, even at this young age this 
emotion of disgust taught me to think. It inspired me to be introspective. At an age which 
was meant to be for skipping and playing, these thoughts would rouse me to fury”414.  
 Pawde’s narration of teacher-student relations as caste encounters offers a 
complex picture of caste Hindu subjectivity in the post-colonial nation-state. In this it 
shares with Dangle’s “Promotion” a sense of how spaces representative of the nation’s 
modern progress do not eliminate caste discrimination, but give it an unpredictable 
quality. As anonymous encounters hold the possibility of violation, there is a heightened 
reflexivity about caste embodiment. For example, Pawde describes as “an ordeal” her 
first meal at the home of her Brahmin Sanskrit teacher Gokhale Guruji with his wife and 
children:  
I became nervous. Fear crept over my mind. Suppose this lady were to find out 
my caste? Along with sips of water, I swallowed the lumps in my throat as well as 
mouthfuls of poha…my only worry was when and how I could escape from 
there.415 
 But the family is always respectful and warm despite their orthodox appearance. It is her 
first encounter with a Brahmin that does not end in humiliation. She compares this 
teacher with the head of her Postgraduate department, a scholar of national repute. He 
opposed her learning Sanskrit, taking “malicious delight” in expressing this to her: “This 
man had been exposed to modernity; Gokhale Guruji was orthodox. Yet one had been 
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shriveled by tradition, the other enriched by it, like a tree weighed down by fruit.”416 This 
comparison indicates the pervasiveness and adaptability of discriminatory practices in the 
modern university. The dichotomy of tradition and modernity does not explain Pawde’s 
different experiences as a Sanskrit student. The narrative registers an ambivalence 
towards these experiences marked by humiliation and exclusion as well as struggle and 
learning.  
 “The Story of My Sanskrit” is also a story of the uneven, ineffectual 
implementation of reservation in university hiring. Significantly, it is in this context of 
non-implementation that the Dalit is excessively identified with the reservation policy. 
Pawde’s expectations upon graduating with distinction reflect a belief in equitable access 
to employment: “A high-paid job would come to me on a platter from the government. 
For I must have been the first woman from a scheduled caste to pass with distinction in 
Sanskrit.”417 These beliefs soon prove to be naïve. Through multiple interviews Pawde’s 
sense of achievement confronts caste Hindu perceptions of the Dalit as undeserving 
beneficiary of state resources. She describes the laughter and taunts that began as soon as 
she left the interview room: “So now even these people are to teach Sanskrit? 
Government Brahmins aren’t they?”418 Pawde’s years of unemployment are a reminder 
that anti-reservation sentiments are expressed in a context where the policy itself has 
been continuously subject to subversion. Two months after her inter-caste marriage, she 
is given a lectureship in a government college. It is a change in caste status, not its 
transcendence that finally enables Pawde’s social mobility. Her own struggles and 
achievements are tainted due to this realization:  
I hear that a woman’s surname changes to match her husband’s – and so does her 
caste. That’s why I say that the credit of being a professor of Sanskrit is that of the 
presumed higher caste status of Mrs. Kumud Pawde. The caste of her maiden 
status remains deprived.419 
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Conclusion 
It has been argued that the relation of caste to the modern secular citizen is that of 
disavowal.420 In the nation-state’s framework of secular modernization, caste is a source 
of shame and embarrassment that will be eliminated by not referring to it. A significant 
consequence of this has been the excess identification of caste with “lower” castes. The 
disavowal through which the normative citizen is constituted thus relies on certain bodies 
to carry the burden of caste. The narratives by Dangle and Pawde attend to the multiple 
ways in which this burden is transferred to Dalit bodies in the production of the modern 
spaces and subjects of the post-colonial nation-state. In Rao’s important description, 
“elements in the modern habitus of caste include the small insult, the sudden withdrawal 
of friendship and intimacy, and the surprised discovery of caste identity or caste 
identified practices”.421 Relating these practices to the politics of reservation suggests the 
co-production of caste subjectivities in the moment of encounter. These practices do the 
work of maintaining caste privilege by displacing the feelings of embarrassment, shame 
and anxiety onto the Dalit body as “government Brahmin”, an undeserving recipient of 
state resources.  
Many accounts of the Constitutional commitment to compensating historically 
oppressed communities describe reservation as an acknowledgement of society’s past 
wrongdoing. Regret and shame thus become a mode of recognition of injustice, but also a 
form of nation building.422 The citizen can take pride in the nation’s progressive 
Constitution because of its commitment to justice. Yet the acute awareness of caste 
generated in Dalit subjects in the anonymous spaces of the modern nation-state indicates 
that only certain subjects can participate in the recognition of shame as a form of nation 
building. The ideal image of the nation, “which is based on the image of some and not 
others, is sustained through the conversion of shame to pride.”423 In “Scheduled Caste, 
Unscheduled Change” a discussion of untouchablity in rural life represents a passing 
phase to the nation-state’s realization of modernity. Alternative experiences of the nation-	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state from the perspective of Dalit embodiment have no place in such narratives because 
the abolition of untouchability and reservations dissolve any grounds for a distinct 
political vision. Tharoor’s narrative thus produces an affective understanding of 
reservation as a temporally limited form of obligation premised on (upper caste) national 
guilt. However, the performance of guilt simultaneously defines the terms and limits of 
that guilt: the children of middle class Dalits - “scions of privilege” - and the “lower 
middle castes” that the Mandal Commission seeks to incorporate into the reservation 
framework. The middle class Dalit subject marks the limits of guilt by signifying national 
inclusion through social mobility and as undeserving beneficiary of state resources. 
Moreover, he/she initiates the process of sorting of subjects for whom reservations were 
intended from those undeserving of them based on how guilty they make upper caste 
subjects feel.  
The anti-caste assertions of the 1970s represents a deep rejection of the affective 
politics of guilt and its constitution of the Scheduled Caste subject as an object of pity. In 
different ways, Panther militancy and literary expression re-signified reservation from a 
mechanism of inclusion towards one aspect of a claim to power and self-representation. 
Through Dalit activism questions of entitlement translated themselves into a different 
language via politico-psychological formulations: “it was better to rebel and shriek in 
rage than be the passive object of pity…the most important strategy of the Dalit 
movement is a coupling of the cultural theory of despair with the politics of hope.”424 The 
intensified violence against Dalits alongside this shift in anti-caste politicization can on 
one level be read as a confrontation between these contending socio-political imaginaries. 
The successive riots of central Bombay in the 1970s, the namantar agitation and anti-
reservation violence of the 1980s expose the brutality with which the limits to caste 
Hindu guilt are staged. The discussion of Dalit literature has tried to show how Dalit 
middle class subjectivity came to serve as an important point of reflection in this context. 
Literary texts refuse the representation of this subject as a marker of the nation’s progress 
towards secular modernity. By representing individual class mobility in a casteist society 
as an ambivalent, painful and isolating process, middle class locations become a site from 
which a critique of the nation-state can be articulated. Thus co-optation and de-	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politicization are not inevitable consequences of reservations. The themes of social 
humiliation in Dalit experience and the moral emptiness of the Hindu middle class in 
literature are harnessed towards a re-thinking of political assertion and the meaning of 
community.  
In the debates on the implementation of the Mandal Commission, discussed in the 
following chapter, the Scheduled Caste came to be represented as the only subject for 
whom reservation was justified. Such discourses suggest that the limits of tolerance for 
reservation are staged at the distinction between Scheduled Caste and OBC. Both 
economically and in terms of social discrimination, the former genuinely deserves 
reservation. However, in this chapter I have shown that these limits are better understood 
as being staged in moments of assertive politicization of subaltern castes. This clarifies 
how the spectacular, sustained opposition to the Mandal Commission registered the 
protection of upper caste privilege. The privilege being protected is not only that of 






Chapter Three. Waging Caste Wars: Imagining Community and Nation in the 
Mandal Commission Debate  
As events unfolded during the fortnight it became clear that what Singh was trying to 
reap was a harvest of shame. He had been reduced…to a vote hungry power broker 
shamelessly using the two elements that have ever bloodied and divided this nation – 
religion and caste.425 
 
The bloody caste war launched by the upper castes (15%) in the press, platforms and 
roads has finally convinced the SC/ST/BCs (65%) sufferers that they are not part of this 
‘Hindu nation.’426  
 
To persist in interpreting caste politics as vote bank politics and the reservation issue as 
effective/ineffective social policy is to miss the radical dislocation of the social in 
India.427 
 
The first two chapters focused on debates about and representations of 
reservations for Scheduled Castes. In this chapter, I look at conflicts over the extension of 
the policy to another category of the population, the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). As 
discussed in the introduction, Ambedkar argued that the particular forms of exclusion 
Dalits faced as a result of untouchability distinguished them from other social groups. On 
this basis, he demanded separate political representation in negotiations with the colonial 
state. The separate categorization of untouchables as Scheduled Caste in the Government 
of India Act, 1935, created a residual category of other backward groups whose 
disadvantage had to be redressed through state interventions. While usage of the term 
“backward classes” can be traced back to 1870, it had shifted rapidly in meaning over the 	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course of colonial rule, never acquiring a fixed definition at the national level.428 Its 
continued existence in post-colonial India was ensured by the Objectives Resolution 
moved by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly, which resolved to provide adequate 
safeguards for “minorities, backward and tribal areas, and depressed and other backward 
classes.”429 Like untouchability, the term Other Backward Classes was left undefined in 
the Constitution. However, untouchablity also operated as an organizing principle for the 
category Scheduled Castes. Untouchability was the basis on which diverse communities 
could be affiliated to an overarching category for administrative purposes. It was also the 
crucial experience that linked groups separated by language, region and occupation in 
regional and national anti-caste movements. As much as upper caste elites sought to 
foreground economic backwardness at the expense of social discrimination in their 
diagnosis of the problem of Scheduled Castes, the criteria of untouchability meant that 
they could never fully dismiss the question of caste. However, in the case of Other 
Backward Classes, the state created an administrative category which it then had to fill.430 
The fluid and shifting term “backward’, used to describe a range of subjects and socio-
economic conditions, had to be forced into some form of a stable definition for policy 
purposes. The task of determining appropriate criteria for the category OBC required an 
assessment of how, if at all, caste discrimination affected social groups that were not 
subjected to practices of untouchability. In this way, it was perceived as an opportunity to 
demonstrate the minimal relevance of caste as a structure of inequality.  
The Mandal Commission on Backward Classes was the second attempt by the 
state to determine the criteria for the category OBC and devise a national social policy for 
Backward Class groups. It was formed in 1979 by the Janata Dal government in 
accordance with Article 340 of the Constitution. This article empowers the president to 
appoint a commission to investigate the conditions of the “socially and educationally 
backward classes”, and suggest measures for the improvement of their condition. Nehru 	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had rejected the findings and recommendations of the first Commission on Backward 
Classes (the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, 1955) because it used caste criteria. Nehru 
argued:  
…the Commission had to find objective tests and criteria by which such 
classifications were to be made; they had to find indisputable yardsticks by which 
social and educational backwardness could be measured. The report…has not 
been unanimous on this point; in fact, it reveals considerable divergence.431  
The insistence on determining objective and scientific criteria to measure disadvantage 
reflected the desire among post-colonial elites to eliminate caste as a category of 
classification. The elite associated the production of knowledge about caste with the 
divide and rule policies of British imperialism. Moreover, despite the best efforts of 
British officials and ethnographers, caste was still not a uniform system of reference 
across India.432 The sheer diversity of caste practices, groupings, names and internal 
differentiations within and across individual states strengthened opposition to the use of 
caste categories, as this was not only harmful to national unity but also bureaucratically 
unmanageable. In Home Minister Govind Pant’s view, the Report’s establishment of a 
list of 2,399 castes that qualified as backward only served to remind Indians that their 
country was backward.433 Following the rejection of the Kaka Kalelkar Commission 
Report the development of a national policy for Other Backward Classes was abandoned 
and it was advised that states appoint their own commissions to devise criteria -preferably 
economic - and welfare measures for this category of the population. Since 1960 
economic criteria was imposed from above on various state level programs and on the 
Mandal Commission itself.434 	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 According to Jaffrelot, an important outcome of the rejection of the Kalelkar 
Commission report was the formation of lower caste movements in North India in the 
1960s.435 The mobilization of these movements was largely focused on the issue of 
reservation quotas for OBCs. This differed from the experience of the Southern states 
where the non-Brahmin movement had struggled and achieved reservation for backward 
classes during the colonial period. Due to this legacy there was greater social acceptance 
of affirmative action policies and backward caste led power sharing arrangements in the 
region. This enabled the further increase of reservation in all Southern states on the 
recommendation of state level Backward Classes Commissions during the 1960s, 
notably, without provoking significant anti-reservation opposition.436 Similar attempts 
had met with strong upper caste opposition in Northern states such as U.P. and Bihar. 
However, the processes of capitalist development that unfolded through land reforms and 
green revolution policies in this region led to the formation of an economically mobile 
class of landowning OBCs interested in attaining greater political power.437 These 
shifting contours of caste relations meant that it would have been impossible for the post-
colonial state to indefinitely ignore mobilizations around the OBC category at the 
national level.438  As discussed in the previous chapter, the trajectory of reservation 
policies prior to the Mandal controversy was marked by non-implementation of 
Scheduled Caste reservation, novel forms of caste discrimination in offices and 
universities and violent anti-reservation protests. The politicization of backward caste 
communities thus occurred in a context of growing anti-reservation sentiment among 	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caste Hindus, for both SC/STs and OBCs. The intense opposition to the implementation 
of the Mandal Commission Report expressed in widespread protests, strikes and violence 
across the Northern states in 1990-91 was thus an extension of intensifying anti-
reservation sentiment rather than a departure from a prior understanding of the need for 
SC/ST reservation quotas. 
 In this chapter I examine the discourses and practices of anti-reservation and pro-
reservation positions on the Mandal Commission. Through my reading of these positions 
I will engage with and complicate some key interpretations of the debate found in the 
existing literature. At the outset it is necessary to foreground one interpretation in 
particular that informs the questions asked in this chapter: that the Mandal controversy 
represents the return of the repressed histories of caste in India.439 The ways in which 
Caste Hindu elites responded to the issue of OBC reservation illustrates that while they 
had repressed and disavowed caste identity, they remained attached to and nourished by 
its privileges. Dhareshwar argues, “ until V.P. Singh decided to implement the Mandal 
Commission Report, caste had no place in the narrative milieu of the secular self”.440 The 
argument about caste as the return of the repressed is related to the spectacular forms of 
protest undertaken by subjects designated as urban, secular and middle class: vandalism, 
arson, the staged performance of caste identified manual labor, and – endlessly noted for 
its significance – the self-immolation undertaken by numerous college students. Rajeev 
Goswami was the first student to stage this form of protest. Although his intention had 
been to stage a mock self-immolation for press coverage, his colleagues’ lack of attention 
resulted in near fatal injuries. Over 159 cases of self-immolation occurred in the month 
following Goswami’s attempt. Thus, Dirks argues “…in the burning of Rajeev 
Goswami’s body, caste leaked simultaneously out of the traditional worlds of the 
subaltern and the village and into the middle-class enclaves of new India.”441 The Mandal 
Commission Report called attention to the glaring dominance of upper castes within state 
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institutions and in turn challenged the naturalized caste privileges of the “secular” elite.  
As I will discuss in this chapter, this made it necessary for those opposed to reservations 
to produce alternative explanations that justified the concentration of upper castes in state 
institutions.  
The interpretation of caste as the return of the repressed in the Mandal debate 
raises the following questions: If the relationship of the secular elite to caste has been one 
of repression and disavowal, what kind of historical, cultural and intellectual resources 
did these subjects draw upon as they participated in one of post-colonial India’s most 
contentious debates about caste? Why did they perceive in the implementation of the 
Mandal Commission Report the onset of chaos, violence, caste wars and national 
disintegration? This chapter addresses these questions by examining how meanings about 
community, nation and caste were mobilized in anti-reservation discourses. These 
meanings will be contrasted with those found in pro-reservation arguments. Notably, 
opponents of the Mandal recommendations consistently claimed the subject position of 
unmarked national citizen in the debate. They claimed that their interests were 
synonymous with the interests of the nation-state. Ranging from narratives about caste 
under Mughal and British (i.e. non-Hindu) rule to affirmations of the principles of merit 
and efficiency, anti-reservation discourses reconciled the elite claim to be beyond caste in 
the secular-public sphere with blatantly casteist stereotypes about Dalits, OBCs and 
“reserved category” students and workers. Hence, I argue that critics of Mandal relied on 
particular framings of SCs and OBCs as inferior subjects in the production of themselves 
as modern and caste-less citizens acting in defense of the nation. The claim that OBC 
reservations would result in national disintegration and caste wars was underpinned by a 
static, colonial understanding of caste groups as infinitely and irreducibly divided. In this 
way, the possibility of political alliances between SCs and OBCs was rejected. In 
contrast, support for reservations among Dalit activists was articulated to an expansive, 
non-essentialist notion of community based on the concept of “Bahujan” (majority). 
Alliances between SCs, OBCs and religious minorities were envisioned in terms of a 
“majority of the oppressed”, thus challenging the concept of a “Hindu majority” as 
fabrication of a privileged minority. The vehement protests against Mandal underscored 
the need to forge these solidarities. Attending to the alternative meanings of community, 
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caste and nation in anti-caste, pro-reservation discourses makes evident that the 
autonomous politicization of subaltern castes had no place in the socio-political 
imaginary of the elite. Opponents of the Mandal Commission were not only defending 
their privileged access to secure employment, but a vision of the nation in which the 
Caste Hindu is the normative citizen-subject and inspirational ideal for the masses.  
In the following section I outline the context leading to the Mandal controversy of 
1990 and review some key analytical accounts that I will be engaging with. 
Subsequently, I examine the specific understanding of caste and caste subjectivities 
deployed in anti-reservation discourses.  I then contrast this interpretation of the Mandal 
Commission to the discourses within anti-caste movements that supported the reservation 
for OBCs as part of a distinct political imaginary based on the concept of “Bahujan” 
(majority). Finally, I discuss the relation of the controversy to two significant political 
developments emerging from this moment: 1) the increased legitimacy of Hindutva 
ideology and its social and political organizations and 2) the intensification of the Dalit 
movement, particularly expansion of activist networks and political parties.442 
 
Calculating Backwardness, Secularizing Caste  
 As noted above, 24 years passed after the shelving of the Kaka Kalelkar 
Commission Report on Backward Classes and the formation of the Mandal Commission. 
These were years of largely undisputed national dominance of the Congress Party, which 
did not regard caste as a relevant category for state directed social transformations. In 
North India, communist parties came to be increasingly marginalized in electoral politics. 
These parties showed scant interest in organizing lower castes as castes on the grounds 
that class would inevitably submerge caste.443 In the Northern states in which the intense 
conflicts over the Mandal Commission Report were staged, it was the Socialists that 
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engaged with lower caste communities as a political constituency of “Shudras.”444 
Guided by the leadership and political ideas of Ram Manohar Lohia, the Socialists 
articulated the inseparability of economic inequality and caste inequality to demands for 
reservations as a means to transform power relations. In the realm of electoral politics the 
Socialists recruited backward caste political leaders and called for the reservation of 
administrative posts for OBCs, following the strategies of the non-Brahmin movement in 
the South. The agenda of OBC empowerment was incorporated into various socialist 
organizational formations over time, culminating in the creation of the Janata Party in 
1977.445  
The Janata Party was in the forefront of the opposition coalition against Indira 
Gandhi’s imposition of emergency rule between 1975 and 1977. Its election manifesto of 
1977 promised a new deal for “weaker sections”, including 25-30 percent reservation of 
government service posts for the backward classes as recommended by the Kalelkar 
Commission.446 The party sought to represent itself as an organization of the poor, and 
build a social base among Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and religious 
minorities. This was reflected in the membership of the Mandal Commission, which 
contained no upper caste members and was comprised solely of OBCs. Submitted to the 
government in 1980, the Mandal Commission Report applied a combination of economic, 
educational and social criteria to produce a national list of caste based communities 
categorized as OBC.447 The report made the case that social backwardness must be seen 
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as an effect of caste and further, educational and economic backwardness flowed from 
the former: “The poverty of these castes stemmed from their social discrimination and 
they did not become socially backward because of their poverty”.448 As such the social 
indicators were given a greater weight in the designation of a community as backward. 
The Commission’s interpretation of article 340 also emphasized that the priority of the 
state had to be the removal of social backwardness, namely, caste-based discrimination. 
This was supported through discussion of numerous Supreme Court judgments on 
reservation that confirmed the constitutional validity of identifying backward classes 
through the category of caste.449 Based on the findings of the Commission 2,399 
communities constituting 52% of the population of India fit the criteria of the category 
OBC. Consistent with its analysis, the Report’s recommendations were based on the 
argument that anti-poverty measures alone would not resolve social and educational 
backwardness. The recommendation of 27% reservation for OBCs in public sector 
undertakings – the particular policy that the National Front government sought to take 
forward in their partial implementation of the Mandal recommendations in 1990-91 – 
became the most contentious.  The Report acknowledged reservations were not being 
recommended to address economic inequality. Rather, guaranteed representation of 
OBCs in state institutions were recommended for their affective, symbolic value:  
…we must recognize that an essential part of the battle against social 
backwardness is to be fought in the minds of the backward people…by increasing 
the representation of OBCs in government services, we give them an immediate 
feeling of participation in the governance of this country…the psychological spin 
off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the entire community…feels socially 
elevated.450 
Inculcating a sense of inclusion in the nation-state among OBCs was also urged due to 
the disproportionate representation of higher castes in the public sector relative to their 
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percentage of the population. The latter were held responsible for fostering elitism within 
government and educational institutions. Further, elite responses to the reservation 
recommendations were anticipated and countered within the text itself. Arguments about 
the injury reservations caused to hardworking, meritorious (upper caste) candidates were 
refuted as “the arguments advanced by the ruling elite which is keen on preserving its 
privileges…it tends to ignore much larger issues of national importance.”451 In this way, 
the Report was characterized by a particularly polemical approach to the backward class 
question. Given the history of resistance to using caste as a category for social policy, the 
Report prioritized the task of establishing that caste was indispensible to the definition of 
backward in the category “Other Backward Classes”. Less attention was given to the 
presentation of empirical data establishing that the caste communities identified should 
be categorized as OBC.  
By the time the Commission’s work was completed the Congress had regained 
political power at the centre. The Report was submitted to Indira Gandhi’s government in 
December 1980 but was not discussed in Parliament until 1982. During the Congress led 
governments of the 1980s, Mandal experienced a fate similar to that of the Kalelkar 
Commission. It was forwarded to the state governments for obtaining their views and no 
actions were taken at the national level. Replacing the question of caste and power 
relations raised by the Commission with a developmental approach, Gandhi introduced a 
20-point program emphasizing health care, welfare programs for women and greater 
access to education.452 However, despite having secured large electoral majorities the 
Congress was unable to contain growing demands from an assertive opposition and from 
active movements and interest groups.453 The implementation of the Mandal Commission 
recommendations was a key issue on which the Janata Dal successfully campaigned in 
the 1989 elections under the leadership of V.P. Singh, a Congress dissident and 
proponent of Lohia’s politics. Singh announced the party’s intention to fulfill this 
promise in a statement forwarded to both houses of Parliament on 7th August 1990. Social 
justice was the key legitimating concept in political arguments over reservations in the 	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Mandal debate in parliament.454 Through the concept of social justice the problematic of 
caste was articulated to transformation in society’s power structures. According to 
Bajpai, supporters of the Mandal Commission extricated social justice from the embrace 
of discourses of national unity, national integration and development that characterized 
earlier Congress arguments about affirmative action.455 In this discursive framework, it 
became impossible for any major political party to denounce the Mandal 
recommendations. In public statements the Congress Party and BJP articulated their 
opposition to Mandal in terms of the timing of the decision, the lack of adequate 
consensus, methodological weakness and the need to extend reservation on the basis of 
economic criteria. That is, their opposition was not directed at the question of caste as 
such. No party could afford to be perceived as against “lower caste” interests in a context 
where the significance of this constituency had become crucial for electoral politics. It 
was the intensity of protest staged by upper castes to the Mandal report that enabled 
parties to begin shifting their positions in the debate.  
Shortly after Singh’s announcement upper caste students organized their 
opposition into various formations such as the Anti-Mandal Commission Forum, 
Committee for the Struggle Against Reservations and the Committee for the Struggle 
Against the Mandal Commission, with the aim of abolishing all reservations including 
those for SC/STs.456 A case was filed in the Supreme Court in September 1990 
challenging the constitutionality of Singh’s decision, which subjected the Report to a stay 
order. In mobilizing against Mandal, anti-reservation protestors perceived of and 
projected themselves as the true representatives of the nation. Their occupation of public 
space and discourses sought to communicate a sacrificial mission to defend the nation 
against divisive sectional interests. For example, college students in Delhi renamed the 
site of their action “Kranti (Freedom) Chowk”. 457 In other symbolic gestures students 	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boycotted classes and held rallies in which they burned their degrees and performed caste 
identified manual labor such as sweeping and shoe shining.458 Such performances were 
accompanied by denouncements of the Mandal Commission and OBC reservations in 
leading national English newspapers. Journalists overwhelmingly supported the student 
protestors and presented their destruction of public property across the states of U.P., 
Bihar, Punjab and Haryana as a justified, spontaneous outburst of anger. These actions 
were interpreted as a warning to the National Front government: “the student 
demonstrations must be seen as a symptom of an approaching storm, the ferocity of 
which may not be confined to the seven states where agitation is currently in 
evidence”.459 Against a government attempting to unleash the divisive forces of caste on 
the nation, the anti-reservation movement was represented as engaged in a struggle to 
preserve the primacy of people over castes, of a modern meritocratic society and the 
values of the freedom movement. 460 Yet their performance of caste identified labor such 
as sweeping as a form of protest indicates that the anti-reservation movement was also 
produced through embodied performances of caste privilege that betrayed abstract 
appeals to merit and equality. Implicit in the staging of this kind of protest was the 
tragedy that particular kinds of subjects will have to labor in this manner – not that the 
labor as such is exploitative and violent. The instrumental concerns about reduced 
opportunities for employment were thus intertwined with certain understandings of the 
relationship between the upper caste self as normative citizen subject and lower caste 
others. One striking example of this was the fast undertaken by BJP Rajya Sabha member 
Jinendra Kumar against the manner in which Mandal was implemented. Kumar broke his 
fast by accepting juice from a “harijan girl”, Mrs. Tara Devi, who worked as a 
sweeper.461 This benevolent political performance echoed Gandhi’s fast after Amedkar’s 
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demand for separate electorates during the Round Table Conference of 1932. Gandhi had 
invited a Dalit youth to serve him on the day he broke his fast. The historical connection 
of this protest to the Gandhian framework of purging untouchability in order to create a 
harmonious form of caste hierarchy suggested that the nation being preserved by 
opponents of Mandal could only be held together through the sacrificial upper caste body. 
The fast framed the issue of caste discrimination within a paternalistic approach to social 
reform emphasizing uplift and empathy for the subaltern caste subject. As I will discuss 
in this chapter, this indicates the complex ways in which the figure of the Scheduled 
Caste subject was mobilized in the anti-reservation discourses of the Mandal debate.  
 Although the anti-reservation movement occupied urban centres for months 
following Singh’s announcement, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of 
caste as a criteria for OBC reservation as proposed in the Mandal Commission.462 The 
judgment registered the view that economic criteria alone would not be adequate to 
address the complexities of disadvantage in Indian society. It also argued for the 
relevance of caste as an identifiable social unit for the purposes of data collection:  
Since caste represents an existing, identifiable, social group spread over an 
overwhelming majority of the country’s population, we say one may well begin 
with castes…and then go on to other groups, sections and classes. If the real 
object is to discover and locate backwardness, and if such backwardness is found 
in a caste, it can be treated as backward…463 
Caste was presented in the Supreme Court ruling as one available option among other 
kinds of social groupings for determination of backward class status. At the same time, 
the court advised the government to devise a means test through which it could exclude 
economically advanced caste groups categorized as OBC. Thus proponents of the Mandal 
Commission were successful in passing some of the report’s recommendations, although 
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V.P. Singh’s government did not survive the controversy and was brought down through 
a no confidence motion that year.  
In retrospect it might seem that despite the intensity of the 1990 protests Caste 
Hindus have largely adjusted themselves to the expanded reservation framework. This is 
explained by the onset of neo-liberal economic policies in 1991, which increased 
opportunities for the upper caste middle class to acquire lucrative employment in the 
private sector.464 However, the swift organization of anti-reservation protests in response 
to the Congress Party’s attempt to implement another recommendation of the Mandal 
Report in 2006-2007 – namely reservation for OBCs in central educational institutions – 
and the stay order on these measures placed by the Supreme Court illustrates that 
reservation policies continue to be strongly opposed among privileged castes. Activists 
have subsequently mobilized against the increased harassment of Dalit students and 
numerous cases of suicide at AIIMS, IIT and IIM, the institutions that were the site of 
anti-reservation actions in 2006-2007.465 Anti-reservation politics continue to shape the 
practices and culture of state institutions long after organized protests have subsided. This 
suggests that despite the claim that Scheduled Caste reservation is historically and 
morally acceptable in contrast to the illegitimacy of OBC reservation, practices of caste 
discrimination and violence do not differentiate on the basis of governmental categories 
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of classification. Indeed, as a testament to the banal practices of casteism in everyday life 
the increase in Dalit suicides in the wake of the most recent anti-Mandal protests suggests 
that “the ‘mistaken for’ itself is not a mistake, insofar as it is the very point.”466    
 It is with this in mind that I will highlight some key points of analysis found in 
accounts of the Mandal Commission. In both the (upper caste) press coverage and 
academic interventions in the debate, the constitutional and moral basis for SC/ST 
reservation was distinguished from the dubious basis upon which reservation was being 
extended to OBCs: “Only the Harijans and Adivasis have suffered collectively the kind 
of social abuse and psychological injury that justify very special measures of redress in 
their cases, including the reservation of jobs. The case of Other Backward Classes and the 
religious minorities is very different…”467 Whereas the historical oppression of 
Scheduled Castes was seen as self evident, the use of “murky” socioeconomic indicators 
in delineating the category of OBC justified the resistance to Mandal on two fronts: 1) the 
lack of moral imperative, as upper castes did not carry the same guilt for oppressing 
OBCs that they did for Scheduled Castes and 2) the imprecision of the data through 
which communities were categorized as OBC, which creates doubt as to whether those 
benefitting from reservation are truly in need of it.468 These arguments suggest that 
regardless of how one feels about caste and social justice, the Mandal report should be 
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rejected as an exercise in the production of faulty and unreliable data. This is related to a 
second interpretation of the debate: the “secularized” conception of caste around which it 
revolved. Scholars have argued that the Mandal debate did not define caste in terms of 
purity-pollution, ritual, scriptures and other religious aspects of the concept. Protestors 
were not concerned with such “traditional anthropological questions” but rather, “feared 
that they would be denied even the slim chance they already had for acquiring 
educational credentials and government employment.”469 Mandal reflected a decline in 
the significance of the religious disabilities of caste and an increased emphasis on its 
secular aspects, including poverty, literacy and representation in state institutions.470 This 
interpretation of the debate can be related to a final point I will engage with in the 
following sections: the argument that the OBC is a purely instrumental, bureaucratic 
category. As such the OBCs do not represent a “real political community”. The political 
subjects mobilizing around this category did so only insofar as the possibility of 
acquiring reservations from the state existed. These subjects internalized an OBC identity 
simply because they thought they could derive benefits from it.471 In fact, more agitation 
and campaigns have resulted from upper caste opposition to reservations than in its 
favor.472 In this interpretation the OBC category has been produced through electoral 
expediencies of political parties following the decline of Congress dominance in North 
India and would not exist outside of the reservations framework. The OBC is thus a 
product of vote bank politics in post-colonial India.  
 In the remaining sections of this chapter, my analysis will seek to complicate 
these interpretations of the Mandal debate. My reading of anti-reservation discourses in 
the (upper caste) media will show how opposition to the Mandal Commission was forged 
through specific understandings of colonial legacies, Scheduled Caste reservation and 
caste practices of purity and pollution. Arguments thus constructed collapsed initial 
distinctions between Scheduled Castes and OBCs in a call for the elimination of all 
reservations by the state. These arguments were upheld by representations of SCs and 
OBCs as the main agents of ritual and religious caste practices. The “real oppressors” of 	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modern India were not upper castes but dominant landowning OBCs in rural areas. This 
betrayed deeply rooted notions about the inferiority of “lower castes” and not simply 
instrumental concerns about employment. Through these kinds of arguments opponents 
of Mandal re-produced themselves as the only modern, caste-less citizens of India. The 
call for economic criteria and developmental solutions as a “secular” alternative to 
reservation in this discourse de-politicized the issue of caste and power relations. Finally, 
my reading of arguments supporting Mandal in publications such as The Oppressed 
Indian and Dalit Voice will show that to view the OBC as a strictly instrumental category 
misses the ways in which it was analyzed in Dalit-Bahujan literature. Through 
mobilization around the politics of the Mandal Commission OBC came to be inhabited as 
a “vibrant and subjectively experienced political community.”473 Attending to these 
discourses about the Mandal Commission locates support for reservation historically and 
philosophically with the movements of Phule and Ambedkar and thus to the search for “a 
community sans Brahminism.”474 This highlights the extent to which the idea of a 
majority Hindu community is naturalized in dominant discourses regardless of elite 
claims that they have transcended the parochialisms of caste and community.  
 
“Reserved Category” Subjects and National Decline: Mandal and the Specter of 
Partition 
The Mandal Commission will severely curtail sanskritizing tendencies within the 
intermediate castes…few will relish the civilizational havoc likely to result from making 
virtue of the cultural attributes of backwardness.475  
 As mentioned in the previous section, a key argument against the extension of 
reservation to OBCs was that Scheduled Castes were the only appropriate subjects for 
such a policy due to their exceptional historical oppression. There was no shortage of 	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such arguments about SC reservation in the national English language press. In this 
discourse the anti-reservation riots and caste atrocities marking the trajectory of post-
colonial India disappeared. They were replaced by firm commitments of the nation to 
atonement for past transgressions: “None of us ever opposed reservation for 
SC/ST…reservations were a way by which the society was doing penance for the 
treatment meted out to SC/ST”.476 Such expressions of Caste Hindu guilt and atonement 
were affiliated to a Gandhian framework of Scheduled Caste uplift. In this framework of 
social reform violent caste relations must be transformed into a harmonious and non-
violent hierarchy. For example, one author observed as a sign of declining beliefs in 
untouchablity that in the capital the “outcastes of yore can be seen doing their chores, 
moving about in the houses of upper castes frequently without any restrictions”. These 
signs of progress were the legacies of Gandhi’s inter-caste dining programs.477 This 
mapping of social transformation in the space of urban middle class domesticity indicates 
how the “traditional” issues of purity-pollution continued to inform the conceptualization 
of caste in the Mandal debate. By drawing upon Gandhi to give moral value to the hiring 
of domestic workers in the homes of the privileged, an incremental and assimilating 
trajectory of social reform was provided to counter the alternative social transformations 
proposed by supporters of the Mandal Commission. As with the “harijan girl” called 
upon in the BJP hunger strike discussed in the previous section, the domestic workers 
remain in a subordinate position to the benevolent agent of social reform. Thus Gandhian 
symbols provided an important historical resource through which the self-articulation and 
autonomous organizing of subaltern castes as envisioned in Ambedkarite movements – 
including those in support of Mandal – could be dismissed as unnecessary.  
 Critics also made their case against Mandal by drawing on the four decades of 
SC/ST reservation policy. The discursive space of the Mandal debate provided an 
opportunity for them to narrate their experiences of and reflections on the kinds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 V.P. Dutt, Vice-Chancellor Delhi University. Quoted in “Now, it is Caste Fanaticism,” 
Hindustan Times, 8 September, 1990. Also see “Open Letter of JNU Faculty”, 4 August, 
1990, published in multiple English newspapers; Purshottam Nivas, Hindustan Times, 23 
August, 1990; J.K. Barthukar, “Key to Reservation,” Hindustan Times, 29 August, 1990; 
Ramashray Roy, “Fiction Into Fact,” Indian Express, 30 August, 1990.	  
477 Vijay Dutt, “Why not the Mahatma Way?,” Hindustan Times, 2 September, 1990.	  
166	  
subjects that had been produced through the reservations framework. Often the same 
articles that began with an affirmation of commitment to SC reservation concluded with 
cautionary tales about the pampered and incapable Scheduled Castes occupying the 
limited spaces in schools and government offices. They described in detail the 
incompetence of Scheduled Caste engineers, doctors, pilots and office clerks. Day in and 
day out papers were filled with “casteist filth” about the “merit the forward castes possess 
and the imbecility of the Dalits.”478 Attending to some of these examples shows the ways 
in which awareness of caste is generated in the modern secular spaces of the nation-state. 
Given that the Mandal debate is described as a departure from traditional anthropological 
conceptions of caste, these examples contribute to understanding how contemporary 
experiential conceptions of caste re-produce assumptions about lower caste inferiority. In 
other words, they shed light on what precisely was “casteist” about modern anti-
reservation discourses.  
In the Hindustan Times, one editorial described an encounter between the author, 
in the capacity of interviewer for a post of Information Officer, and a Scheduled Caste 
candidate from South India who “…had graduated from an American University; hence it 
could be assumed that she came from an affluent family.”479 This encounter was a dismal 
one – the candidate was extremely unqualified for the position. For example, she was 
unable to answer any general knowledge questions put to her. She had no understanding 
of current events, admitting frankly “she did not read newspapers.”480 However, the 
interviewer’s decision to not recommend the candidate for the post was ignored due to 
the constraints of the reservation policy. The Chairman of interviews informed him, 
“…we have no option. A scheduled caste candidate has to be recommended and she is the 
only one we have.”481 The encounter with and subsequent hiring of an economically 
privileged, incompetent SC that would be entrusted with the task of disseminating 
information to citizens of India served as a cautionary anecdote about caste based 
reservation policies. It was implicit that her economic privilege made her the daughter of 	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an SC bureaucrat or politician whose status was only due to the quota system. The dismal 
performance in the interview suggested the affluent SC girl planned to use this quota as a 
substitute for merit. Thus the author concluded that while the moral necessity of “undoing 
wrongs done to outcastes…over the centuries”482 is an important national commitment, 
this must be weighed against the other implications of reservation: the perpetuation of the 
caste structure and ignoring the merit of the deserving. In this article Caste Hindus, the 
“we” who must balance these conflicting priorities, may have a moral obligation to 
Scheduled Castes. However, the implications of reservation policies are ruinous to the 
nation-state regardless of the subject in question.  
 In another article the Mandal debate was taken as an opportune moment to raise 
the issue of Dalit suicides in educational institutions such as IIT. The article began by 
describing the spate of Dalit suicides in the late 1970s that led author Giriraj Kishore to 
publish Parishist, a book on the real life experiences of Dalit students at the IIT 
Kanpur.483 But the author does not discuss the experiences described in Parishist to 
explain the reason for these suicides. Rather, he consulted with an (upper caste) IAS 
officer. Seemingly the officer’s expertise came from his experience of working with SC 
employees. Based on this he argued: “the only way the SC and ST students can be 
helped…is by raising their educational standard.”484 Thus the IIT had started to provide 
special coaching sessions for students from these communities. In this analysis the lack of 
confidence and skill among such students – due to which they commit suicide - is a result 
of their unpreparedness for higher education. In this way, the Mandal Report’s argument 
in favor of building a sense of inclusion and confidence among excluded communities 
was challenged: “Reservation is an opportunity, not a confidence building exercise. That 
comes from the sort of education and training one has received.”485 Subsequently, the 
officer recounted his own experiences with “reserved category” employees, in which 
Dalits became sub-standard officers of the IAS.486 In one case, an employee whose 
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educational success is attributed to the special coaching sessions of IIT quit the IAS 
prematurely because his overconfidence led him to conclude: “the administration has not 
come up to my expectations”. Another officer who was “petrified” by the sheer thought 
of guns attempted to resign upon learning that IAS officers were required to issue shoot 
orders. In this infantilizing representation of an SC officer it is the meritorious Caste 
Hindu who is left to deal with the strains such employees place on the administration. 
Only the latter is capable of respecting the institutions of the nation-state.  So the issue of 
suicide among “Society’s Supplements” served as evidence that the government must 
“take a fresh look at the reservation policy to make it more realistic”. Such discourses 
about the Scheduled Caste as subject of reservations revealed that the anti-Mandal 
position was not only driven by fears that Caste Hindus will have reduced access to jobs. 
There was a deeper sense motivating these illustrations of incompetence that this subject 
does not belong in and cannot maintain the integrity of national institutions.  
 It is not simply that the questions of discrimination and harassment of Scheduled 
Castes in education and employment were ignored or unaccounted for in these articles. 
The concept of discrimination was reduced to an excuse used by reserved category 
subjects to mask their inadequacies. In the Special Issue of India Seminar entitled 
“Reserved Futures”, the consequences of reservation policy were brought to life through 
the figure of the “quota appointed” university professor. It was argued that PhD students 
would refuse to work with this professor, not because of their casteism, but for fear of not 
“getting their money’s worth.”487 This individual would then inflate student grades in 
order to attract interest in his courses, a strategy that must ultimately backfire because 
only students admitted on the basis of quotas would be interested in such grade inflation. 
In the end, “the teacher is left…frustrated, isolated and naturally inclined to blame his 
plight on ‘discrimination’ rather than on the reservation policy.”488 In this scenario the 
resentment of other (Caste Hindu) professors is justified as a natural consequence of 
having to deal with such costly burdens on the educational system.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
resigned in 1964. The article discussed here does not mention the issue of discrimination 
at IIT or the IAS. 	  
487 Ashok Guha, “The Mandal Mythology,” India Seminar 375 Reserved Futures: A 
Symposium on the Policy of Positive Discrimination, November 1990, 53.	  
488 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 	  
169	  
 In these and other reflections on the experience of SC reservation, the candidate 
admitted through a quota was always positioned against the larger public interest. 
Whether it was an inferior teacher hired at the expense of students and educational 
standards, government officials hired at the cost of substandard public services and 
corruption, or defense department agents that are a risk to national security, the “reserved 
category” candidate is by implication an inferior, unqualified candidate.489 Nor was this 
fear of the incompetent limited to the upper castes: “… as one backward officer himself 
admitted to me, ‘I would be in dithers if a captain commanding a Boeing is one of us, not 
knowing…if he really merits the responsibility of flying the aircraft.”490 Thus the 
problem with the Mandal Report was not only that the OBCs had no moral or historical 
entitlement to reservations. These detailed commentaries on “reserved category” 
subjectivity suggest that the problem with Mandal was that it would open the floodgates 
to an increasing amount of similarly unqualified candidates, resulting in deterioration of 
the nation-state’s institutions. It has been argued that the appeal to merit in elite discourse 
represents a novel shift emerging out of the Mandal debate.491 The articles discussed 
above illustrate how a particular reading of Scheduled Caste reservation was mobilized in 
the production of this merit discourse. As such the anti-reservation position in the Mandal 
debate on OBCs was not in contrast to the national acceptance of SC reservation. The 
former must be located within the trajectory of non-implementation, discriminatory 
practices and anti-reservation riots in the first four decades of post-colonial affirmative 
action policy.  
How was it that a secular elite who had apparently repressed or disavowed caste, 
who conceived of themselves as beyond caste, had these examples of SC inferiority so 	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readily available? The ways in which the figure of the SC was pressed into service of 
anti-reservation discourse is indicative of the constant monitoring of SC bodies in 
educational institutions and workspaces by the “secular caste-less elite” of post-colonial 
India. The critiques of Mandal in the national English media thus provide insights into 
the contours of contemporary casteism. They show that the intellectual, historical and 
cultural resources available to a class that constituted itself through repression of caste 
are not casteist in the “traditional anthropological sense”. In other words, the casteism 
displayed in the press cannot be explained solely with reference to the caste of the writers 
– that the writers are essentially inclined to denounce reservations because they belong to 
upper caste families, hence their views are remnants of “traditional” religious bias. The 
casteism displayed in the press as it reconstructed the trajectory of reservations policy 
was produced through the resources of secular nationalism. For example, Nehru’s letter 
to Chief Ministers in 1961 in which he expressed his dislike of any kind of reservation 
because they promote “second rate” standards was printed in numerous English dailies in 
August and September 1990. Thus the “secularized” conception of caste deployed in the 
Mandal debate facilitated the secularization of caste prejudice. The framework of 
developmental modernizing nationalism did secularize caste categories by defining 
communities through indicators such as poverty, literacy and income levels. However, 
this same framework also informed representations of the “reserved class” as 
undisciplined in the task of national development: “reservations should only be given to 
those who follow family planning norms and have fewer children, because due to the 
pressure of this class on national resources persons are forced to migrate leading to brain 
drain”492. Eminent scholars of caste such as MN Srivnavas blamed the tragedy of hoards 
of teenagers leaving India for American universities on the reservation system.493 In this 
articulation a class of subjects inferior in skill and undisciplined in development goals 
was literally pushing disciplined, secular subjects outside the nation’s borders. The anti-
reservation discourse thus demonstrates the “secularization of casteism”: the 
naturalization of hierarchy through the framework of developmental, modernizing 
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nationalism. Through this framework critics could simultaneously denounce Mandal and 
re-produce themselves as beyond caste identity.  
The representation of OBCs in the media further reinforced the modern secular 
credentials of the Caste Hindu citizen. There are two key ways in which the category of 
OBC was described in anti-reservation discourse. Firstly, as a category so vast and 
incomprehensible that it was virtually meaningless: “a huge but as yet undefined and 
almost undefineable mass of many millions of people clamoring for special treatment.”494 
Communities on the OBC list did not share a common history or common interests. Thus 
the state could easily manipulate the category by redefining criteria and adding new 
castes for its own political interests. This tendency would be encouraged by the 
methodological weaknesses of the report itself, as it had generated data based on 
projections from the 1931 census. As a purely administrative category there was no 
meaningful form of political community or internal unity among subjects qualifying as 
OBC. Secondly, when the OBC subject was described in more specific detail, it was only 
as part of a dominant, landowning elite that perpetuated casteist oppression in rural India: 
“…the primary contradiction is not between so-called forward castes and the sudras, but 
between dominant castes many of which are clubbed as backward castes by Mandal and 
the Harijans.”495 Economically this section of OBCs - principally Yadavs and Kurmis in 
North India – were already privileged due to the way land and agrarian reform policies 
had been implemented in previous decades. They now sought to gain political power in 
accordance with their economic status:  
…the light that inspires the Prime Minister’s flights of lyricism is not the 
glimmer of hope in the eyes of the oppressed; it is the glitter of greed in the eyes 
of an OBC elite offered a sudden bonanza which it could never have hoped for 
under open competition.496 
The main support base for Mandal was this small OBC elite, who would also be the only 
group to benefit from reservation. Using the rhetoric of social justice and caste 
discrimination, these elites were manipulating the OBC masses. The latter would see no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 Parmanand Singh, “A Question of Legality,” India Seminar 375 Reserved Futures: A 
Symposium on the Policy of Positive Discrimination, November 1990, 26.	  
495 Swapan Dasgupta, “Curse of Mandal.” 	  
496 Guha, “The Mandal Mythology,” 52.	  
172	  
improvement in their employment prospects through the proposed policy. Furthermore, it 
was these elites who were the principal agents of casteism in society: “today it is not 
Thakurs who rape scheduled caste women but some of those who belong to the so-called 
other backward classes also do.”497 As such, the exceptional forms of oppression suffered 
by the Scheduled Castes and due to which they received reservation, were perpetuated in 
contemporary India by the very subjects that the Mandal report sought to provide 
reservation for.498 The representation of OBC subjectivity reinforced the upper caste 
markers of the secular citizen through a displacement of the purity-pollution framework 
onto the life-worlds of rural subaltern caste communities. Again, these arguments were 
supported by the scholarly authority of academics such as Srinavas: “it is not only the 
OBCs who are “ruthless oppressors” but Scheduled Castes also continue to practice 
untouchability amongst themselves.499 Such claims echo those made by Ghurye about 
Scheduled Caste legislators who practiced untouchability against each other but united in 
order to secure reservation, discussed in the previous chapter. In anti-reservation 
discourses Dalits were represented either as violated subjects of the rural social order or 
as unqualified bureaucrats interested in maintaining this order.  Taken together, the 
Scheduled Castes and OBCs constitute the principal agents interested in maintaining 
caste hierarchy. They are thus incapable of working together across caste divisions. This 
amounts to the claim that the majority of the population of India is unable to move 
beyond their narrow caste identities. In this way, anti-reservation discourses re-produced 
a static, colonial view of caste as an endless series of antagonistic compartmentalized 
communities.  
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 In their critiques however, it was the Mandal Commission Report that opponents 
of reservation charged with portraying Indian society, and Hindu society in particular, as 
a static, unchanging and rigid hierarchical structure. The report drew on ancient religious 
scriptures in explaining caste inequality but did not account for the changes that had 
significantly loosened the rigidity of caste structures over time: “in order to show that it 
must right a grievous wrong, the Mandal Commission resorted to the most brazen 
misrepresentation of history, sociology and above all, the dynamics of popular 
Hinduism.”500 In this discourse only the historical social reform movements and liberal 
attitudes of upper castes in urban spaces qualified as evidence of social change. What did 
not qualify were anti-caste mobilizations that sought social transformation by 
consolidating SC and OBC communities. Any autonomous political organizing of this 
kind was only to continue securing the benefit of reservation. Thus the “secular profile” 
of contemporary casteism in the Mandal debate relied on portraying subaltern castes as 
the subjects responsible for the perpetuation of caste identities and practices in society. It 
was then the responsibility of the casteless secular subject to save the nation from these 
divisive forces.  
 An important historical resource drawn upon by the critics of the Mandal 
Commission in order to position themselves as beyond caste and communal identities 
was the nationalist narrative linking separate electorates, the Muslim League and the 
India-Pakistan partition. For example, an open letter by faculty and staff at JNU stated: 
“the dismal lesson of history that partition of the country was primarily the result of the 
colonial policy of reservation and separate electorates on communal lines has been 
forgotten too soon.”501 These arguments framed OBC reservation as an extension of 
colonial policies of divide and rule and linked its proponents to the figure of the divisive 
and disloyal Muslim.  They sought to remind the public that caste and religion were the 
principal instruments by which the colonizers ruled over India, and that the whole policy 
of reservation was a politically motivated policy coming down from British days.502 It 
was argued that reservations for OBCs would make caste just as divisive as religious 	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communalism. This historical narrative enabled critics to establish the nationalist 
credentials of the secular elite. V.P. Singh was compared to Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
because neither held aspirations to be national in character.503 Discussions of imperial 
legacies also served to provide alternate explanations for the dominance of upper castes 
in state institutions to those made in the Mandal Report. For example, Jain explained that 
Brahmins had experienced exclusion from the institutions of the Mughal Empire despite 
being a literate and priestly class. This is why they so readily took to Western education 
under the British. The Sudras who lived off the land had no use for such education. This 
explained their minimal representation in the bureaucracy, yet today OBCs were being 
portrayed as the victims of “Brahmin marauders of the North.”504 Discourses about 
Mughals and Muslims displaced the role of Brahminism in the perpetuation of caste 
inequalities. The figure of the Muslim and other religious minorities enabled a portrayal 
of caste hierarchy as a defense against threatening others: “the report ignores the concrete 
circumstances – notably the proselytizing zeal of Islam and Christianity – that led to the 
rigidities of the caste system”. 505 In this way, anti-reservation discourses drew upon 
longer histories of articulation of the Hindu community as historically subjected to the 
violence of foreign invaders and external others that sought to weaken its “majority 
status”. In this narrative the Caste Hindu subject must struggle to hold the nation together 
against the divisive forces of caste and communalism, represented by historical figures 
such as Jinnah and Ambedkar.  
These historical linkages also tapped into ongoing cartographic anxieties506 about 
the nation-state’s territorial integrity. With the spread of militant nationalist movements 
in Punjab, Kashmir and Assam in the 1980s that also implicated the Pakistani state, the 
question of national integration had great significance: “ it is precisely our hearts…that 
appear to be divided today by a multiplicity of lines. Drawing yet another dividing line 
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would only…push national consciousness still farther from our grasp.”507 It was seen as 
reckless and irresponsible for V.P. Singh to introduce a divisive reservation policy in a 
moment where internal and external forces threatened the borders of the nation-state. For 
example, a slogan of the anti-Mandal protestors read: “We don’t require Pakistan or 
China to destroy us, we have V.P., Ram Vilas and Sharad Yadav.”508 These anxieties 
coincided with and contributed to Hindu right wing discourses of the inherently 
threatening presence of Muslims in India. The Ram Janambhoomi movement that would 
lead to the destruction of the Babri Masjid and widespread violence across India was 
intensifying at this time.509 However, the looming threat of religious communalism was 
defined solely in relation to the Mandal Commission in the national media. In fact, the 
Hindutva movement was held up as an example of national unification and caste reform 
efforts. Its interest in the social reform of Hindu society was evident because a “Harijan” 
was invited to lay the first stone at the ceremony for building the Ram Temple at the site 
of the Babri Masjid.510 
 V.P. Singh’s position on the Babri Masjid issue, and by implication the “Muslim 
question” was explained as evidence of his personal political ambitions in contrast to the 
Hindutva concern for Hindu and/as national unity. His tough stance with the BJP on the 
Masjid and decision to put “Muslims in a political position so that they can play a crucial 
role in determining the political fortunes of secular India” demonstrated his desire to 
restructure the polity511. The implementation of Mandal was but one aspect of Singh’s 
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attempt to consolidate a support base among OBCs, Scheduled Castes and Muslims. 512 
The consolidation of this kind of majority would bring about national decline, 
disintegration, chaos and caste war. When located against the self-representation of the 
critics of Mandal as the only subjects that prioritized the nation over caste, it is evident 
that these discourses were not simply rhetorical embellishment. They expressed a deeply 
felt threat to the dominant framework of secular nationalism. The exclusion of the Caste 
Hindu from this support base meant the exclusion of the subject integral to a cohesive 
and unifying framework for nationhood: “the burgeoning denunciation of the Brahmin-
Bania combine can only unleash an anti-intellectual fury.”513  Both Nehru’s 
modernization framework and the BJP’s framework of Hindutva were preferred to 
Singh’s political project because despite their drawbacks, both provided “the individual 
with a chance to identify…with a pan-Indian vision of the state and society.”514 These 
arguments reflect the naturalization of the concept of a majority Hindu community within 
articulations of secular nationalism.  
 Yet it is not that these critics saw no place for the demographic majority – lower 
castes and religious minorities - in their visions of national unity. In presenting 
themselves as the enemies of caste and communalism, they simultaneously claimed to be 
champions of the poor. They argued that rather than reservation OBCs would be better 
served by educational, health, nutritional and other social welfare benefits.515 The costs of 
implementing the Mandal Commission would in fact reduce the funds available for such 
development priorities, particularly primary education. The real problems of poverty, 
illiteracy and unemployment were being obscured through the divisive politics of caste 
identity, distracting the poor from understanding their real interests. Hence, one of the 
organizations formed in response to the Mandal Commission was a central forum of 
teachers, researchers and senior students across Delhi University, AIIMS, IIT and JNU 	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seeking to evolve a “rational strategy for socio-economic uplift and scientific 
development of the country.”516 These proposed solutions to the problem of socio-
economic inequality contradicted accusations that OBCs constituted an elite, landowning 
class and in fact deserved very few entitlements from the state. That the full list of 
recommendations in the Mandal Report included sections on literacy, educational access 
and land reforms was also excluded from discourses that emphasized “rational” 
development. The issues of participation and distribution of power raised by the Mandal 
Commission and its supporters could then be marginalized. This insistence on the need to 
“uplift” the poor rather than confront and engage with the assertion of subaltern caste 
political subjects assimilated the categories of SC, OBC, Dalit, Muslim etc. to an abstract 
category of the “masses”. While the elite can relate to the masses through paternalism 
and benevolence, the latter cannot be imagined as agential political subjects capable of 
sharing the same spaces or making decisions for the nation-state with the former. The 
category of the masses subsumes the contradictions between privileged and subaltern 
castes, thus enabling the representation of a nationalist elite committed to development. 
In the following section, it will be seen that pro-reservation discourses conceptualized the 
demographic majority of India through a very different representational frame. This 
frame underscored the issues of power and political agency and maintained that any 
reference to “development” or “economic criteria” divorced from these issues sought to 
maintain the privileges of Caste Hindus.  
 
Dalit-Bahujan Discourse on Reservation: Envisioning Alternative Communities  
If we are uniting 6000 castes, how can you call us casteist? 517 
According to the press coverage of the Mandal Commission discussed above, the 
supporters of OBC reservation were limited to V.P. Singh, the JD and dominant OBC 
caste groups, namely Yadavs and Kurmis in North India. These groups and individuals 
had mobilized around the reservation issue due to their personal ambitions for political 
power rather than genuine concern for social justice. They were distracting the vast 
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majority of India’s poor from their real material interests using the “crumbs of 
reservation”.518 The anti-reservation protests of 1990 were represented as spontaneous 
outbursts of justified anger about these developments, with no historical connection to 
other upper caste mobilizations against affirmative action. Pro-reservation arguments in 
publications serving politicized SC/ST, OBC and minority communities such as the 
Oppressed Indian and Dalit Voice presented an alternative trajectory in which the 
experiences of SC/ST reservation, casteism and anti-reservation protests over time 
justified the implementation of the Mandal recommendations. Although these 
publications emerged out of different regional contexts and vary in ideological 
orientation, the common arguments that I will focus on in this section point to a shared 
set of ideas that have been revisited and reasserted overtime in the production of Dalit-
Bahujan discourse.519  Linking these diverse contexts of Dalit politicization were the 
shared resources of over a century of anti-caste thought through which arguments in 
support of reservation were constructed. These arguments framed caste inequality as not 
only economic but also political, and emphasized the importance of power for Dalits to 
bring about a radical transformation in society as part of the Bahujan Samaj (society of 
the majority).520 This was largely ignored in the mainstream media, which portrayed 
OBC reservation as a product of instrumental party politics and vote banks.  
 While the Congress Party put the Mandal Commission Report in cold storage in 
the 1980s, the Marathwada agitations and the anti-reservation riots in Gujarat produced 
collective memories of violence that contributed to further politicization across subaltern 
caste communities. Of particular significance in this context was the intensification of the 	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Dalit movement in U.P., a state in which anti-caste mobilization declined after 
independence. From the 1960s to the 1980s issues relating to Dalits in U.P. were 
addressed by non-Dalit political leaders and subsumed within the broader agenda of 
development promoted by the Congress.521 By the 1980s an educated and politically 
conscious middle and lower middle class of U.P. Dalits was formed. These classes 
became active in writing and publishing literature with the aim of creating awareness 
among Dalit communities, and supported the formation of an exclusively Dalit political 
party. 522 These processes gained momentum under the leadership of Kanshi Ram, a 
Scheduled Caste Sikh from Punjab who worked as a researcher for the ERDL (Research 
and Development Laboratory) in Pune, Maharashtra. His experiences of caste 
discrimination in Pune and exposure to the more oppressive conditions for Dalits in 
Maharashtra led to an engagement with Ambedkar’s writings. Kanshi Ram resigned from 
his research position to participate in struggles against caste inequality, forming the 
BAMCEF (Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation) in 1978. He 
travelled across North India and Maharashtra to convince SC government employees to 
organize within the BAMCEF, an organization he envisioned as the “think bank”, “talent 
bank” and “financial bank” of the Bahujan Samaj.523 The objective of building a capable 
and educated leadership among Dalits through the BAMCEF was linked to the historical 
critique of Indian democracy and caste inequality presented in his book the Chamcha 
Age: Era of the Stooges. Released on the 50th Anniversary of the Poona Pact, the text 
argued that Gandhi’s hunger strike, which forced Ambedkar to give up the demand of 
separate electorates for Dalits in 1932, created a political structure in which post-colonial 
Dalit leaders operated as stooges or agents of the high-caste Hindus. “The Poona Pact 
was the scalpel that cut short the life of a genuine democratic revolution”.524 The 
BAMCEF was defined as a non-religious and non-political organization committed to 
social activities. Its establishment was necessary to overcome the isolation of SC public 	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sector employees and encourage them to give back to the more exploited and oppressed 
sections of the society to which they belonged. Kanshi Ram argued, “the disease of the 
age was the alienation of the elite and the cure was BAMCEF”. However, government 
fears about politicized SC employees led to continual harassment and transfer of 
BAMCEF members, resulting in its transformation into a shadow organization in 1985.525   
 Alongside the BAMCEF Kanshi Ram established the Dalit Shoshit Sangharsh 
Samiti (DS-4) in 1981 to carry forward the work of mass mobilization, consciousness 
raising and political action that government employees were restricted from participating 
in. The DS-4 aimed to organize Scheduled Caste Dalits, as well as OBC, Tribal and 
Muslim communities to achieve the legitimate political rule of the Bahujan Samaj. Its 
main focus was in rural areas where it organized activities such as people’s parliaments, 
the “Poona Pact Denunciation Program” and anti-liquor agitations. Between March and 
April 1983, the DS-4 organized a 3,000 km cycle procession across seven states to 
“educate the oppressed and the exploited people that they need to build up their own 
organization and independent movement.”526 The bicycle used by common people was 
meant to demonstrate that the oppressed could, and should, use whatever means they 
have to be self-sufficient and to organize and agitate for betterment.527 The following 
year, a similar campaign with meetings across the country concluded in Delhi and 
culminated in the formation of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). The latter gained in 
prominence at the expense of BAMCEF and the DS-4, reflecting the prioritization by 
Kanshi Ram of the attainment of political power by the Bahujan Samaj. The prime focus 
of the category Bahujan was “to point out the marginalization of the majority by the 
minority caste Hindu groups and challenge this condition through electoral politics”.528 It 
was declared that while upper castes were welcome to join the BSP, the leadership of the 
party would be in the hands of Dalits. In Kanshi Ram’s political vision it was necessary 
to replace sub-caste hierarchy with horizontal relations between oppressed communities 
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before caste could be abolished.529 The political possibilities that Dalit-Bahujans 
perceived in the implementation of the Mandal Commission were related to this broader 
project of social transformation for which communities were mobilizing in the 1980s. 
 Although mainstream political discourses expressed shock towards the 
unexpected (and unwanted) announcement of V.P. Singh to partially implement the 
Mandal recommendations in 1990, articles in the Oppressed Indian had stressed the 
relevance of the Report throughout the 80s. In 1985 BAMCEF, DS-4 and the BSP 
initiated a pro-reservation movement to counter the challenges of anti-reservation 
agitations. That year they sponsored symposiums and rallies across India in support of 
reservation, as well as a three-week long demonstration in Delhi during the winter session 
of parliament.530 The pro-reservation movement sought to: 
…impress upon the government that non-implementation and non-acceptance of 
the Mandal Commission report for OBC can be the interest of the higher castes 
and their government but how can it be in the interests of the SC, ST, OBC and 
the converted minorities…they, therefore, should not be expected to keep silent at 
all times.531 
A nationwide movement was considered necessary for SC/ST and OBCs because the first 
four decades of the post-colonial nation-state was characterized by systematic 
undermining of the reservation policy. The publication stressed, “all the reservation of 
SC/ST and Other Backward Communities are only on papers, they have not been 
implemented…though more than 30 years have passed.”532 Written years before the 
“crisis point” of 1990, these articles counter the framing of V.P. Singh’s decision to 
implement Mandal as an undemocratic attempt to further empower dominant OBC 
landowners. Rather, reservation was a necessary but insufficient means to transform caste 
based power relations by democratizing political structures:  
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…reservation is not a question of our daily bread, reservation is not a question of 
our jobs, reservation is a matter of participation in the government and 
administration…we want participation in the government and administration of 
this country…if 52% of the people cannot participate in the republic, then which 
is the system in which they can participate?533 
Dalit activists supported OBC reservation despite the fact that it did not immediately 
benefit them. In some cases, Dalits seemed to have been more militant and organized on 
the issue than the fragmented Shudras.534 For supporters of reservation, the category OBC 
did not have a fixed, essential meaning or political subjectivity attached to it. Thus it 
could be harnessed towards the building of an alternative political community. The 
Mandal Commission was seen to have the potential to facilitate alliances between SC/ST 
and OBCs, and hence the realization of political rule by the Bahujan Samaj, which 
comprised 85% of the population of India.  
 This is evident from the way that the demand for the implementation of the 
Mandal Commission was linked to a series of other demands by the pro-reservation 
movement in 1985: 1) the extension of reservation to private sector undertakings, 2) 
representation of SC, ST, OBC and religious minorities on all Public Service 
Commissions and Selection boards, 3) justice for victims of caste atrocities, 4) the 
establishment of a national university in the name of Dr. Ambedkar and 5) the re-naming 
of Marathwada University.535 Additional demands for uniform compulsory education, the 
right to work, and protection for artisans and primary agricultural producers indicated 
how the politics of caste power were intertwined with those of economic inequality. This 
stands in contrast to the arguments discussed in the previous section, in which economic 
and social welfare concerns were presented as the “real interests” obscured by divisive 
caste identities created by reservation policy. From the perspective of Dalit-Bahujan 
politics accepting a tradeoff between developmental programs and the surrender of 
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reservation would reinforce the dominance of privileged castes in the nation-state.536 
According to Omvedt, Dalits were quite aware that upper caste opposition was not simply 
to OBC reservation, but to any kind of reservations, and if they succeeded in beating back 
the former they would next move on to push back the Dalits.537 These demands illustrated 
the linkages between issues of representation, inequality and violence in pro-reservation 
positions. As such they challenged the notion of reservation as an upper caste concession 
or gesture of atonement that makes autonomous Dalit politicization unnecessary. 
Arguments in support of the Mandal Commission were thus articulated to a critique of 
Indian democracy. They called for a deepening of democratic politics by explicating the 
historical, demographic and moral dimensions of the Bahujan Samaj.   
Both the Oppressed Indian and Dalit Voice historicized the Bahujan Samaj as a 
political community on the basis of indigeneity. They drew on Jyotirao Phule’s 
conception of a racial theory of conquest to explain the subjugation of Shudras (OBCs) 
and AtiShudras (SCs) by Aryan Brahmin invaders. Phule argued that a permanent 
hostility between Brahmin and non-Brahmin had characterized caste society from its very 
inception.538 Bahujan communities pre-existed Brahmanical Hinduism and the system of 
caste it imposed on the subcontinent.  The colonizing Aryans – Caste Hindus – of Central 
Asia had subjugated the Shudras and Atishudras who had largely practiced Buddhism. 
The Aryans subjected them to the caste system in order to exploit their labor and 
composed sacred texts to justify their ill treatment. The motif of original inhabitant was 
used as an instrument to motivate communities to struggle for socio-political 
transformation.539 For example:  
The history of India is full of daring stories of the shudras and 
atishudras…thousands of years ago, they were the rulers of the 
land…unfortunately, the high caste historians of this land, who pose as the 	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custodians of culture and literature, distorted the facts and wrote the history in 
such a way that for all times, shudras and atishudras were projected as helpless 
and hopeless creatures.540 
Hence, the history of reservation was traced back to Phule’s struggle for the education of 
Shudras and Atishudras launched in 1850, the first reservation scheme by Shahu Maharaj 
in Kolhapur in 1902 and the efforts of Dr. Ambedkar at the Round Table Conferences in 
1932. This trajectory highlighted a history of antagonisms between Aryans and Bahujans 
in which the “evolutionary process of reservation was resisted by the higher castes from 
the very beginning.”541 Caste based reservations provided in the Constitution did not 
represent a historical settlement between Caste Hindus and Scheduled Castes. From this 
perspective the end of British colonial rule in 1947 had only given independence to 15% 
of the population, the upper castes who continued to expect submission from the 
Bahujans. Thus reservation as one aspect of the struggle against caste inequality was 
linked to “the struggle for the freedom of the downtrodden inhabitants of this country to 
get freedom from those who have come from Central Asia and other places.”542 In Dalit-
Bahujan discourse the Caste Hindu was thus externalized as foreign presence. Muslims, 
Christians and other non-Hindu communities were included in the concept of Bahujan as 
indigenous converts whose change of religion signified an attempt to escape caste 
hierarchy. The demographic and historical basis of the Bahujan Samaj was posited as an 
alternative to the concept of “Hindu majority”. Identification as an indigenous majority 
emphasized the illegitimacy of a casteist minority occupying the power structures of the 
nation-state and resisting its transformation. The Mandal Commission Report reflected 
this view of a national non-Hindu majority, as its figure of OBCs as 52% of the 
population included Christian and Muslim caste-based communities.  
 The expansion of the reservation policy was viewed as a progressive development 
because it would encourage the identification of diverse groups with the concept of 
Bahujan as a political community. The multiple divisions of caste and religion produced 
by Caste Hindu society worked against this process and had to be countered. It was in 	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facilitating this process of identification that the political potential of the Mandal 
Commission was seen for supporters of OBC reservation. The Mandal Report contributed 
to the Dalit-Bahujan discourse of numbers as it centralized in public debate the fact that 
52% of the population was effectively absent from the institutions of the nation-state. The 
figure of 52% (OBC) was constantly reiterated alongside 65% (SC/ST and OBC) and 
85% (ST/ST, OBC and indigenous religious minorities) in speeches and articles 
supporting the Mandal Commission. For example,  
We need to ask why the Other Backward Castes, accounting for 52% of the 
population have not been able to produce even a single supreme court judge in 43 
years of independence. We need to ask why Brahmins, accounting for less than 
5% of the population hog around 95% of all executive posts.543 
The case for implementation of the Mandal Commission was made by calling attention to 
these figures as evidence of severe inequality and discrimination. This emphasis on the 
overwhelming exclusion of the majority of the population from public representation 
enabled a distinct reading of the colonial legacies of the nation-state. Whereas anti-
reservation critics argued the Mandal Commission would reproduce colonial policies of 
divide and rule, Dalit-Bahujan discourses framed the debate as an issue of self-rule for a 
subjugated population. By arguing against reservation in the name of merit and 
efficiency, the upper castes were effectively arguing that the majority of Indians did not 
possess these qualities. Upper castes had conveniently forgotten that similar arguments 
were made by the British to exclude them from state structures:  
Those who talk about merit and efficiency, may I ask them as to how after 
independence the so-called higher caste people who were otherwise unfit for the 
senior post overnight became suitable and efficient? If it could be so then 
why…SC/ST are not given their due share in every area of life?544 
 In light of the glaring exclusion of 52% of the population from state institutions, elite 
arguments about efficiency amounted to the claim that the majority was incapable of 
governing themselves. However,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543 Naval Kishore Yadav, “In Defense of Mandal,” Hindustan Times, 21 August, 1990.	  
544 Kureel, “Case for Reservation”.	  
186	  
…self-government is any day better than efficient government. The British 
advanced the same argument to deny ‘home rule’ to India…they said India will 
go to the dogs if…given independence…BG Tilak, MK Gandhi and others said 
‘we Indians prefer self-rule to efficient British rule.’545  
Similar critiques of the merit discourse as re-producing the arguments of British 
colonizers were also made in the parliament during the debate on the Mandal 
Commission in 1990.546 This indicates how the historic debates between Gandhi and 
Ambedkar on political independence versus social emancipation remained unsettled. The 
Mandal debate revealed how Dalit memory of 1932 as the year of Gandhi’s betrayal 
continued to animate their position on the post-colonial reservation policy. Those 
opposed to the policy argued that it would fragment the nation into innumerable caste 
identities. Those who supported it called into question the very idea of national 
independence as marking a distinct break from colonial domination and in turn, the 
concept of national unity itself. The political aspirations of the Dalits had been betrayed 
much before 1947 in the Poona Pact of 1932. This moment marked the beginning of a 
series of similar betrayals in the “post-colonial” context: the denial of reservation to SCs 
through failure of implementation, the long denial of national recognition to Dr. 
Ambedkar, the violent opposition to the renaming of Marathwada University and the 
anti-reservation riots of Gujurat in 1981 and 1985.547 It was through continual thwarting 
of policies and movements for subaltern caste progress that an elite representing 15% of 
the population was able to claim to speak in the national interest.  
In this discourse, categories such as SC and OBC were not administrative 
containers for an endless variety of sub-caste groups perpetually locked into practices of 
purity-pollution. Rather, these governmental categories of classification could serve to 
consolidate larger collectivities for progressive social transformation:  
Previously, the four thousand castes could not come together and overthrow the 
system, but today these…castes are reduced into three groupings…the Scheduled 
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Castes…the Scheduled Tribes…the Other Backward Castes. All these groups put 
together number about six hundred million people in India.548 
These categories did not simply reflect existing caste relations in society, but acted upon 
these relations and altered them. DS-4 and BAMCEF activists recognized that many 
communities categorized as OBC were not politicized and would have to be engaged 
with in order for Bahujan politics to gain strength. Although OBCs/Shudras were not 
subjected to untouchability they had been historically excluded from education, property 
rights and religious leadership.549 Alliances between SCs and OBCs were presented as a 
fulfillment of Ambedkar’s political vision. Ambedkar’s call for the establishment of the 
Republican Party and his inclusion of Article 340 in the Constitution reflected his interest 
in expanding Dalit struggles to include other oppressed groups in society.550 It is in 
destabilizing the dominance of the 15% minority in government institutions and 
facilitating alliances between different marginalized groups to act as a collective of 85% 
that the transformative potential of the reservation policy was seen:  
The Mandal Commission Report is a document of fulfillment and emancipation of 
Bahujan Samaj. It is a document to bring about unity and solidarity…to bring 
about fraternity and a sense of…intercommunication and interstimulation…our 
enemies do not want this to happen.551 
Thus Dalit-Bahujan discourse articulated an alternative form of community that was 
expansive and non-essentialist. In cutting across differentiations of sub-caste, 
governmental category and religious community, the concept of Bahujan challenged the 
notion that caste and religion were pre-determined, static identities. This also enabled a 
certain degree of reflexivity around the concept, as its realization was linked to the need 
for ongoing politicization and education.  
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 In the coverage of the mainstream media there was minimal engagement with 
these arguments or recognition of political organizations aside from the JD involved in 
the reservation debate. Rajni Kothari’s contribution to the Times of India stands apart as 
an exception to this trend.552 Kothari conceptualized caste formations as both aggregative 
and dis-aggregative. Since endogamous, occupation based jatis (sub-castes) were too 
small and numerous to wield much influence by themselves they required affiliation with 
larger collectivities such as Dalit and OBC. These processes worked to introduce 
pluralism into homogenizing religious categories such as “Hindu”. The transformation of 
caste through the forging of collectivities cut across religiously invoked symbolism and it 
is in this sense that “Dalit” and “OBC” can be seen as broad secular identities: “caste, 
indeed, is the great seculariser in a society being pulled apart by convoluted religions 
bent upon tearing apart the social fabric.”553 Kothari also criticized scholars for not 
recognizing that class is intricately bound up with caste in India: “class finds its basis in 
the transformation of caste, the basic unit of not just the Hindus but of Muslims, 
Christians and Sikhs as well.”554 In this analysis the main message of Mandal was the 
class-consciousness associated with trans-caste mobilization based on a numerical 
majority of the population. Mandal facilitated a form of class-consciousness that built 
upon rather than destroyed caste identities. The continued importance of caste in the 
distribution of property and power and its use in the maintenance of inequality made class 
struggle and caste struggle coterminous.555  
 Kothari’s analysis provides a vantage point from which to further nuance the 
argument that a secular conception of caste was at work in the Mandal debate. As 
mentioned earlier this argument was often made with reference to the shift from 
ritualistic and religious definitions of caste to the economic and developmental profile of 
caste groups as seen in the Mandal Report and the preference of economic criteria by its 
critics. The anti-reservation discourse demanded “objective” developmental solutions and 
simultaneously identified SCs and OBCs as the primary agents of casteism and purity-
pollution practices in India. Kothari’s analysis points to the secularization of caste in a 	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different sense, by insisting that caste be seen as a principle of social organization that 
cuts across all religious communities. Caste becomes secularized when its exclusive 
association with Hinduism is challenged. Indeed, the national list of OBCs produced by 
the Mandal Commission reflected this view of society. With the inclusion of Muslims 
and Christians communities the list challenged representation of these communities 
solely as part of a “religious minority” to be governed through the framework of religious 
freedom and cultural rights.  Caste as mobilized in Dalit-Bahujan politics is understood as 
a secularizing force because it: 1) complicates Orientalist conceptions of India as 
comprised of distinct, homogenous religious communities and 2) challenges the notion 
that secularism in India strictly concerns the regulation of relations between the Hindu 
majority and various religious minorities. Thus, in the political ideology of the BSP under 
Kanshi Ram, social (i.e. caste) identity not only replaced the class category but was also 
democratized by sanctioning autonomy to every cultural, social and religious group 
before forming the alliance: “Bahujan identity neither believes in the total submission of 
all deprived communitarian identities to become one nor does it philosophize a complete 
suppression of the minority ruling elites to achieve its political ideals”.556 In the context 
of Maharashtra, the Bahujan Mahasangh also defined the “Bahujan” category to include 
all religious affiliations whether Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains or Muslims as well as caste 
groups – Shudra and ati-Shudra, tribes, women and finally poor Marathas and poor 
Brahmins.557 In the pages of Dalit Voice, the Muslim was not an external “other” but a 
co-sufferer of Brahmanical supremacy. It is in the shared practices of labor and 
experiences of discrimination that a case for this alternate, expansive form of community 
was made.  	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 The framework of a secular, non-Hindu majority informed distinct readings of 
upper caste mobilizations, both against the Mandal Commission and in support of the 
Ram Janambhoomi movement. Dalit-Bahujan publications identified the BJP’s attempt to 
consolidate a united Hindu community on the latter issue as a means to negate the caste 
based power relations revealed by Mandal. In Dalit Voice the image of L.K. Advani’s 
Rath Yatra was repeatedly invoked as a desperate attempt to maintain a casteist social 
order:  
…the parties are not interested in their god Rama or the temple they vowed to 
build. It is all a cruel, violent drama periodically enacted to ‘unite’ the SC/ST/BCs 
under their Hindutva flag, flown over a Toyota Rath so that the upper castes could 
rule and use this ‘unity’ of the Hindus to torment the religious minorities…they 
simply cannot accept sharing of power with 85% of the country’s deprived.558 
The very fact that a Rath Yatra was being undertaken in the name of Hindu unity belied 
the absence of such unity in the first place. The Muslim had been manufactured by the 
BJP as an enemy subject to displace the real source of threat to upper caste rulers: “the 
65% SC/ST/BCs falsely described as Hindus.”559 The targeting of Muslims by Hindutva 
activists was inseparable from their claiming of Dalits and OBCs as part of a Hindu 
majority – a form of incorporation that maintains Brahmanical superiority. Confronted by 
the assertion of subaltern castes, Hindutva organizations had resorted to “chauvinism as 
the main instrument…to consolidate the majority community as a bulwark against social 
change”, revealing the “sense of insecurity and pyschosis” in the Hindu mind.560 This 
was not a novel strategy; Dalit-Bahujan communities recognized it from the way anti-
reservation protests turned into the systematic targeting of Muslims in Gujarat in 1985.561 
These arguments provided a critique of “secular nationalism” by exposing the extent to 
which this nationalism relies on a static conception of the majority as Hindu. Demands 	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for OBC reservation were in this way linked to a cultural politics that rejected any 
attempt to define Indian culture in terms of the primacy of one religion or region, or to 
exploit culture as an instrument of domination.562  
 Although the mainstream media represented the anti-reservation protests as a 
“struggle for nothing less than the principles on which Indian nationhood were 
founded”563, supporters of the Mandal Commission identified these actions as a spectacle 
of unrestrained casteism. Months of vandalism and offensive performances reinforced the 
importance of alliances between SCs and OBCs and their mobilization as an alternative 
political community. While both anti-reservation and Ram Janambhoomi movements 
claimed to defend or preserve the nation in the face of divisive politics, they had the 
effect of communicating a social order divided between the Bramanical elite and the 
Bahujan. The force with which the movements denounced reservation in the streets of 
Delhi, Patna, Chandigarh and Lucknow had never been mobilized to denounce caste 
atrocities. Thus the protests worked to “rip aside the benign mask of nationalism and lay 
bare the ugly face of Hindu chauvinism.”564 The swift unification of a Brahmanical 
minority in the protests was particularly instructive for OBCs who had earlier never 
sought to align with SCs and STs at the all-India level.565 The responses of journalists, 
intellectuals and political parties to the Mandal Commission underscored the thesis of the 
report: the domination of particular privileged castes within institutions of knowledge and 
power was a result of social discrimination. In this way, upper caste discourses and 
practices worked to facilitate those political solidarities between SCs and OBCs that they 
dismissed as non-existent and impossible to create. While the bureaucratic ambiguity of 
the category OBC led particular communities to identify with it due to the possibility of 
reservation, the experience of the anti-reservation movement produced shared meanings 
and memories around, and in turn stronger identification with, the category. Thus a 
significant outcome of the Mandal controversy was that it “convinced everybody of the 
logic of our oft-repeated statement of 15% versus 85% and that this 85% are non-Hindus. 	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The 85% Bahujan Samaj is under formation.”566 The moment in which “the 15%” 
displayed without restraint their sense of entitlement was simultaneously one through 
which anti-caste struggles intensified and extended into multiple terrains such as electoral 
politics, trans-national rights based campaigns, activist networks and cultural production. 
In this way the Mandal debate illustrates the co-production of upper caste and anti-caste 
subjectivities.  
 
Hindutva and Dalit Assertion: The Politics of Nation and Community Post-
Mandalization  
 
Due to the Aura of Ram, the demon of reservation ran away.567 
  
…so let the Arjunas roam the streets burning buses and let the Dronas write their 
editorials; Eklavya will no longer sacrifice his thumb.568 
 
The contentions over the implementation of the Mandal recommendations 
illustrate that debates over reservation always articulate the beyond of reservation – these 
debates imagine futurities as alterations to the social order and the kinds of subjects that 
would be empowered by these alterations. Those in opposition to the reservation policy 
imagined a future of fragmentation, chaos and violence brought on by the empowerment 
of subjects at once unqualified in secular credentials and parochial in disposition. The 
passionate, elaborate rejections of the Mandal Commission in these terms appears 
disproportionate if compared to the relatively minimal amount of jobs that would be 	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moved from the “general category” as a reserved position. However, when located in 
relation to the growing assertiveness of subaltern caste communities and the alternative 
conceptions of caste, community and nation articulated in Dalit-Bahujan discourse, one 
can better understand how the deep sense of dislocation amongst Caste Hindus came to 
be framed as a threat to national unity, secularism and merit. Indeed, those supporting 
OBC reservation were challenging the exclusions built into dominant conceptions of 
these terms. Emerging out of broader struggles for self-respect, they rejected the politics 
of empathy and injured subjectivity to which upper castes confined the caste question. As 
such they “challenged the power of the elite to nominate, classify and represent”.569 From 
this perspective we can also understand the rejection in pro-reservation discourses of elite 
appeals to national unity and secularism: “the appeal to social meaning cannot secure 
legitimacy or consensus because social meaning is what is being contested”.570 
The Rath Yatra led by L.K. Advani began on September 25th, 1990 to unify the 
nation around the Ram Janambhoomi movement. The BJP leader claimed that the 
procession to Ayodhya had “taken away the cynicism that was fostered by the Mandal 
Commission.”571 On December 6th, 1992, 150,000 Hindutva activists converged in 
Ayodhya and succeeded in demolishing the Babri Masjid, sparking off months of 
violence in multiple cities that resulted in over 2,000 deaths. The destruction in Ayodhya 
and its aftermath provoked a deep sense of shock and loss of confidence about the 
viability of Indian secularism. This led to debates about the “crisis of secularism” and the 
status of the Muslim minority in India. In particular, this was a crisis of the Constitutional 
commitment to minority rights and the project of Nehruvian secularism: “what came 
crashing down that day in Ayodhya was the very structure of Indian citizenship… the 
figure of the secular citizen subject itself.”572  This sense of crisis only amplified with the 
electoral gains made by the BJP throughout the 1990s, the naturalization of Hindutva 
discourses in popular culture and daily life, and the horrific days of violence in Gujarat 
2002 in which thousand of Muslims were killed and hundreds of thousands (remain) 	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displaced, unable to return to their homes. These forms of violence have led to 
investigations of the historical roots of Hindu nationalism and the distinctly majoritarian 
character of Indian secularism that enabled the former to gain ground since the 1980s.  
One must consider the contemporary “communalization” of the polity in relation 
to the politics of caste and particularly the intensification of anti-caste struggles after 
1990-1991. Those (Caste Hindu) classes who had historically supported the Congress 
turned to the BJP’s Hindutva politics in a moment where they felt “a sense of 
encroachment on their social world by ascending groups of peasants, traders and 
entrepreneurs, compounding the dislocation already being felt by the gradual retreat of 
the state from the economic model of which it had been the main beneficiary.”573 If the 
BJP appeared to upper castes as the best guarantor of their privileges, the party 
simultaneously confronted subaltern caste politicizations with strategies of incorporation 
and cooptation. In the 1980s the RSS established a Social Harmony Forum with a view to 
appropriating Dalits under their own fold, deploying reformist arguments that social 
inequality could only be eradicated by a change of heart among the upper castes.574 Dalit 
and OBC leaders have since been recruited into the BJP. Furthermore, distinct readings 
of Dalit myths and Ambedkar’s writings have been generated with the objective of 
appropriating them within the logic of Hindutva. For example, narratives stressing the 
similarities between RSS founder Hedegwar and Ambedkar, and interpretations of 
Ambedkar’s writings on Pakistan to illustrate an anti-Muslim politics. In this way, 
Hindutva forces are projecting themselves as the most egalitarian and non-Brahmin 
organizations, which have accommodated certain Bahujan sections into their network of 
opportunity structures.575 If the Congress typically dealt with caste through disavowal, 
the BJP has sought to diffuse the challenges posed by the growth of Dalit-Bahujan 
movements through a re-articulation of their histories, mythologies and political 
objectives in line with Hindutva ideology. Certain OBC communities have been 
particularly attracted to BJP politics, indicating the heterogeneous and conflicting 
interests and positions encompassed by the category. 	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Despite these efforts the core social base of Hindutva parties remains upper caste-
middle class. Hindu nationalism could not consolidate any major constituency among the 
millions of marginalized and poor Indians.576 At the height of the violence following the 
destruction in Ayodhya it was members of the Congress Party that demonstrated a strong 
attraction to Hindutva politics. Meanwhile, organizations such as the Bahujan 
Mahasangha in Maharashtra emerged during 1992-1993, prioritizing the socio-cultural 
mobilization of Bahujans rooted in the lived interaction of Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, 
Christianity, Islam, Charwaka, Sufi and Mahanubhav cultures, as a counter to both 
Hindutva and the Congress.577 The BMS specifically sought to demobilize Dalits and 
OBCs from Hindutva organizations at this time. Similarly in UP, the Bahujan Samaj 
Party opposed BJP communalism and forged political alliances among OBCs, SCs and 
Muslims in the state.  While the BJP gained important ground in the elections of 1991 
and 1993 these gains came at the expense of the Congress rather than the BSP. The BJP 
performed well in precisely those regions where the BSP was either weak or Dalits did 
not assert themselves in an organized manner.578 Subaltern caste consciousness has thus 
been one of the major antidotes to the growth of Hindu nationalism.579 In considering 
these kinds of political engagements we can locate reservation debates in relation to 
broader social transformations. The BMS and BSP examples indicate that subjects that 
mobilized in support of reservation simultaneously participated in broader struggles 
through which the meanings of caste, community and nation were contested.  If the 
project of Nehruvian secularism cannot be restored in the post-Babri Masjid context this 
is not simply because of the success of Hindutva mobilization. It is also related to the 
transformations in the politics of caste and community out of which a strong critique of 
secular majoritarianism has emerged. Identifying both the Congress and the BJP as 
Brahminical organizations challenges the identification of the Congress Party with 
secularism. From this perspective the problem with secular majoritarianism is not just 
that it naturalizes the privileges of the Hindu majority, but that it naturalizes the very 	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notion of a Hindu majority as such. Accordingly the problem with Hindu nationalism is 
not simply that it violates secular nationalism and its symbols – the constitution, 
Gandhian pluralism, Nehruvian modernity – but that it seeks to contain Dalit-Bahujan 
assertions and perpetuate the violence of the lived experiences of caste identity.  
 The attempts to counter the violent and exclusionary politics of Hindutva through 
cultural and electoral participation reflects the ways in which Dalit-Bahujan political 
consciousness came to be forged in the context of the Mandal debate. As mentioned in 
this chapter, activists recognized early on the attempts of the BJP to displace the question 
of caste inequality by centering the Muslim minority subject as a threatening, foreign 
presence that had to be expelled from the nation-state. As Narayan argues, the Mandal 
debate contributed to pull the historical question to the centre of Dalit-Bahujan discourse 
in the Hindi region, in order to provide historical support to the report and its 
recommendations580. As such this emergent political consciousness has played a role in 
developing a corpus of counter knowledge about Dalit-Bahujan history, culture and 
tradition in North India. Importantly, this search for counter-knowledge is “not a normal 
outcome of reading and literacy but a defining stage in which the downtrodden seek 
forms of knowledge wrested from the Brahmannical tradition and in opposition to it”581. 
These kinds of socio-political developments are missed if we consider the reservation 
issue only from the perspective of policy evaluation – the extent to which quotas have 
been filled, or the proportion of SC/ST and OBCs in educational institutions and 
government employment. A broader view of the “effects” of reservation complicates 
questions about the kinds of “access” and “opportunities” that reservation politics and 
discourses facilitate for Dalit-Bahujan communities. In turn, this can further our 
understanding of the kinds of subjectivities forged at the intersections of caste 
discrimination, quota politics and Dalit assertion.    
 The shifting politics of nation and community in the post-Mandal context reveal a 
contradictory terrain. On the one hand the BJP and its affiliated organizations have 
gained a level of prominence and acceptability that seemed impossible in the post-
colonial decades of Congress hegemony. On the other, processes of democratization have 	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advanced due to the mobilization and greater politicization of marginalized sections of 
the population.582 In Yadav’s early assessment of this terrain as marking the effective end 
of Congress dominance, the democratic upsurge is an example of the creative role of 
politics in the process of articulating, and thereby transforming social cleavages through 
shared narratives of the past and sometimes, of the future.  The traditional notion of 
pluralism has been replaced by a more radical version with the massive influx of new 
beliefs not shaped by the high ideology of liberal democracy.583 At the same time, 
Mandal coincided with the onset of sweeping neo-liberal economic reforms intensifying 
inequality and producing dire consequences for the most marginalized Dalit-Bahujan 
communities: landless laborers, farmers with small landholdings, and artisans. The entry 
of large numbers of previously excluded subjects in state institutions coincided with the 
moment in which the state re-defined its political-economic role. This has heightened the 
consequences of the limiting emphasis on political power by Dalit-Bahujan leadership. 
Acceptance of the unrestricted entry of foreign firms and retreat of the state not only from 
a regime of controls but also from social welfare programs have been accepted across all 
the major political formations.584 In this context caste inequalities are also manifesting in 
novel ways, for example, in the glaring absence of SCs and OBCs in the private firms and 
multinational corporations that have come to signify a new “globalized” India. In the 
following chapter, I will turn to the impact these processes of communalization, caste 
mobilizations and increasing inequality have had on the politics of minority and Muslim 
subjectivity in the ongoing debate on reservation for Muslims.  
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Chapter Four. Interrogating Minority: Difference, Discrimination and the Muslim 
Reservation Debate  
 
The only way forward is to stop this coyness. Call Muslims, Muslims. Shift lenses, 
change paradigms. For once, see them not as a ‘religious community’ (of veils and 
fatwas), but as development subjects, suffering from underserved want. Accordingly, 
design interventions, schemes and programmes with ‘Muslim’ targets that will be 
monitored and met.585  
 
We brought a significant change in the perceptions of Muslim identity. Previously, the 
question was whether or not they were Muslim, but now the question is whether or not 
they are Pasmanda Muslim. With this new identity we were able to address the problems 
specific to the lower caste Muslims.586  
 
The preceding chapters have shown how different understandings of caste 
circulate in discussions about affirmative action. Caste is described as a marker of pre-
modern religious tradition, as an indicator of socio-economic disadvantage and as a 
politicized, oppositional identity. During the controversy over the Mandal Commission 
Report, these varied meanings were considered from the vantage point of secularism. 
Anti-reservation arguments held that further caste-based quotas would perpetuate divisive 
caste identities and thus harm the nation’s secular ethos. Critical scholarship on the 
debate observed that Mandal contributed to the secularization of caste by shifting the 
focus from its religious and ritualistic aspects to the human development profiles of 
different groups.587 Focusing on lower caste mobilization, Rajni Kothari argued that 
dynamic caste identities could be a secularizing force in society. In this analysis the 
aggregation of disparate occupational groups under larger collectives such as “Dalit” and 
“OBC” introduced pluralism into homogenized religious categories.588 For caste to 
become secularized, its exclusive association with Hinduism had to be challenged.  
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Kothari’s analysis was substantiated by the response of the Hindu Right to the 
Mandal controversy, namely, its calls for Hindu unity against a homogenous Muslim 
community. Confronted with lower caste political assertion, Hindu nationalist discourses 
demonized Muslims as historical enemies that created disorder and prevented the 
emergence of a strong nation.589 Muslims were portrayed as undemocratic, anti-modern 
and patriarchal subjects that refused to integrate in the national mainstream. Based on 
stereotypes of aggressive Muslim sexuality and polygamy, the community was held 
responsible for overpopulation and in turn, for hindering national development. The 
consolidation of a Hindu majority through discourses of Muslim otherness markedly 
shifted national political discourse in a communal direction.590  The Hindu right attacked 
secular nationalism as a product of Westernized elites. They argued that the secular 
ideology of the Congress catered to the demands of religious minorities at the expense of 
the interests of the Hindu majority. The increased prominence of the Hindu right and 
electoral success of the BJP in the 1990s served to reinforce the association of the 
Congress Party with secularism and tolerance for minority groups. However, the secular 
framework that the right wing sought to replace with an assertive Hindu nationalism also 
relied on the premise of essential difference between religious communities. That is, 
secularism was conceived of as a means to peacefully manage the differences between 
distinct, bounded and demographically imbalanced religious communities. Official state 
secularism recognized and protected religious difference but also restricted the kinds of 
claims minority subjects could make on the nation-state. While the self-designated 
secular elite opposed the politicization of caste as manifested in lower caste mobilizations 
and claims for reservation, it was more amenable to translating caste inequality into the 
language of disadvantage and development. This stands in contrast to the approach to the 
categories of religion and religious community. If the provision of religious and cultural 
rights for minorities was a secular commitment, so too was the refusal to tabulate 
religious identity with socio-economic disadvantage. The collection of such data about 
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religious minorities was framed as a threat to the secularism of the nation-state, insofar as 
it could enable claims to separate social policies, thus bolstering separatist politics.   
 The results of the 2004 national elections revealed the limits to mobilizing Hindu 
nationalism as a political strategy. The virulent anti-Muslim rhetoric and its culmination 
in horrific mass violence against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, combined with celebratory 
rhetoric about neo-liberal economic reforms in the face of increasing inequality, were key 
factors in the electoral defeat of the BJP. The reinstatement of a Congress led coalition at 
the centre was perceived as an opportunity for the restoration of secularism and the 
adoption of equitable and inclusive economic growth policies. The major challenges 
before the new government would be to reverse the trends of imperialist globalization 
and Hindutva fascism.591 Muslims in particular, described as a wounded community 
whose psyche had to be soothed, required a sense of security in the nation-state.592 It was 
imperative that the government should re-gain the confidence of Muslims through 
concrete actions. Signaling a firm commitment to this task, Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh established the Rajinder Sachar Committee in 2005 to investigate the social, 
economic and educational conditions of Muslims in India. This was a departure not only 
from the religious polarizations that had characterized the BJP government, but also from 
the longer history of confining the Muslim question to state accommodation of religious 
identity.  
Released in November 2006, the Sachar Committee Report (SCR) stated its 
“innocuous” purpose was to know if Muslims were under-represented in some 
departments or any other sphere, and the reasons thereof, so that the Government could 
take corrective steps.593 The contents of the Report, portions of which were leaked before 
the official government release, quickly attracted the attention of the media. This was the 	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first government report on the status of India’s largest religious minority to be publicly 
circulated and debated since Independence. The kind of data that the committee obtained 
had “never been attempted in India in her history, not even after independence and not 
even when the Gopal Singh Committee was set up in the 1980s”.594 Indeed, the SCR 
contains an extensive amount of statistical data on human development indicators, 
including income, employment, health, education, poverty, consumption levels, access to 
credit, the conditions of infrastructure in Muslim majority localities and the 
representation of Muslims in governance at various levels. The data revealed the 
widespread conditions of poverty and insecurity in which the majority of Muslims lived, 
their near absence from institutions of higher education and formal employment and the 
indifference of successive governments to these circumstances over time.595 The SCR 
concluded, “…the Community exhibits deficits and deprivation in practically all 
dimensions of development. In fact, by and large, Muslims rank somewhere above 
SC/STs but below Hindu-OBCs, Other Minorities and Hindu-General (mostly upper 
castes).”596 Many commentators welcomed this official recognition of the extent of 
marginalization and inequality among Muslims as a positive step forward. The Report 
had “stirred the national conscience” and was a “historic service to secularism.”597 The 
importance of this data was related to the charges of “minority appeasement” made by 
Hindu Right Wing political parties and civil society organizations: that since 1947 
Muslims had been unnecessarily privileged and appeased by the “secular” Congress Party 
at the expense of broader national interests. The SCR, a “shocking testimony to the 
institutional neglect and bias that has left Muslims far behind”, exposed the myth of 
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Muslim appeasement as a baseless claim mobilized to generate hatred towards the 
community.598   
Although the SCR did not include quota-based reservations in its list of 
recommendations, the public debate promptly focused in on this issue as a potential 
solution to Muslim backwardness. For many participants of the post-Sachar debate, this 
was a predictable and expected conversation. Farah Naqvi, a prominent writer and 
activist on gender and minority issues, argued that this predictability was due to the fact 
that quotas provided politicians with a cheap and easy answer to a complex problem: 
“having given ‘the quota’, it’s a home run for politicians, and governments will do little 
else.”599 While she supported reservations in principle, Naqvi questioned why issues of 
development, equitable growth and inclusive citizenship could not be thought of outside 
of the paradigm of quotas and reservations. An alternate explanation is found in Javeed 
Alam’s post-Sachar analysis. Alam located the emergence of the post-Sachar reservation 
debate in relation to the various struggles of marginalized groups over time. “Oppressed 
people across social divides have come to look on affirmative action as necessarily 
involving reservations and quotas. And quotas are viewed as empowerment.”600 This 
historical association placed a discursive limit on the question of how to surmount 
backwardness. However, quotas had proved effective in improving the circumstances of 
SCs and STs, a fact which the SCR also acknowledged. Access to reservation over an 
extended period of time had enabled the emergence of a middle class among Dalits, 
which in turn provided a reserve of energy for protracted struggle.601 These differing 
responses indicate the entanglement of reservation politics with both electoral 
expediencies and subaltern politicizations. As seen in the previous chapter, opponents of 
the Mandal recommendations argued that 27% reservation for OBCs would only serve 	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individual political ambitions while the communities in question would see few benefits 
from the policy. However, support for Mandal went beyond the instrumental concern for 
middle class employment. Dalit-Bahujan activists saw the Report as having the potential 
to politicize OBC groups, and in turn, create solidarities across caste divides in the 
articulation of a non-religious conception of majority community.  
If the “quota question” was a predictable aspect of the post-Sachar debate, so was 
the response of the BJP and other right wing organizations that the Report and the 
reservation issue were part of an ongoing policy of “Muslim appeasement”. They 
strongly opposed the possibility of Muslim reservation on both Constitutional and 
historical grounds. First, the Constitution did not sanction reservation on the basis of 
religious identity. Second, Muslim reservation was historically associated with separatist 
politics. BJP leader L.K. Advani argued that “communal” reservations would “legitimize 
and in the course of time, revive the very same communal and separatist tendency that 
developed into the two-nation theory and led to the partition of our motherland.”602 
However, opposition to a Muslim quota was not limited to the Hindu Right wing.  It was 
also criticized by Muslim groups that called attention to the pronounced internal 
inequality on the basis of caste among the community. The Mandal Commission Report 
had acknowledged the existence of caste based inequality across religious communities 
and included approximately 80 caste groups among Muslims within the OBC list. These 
groups argued that all initiatives of the state emerging from the SCR must be cognizant of 
these intra-community inequalities:  
Pasmanda Muslims apprehend that they will lose if they are submerged in the 
pressures of seeking planning for the entire religious community. Instead there 
should be planning for the Backward Muslims…wherever possible in conjunction 
with their counterparts in other religions with mechanisms to preclude 
discrimination.603  
This intervention illustrates that post-Sachar debates about socio-economic inequality and 
reservations for Muslims have unfolded in a context in which dominant conceptions of 	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“Muslim” and “minority” politics have been undermined from within the community. 
The SCR was significant because discrimination and socio-economic inequality among 
Muslims had never been meaningfully addressed in post-partition India. However, lower 
caste Muslims argued that these issues could not be addressed without a re-
conceptualization of the “Muslim community” vis-à-vis caste hierarchy.   
The post-Sachar debate was not the first time that the issue of Muslim reservation 
had been raised. In 1994 prominent members of the Muslim political elite founded the 
Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims. In a Convention on 
Reservation organized in the same year, the Association put forth a demand of 10% 
reservations for the entire Muslim community on the grounds that the community was 
educationally, socially and economically backward.604 The demand was reiterated in its 
publication “Muslim Agenda 99”, which was endorsed by key Muslim organizations 
including the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, All India Muslim Majlis-e-
Mashawwarat and the Jamat e Islami Hind.605 Its emergence is linked to the Muslim 
leadership’s loss of legitimacy after the Babri Masjid demolition. After 1992 the 
discourse of community representatives shifted in focus from culture and identity to 
issues of development, education and employment.606 However, this context also 
produced the vocal dis-identification of non-elite Muslims with established minority 
organizations. With the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, Muslims 
from artisan and working class communities increasingly identified with OBC 
communities that were “adjacent to them in terms of social standing, status and 
occupation”.607 Enduring alliances and articulated understandings emerged between non-
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elite Muslims and OBCs and their leadership.608 An early assessment of these 
developments suggested that Muslim OBC politics could perhaps be “the best antidote to 
all religion based identity politics”.609 Mobilization of Dalits and OBCs in the 1990s 
posed a significant challenge to Hindu Right Wing politics and the established Muslim 
leadership.610  
In this chapter I examine how debates about Muslim inequality and reservation 
generate conflicting understandings of community, difference and discrimination. I begin 
by reviewing the production of knowledge about Muslims in post-partition India, and 
highlight their constitution as a religious minority community through affective 
discourses of fear, suspicion and nostalgia. Echoing the discourses in the Constituent 
Assembly, Muslims are diagnosed with a pathological “minority complex” that results in 
an emotional resistance to national integration. In these assessments of the “Muslim 
problem”, the community requires moderate secular leaders that can encourage 
modernization among the Muslim masses. Next, I trace the politicization of backward or 
Pasmanda Muslims since the 1990s, which resulted in the formation of organizations 
representing their interests. These movements challenge the notion of a homogenous, 
monolithic Muslim community in India through their specific position on caste, 
discrimination and reservation. A significant aspect of this challenge is the critique of the 
upper caste, or Ashraf elite, and a rejection of their authority to speak for the interests of 
a national “Muslim community”. In contrast to “modernization”, Pasmanda Muslims 
emphasize the need for democratization to counter the historical privileging of a small 
section of the community. By attending to this historical background of minority politics 
and contemporary developments vis-à-vis caste, the contours of the reservation debate 
can be better understood. I will conclude this section by bringing into relief the distinct 
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positions of Ashraf and Pasmanda Muslims on the reservation issue. Finally, I assess how 
their competing interests have been addressed in the Ranganath Mishra Commission 
Report on Religious and Linguistic Minorities.611  
It will be seen that through the production of historical and ethnographic 
knowledge about caste discrimination and Muslims, Pasmanda activists articulate a 
political subjectivity in opposition to the category “religious minority”. Dominant ways 
of telling the history of Muslims and minority politics are thus particularized as 
emanating from a location of caste privilege. Their critiques reveal that the notion of 
fixed majority and minority religious communities contribute to the oppression of 
marginalized caste groups. In this way, they draw upon and extend the epistemological 
challenges posed by Dalit-Bahujan thought to established categories of majority and 
minority, secularism and nationalism. However, while both government commissions and 
prominent “minority” representatives acknowledge the existence of caste among 
Muslims, these are considered of little relevance for understanding or addressing 
inequality. My analysis connects this specific mode of recognition and disavowal of 
Muslim caste to the entrenched assumption that religion is the principal marker of 
difference in the nation-state. As such, this response to Pasmanda politics draws upon the 
intellectual and historical resources that obscure questions of caste discrimination to 
naturalize privilege.   
 
Muslims and the “Minority Complex” in Post-Partition India  
In post-partition India Muslims became the principal subjects through which an 
inquiry into the appropriate place and status of “minorities” in the nation was conducted.  
Pandey argues that partition and nation-state formation worked to fix the terms 
“majority” and “minority” in a national sense for Indian society and politics.612 “Muslims 
were the minority that had fought for, or wanted, Pakistan, and now they had to choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  611	  Established in 2007, this Commission was responsible for determining whether 
Muslims constitute a backward class for the purposes of affirmative action. It was also 
asked to recommend a position for the government on recognition of caste 
discrimination, particularly untouchability, in Muslims and Christian communities. 	  
612 Gyanendra Pandey, “Can a Muslim be an Indian?,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 41, no. 4 (1999): 608-629. 	  
207	  
not only where they belonged, but also to demonstrate the sincerity of their choice.”613 
Members of the Muslim League and other participants in the Pakistan movement who 
remained in India were especially regarded with suspicion and called upon in numerous 
ways to demonstrate their loyalty to the nation-state. The association of the category 
Muslim with Pakistan made it possible to speak of a homogenous minority community 
whose true loyalties extended outside of the borders of the nation-state. Emphasis was 
placed on the inner sympathies they harbored for the Pakistani state. This meant that 
public assertions and activities would never be adequate proof of Muslim loyalty to India. 
The essential and threatening difference of the minority subject was reinforced with 
reference to Islam as a non-indigenous religion that encouraged extra-territorial 
attachments among its followers. Muslim attachment to Pakistan was the latest 
manifestation of their tendency to identify with the Arab world. Hindu nationalists argued 
that even local populations that had converted to Islam, belonging largely to “lower” 
castes, had come to think of themselves as descendents of Arab and Mughal 
communities, thus denying their “Hindu” origins.614 The category Muslim was over-
determined by a fundamental difference and this difference was framed as threatening to 
the territorial integrity of the nation-state. It was believed that if Muslims were to live 
peaceful lives in India, they must cease to articulate political demands, needs or 
perspectives on the basis of religious identity.  
As seen from the Constituent Assembly Debates discussed in Chapter 1, secularism 
was considered integral to facilitating relations of trust and goodwill between majority 
and minority communities. Secularism would guarantee existential security for religious 
minorities. Importantly, it would replace the separate electorates and reservation quotas 
available to them under colonial rule. The conception of secularism as minority security 
framed the Muslim as a protected subject different from the majority Hindu community 
and hence a potential victim of its discrimination. According to Ansari, whereas caste 
was defined negatively in terms of disadvantage and captured by the term “social justice” 
in public discourse, the religious identity of minorities was associated with a core set of 
ethics and a substantive notion of the “good life”, seen as requiring protection and 	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safeguards from the state through minority rights.615 The Constitution tried to promote 
equality between different religious communities by acknowledging their separate 
character and by protecting the distinctiveness of each.616 Religious minorities were 
guaranteed freedom of religion, the right to conserve their language, script and culture, 
and to establish and administer educational institutions. Minority rights were thus framed 
primarily as rights to religious and cultural difference. It was expected that they would 
render unnecessary political or socio-economic rights for these communities. Indeed, 
those most supportive of religious and cultural rights were also the most vocal opponents 
of political rights for Muslims in the Constituent Assembly.617 This approach to the 
management of difference reinforced the pervasive silencing of issues and perspectives 
considered to be distinctly “Muslim” in post-partition public discourse. After the release 
of the Sachar Committee Report in 2006, Farah Naqvi described how this approach had 
shaped Muslim subjectivity in India:    
The defining characteristics of the Muslim became the right to celebrate Eid, go 
on Haj, cook cauldrons of biryani, and smilingly pose for the national photo-op 
(along with the turbaned Sikh and cross-bearing Christian)…discrimination, riots, 
communalism – these experiences of the Indian Muslim became lodged only in a 
frustrated political space, never cross-feeding into the development trajectory.618  
This passage indicates how the restriction of minority rights to protection of difference 
sought to reduce Muslim subjectivity to an essentialized, non-political difference. The 
identification of Muslims as a religious minority in turn normalized the notion of Hindus 
as the national majority. In this way, while secular nationalism posited a transcendent 
ideal, it also re-produced the very object that had to be transcended.  
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The emphasis on irreducible difference and extra-territorial attachments significantly 
shaped the ways in which the “Indian Muslim” was represented in writings about the 
status of minorities after 1947. Widespread suspicions about their ability to be loyal 
citizens of India in light of the existence of Pakistan that circulated amidst the uncertain 
and fluid conditions of the partition came to settle in later years as a discourse about the 
“Muslim problem” in India. The problem was the failure of Muslims to integrate into the 
nation-state. In 1954, Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers about the “state of the Muslims’ 
deep frustration, persistent discrimination in the public services and in commerce and 
industry, educational backwardness, the apathy of the Congress and the Muslims’ 
withdrawal into a political ghetto.” 619 Indeed, the limited information available on the 
socio-economic status of Muslims following the partition bears strong resemblance to the 
evidence of marginality provided by the Sachar Committee Report. For example, the 
proportion of Muslims in select institutions of public employment in 1965 was described 
as “abysmally low”: 
…it does seem shocking that…there should have been only 111 Muslims out of more 
than 2,100 IAS officers; around dozen Muslims out of 270 members of the Indian 
Foreign Service; and a mere 43 Muslims officers out of 1,200 in the Indian Police 
service…there were only six Muslim officers in the top two grades of the CSS out of 
681…And if this is not shocking enough, there were only 21 Muslims out of 9,900 
clerks.620 
Although the state did not collect systematic information about minority representation, 
there was a general acceptance that “on practically every elementary item of the 
categories of socio-economic indicators of development…the bulk of the Muslims are at 
the lower rung of the ladder.”621 However, this perception did not result in the 
development of social or economic policies targeted to address Muslim inequality. Any 
mention of Muslim grievances provoked strong reactions against empowering a 	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community that had “caused” the partition. The lack of state intervention was justified 
through an explanatory discourse that linked Muslim backwardness to a specific mode of 
thinking. The principal barrier to Muslim participation in the nation-state was their 
affliction by a “minority complex”. Given this mental state targeted social policies were 
of little use.  
  Explanations of the under-representation of the community in public employment 
made only minimal reference to discrimination and structural inequalities. Discussions 
about the “Muslim problem” in India centered on socio-psychological explanations in 
which the failure of national integration was described in terms of a “minority complex” 
and a “fear psychosis” among the community. For example, a Hindustan Times editorial 
stated that the Muslim problem was an “emotional one” that existed “largely because of 
the unwillingness of the Muslims to integrate themselves into the country, and the desire 
to consider themselves separate and even to emphasize that separation.”622 Through 
arguments that the essential difference of the Muslim subject resulted in a refusal to 
participate in public life, evidence of structural inequality such as low levels of education 
and unemployment were reduced to the effects of a bad attitude that pervaded the 
community. The debates about caste based inequality discussed in previous chapters 
showed a concern with determining the relative importance of economic criteria and 
social discrimination in explaining the backwardness of SCs and/or OBCs. In contrast, 
the backward Muslim was framed as a product of the irrational fear and anxiety that 
underpins minority consciousness. The minority community was described in static and 
homogenous terms on the basis of a collective resistance to identification with the nation-
state and its modern, secular institutions. In these arguments a particular historical legacy 
was highlighted to support the claim that Muslims were inherently inclined to see 
themselves as not only different from, but also culturally superior to, the Hindu 
community. Specifically, Muslims refused the abstract equality of national citizenship 
because they desired the privileges bestowed upon them during the Mughal Empire, 
which the British had upheld. The Muslim perception of having ruled over India for a 	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thousand years, which “played a major role in the rise of Muslim nationalism” continued 
to persist in post-colonial India.623 This minority mindset held the community back from 
socio-economic progress and was disruptive to the process of national integration.  
An instructive example of the articulation of the “Muslim problem” as one of 
minority mentality is the text The Muslim Dilemma in India by MRA Baig.624 Baig 
argued that collectively, Muslims were steeped in superstition, mentally bound by dogma, 
and governed by irrational customs. Hence the Muslim had become the “problem child” 
of the Indian family and was “dependent on the intellectual charity of the more healthy 
members”.625 The relationship of the Muslim subject to Islam had resulted in a situation 
in which Muslims were in India, but not of India. The Islamic outlook produced trans-
national attachments that were a barrier to the socio-economic progress of Indian 
Muslims. Therefore, they had to decide “whether they are Indian Muslims…whose 
heartland is in West Asia, or whether they are Muslim Indians…of the Indian family 
which is rooted in the Indian soil.”626 While Baig acknowledged that the community did 
face instances of discrimination in India, he was convinced that if Muslims were 
educationally backward and unemployed it was largely their own fault. Their inferiority 
complex vis-à-vis Hindus led them to imagine discrimination where none existed.  
Baig described the existence of caste-based divisions between Muslims in terms of 
the historical adaptation of Islam in the subcontinent and as evidence of Muslim 
diversity. However, caste was not considered relevant for understanding the 
contemporary structural location of Indian Muslims. Caste-based labor was translated 
into the framework of religious difference. Therefore, the fact that the majority of 
Muslims labored as weavers, artisans, mechanics and clerks was evidence of their 
irrational attachment to traditional community occupations.627 They did not even attempt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 Girilal Jain, “Muslims after Partition,” The Times of India, January 7, 1988. In 
Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, Indian Muslims: The Need for a Positive Outlook (New 
Delhi: Al-Risala Books, 1994), 40.	  
624 (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1974). Baig was a former member of the 
Muslim League and a speech writer for Jinnah. He later joined the nationalist movement 
led by the Congress Party. 	  
625 Baig, The Muslim Dilemma, x.	  
626 Ibid., xii.	  627	  Ibid., 12.	  
212	  
to enter modern educational institutions. For Baig, “the lack of enterprising Muslims is 
simply astonishing.”628 In this way, the specific socio-economic locations of artisan and 
working classes are subsumed within a generalized account of a progress resistant 
religious community. The historical caste basis of these occupations is overlooked. Baig 
argued that a new leadership was required to liberate Muslims from the stranglehold of 
religious authorities that kept them as prisoners of the past.629 This leadership should 
draw inspiration from the historical lessons of the 1857 war that led to the collapse of the 
Mughal Empire and the consolidation of British rule in the subcontinent. In this context 
Muslim leaders had encouraged the modernization of the community in order to face the 
challenges of British colonialism. Specifically, in the movement led by Syed Ahmed 
Khan, who founded the Mohammaden Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh to encourage 
Muslims to start thinking on modern and rational lines. Syed Ahmed Khan stood apart 
from all other Muslim leaders in India, who continuously emphasized a pan-Islamic 
consciousness and a sense of separatism.  
The reading of the post-partition crisis of the Indian Muslim in relation to the crisis of 
the Mughal Empire in 1857 recurs in numerous texts devoted to assessing the state of the 
community. In S. Abid Hussain’s text Destiny of Indian Muslims the point of comparison 
is the collective sense of defeat in both contexts.630  In 1857 Indian Muslims, especially 
those of Northern India, felt as if “the end of the world had come”. They felt condemned 
to live under foreign rulers who wanted to suppress them politically and economically, 
and strike at the roots of their religion and culture.631 However, Muslim princes continued 
to rule after the end of the Mughal Empire, and thousands of landed estates owned by 
Muslims also survived. Thus, they had been able to maintain their self-respect and way of 
life under British colonialism; “they were broken by a superior force but had not bent 
before it.”632 In comparison, Husain felt that the plight of Muslims in 1947 was in many 	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ways worse than that of 1857, as they had to “pay in the form of spiritual and mental 
anguish as well as in economic depression and educational and cultural backwardness.” 
Husain’s discussion of this dislocation focuses on the abolition of feudal estates after 
1947, which had been a source of income for upper and upper middle class Muslims for 
centuries. This was compounded by the marginalization of Urdu in public institutions and 
the selection of Hindi as the national language, which provoked a cultural and 
educational crisis within the upper and middle classes.633  
Similarly, in Mushirul Hasan’s text Legacy of a Divided Nation: Indian Muslims 
since Independence, the discussion of the dislocation experienced by Muslims in the 
aftermath of partition focuses on the landed elite of North India and Hyderabad. The text 
describes how the rulers of Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur “continued living in their 
decaying palaces…wallowing in grief for a bygone era, they cursed the politicians who 
had brought the British raj to an end…they were insulated from the populace and 
blissfully unaware of the changes that were visibly taking place in urban and rural 
areas.”634 For the landed classes the partition and abolition of feudal estates “signified not 
only the loss of land but also the end of a cultural and intellectual ambience they had 
fashioned meticulously.”635 With its relationship to Arab and Persian scripts, Urdu, like 
Islam, was considered an object of cultural identity that Muslims were greatly attached to 
and in fear of losing. The increasing neglect of Urdu by the state and educational 
organizations struck at “the very heart of the fear of cultural assimilation and their 
apprehensions about their employability in government services.”636 The externalization 
of Urdu from the emergent national culture and its status as a language without a state 
presented a poignant statement on the alienation of the Muslim subject from national life. 
This focus on the experiences of landed elites and the degeneration of their socio-cultural 
ethos produced the Muslim community as an affective formation of nostalgia, loss and 
fear. The community was represented as pervaded by an overwhelming sense of defeat 
that hindered their ability to live as productive citizens of the nation-state. 
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 Across various texts about the problems and prospects of the Indian Muslim, very 
little information can be found on the perspectives of working class, rural or artisan 
communities. Non-elite Muslims are represented as voiceless masses whose relationship 
to the nation-state is mediated by the established elite and dependent on the latter’s 
political and religious orientation. Such an assumption is not specific to Muslim elites. As 
seen in previous chapters the dominant political vision of the nation-state and social 
transformation assumes a distinction between a modernizing elite and the traditional, 
backward masses that the former must guide towards socio-economic progress. 
Importantly, this vision renders invisible the caste privileges of the former and trivializes 
the different political engagements among the latter. In the case of Muslims, the 
implications of this silencing are compounded by the refusal of the state to collect and 
disseminate information on their socio-economic status, reinforcing the representation of 
“Muslim backwardness” in homogenized, socio-psychological terms. Although class and 
caste inequalities can be acknowledged, the “Muslim problem” is overdetermined by the 
assumption of religious difference. Accordingly, the irrational attachment to religion 
must be resolved within the community.  
 The strong sentiments of Muslims towards Islam and Urdu, those aspects of their 
identity that made them different and thus resistant to national integration, were attributed 
to the failure of the community leadership. The partition resulted in the large-scale 
migration of the modern educated classes of intellectuals and politicians to Pakistan, thus 
creating a leadership vacuum.637 Unfortunately this was filled by the nationlist ulama, 
which took on the leadership of the community after partition.  “Clouded with the 
shadows of the past”, the ulama confined itself to limited religious reform and religious 
education, refusing to modernize the traditional syllabus.638  Religious authorities 
encouraged Muslims to adopt a manner of thinking at odds with secular principles. 
Although the ulama was politically connected to the Congress Party and responsible for 
securing votes for its candidates in elections, they had failed to secure tangible benefits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  637	  Baig, The Muslim Dilemma; Husain, Destiny of Indian Muslims; Noorani, The 
Muslims of India; SCR; Hasan, Politics of Inclusion; Abdul Shaban, ed., Lives of Muslims 
in India: Politics, Exclusion and Violence (New York: Routledge, 2012). 	  638	  Husain, Destiny of Indian Muslims, 138.	  	  
215	  
for the Muslim masses in this arrangement.639 In such assessments any prospects of an 
improved future for the Muslim “masses” would be dependent on the ability of secular 
and moderate elites to gain influence over them at the expense of the religious 
establishment. In Hasan’s discussion of the future of Muslim politics after the Babri 
Masjid demolition, the most notable development is that for the first time since 
independence the secular modernist Muslims have begun to gain ground and define the 
parameters of public debate. Hasan relates the significance of the task before them by 
comparing it to the great historical mission of Syed Ahmad Khan. Interestingly, even the 
historical-class location of these intellectuals is noted to stress the similarity with Khan, 
as they are identified as members of the former “landed gentry” of U.P.  Secular 
intellectuals are confronted by the same issues that were bravely faced by Khan after 
1857: “the steady impoverishment of Muslims, their poor representation in public and 
private sectors, their educational stagnation, the oppressive state of Muslim women, the 
stranglehold of traditionalists and their antipathy to modernizing processes.”640 In its 
movement from structural conditions of marginality to the mental state of the community 
this list reinforces the notion of the “Muslim problem” as an internal, community 
problem. Secular intellectuals are simultaneously within this community and stand in a 
position of distance to it, from which they lament “the steadfast refusal of their 
community to come to terms with the reality of the present day.”641  
More than two decades prior to the release of the highly praised Sachar Committee 
Report, Imtiaz Ahmad and Peter Mayer observed the limited scope and content of 
literature on Indian Muslims.642 According to Ahmad, modernization and social change 
among Muslims had been discussed almost entirely in terms of certain commonly 
prevalent stereotypes or clichés, specifically, that the community was either not 
modernizing at all or lagging behind other communities in the pace of modernization.643 
Further, this “failure to modernize” was due to the inherently anti-modern orientation of 
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Islam. Thus much of the available literature explained the social reality of Muslims as if 
they were completely isolated from broader structural and relational processes that 
occurred within and across various communities. Often the Indian example was framed 
as a localized manifestation of the Muslim world, making religion the single most 
important determinant of minority behavior.644 Mayer argues that by and large it has been 
taken for granted that the important questions to be answered with regard to the 
community relate to the ways in which it is different from other Indian communities.645 
Even in studies of Muslim intellectual history, the focus is on the literary legacy of select 
individuals who are implicitly assumed to have provided leadership for very large, highly 
unified segments of the Muslim population.646 This is registered in the preoccupation 
with Syed Ahmad Khan as the exemplary negotiator of Islam and modernity after 1857 in 
the texts discussed above. Mayer argues that accounts of these intellectuals must be taken 
as studies of the ideological position of the Muslim elite and not a valid statement about 
the community as a whole. The premise of the distinctive and unified nature of Islamic 
political actors forecloses inquiries into the changes in social relations, organization and 
political outlook among diverse groups of Muslims in India, which are importantly 
shaped by region and class.647 However, the middle class often generalizes their 
particular experiences as those of the whole Muslim community.  
The comparison of contemporary community leaders with Syed Ahmad Khan’s 
specific negotiation of Islam and modernity in 1857 takes for granted the authority of the 
landed elite over the general population. Further, it creates the impression of Muslim 
backwardness as a static condition. In the literature reviewed above the issue of intra-
community inequalities is not significant to assessments of Muslim backwardness. 
Various texts share the assumption that there is a community that can be addressed as a 	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single distinctive unit, characterized by an emotional and psychological inability to face 
the challenges of modern life. In the following section, I turn to a different set of 
responses to the problems of Muslim and minority politics by non-elite Muslims who 
deploy the analytics of caste inequality. In these responses the notion of democratization 
replaces modernization as the grounds of “minority” politics are interrogated.  
Democratizing Community: Pasmanda-Dalit Interventions and Minority Politics 
 The previous section showed that in the dominant interpretive frameworks 
through which knowledge about Indian Muslims has been produced, the socio-economic 
heterogeneity of Muslim communities and the role of caste based stratification in their 
social organization were minimally acknowledged. As such, they were not considered 
significant to understanding Muslim subjectivity and community formation in post-
partition India. Inequalities of caste and class among Muslims were largely collapsed into 
the terms “elites” and “masses”. According to Ahmad, the lack of analysis of social 
change among Muslims resulted in the production of large-scale works about Indian 
society that were focused almost exclusively on social change among Hindus.648 Despite 
the tendency to write about the status of Indian Muslims in homogenizing terms, scholars 
have long acknowledged that social relations between distinct groups of Muslims 
resemble those of the Hindu caste hierarchy.649 That is, hereditary occupational groups 
with similar social locations are found in both religious communities. There are also 
notable differences shaped by the history of Mughal rule and the large-scale conversion 
of indigenous subaltern communities to Islam over time. These historical processes 
produced a distinction between foreign and indigenous Muslims in South Asia. As such, 
an alternate set of caste categories are applied to Muslim social stratification: 1) Ashraf: 
the Muslim nobility that trace their origins to Central Asia. These groups constitute the 
“upper caste” and are identified by the surnames Syed, Shaikh, Mughal, Khan and 	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Pathan, 2) Ajlaf: hereditary occupational communities such as weavers, tailors, butchers, 
barbers and cotton carders, considered to be “middle” or “lower” caste, and 3) Arzal: 
groups engaged in the most exploitative forms of labor such as sweeping and scavenging 
and subjected to practices of untouchability. The latter two groups comprise communities 
of indigenous converts to Islam. Most of these communities were categorized as Other 
Backward Classes (OBC) by the Mandal Commission and as such are eligible for the 
reservations in public sector employment. Although Arzal communities are subject to 
practices of untouchability, they are prevented from accessing the more extensive social 
policies available for Scheduled Castes due to the Presidential Order, 1950, which 
prohibits Muslims and Christians from being identified as SC. Arzal communities have 
been misclassified in the affirmative action framework. These communities are generally 
referred to as Dalit Muslims in recognition of the extreme degree of stigmatization and 
exclusion to which they are subjected. 
 In his response to the Sachar Committee Report and the anticipated reservation 
debate in Frontline, Javeed Alam argued that among the features that distinguished 
Muslims from other religious communities in India was that historically, the Muslim 
gentry and their representatives never treated the Muslim masses any better or differently 
than the other subjects under them; “all people were equally unworthy of respect or 
dignity”.650 The conditions of colonial rule, as informed by Orientalist discourses, 
governmental knowledge and the positioning of the colonial state as neutral mediator of 
group interests further empowered elites across religious categories to represent “their” 
communities at different levels of governance. Revivalist religious movements also 
emerged during this time in response to Christian missionary activity. According to 
Menon, both Hindu and Muslim revivalists responded to the portrayal of their religious 
beliefs as uncivilized and irrational with attempts to recreate their traditional religions 
through textual exegesis, a return to essentials and a distancing from popular forms of 
religion.651 These efforts resulted in the further consolidation of an upper caste, elite 
Ashraf identity premised on “pure”, textual practice of Islam and a move away from 
spaces of syncretic and shared practices within the popular realm. During colonial census 	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operations the Ashraf insisted that their foreign ancestry be acknowledged by the state, 
effecting a division between “original Muslims”, defined as those who comprised the 
higher classes, and local Muslim converts from Hinduism, who were consistently 
identified with the lower classes.652 These historical developments indicate some of the 
ways in which the contours of “upper caste” identity were sharpened during colonial rule, 
in tandem with the construction of the categories “Hindu” and “Muslim” as bounded 
religious communities with oppositional interests. 
Ashraf elite dominance was strengthened in the post-colonial nation-state due to 
the conditions of violence that threatened the security of Muslims after the partition. 
While the texts discussed in the previous section described the “Muslim problem” as fear 
of cultural assimilation in a Hindu dominated society, they minimized the extent to which 
post-partition Muslim politics were shaped by insecurity and fear of violence. Alam 
explains that most communities dealt with this situation by relying on elites to negotiate 
and make deals with the Congress for security and small relief in return for electoral 
support.653 In the religion and caste based mobilizations around the Babri Masjid and the 
Mandal Commission respectively, these relations between elite and non-elite Muslims, 
primarily among artisans and the working class, began to change. Muslims had decisively 
broken off from the politics of leaning on the Congress.654 As non-elite Muslims became 
more politically assertive they subordinated the issue of security to concerns for 
dignity655. More broadly they challenged the authority of the elite to act as representatives 
of a nationwide Muslim community and set political priorities on its behalf.  
The contemporary political mobilization among these groups is connected to the 
spaces created by the Mandal Commission for public debates about caste, discrimination 
and community. Regional political parties formed around the articulation of “lower caste” 
interests also began to attract wide support in this context. In the 1980s an OBC Muslim 
movement was formed in Maharashtra with the influence of progressive Muslim writers 
of Marathi literature who challenged the claim that Urdu was the “natural” language of 
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Muslims.656 Initial organizing involved surveying and compiling a list of backward caste 
Muslims for recognition in Mandal’s list of OBCs as well as for educational, economic 
and political empowerment.657 115 Muslim castes were identified in the state, which 
largely corresponded to occupational divisions and ritual status differentiations found 
among Hindus. These efforts were paralleled in Bihar with the formation of the All India 
Backward Muslim Morcha and the Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz (PMM) in the early 1990s. 
These two organizations are differentiated by the latter’s emphasis on the question of 
Dalit Muslims. Alam notes that the former is concerned with the social and political 
advancement of  “backward Muslims” more generally and uses the term Dalit in a more 
nebulous fashion, including dominant middle castes and at times, supporting the 
inclusion of certain upper castes in the reservation framework.658 As such, the Backward 
Muslim Morcha has been losing ground among lower caste Muslims.  The PMM began 
as a local organization founded by journalist Ali Anwar. From time to time it had 
published articles in regional newspapers about the need for lower caste Muslims to unite 
under a common platform.659 Its organization as a social movement coincided with and 
has been shaped partly in response to the mobilization of elite representatives for a 10% 
Muslim reservation, as discussed in the introduction. In response to the publication of 
“Muslim Agenda 99” by prominent Muslim leaders, the PMM produced “Pasmanda 
Agenda 99”. Released on 15 August 1999, the publication categorically rejected the 
demand for Muslim reservation. It argued that since the majority of Muslims were 
already beneficiaries of reservation as part of the 27% OBC quota, the real purpose of 
“Muslim Agenda 99” seemed to be to bring the upper caste Muslims within the fold of 
reservations.660 This would not only make the upper castes more dominant, it would 
further polarize society on religious lines as the Hindu Right would certainly oppose any 
such scheme as an exercise in minority appeasement. The PMM expanded from the 
regional to the national level in July 2004 as an umbrella organization for various caste 
based associations. It held that these different groups need not be dissolved and should 	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maintain separate identities connected to the PMM, which would seek to coordinate its 
activities.  
Pasmanda is a Persian word, which means deprived or left behind. It is mobilized 
as a collective identity to bring together and represent the concerns of distinct Muslim 
castes. According to Ali Anwar, former president of the Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz 
(PMM): “the Pasmanda movement, i.e. the mobilization of lower caste Muslims, or we 
may call it the Shudra Muslim, particularly in the 90s, is the child of the Mandal 
Revolution. The Pasmanda section is the biggest population block of Muslims in 
India”661. Anwar and other activists insist that there has never been a single, homogenous 
Muslim community in India. Nor is a national level politics organized around the 
category Muslim beneficial for non-elite Muslims.662 The PMM argues that 
approximately 80% of India’s Muslim population belongs to castes that have been 
historically marginalized from power and resources in society. The articulation of 
Pasmanda Muslim politics is thus related to changing self-perceptions of these 
communities based on a rupture within the category “Muslim”, which foregrounds 
divisions between elites and marginalized groups maintained through caste privilege. 
Activists emphasize that while the post-Mandal context created new political possibilities 
for their communities, the issues of discrimination and inequality are historically rooted 
and experienced in their daily lives. “There has always been one or other kind of caste 
movement within Muslims, even before independence…what is novel in these recent 
movements is that they form a united platform to represent the concerns of otherwise 
discrete Muslim castes.”663 The PMM draws from the anti-caste philosophical traditions 
of Phule, Ambedkar and Lohia. Thus, it is emphasized that the Pasmanda Muslims 
comprise the demographic and indigenous majority of the community, whose interests 
have been neglected due to the historical privileges of the Ashraf elite. Their 
empowerment is linked to the empowerment of the Bahujan Samaj, the legitimate 
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majority community comprised of the indigenous groups of India.664 In these discourses 
the terms Pasmanda, Bahujan and Dalit often appear as overlapping and inclusive 
identifications based on common experiences of and struggles against oppressive 
structures. This understanding of anti-caste subjectivity is articulated in opposition to the 
notion of fixed majority and minority religious communities, as these categories have 
contributed to the oppression of marginalized castes:  
The identity of Pasmanda Muslims was hitherto obscured in the name of minority. 
Now we fear the word minority and feel that it is a fake word. In the name of 
minority either someone terrorizes us or someone snatches away our rights. In 
real terms we are the majority (bahujan) in this country…there is a bond of pain 
between Pasmanda-Dalit Muslims and the Pasmanda-Dalit sections of other 
religions.665 
This statement reflects the political objective of strengthening solidarities between 
similarly placed caste-class groups across religious divides.  It is also the basis for one of 
the principal demands of the movement, namely, that the Presidential Order 1950 should 
be repealed and Muslim and Christian Dalits should be recognized as Scheduled Castes.  
 In Chapter 1 it was seen that members of the Constituent Assembly attempted to 
include a clause on “conversions by coercion” in the fundamental rights, on the grounds 
that Scheduled Castes were vulnerable to the manipulation of religious minorities. 
Although this clause was not included in the Constitution, the Presidential Order 1950 
provided an alternate means to regulate religious conversions by excluding SCs who 
converted to Buddhism, Islam or Christianity from social policies and anti-discrimination 
laws intended to address untouchability. The Order was amended in 1990 to enable 
recognition of Buddhists as Scheduled Castes. This restriction has been a site of struggle 
for Muslims and Christians who challenge the Constitutional validity of the Order. 
Numerous petitions have been filed in the courts on behalf of Dalit Christians and 
Muslims on the basis that the Presidential Order violates their rights to freedom of 
religion and equality before the law. A common argument made against these petitions is 	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that Islam and Christianity do not sanction caste hierarchy in their respective scriptures 
and thus caste does not exist among its followers. The judiciary has consistently upheld 
the Order based on a particular understanding of the relationship between caste, religion 
and discrimination. The courts have been willing to concede the point that discriminatory 
practices, including untouchability, continue to be experienced in religious communities 
in which there is no scriptural or theological basis for caste distinction. However, the 
“fact” of discrimination has not been considered sufficient for the official recognition of 
Christians and Muslims as Scheduled Castes. The ruling of the 1985 case Soosai vs. 
Union of India provided a justification for the exclusion that has been applied in 
subsequent judgments on this issue.  It is worth considering the dominant judicial 
perspective here in order to appreciate its difference from the ways in which the 
relationship between caste and religion is articulated in Pasmanda discourse: 
It is not sufficient to show that the same caste continues after conversion. It is 
necessary to establish further that the disabilities and handicaps suffered from 
such caste membership in the social order of origin – Hinduism – continue in their 
oppressive severity in the new environment of a religious community.666    
 In this way, the state demands from petitioners that they establish a comparable level of 
oppression and discrimination to that of an “original” caste hierarchy as sanctioned in 
Hindu religious scripture. This implies that the principal site of discrimination is the 
“religious community”, bounded and distinct from other faith based communities.  
Moreover, the social relations and practices of each community are derived primarily 
from religious texts.667  
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In their demand for the repeal of the Presidential Order 1950, the AIBMM and 
PMM point out that whereas the OBC provisions are limited to government employment 
and limited educational concessions, Scheduled Castes are also provided political 
reservations in state legislatures and parliament and facilities such as housing schemes, 
interest free loans and protection from caste based violence under the Prevention of 
Atrocities Act, 1989.668 These more extensive provisions can better address the socio-
economic conditions of Dalits, due to which they cannot compete for reserved seats 
against more privileged communities as part of the OBC category. The denial of SC 
reservation to Dalit Muslims is a key reason why they have not made the kinds of 
advancements in education and employment seen among Dalits recognized as SC.669 The 
Report commissioned by the Ministry of Minority Affairs on this question also supports 
claims about the extent of deprivation among Dalit Muslims and Christians:  
…regardless of whether and to what extent the caste disabilities of Dalit Muslims 
and Dalit Christians resemble those of Hindus or other Dalits…Dalits suffer the 
most from their caste identity…if Muslims and Christians in India ‘have’ caste, 
then it is clear that Dalit Muslims and Dalits Christians have it the most.670  
On the grounds of economic backwardness as well, the Report finds Dalit Muslims are 
“unquestionably the worst off among all Dalits” in both the rural and urban sectors and 
completely absent from affluent classes. The absence of Dalit Muslims from mainstream 
politics and political discourse is thus related to complex processes of exclusion at 
historical, social and constitutional levels. The arbitrary nature of the Presidential Order 
1950 is underscored with reference to its departure from the reservation framework in the 
Government of India Act, 1935, which did not have a religious restriction.671 It is argued 
that the Order violates the “professed secularism of the Indian constitution”, in particular 
the right to freedom of religion. This is seen in the qualification in Constitutional Article 	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341, on the classification of Scheduled Castes. This article states that SC status can be re-
acquired by those who re-convert to Hinduism: “what is this but an inducement for Dalit 
Muslims and Christians to accept Hinduism, and a threat of punishment to Dalit Hindus 
seeking to convert to other religions in search of religious equality?”672 By linking access 
to resources with certain religious identities the state fails to recognize the right of all 
citizens to choose their religion. Further, the state fails to recognize the dynamic and 
contextual aspects of religious practices. In contrast to the argument that caste cannot be 
as “severely oppressive” in religious communities whose scriptures uphold egalitarian 
principles, Pasmanda-Dalit activists demand that state categories reflect the divergence 
between “text” and “practice” in the social organization of all communities. They 
highlight the diversity of indigenous communities that pre-existed categorized religious 
difference: “the so called ‘untouchables’ in India were not a homogenous group of 
people. They belonged to different ethnic and regional groups and were spread and 
oppressed throughout the country.”673 The conception of caste here refutes the view that 
all Dalits were originally part of a “Hindu community” and have only recently converted 
out of the fold. This challenges the dominant distinction made between “indigenous” 
(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh) and “foreign” (Islam, Christianity) religions. Instead it makes a 
distinction between indigenous and foreign subjects across religious communities, onto 
which unequal relations of power and privileges have been imposed. Caste is identified as 
the principal axis of discrimination in Indian society, and its practice is not dependent on 
scriptural sanction.  
 The demand for Constitutional recognition and alterations to the existing 
reservation framework require of activists that they interrogate and de-naturalize 
dominant meanings of caste and community. As seen above, the PMM maintains that the 
framework of “minority politics” homogenizes Muslims and obscures the commonality 
of experience and political priorities they share with other communities. This claim has 
been substantiated through generation of knowledge about the ways in which caste 
discrimination is practiced and legitimized in Muslim communities. Further, it is 
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grounded by a historical critique of the Ashraf elite and the limited set of interests it has 
promoted while claiming to represent the interests of the Muslim minority. These are key 
aspects of the broader analysis of power relations and Indian democracy through which 
specific positions on the reservation debate are taken by the movement. Pasmanda 
discourse thus relates to the arguments made by Badri Narayan discussed in the previous 
chapter. Namely, that the Mandal debate contributed to pull the historical question to the 
centre of Dalit-Bahujan discourse in the Hindi region in order to provide historical 
support to the report and its recommendations.674 The production of historical knowledge 
is linked to the development of political consciousness and a corpus of counter-
knowledge about Dalit-Bahujan history, culture and tradition in North India.  
Two significant contributions to this knowledge base that have been translated 
into English are Ali Anwar’s book Masawat ki Jung (Battle for Equality) and Masood 
Alam Falahi’s Hindustan mein Zat-Pat aur Musalman (Caste and Caste Based 
Discrimination Among Indian Muslims).675 Falahi and Anwar both write of how the 
silence surrounding caste discrimination among Muslims is maintained by an emphasis 
on their difference from Hindus. Through the premise of difference political and religious 
authorities blame those who have converted from Hinduism to Islam for perpetuating 
casteist practices. That is, caste distinction is due to the inferior cultural traditions of 
lower caste Hindus who have converted to Islam. This argument maintains a dichotomy 
between an original, textual Islam and the syncretic, Hinduised practices of indigenous 
Muslims. By tracing the various initiatives of political elites and prominent religious 
authorities that have legitimized exclusion and discrimination on the basis of caste, these 
texts refute such arguments. They also stress the socio-historical differences between 
Ashraf and Pasmanda Muslims.  
 The historical critique of the Ashraf identifies the upper castes as responsible for 
introducing casteism among Muslims and formalizing it within religious and political 
institutions. In the introduction to his text, Falahi recalls an exchange between a Dalit 
youth and an activist of the Jamaat-e Islami during an “Introducing the Quran” program 	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in Uttar Pradesh in 1994.676 When the Dalit youth raised concerns about the casteism 
practiced by Muslims in his village, the latter remarked: “some people concoct lame 
excuses so as not to accept Islam because they know that if they embrace Islam they are 
bound to be confronted with problems.”677 This dismissal of the Dalit youth prompted 
Falahi to consult the writings of prominent Sunni scholar Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, in 
which he discovered that caste, caste-based discrimination and notions of social parity 
that governed the choice of marital partners had been declared an integral part of the 
Islamic shariah. Falahi describes a sense of horror upon learning that Thanvi  
legitimized the division of Muslims into what he considered ‘high’ and ‘low’, 
‘noble’ and ‘despicable’… on the basis of individuals’ birth in particular social or 
caste-like groups…Thanvi went further and even declared that newly-converted 
Muslims were not the social equal of other Muslims, and that inter-marriage 
between the two was not advisable.678  
Falahi articulates his own investment in challenging these hierarchies as a commitment to 
Islamic notions of truth and duty, which means a politics characterized by justice, 
equality and equal treatment of all people irrespective of social status. As such he seeks 
to impress upon the reader that supporters of casteism are not restricted to particular 
communities: “widespread caste-based discrimination and fiqh based rules of kufu 
(suitability in marriage) prevalent among the Indian Muslims resemble very closely the 
Hindu case, and in fact, correspond to the teachings of Manusmriti.”679 The text traces 
various expressions of contempt and scorn for indigenous Muslims in policies, speeches 
and practices of the nobility during the era of Mughal rule and into the modern reform 
movements during British rule. In both contexts Falahi highlights the official exclusion of 
indigenous Muslims from political positions and educational institutions. He argues that 
not only have prominent ulema and intellectuals failed to combat casteism, but have 
implicitly or explicitly rendered its practices as “Islamic”. Tracing the historical 
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development of religious interpretation in South Asia refutes the argument that there is no 
scriptural sanction for caste in Islam, as textual meaning is not static over time.  
Falahi’s analysis of Syed Ahmad Khan provides an instructive contrast to the 
works described in the previous section.680  This analysis challenges the perception of 
Khan as a great Indian Muslim intellectual, reformer and modernist by showing how his 
politics sought to maintain Ashraf hegemony. Falahi’s reading of Khan’s modernist 
response in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt highlights his use of caste distinctions to 
counter British accusations of disloyalty among Muslims. Khan made every effort to 
convince the British that the Ashraf had little role in the Revolt, which he blamed entirely 
on low caste Muslims. As he impressed upon the British the loyalty of his caste, he 
denounced demands for equality and self-respect for the “low” caste Muslims. Notably, 
Khan opposed the democratic election of members to the Legislative Council on the 
grounds that “ordinary people” could also be chosen. In his correspondence with colonial 
administrators Khan argued, “you must certainly believe that people from lowly families 
are not useful for the country or for the government…the noble communities of India 
would not like a low-grade person, whose roots they know well, to rule over their lives 
and wealth.”681 Similarly, his educational reforms in Aligarh were intended to modernize 
the Ashraf and he advised that Western education be limited to them: “Syed Ahmad 
insisted on numerous occasions that his college was not meant for ‘julahas’ (weavers), or 
in other words, non-Ashraf Muslims.”682 Ali Anwar’s text also critiques the status of 
Syed Ahmad Khan as an exemplary historical figure whose principal achievement was to 
reconcile Islam and modernity. Instead he is portrayed as a figure unflinching in his 
loyalty to the British and a staunch supporter of the feudal system.683 These texts 
underscore the difference between the concern for “modernization” with which figures 
such as Syed Ahmad Khan are associated and indeed celebrated, and the concern for 
democratization in Pasmanda politics.   
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Anwar argues that the consolidation of Ashraf Muslim interests during colonial 
rule was also furthered through the Muslim League. The operation of caste-class 
privilege within the party has been discussed in Anwar’s text to show its unrepresentative 
character. The emergence of the Muslim League in North India is related to the 
challenges posed to Ashraf dominance by the distinct political engagements of “lower” 
caste Muslims during colonial rule. These mobilizations took place among communities 
of weavers who shared an occupational caste-class identity and constituted a significant 
proportion of the Muslim population in North India. Their politics displayed an 
alternative worldview that sought to challenge social hierarchies and create an 
autonomous political space.684 This took organizational form in 1926 as the Momin 
Conference, which avoided identification with the Muslim League or the Congress Party. 
The Momin Conference petitioned the British for recognition as a distinct group on the 
grounds that “being influenced by the Brahmanic idea of supremacy and domination” 
upper class Muslims divided Indian Muslims into several castes and sections.685 Anwar 
observes the similar position of the League and the Hindus in the context of lower caste 
struggles during the colonial period. The League shared the demand of the upper caste 
Hindus that caste be eliminated as a category in the census: “does it not prove that the 
marginalized and suppressed classes of this society, be it Hindu or Muslim, think on the 
common line, likewise the upper caste, be it Pandit or Maulana, who think and work in 
the same direction.”686 The Momin Conference opposed the two-nation theory on which 
the Muslim League’s claim for a separate nation was based. However, like the Scheduled 
Caste Federation, the Momins were marginalized in negotiations between the League, the 
Congress and the British during the transfer of power culminating in the India-Pakistan 
partition. The restricted electorate in the 1946 provincial assembly elections skewed 
results in favor of the Muslim League, ensuring the representation of elite upper caste 
interests.687 In Masawat ki Jung Anwar states, “it is worth noticing that when a new 
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awareness was developing among Dalit Muslims, in the leadership of Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, Muslim League demanded for Pakistan…the nawabs, landlords, respectables and 
upper sections supported this demand of the Muslim League.”688 In this way, Falahi and 
Anwar provide alternate understandings of individuals and institutions that continue to 
dominate representations of “Muslim” history and politics in South Asia. These are 
particularized and shown to serve narrow interests of caste and class.  
The PMM locates its articulation of a distinct lower caste Muslim perspective in 
relation to the historical legacy of the Momin Conference and its leaders, notably Abdul 
Quayam Ansari. The Conference aligned itself with the Congress after 1947, which 
contributed to the weakening of the movement and the dilution of its independent 
identity. Despite this the Congress made greater accommodations for the Ashraf elite in 
its political structure. This enabled the Ashraf to maintain certain privileges after partition 
while Pasmandas were marginalized from political participation. Anwar argues that the 
Congress perceived that the neglect of the vocal middle and upper middle class Ashraf 
would affect its hold on political power: “Congress wanted slavish Muslim leaders and 
not independent ones. That is why they preferred ex Muslim League supporters. 
Basically, these leaders went seeking shelter to Congress. Had there been any other party 
in power they would have joined it too.”689 The negligible presence of Pasmanda 
Muslims and non-existence of Dalit Muslims in mainstream and minority institutions is 
explained as the outcome of these elite power struggles. From this perspective caste 
remains the principal barrier to political representation and socio-economic mobility 
across the boundaries of religious communities.  
 The Pasmanda critique of the elite Muslim leadership in post-partition India and 
its empowerment as legitimate representatives of the “Muslim community” challenges 
the conflation of the experiences and interests of the Ashraf with those of Muslims across 
India. It is argued that the popular projection of Muslims as a monolithic group is rooted 
in the class character of the Muslim elite in the Hindi heartland.690 This elite has never 	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shown any interest in building alliances with Dalits because they “suffer from an 
enormous sense of superiority, owing to their supposedly foreign extraction and because 
they claim descent from Muslim elites who ruled…India for over 1,000 years. Because of 
this, they feel they have the right to control all Muslims throughout India.”691 Their 
longstanding alliance with the Congress and monopolization of various minority 
institutions is the means through which this elite safeguarded its power after the 
dismantling of feudal landholdings. In other words, they were able to extract state 
resources by projecting themselves as legitimate representatives of the community at the 
expense of the majority of Muslims. The generation of fear about the dilution of cultural-
religious identity and vulnerability to violence in a Hindu dominated society is used to 
silence marginalized caste-class groups.  
In this context of an elite seeking to protect its privileges after partition, the 
leadership focused on select “cultural-emotional issues” related to a specifically Ashraf 
conception of Indian Muslim identity: preservation of Urdu, preservation of the ‘minority 
character’ of Aligarh Muslim University, personal law and the Babri Masjid.692 The 
attention received by these issues as definitive of community experience is ensured by the 
dominance of the Ashraf in all national organizations that claim to represent Muslims, as 
well as in the Urdu press. “Whenever an issue arises that concerns Muslims, the media 
approaches certain name-sake and un-elected Muslim ‘leaders’ in Delhi…and present 
them as spokesmen for the 150 million Muslims of India.”693 The homogenization of 
minority politics is also enabled by dominant political parties who ignore the diversity of 
opinion within the community. The recognition and support the state provides to a 
particular segment of the Muslim elite reveals the undemocratic character of the state and 
its various institutions. The critique of minority politics is thus linked to an analysis of the 
actual working of Indian democracy, which has “tended to take care of the dominant 
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socio-economic interests of the elite of various castes and communities”.694 The PMM 
calls for the democratization of minority institutions via greater representation of 
Pasmanda-Dalit Muslims on their boards. It has called for the implementation of 
reservations within Muslim managed organizations that receive state support, such as 
Aligarh Muslim University and Jamia Milia Islamia University. According to Alam, the 
demand is provocative because the AMU has been made a symbol of Indian Muslim 
politics, and any interference is construed as interference in the “internal affairs of the 
community.”695  
 Yet it is not only that these select community issues prioritize cultural and identity 
politics over those of socio-economic inequality. Pasmanda-Dalit interventions illustrate 
that the use of these issues to define the cultural content of the category Muslim 
naturalizes the authority of the Ashraf elite. This content is challenged by highlighting the 
different socio-cultural practices of Pasmanda-Dalit communities, for example, on 
language: “The mother tongue(s) for Dalit Muslims is region-based…it is a false claim 
that Urdu is the mother tongue of Muslims. Neither Urdu, nor Hindi, is their mother 
tongue.”696 By re-defining such markers of “Islamic culture” as markers of caste status, 
they can be seen as the means through which Ashraf superiority is maintained vis-à-vis 
other Muslim communities. Pasmanda discourses emphasize the affective and cultural 
constitution of the Ashraf as a class whose nostalgia for former glory determines its 
politics: “it is in fact a lamentation for the loss of our glorious past that pervades the 
minds and writings of these writers and is projected as the universal Muslim 
truth…needless to say that these Muslim authors’ concern emanates from the same high-
caste location that abhorred Shudra Muslim.”697 Alongside the pride in “Islamic 
civilization” marked by high Urdu culture and Mughal rule, a disdain for the 
“uncultured” indigenous Muslim is constitutive of Ashraf identity. It is through drawing 
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on these relationships and politicizing them that Pasmanda subjectivities come to be 
articulated in opposition to the category of religious minority.  
 Pasmanda-Dalit politics has also involved the documentation of caste based 
discriminatory practices and related deprivation which structure social relations between 
differently located Muslims. Anwar’s text extensively documents these practices through 
the collection of oral histories of non-Ashraf Muslims across the state of Bihar. It 
provides an account of the multiple ways in which the maintenance of social distance, 
hierarchy and segregation impacts the daily lives of these communities. Prominent 
examples include the separation of cemeteries on a caste basis, barring of Dalit Muslims 
from taking the front rows for prayers and restrictions on inter-caste marriages. 
According to Ansari, most of the Pasmanda communities are subjected to a “complex 
culture of humiliation through circulation of several stories and jokes by the upper castes 
where even the titles of their castes are used in derogatory terms and often as an 
abuse”.698 In many of the interviews collected by Anwar, this social world is described in 
terms of affective distance maintained by the local Ashraf from “lower caste” Muslims. 
Despite their adherence to Islamic practices, “the other Muslims of Patna never care for 
them”. He is informed by one respondent from the Lalbegi (sweeper) community, 
“though the people of our own religion avoid us in the event of marriage, death or 
celebration our Hindu neighbors join us.”699 Anwar is told that he is the first Muslim to 
visit this community. The text also describes the lack of support given to Pasmanda 
political activities. During elections Ashraf politicians take for granted that they will be 
supported by all Muslims on the grounds of religious unity. Pasmanda Muslims are 
actively discouraged from entering politics, and subject to humiliation and insult during 
their attempts to do so. The “so-called forward Muslims” refuse to vote for candidates 
from their communities: “several leaders of backward community complain that during 
the election, we get to hear from the upper caste, ‘instead of voting for the julaha-
dhuniya-kunjra, we will tear up our votes’.”700  The interviews are organized according to 
hereditary occupational community and include if they have been mentioned in any 
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historical documents, their socio-economic conditions and religious-cultural practices. In 
this way they capture an array of diverse cultural practices of smaller Muslim castes, 
which often combine Islam with local syncretic customs. As Alam argues, this extends 
the critique of the way the state represents Muslims to debates on pluralism and 
multiculturalism.701  Dominant representations of Indian diversity produce the categories 
“Hindu” and “Muslim” in reference to upper caste cultural and religious practices, at the 
expense of the multiple and often syncretic practices of subaltern communities.   
These accounts of the role of caste in structuring relationships between Muslims 
illustrate why Pasmanda activists oppose the demands for “total” Muslim reservation. 
According to Ashfaq Husain Ansari, Former President of the Centre for Backward 
Muslims, the Ashraf leadership has continually denied the existence of caste-based 
divisions among Muslims. It has further placed the blame on backward groups for having 
invented these divisions and fragmenting the religious community. In their campaigns to 
build support for a separate Muslim quota within the reservations framework, “minority” 
leaders have elided the fact that most Muslim groups are already eligible for benefits as 
part of the OBC category. Their position deliberately gives the impression that the 
community as a whole is excluded from such benefits.  Therefore, “political parties 
claiming to be secular and well wishers of the OBCs and Muslims should clearly realize 
the fact that 85% of the total population of Muslims is backward and most such 
communities are included in the OBC list. These parties have deliberately sidelined the 
OBCs until now.”702  That is, “secular” parties have also taken for granted that the 
legitimate representatives of the “Muslim community” are the Ashraf and thus failed to 
support struggles for democratization of minority politics. This assertion interrogates the 
basis on which certain political parties identify as “secular”, namely, against the 
communal, anti-Muslim rhetoric of the Hindu right wing. Ansari dismisses the notion that 
it is possible to have a singular “pro-Muslim” position in the post-Mandal political 
context.  
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From the perspective of Pasmanda Muslims the reservation framework can only 
address the problem of social and educational backwardness of the majority of present 
day Indian Muslims of “indigenous origin”. It is not appropriate to use the policy to 
address the problem of discrimination based on religious identity.703 Therefore any 
further policy changes must be made within the Constitutional framework and strengthen 
the existing Mandal provisions, both of which prioritize social discrimination based on 
caste. This position defines a secular process as one in which religious categories are not 
made the basis of social policies. Two proposals are advanced in accordance with this 
position. The first is to address the unevenness and structural differences between 
communities of all religious groups in the OBC list by bifurcating the quota into the 
categories of “backward” and “most backward”. Most Muslim OBCs would fall into the 
latter category, increasing their chances of employment alongside similarly located 
communities of other religions. Secondly, Ashrafs must be counted as a distinct group in 
assessments of Muslim representation in state institutions. This illustrates that even in the 
post-Mandal context Ashraf Muslims as a caste have been well represented in 
legislatures:  
Of the total religious minorities population more than 75% belongs to these ‘bulk’ 
(backward Muslim groups) and less than 25% belong to the other category who 
are generally called the ‘Ashraf’ or elite and ‘non-indigenous’…From first to 
fourteenth Lok Sabha around 7500 members were elected but out of this only 400 
Muslims could be elected, and out of this 400, 340 belong to Ashraf elites or 
Muslims of non-indigenous category. The representation of “bulk” of backward 
Muslims is only 60.704 
By considering the Ashrafs as a distinct group comprising 2% of the national population, 
the statistics cited above indicate that their representation in the Lok Sabha works out to 
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4.5%, that is, much beyond their actual population.705 This undermines the claims made 
by proponents of “total” Muslim reservation that discriminatory treatment has been 
meted out to the community in a uniform manner since independence.  
 Syed Shahbuddin, a prominent politician that led the Babri Masjid Action 
Coalition and the demand for Muslim reservation, presents counter arguments to this 
position. His case for Muslim reservation is based on the argument that the entire 
community faces common discrimination on account of being a religious minority in 
India:   
One would have expected that a religious minority which has been targeted in 
every conceivable manner, treated, consciously and unconsciously, as a historic 
adversary of the Hindus, which has shared common sufferings and which has a 
common objective for securing a place of security, equality and dignity in its 
motherland was more likely to struggle collectively and unitedly for its 
constitutional and human rights.706 
In this argument the experiences of religious discrimination and violence constitute the 
Muslims as a singular unit despite regional, sectarian and caste differences. “In situations 
of communal violence and all situations of discretion at any level all Muslims are treated 
alike.”707 Caste based reservations are divisive and ineffective: “Muslim OBCs can never 
receive their due as part of a conglomerate because they suffer from a double jeopardy – 
backwardness and communal bias.”708 The denial of religion as an aspect of 
backwardness is therefore “nothing more than a symptom of the delayed shell shock 
caused by partition”.  In Shahbuddin’s position recognition of caste based stratification 
among Muslims is reconciled with the claim that all Muslims are discriminated against 
based on their religious identity. These forms of inequality can be isolated from each 
other in making a case for a separate Muslim quota by highlighting the issue of anti-
Muslim violence. Other representatives of the Muslim Reservation Movement have 
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institutions in order to influence the distribution of goods and services in ways that 
counteract communal bias, particularly in security agencies during situations of 
communal violence.709 In this way, the claims of the Movement remain reliant on the 
dominant framework of minority security. For example:  
Babri was to my generation what partition was to my father’s generation. 
Something that might help erase the trauma is if our government finally moves to 
provide reservation for Muslims in jobs and educational institutions in India. 
Reservations have empowered the Dalits and similar measures can help empower 
Muslims, help them join the Indian middle class in proportionate numbers.710  
In this argument reservation is a form of compensation from the state for the failure to 
prevent anti-Muslim violence. However, critics of Muslim reservation argue that the 
quota would deepen religious polarization and be used by the Hindu right to incite further 
violence. The following section will review how the National Commission on Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities addressed these issues in its suggestions to the government on 
the question of Muslim reservation.  
 
Reservations and the Search for “Objective” Inequality 
 Although the Sachar Committee did not include reservation in its list of 
recommendations, its conclusions created greater receptivity to the institution of such a 
policy for Muslims. Thereafter, the Ranganath Mishra National Commission for 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (NCLRM) was formed to develop criteria for the 
identification of socially and economically backward sections of minorities and suggest 
measures for their welfare, including reservations in education and government 
employment. Due to the increasing number of petitions filed in the Supreme Court by 
Muslim and Christian Dalit organizations for recognition as Scheduled Castes, the terms 
of reference were subsequently expanded to provide an official government position on 
this question. In response these communities submitted “kilograms of data” and “scores 
of historical records including some dating back to the 19th century law courts of the 
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Madras presidency” to support their claims.711 The PMM argued that this mandate 
effectively translated into devising constitutional modalities through which reservation 
could be extended to upper caste Muslims, since the state and central OBC lists already 
identified socially and educationally backward religious minorities. In a memorandum 
submitted to the Commission, Ali Anwar argued, 
‘economically backward classes/sections’ or ‘socially and economically backward 
classes/sections’ of religious and linguistic minorities…are spurious constructs 
and irrational classifications which cannot be accommodated within the four walls 
of the Constitution by any amendment.712  
Both in the Constitution and the Mandal Commission Report on Backward Classes there 
is no use of the term “economically backward classes”. The inequalities reservation is 
intended to address are related to historical, social (i.e. caste-based) discrimination. “The 
economic criterion by itself cannot identify a class as backward unless the economic 
backwardness of the class is on account of its social backwardness.”713 Pasmanda 
activists argued that by introducing a new term to accommodate upper caste Muslims, the 
Commission neglected their dominance in state institutions relative to OBC and Dalit 
Muslims, who constituted the majority of the Muslims in India. They unsuccessfully 
demanded that the Commission be dissolved.  
In its recommendations the NCLRM distinguishes between short-term and long-
term solutions. In terms of the former, it recommends that 15% of posts in all grades of 
the state and central governments and seats in educational institutions be reserved for 
religious minorities, on the grounds that they constitute an economically backward class. 
10% of this quota should be allotted specifically to Muslims.714 On the question of Dalit 
Muslims and Christians, the Report concludes that “the caste system should be 	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recognized as a general social phenomenon, without questioning whether the philosophy 
or teachings of any particular religion recognizes it or not.”715 Therefore, there is no basis 
for the continued exclusion of Muslims and Christians from the SC category. The 
Commission recommends the transfer of communities to the SC list whose Hindu, Sikh 
and Buddhist counterparts are categorized therein. These recommendations of the 
NCRLM appear to be a departure from the existing reservation framework in three ways: 
1) by creating space for religious minorities, which has been opposed as both 
unconstitutional and non-secular, 2) by recognizing the claims of Dalit Christians and 
Muslims, which the judiciary has refused to do and 3) by making a case for economic 
criteria, which is not recognized in the Constitution as a basis for reservation.  
While the recommendations reviewed above represent a position on the specific 
terms of the Commission’s mandate, the long-term recommendations shed light on the 
broader concerns and perspective that animate the report. When these are considered the 
NCRLM illustrates continuity with long-standing dominant perceptions on reservation, 
caste and discrimination. In the long term, the Commission recommends the elimination 
of all caste and religious considerations from the reservation policy: “there should be a 
single list of socially and economically backward including religious and linguistic 
minorities based on common criteria.”716 This new list of the socially and economically 
backward should be based on the family or household unit rather than caste or tribe. Even 
with this more objective list of the “truly backward”, reforms in education are preferable 
to quotas.  Improving access to education for all would alleviate the need for 
reservations.717 As such, “the socially and economically backward minorities need to be 
enlightened about the importance of acquiring knowledge and creating competitive spirit 
with a view to ensuring that merit is properly rewarded and reservation is not used to kill 
initiative and competitive spirit.”718 In this statement one can see how an established 
understanding of what reservation policies do and the kinds of subjects they produce is 
drawn upon to attack the entire framework.  
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The report does not focus on the specific forms of discrimination that lead to 
disadvantages among religious minorities or the practices of untouchability in non-Hindu 
communities. Rather, its primary engagement is with the question of economic criteria 
and a quota for “economically backward” Muslims. Two key arguments are made 
consistently throughout the Report: 1) the existing procedures for identifying the 
backward classes are subjective, inaccurate and rely on faulty or non-existent data and 2) 
this had led to an abuse of the reservation system across the categories of SC, ST and 
OBC, thus preventing those in genuine need from accessing the quotas. In this way anti-
reservation discourses that circulated in the context of the Mandal debate have been 
incorporated into the Report as an official position. The use of social criteria, specifically 
caste, is also seen as contributing to these problems, especially for religious minorities: 
The norms of caste-based criteria (used by the Mandal Commission) were not 
suited to non-Hindus. Uniform parameters which were both religion and caste 
neutral should have been identified to ensure that the socially, educationally, and 
economically backward of all communities irrespective of religion, caste, etc., are 
equally included.719 
This position on the unsuitability of caste criteria for non-Hindus is contradictory to the 
Committee’s recommendation on Dalit Muslims and Christians discussed above, where it 
is argued that caste must be seen as a “general characteristic of Indian society”.  On the 
one hand, it is being argued that caste is an inadequate criterion for identifying backward 
groups among Muslims. On the other hand, it is recognized that caste structures social 
relations across different communities. One possible reason for the existence of these 
opposing views in the Report is that the issue of Presidential Order 1950 was an ad-hoc 
addition to its terms of reference, and its treatment in the text reflects this. This is the 
shortest chapter in the volume, consisting of a brief summary of the arguments for and 
against recognizing Muslim and Christian Dalits as SCs, with scant attention to where 
these arguments come from. However, another reason is that both views of caste can be 
reconciled to the overarching efforts in the Report to discredit the significance of social 
(caste) criteria in the reservation framework in favor of economic criteria.  
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 This is seen in the Report’s assessment of the existing criteria used to identify 
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs for the purposes of affirmative action. In 
order for criteria to be effective in identifying eligible and deserving groups, it should 
have a “scientific basis” which makes the process rational and judicious.720 Secondly, it 
must provide for a constant review and exclusion of those who are able to rise above the 
levels that determine backwardness. The Commission states that the procedures for 
identifying SCs and OBCs both fail in this regard as they are “unscientific, ad hoc and 
subjective.”721 The restriction on enumerating caste in the Census is cited as one reason 
for the inaccuracy of the existing procedures. However, the Commission does not 
recommend including caste in the Census as a solution. A more important issue for the 
Commission is that the number of backward classes in the lists has increased over time 
despite the state’s investment in developmental programs and positive discrimination 
policies for SCs, STs and OBCs over the last several decades. According to the NCRLM, 
“this by itself is indicative of the fact that considerations other than actual socio-
economic backwardness of classes are perhaps responsible for increasing tendency of… 
governments for recognizing new castes/classes…it is indicative of failure to reach out to 
the deserving.”722 The implication here is that most of the communities being added to 
these lists are merely interested in gaining concessions from the state but are not 
genuinely in need of them. An economic yardstick would enable the gradual removal of 
communities from SC and OBC lists that are more politically organized and have 
benefited from quotas. The economic criteria would facilitate the de-listing of 
communities by providing a transparent means of identifying which groups can be 
excluded. Ultimately, “a deadline may be fixed when the lists of Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes are totally dispensed with.”723 In this way, the Report casts doubt on the 
authenticity of any recognized claims for Constitutional status that make communities 
eligible for affirmative action. Recognition of Dalit Muslims and Christians as Scheduled 
Caste is not inconsistent with the view that the entire SC category should be ultimately 
dismantled. Implicit in this position is that the reservation framework produces a range of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 Ibid., 61.	  
721 Ibid., 62. Also see 71, 137.	  
722 Ibid., 62.	  
723 Ibid., 64.	  
242	  
political subjects that have a vested interest in claiming backwardness. Applying 
economic criteria would expose these false claims. In this way, the question of whether a 
specific population group should qualify for reservation is resolved by claiming the 
irrational basis of all reservations for any group.  
 Special emphasis is also given in the NCRLM to the issue of fake caste 
certificates obtained by non-backward groups. According to the Commission this has 
assumed alarming proportions in several states and contributed to the marginalization of 
the deprived and poor. It argues that the increase in the number of backward communities 
must be based on fraudulent claims because decades of concerted development planning 
have taken place in India. It is inconceivable that so many groups could have “become 
backward” in a context of a myriad of policies aimed at improving the economic 
wellbeing of the population. Moreover, “untouchability as a practice in cities and towns 
has considerably changed and is visible in a diluted form. In fact demarcation between 
the high castes and low castes in cities specially in public spaces has become 
meaningless.”724 Based on these two aspects of perceived social change, it is untenable 
that any community’s status could have deteriorated to such an extent that they require 
recognition as a “backward class”. Thus “caste or tribe as criterion for identifying the 
socio-economic backward has become totally irrelevant.”725 This line of argumentation 
clearly illustrates how a deliberate conflation of the meaning and purpose of the 
reservation framework operates in the Report. The existing procedures for identification 
of backward classes – social and educational backwardness – are obfuscated with what 
the Committee believes should be the correct basis of affirmative action policies. 
However, developmental efforts aimed at economic improvement do not rule out the 
ability of communities to seek provisions for greater representation in public institutions 
on the grounds of social discrimination. Nor do arguments about the decline of 
untouchability bear much relevance to a discussion of backward classes (OBCs), as they 
are identified by a distinct set of social, educational and economic criteria. In the two 
examples given in the Report on instances where fake certificates have been issued, these 
were certificates for Scheduled Tribes. That the specificity of each category – SC, ST and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724 Ibid., 65.	  
725 Ibid. 	  
243	  
OBC – is irrelevant in this discussion indicates a perspective from which any kind of 
“identity based” reservation is intolerable. The emphasis on fake certificates is such that 
it comprises almost the entire discussion of “Difficulties Encountered in Implementing 
Reservation Policy.”726  
From these arguments of the NCRLM on the objectivity of economic criteria, the 
problem of fraud and need to initiate a process of de-listing communities from SC, ST 
and OBC lists that have already benefitted from reservation policies, we can see how the 
subjects of these policies continue to be imagined as disruptive to the achievement of a 
secular, modern nation-state. Against the re-scripting of political normativity that has 
resulted from Dalit-Bahujan assertion in the post-Mandal context, the position described 
here is a reminder that sites like “civil society” and “policy” remain overly informed by 
the modernizing impulses of the ruling caste-class elite across religions.727  The 
recognition of Dalit Muslims as Scheduled Castes by the Mishra Commission indicates 
the inability of the state to continually bracket the politics of minority from that of caste 
when faced with competing political claims emerging from a heterogeneous and unequal 
Muslim community. However, these claims are considered from an entrenched 
perspective in which a desire for an “objective” and “scientific” basis for devising social 
policies seeks to achieve this goal by displacing the category “social” in favor of the 
“economic”. It is important to remember that the preference for economic criteria has 
always emerged out of a concern for upper caste Hindus. Since caste based reservation 
was debated in the Constituent Assembly, concerns have been expressed around the 
figure of the poor Brahmin as a victim of “reverse” caste discrimination. That the 
mandate of the NCRLM and the aims of the Muslim Reservation Movement converge in 
the attempt to include upper caste Muslims within the reservation framework is illustrated 
by the fact that the economic criteria had to be employed for this purpose. The 
Commission focused heavily on the economic criteria despite the knowledge that it does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726 Ibid., 133. The under implementation of the policy and discriminatory treatment of 
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Sachar Committee Report. 	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not have a Constitutional basis and hence would be unlikely to withstand legal 
challenges. In other words, it developed a set of recommendations that it knew could not 
be implemented. The work of the Commission thus highlights the relations of power that 
structure the terrain of reservation debates, always ensuring a prominent space for 
arguments about the illegitimacy of the existing policy and its beneficiaries. This is 
confirmed by way of a specific representation of the subject of reservation policy: lacking 
in merit, developing a vested interest in backwardness, accessing policies based on fraud 
and thus preventing the truly deserving from receiving state benefits. 
 
Conclusion  
	   Despite the validation that the NCLRM gave to a quota for (socially and 
economically backward) religious minorities and to the transfer of Muslim and Christian 
Dalits to the SC lists neither recommendation has been taken up by the UPA government. 
One reason for this is the threat posed by Hindu nationalists who are hostile to any 
positive discrimination in favor of Muslims and have gained political power through 
charges of minority appeasement in the past.728 While advocates of total Muslim 
reservation frame the demand in terms of a compensation for anti-Muslim violence, it is 
felt that such a policy would increase the vulnerability of the community to violent 
campaigns organized by the Hindu Right. Moreover, the Commission’s case rests to a 
large extent on categorizations that do not have a Constitutional sanction and will 
inevitably be contested.  
In the case of Dalit Muslims and Christians, the government has effectively 
assigned the issue to the courts and thus avoided any further action even though it has the 
authority to do so. The extension of SC status to Buddhists and Sikhs was accomplished 
not through the courts but through the parliamentary process.729 It is also complicated by 
the Mandal framework’s placement of both “lower caste” and “Dalit” Muslims under the 
OBC category. On the one hand, the inclusion of both groups enables the courts and 
opponents of the demand more generally to claim that there is no need for a change in 
status because Dalit Muslims already receive some benefits from the state. On the other 	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hand, many Dalit Muslim communities have been identifying as OBC for years in their 
interactions with the state. There is no way within existing government surveys to 
separate out those OBCs who are Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians. These problems of 
identification also discourage serious attempts to re-work existing policies of affirmative 
action. Any attempt to clarify this would require enumeration of caste in the census, 
which is also highly unpopular among upper castes, on the grounds that the information 
gained will further proliferate demands for reservation.  
In this way, contemporary debates about Muslim inequality highlight the 
complicated interactions between governmental categories and social locations. In the 
NCRLM it is argued that these complications are due to the use of caste itself as an 
indicator of inequality. As such, the Commission can recognize the existence of caste and 
casteism among non-Hindu communities and simultaneously advocate the replacement of 
caste with the assumed objectivity and neutrality of economic criteria for social policy. 
The recognition need not force a re-thinking of the relationship between discrimination 
and socio-economic inequality, or the dominant view that religion is the principal marker 
of Muslim difference. The NCRLM indicates how the ongoing disavowal of caste 
structures the debate on Muslim reservation. Any specific mandate or policy question can 
be resolved by expressing a deep concern for improving educational standards and the 
alleviation of poverty, the “real issues” that all citizens must prioritize over the 
divisiveness of “quota politics”. The dominant presence of this position in any debate 
relating to reservation reveals that upper caste subjectivity is re-produced not only as 
“Ashraf” and “Brahmin” but also as “modern”, “educated” and “secular”. From this 
perspective the problem to address is how to make the “masses” similarly modern and 
secular, rather than question the content of these terms or the privileges that they conceal.  
 The concept of “democratization” in Pasmanda Muslim discourse challenges this 
perspective in important ways. The rejection of the dominant framework of Muslim 
politics as minority politics enables a recognition of conflicts and strivings for democratic 
transformation within communities. As such, the agents of secular and democratic 
transformations are seen to exist within all communities.730 According to Kancha Illiah, 
no secularist school has constructed a systematic critique of Brahminism or examined its 	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implications for secularist notions of life.731 Illiah argues that it is necessary to Dalitize 
secularism in terms of everyday practices and cultural forms. This intervention opens a 
space to explore the interactions between governmental categories and social location 
against a different set of questions raised by Dalit struggles. Specifically, what is the 
appropriate constituency for a struggle against upper caste hegemony? How can a 
political agenda be articulated in a way that is inclusive of different marginalized groups 
without minimizing the specific conditions of untouchabilty? From Ambedkar’s call for 
the establishment of the Republican Party of India, to disagreements about Buddhism and 
Marxism as guiding the principles of the Dalit movement, to articulations of the 
“Bahujan” as indigenous majority, such questions have been engaged through dynamic 
and shifting notions of anti-caste subjectivity. To Dalitize secularism would require the 
conceptualization of “community” in dynamic, non-essentialist terms. This is in contrast 
to the static distinctions of the categories Hindu and Muslim. In recognition of this 
trajectory, how can we understand the relationship between the terms Dalit, Muslim and 
Scheduled Caste? Does the term “Dalit Muslim” indicate the “fact” of caste or point to 
the formation of a politicized, anti-caste positionality? These questions suggest the 
historical specificity that might be lost if the term “Dalit” is reduced to a term simply 
interchangeable with “Scheduled Caste” and “untouchable” in the struggle over 
Constitutional status.  
 Critiques of the reservation framework in general and the Pasmanda movement in 
particular also indicate the tension between the terms Dalit and Scheduled Caste, and 
their entangled but distinct political trajectories. In recent years the PMM has come to 
focus too largely on affirmative action and electoral politics at the expense of developing 
a comprehensive alternative socio-cultural-economic agenda.732 Ansari thus suggests an 
important area of intervention for Bahujan politics should be in the realm of knowledge 
and culture. Further, a more robust critique of political economy is required of the 
movement, as a greater part of the Pasmanda population works in unorganized sectors of 
the economy – as artisans and landless labor – that have been adversely affected by 	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processes of neo-liberal globalization. A comprehensive alternative framework across 
various spheres of life draws inspiration here from Ambedkar’s socio-political vision. 
Similarly, in a series of proposals for re-invigorating the politics of social justice, Yadav 
underscores the variety of languages in which the idea of justice unfolded in modern 
Indian thought: Phule’s idiom of radical social reform, the religious vocabulary of Bhakti 
and Ambedkar’s language of legal rights and the constitutional framework.733 He 
suggests the need to recover and reconstruct the paradigms of these different approaches 
in order to recover lost spaces and claim new ones for social justice. These critiques 
perceive the need to re-situate the struggles for and politics of reservation within the 
multi-faceted traditions of anti-caste movements and philosophy. The limitations of the 
existing framework are from this perspective not served by the search for “economic 
objectivity” and “neutral” indicators, but by a critical analysis of power relations.  
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When I began to study the history and politics of reservation policy, I found that 
two points were consistently made. First, that the inclusion of quotas in the Constitution 
was a clear indication of the nationalist commitment to the creation of a just and 
egalitarian society. Second, that reservations were an ineffective, insufficient measure for 
achieving social equality. I sought to understand how the policy had attained the status of 
a highly contentious, emotionally charged issue if it had made such little impact in Indian 
society. Why was it perceived as capable of severely threatening national unity, 
secularism and the realization of a modern, meritocratic society? What were the 
meanings of caste, community and nation that enabled these dire predictions? How did 
reservation policy operate as a mechanism for the inclusion of target groups and 
simultaneously, for the differentiation of groups on the basis of caste and religion?  
As I read through the various texts dedicated to the subject, I noticed the almost 
complete absence of the experiences and opinions of the beneficiaries of the policy. My 
time spent in newspaper archives yielded similar results. From this initial survey it 
appeared that an overwhelmingly unpopular policy had managed to survive and indeed 
expand for over 60 years. Not only did it provoke outrage among average (upper caste) 
citizens, it did very little to improve the lives of SCs, STs and OBCs. An array of policy 
options to improve the framework – replace caste with economic criteria, remove 
communities that are relatively better off from the lists, divert resources to universal 
primary education, set firm deadlines for the removal of all reservations – could be 
discussed without reference to the perspectives of the subjects eligible for reservation. 
Anti-reservation protests served as occasions to revisit the validity of the policy. The 
intensity of the protests and the forms of discrimination and privilege that they were 
connected to did not become the focus of inquiry.  
The structural exclusions that shaped the results of my research started to become 
clear when I encountered a collection of essays entitled Dalit Diary 1999-2003: 
Reflections on Apartheid in India by Chandra Bhan Prasad. The essays were selected 
from Prasad’s weekly contributions to the English newspaper Pioneer. Prasad was the 
only Dalit writer to have a regular column in a mainstream English newspaper. In 1996 
the publication had carried out an investigation that revealed there was not a single 
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accredited Dalit journalist in Delhi.734 Ten years after the investigation not a single SC or 
ST was found among more than 300 media decision makers.735 Prasad’s column 
challenged the journalistic trend of reporting on caste only in cases of violent atrocities. 
He dedicated a regular series to investigating the operation of caste in prestigious public 
institutions such as the Delhi School of Economics (D School), the Center for Policy 
Research (CPR), the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund (JNMF) and Delhi University. 
The results connected the pervasive absence of knowledge produced by Dalits with the 
meager presence of Dalit bodies – indicating noncompliance with constitutionally 
mandated reservation policy – in publically funded institutions. Despite a library 
collection of 250,000 books Delhi School of Economics did not have the complete works 
of B.R. Ambedkar, the first Indian to acquire a degree in economics from a foreign 
university. There was one Dalit in its faculty of 29.736 Ambedkar’s works were non-
existent in the CPR’s collection of 10,000 books. A centre with the objective of “studying 
major policy issues before the nation to help develop a body of knowledge about policy-
making” did not have a single Dalit on faculty, nor did any of its members specialize in 
caste studies.737 The JNMF runs a prestigious fellowship for doctoral and post-doctoral 
study. Prasad’s inquiries found that it did not implement reservation for SCs/STs, did not 
list caste as a possible area of study and had no Dalits on its 29-member board of 
trustees.738 Similarly, Kancha Ilaiah begins his book on Dalit-Bahujan writings and 
Indian nationalism by describing the conditions of his research fellowship at the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library. “There were several racks of books on Gandhi and 
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Nehru. But to my surprise, there were hardly any books on Ambedkar.”739 Ambedkar 
hardly seemed to exist in the memory of research scholars in the library. Ilaiah connects 
this absence to the silence on caste in discourses of modern nationalism, a refusal to 
recognize the contributions of Dalits in nation building and the portrayal of their 
movements as threatening to the nationalist project.  
In their respective discussions about how caste inequality structures the politics of 
knowledge in the country’s most reputable, well funded and influential institutions, 
Prasad and Ilaiah underline absence and denial. The torturous conditions of Dalit 
presence and inclusion are seen in the Death of Merit Campaign. Launched in 2011, the 
purpose of the Campaign is to document the prevalence of caste discrimination in higher 
education and expose the disturbing pattern of suicide among SC and ST students in these 
institutions. Between 2007 and 2011, 18 Dalit students took their lives in 16 institutes of 
higher education, including various campuses of the Indian Institute of Technology, the 
Indian Institute of Science and the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). The 
Campaign provides a site of remembrance for students who have lost their lives in the 
struggle against caste inequality.740 By collecting testimonies of friends and family 
members, their experiences are reconstructed through an anti-caste framework. That is, 
their deaths are read as a sign of protest:  
The death of young people, the hopes of their parents and communities, has 
forced the festering casteism and anti-democracy of the ‘prestigious’ educational 
institution into the public realm. Their deaths remind us again that Merit has 
blood on its hands, that bloody Merit is the offspring of generations of privilege 
and exploitation, that Merit was fed on blood.741 
In addition to collecting written commentaries the Campaign has produced a series of 
documentaries which detail how the unrelenting practice of caste hatred led to the death 
of three students: Jaspreet Singh (age 22, final year medical student, Government 
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Medical College, Punjab), Manish Kumar (age 20, computer science and information 
technology student, Indian Institute of Technology, Uttarakhand) and Balmukund Bharti 
(final year medical student, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi).742 In the 
respective films their families describe the sacrifices they had made to bear the costs of 
higher education, the determination with which their children had prepared for entrance 
exams and their excellent academic records. In each case, not only did the administration 
refuse to acknowledge the role of caste discrimination in the suicide, they actively 
obstructed inquiries on this basis. The families of Manish Kumar and Balmukund Bharti 
had been aware of the treatment they had been enduring in college and both had arranged 
meetings with the respective administrations to address the issue. Kumar’s uncle recounts 
the day he went to meet with the hostel warden to discuss the effects that harassment was 
having on his nephew’s health. The warden suggested that he should find accommodation 
outside the hostel and offered the following advice: “Ambedkar, because of whom you 
have reservations, never bothered about what others said to him. You should all learn to 
be like him”. Another commonality between these suicides was the refusal of the police 
in each state to register them as hate crimes under the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities 
Act. Such callous denial was particularly striking in the death of Balmukund Bharti. 
AIIMS was subject to a government inquiry in 2006 due to ongoing complaints of 
harassment by SC/ST students. Headed by Dalit professor Sukhdeo Thorat, the results of 
the inquiry revealed that casteist violence shaped all aspects of student life for reserved 
category students at AIIMS, from differential and humiliating treatment by professors, 
segregation in hostels and verbal and physical abuse by “general category” students.743 
The Thorat Committee reported that the pace of these practices had intensified with the 
organization of anti-reservation protests in 2006. The administration of AIIMS played a 
proactive role in the coordination of the national agitation against reservation in higher 
education for OBCs. During this time students from reserved categories had been forced 
to move from their hostel rooms and were segregated to one floor. The administration 
rejected the Report, citing it use of faulty methodology.  Three years later, it attributed 	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  All three documentaries are available online via the Death of Merit website.	  
743 See Report of the Committee to Enquire into the Allegation of Differential Treatment 
of SC/ST Students in All India Institute of Medical Science (Delhi: 2007). Accessible via 
the Death of Merit website.  	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Bharti’s death to his inability to cope with academic pressures, which led him to 
depression. In turn, the police pressured his father to sign a statement that he did not want 
to pursue further investigation into the matter.  
 The personal interviews and written statements collected by the Thorat 
Committee and the Death of Merit Campaign show how the politics of reservation shape 
the culture of educational institutions and encounters between “general” and “reserved” 
category students, educators and administrators. A respondent for the Thorat Comittee 
describes how this distinction between “students who enter through merit” and “students 
who enter through quota” is established early through hazing in hostels. “They used to 
call us into their rooms and order us – tell ten reasons why you should get reservation, 
why you don’t deserve to be in AIIMS. If you don’t tell then we will beat you. We will 
lock you (in your room).”744 The Death of Merit Campaign illustrates that even the 
privileges of middle-classness that are supposed to insulate Dalits from the worst forms 
of casteism fail to save lives. Among the deaths it documents is the suicide of Ajay Shree 
Chandra, PhD student at Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore and a second generation 
literate. “As a middle class student, Ajay had all the tools to be a meritorious student, to 
compete with the mainstream upper caste students.”745 Despite having secured the marks 
for admission as a General category student he was offered a seat in the Reserved 
Category. The only resource that can be used to re-construct his experiences is his diary, 
in which he describes the atmosphere of his lab. “Those eyes, they scare me, they look 
with such inferiority/superiority complex at you…those eyes scare me. They tell 
everything. Those scares me a lot. My legs are paining.”746 The tragedies documented by 
the Campaign illustrate the connections between discourse, inequality and violence in the 
politics of reservation. In particular, the argument made by Roy, that discourses cannot be 
separated from “real politics” or be seen merely as reflections of social, economic and 
political processes. Rather, they affect real lives and real bodies in tangible ways.747 Anti-
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reservation protests have a long afterlife; the political positions staged through public 
demonstrations are also expressed at the levels of the individual and the everyday. As the 
prevalence of discrimination and harassment are routinely ignored in dominant discourses 
about reservation, they must be implicated in the re-production of these practices and of 
caste inequality more broadly. The Death of Merit Campaign starkly demonstrates the 
banality of the argument that the existence of the reservation policy perpetuates caste 
consciousness because the benefits of the quota encourage eligible groups to maintain 
their caste identities. The quota is assumed to be both a reminder and a reward. Rendered 
invisible by this argument are the ways in which privileged caste subjects come to 
understand themselves and their relationship to state institutions, including their refusal to 
implement reservations, participation in anti-quota protests and rejection of any evidence 
of discrimination. So are the ways that these practices inform the decisions of groups 
eligible for reservation. For Balmukund Bharti’s father the loss of his son, the first person 
in their community to become a doctor, has taught him that aspirations can kill. He 
explains the decision of his family to keep their surviving son close to home and be 
satisfied with “a small education and a small job.”  
It is rare to find an extensive volume dedicated to the subject of reservations in 
Dalit and anti-caste literature.748 As indicated by the materials I have drawn upon in the 
preceding chapters, the reservation issue is embedded within broader questions about the 
role of caste in Indian democracy, autonomous anti-caste struggles and the role of 
literate, middle class Dalits within them, the building of political consciousness and the 
exercise of political power. In this way, the implications of quotas are assessed from a 
distinct set of criteria and support for them is articulated to and with alternative 
understandings of history, community and nation. My engagement with this literature 
prompted me to think more carefully about the status of Dalit perspectives and 
experiences in dominant discourses about reservation – absent, irrelevant or briefly 
mentioned. Specifically, to be attentive to the ways in which SCs, OBCs and “reserved 
category” students and workers were portrayed within this general trend of absence. 
Engagement with anti-caste analytics thus provided a vantage point from which to 	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interrogate the arguments, examples and historical memories that constitute dominant 
discourses about reservation. Not only was there significant continuity in these discourses 
across time, this continuity had persisted despite the shifts in anti-caste politics and 
knowledge organized under the terms Dalit, Bahujan and Pasmanda.  
Over the course of researching my initial formulations around the dynamic 
between inclusion and differentiation felt inadequate for working through the 
intractability of debates about reservation. If inclusion is the obvious desired outcome of 
social policies aimed at non-discrimination and equal opportunity, continued 
differentiation is generally considered the problematic outcome. The problem of 
differentiation is especially acute in the Indian context due to the colonial legacy of using 
caste and religious categories in relations of rule. My dissertation has approached this in 
an alternate way by specifying the multiple, conflicting political objectives that circulate 
in these debates and the social imaginaries that underpin them. I have shown that 
dominant discourses about reservation are constructed through a conflation of the issue of 
caste based discrimination with a series of structural consequences that stem from 
discrimination, such as illiteracy, poverty and landlessness. This conflation enables the 
argument that the policy has dismally failed to redress widespread poverty and 
perpetuates divisive identities. In this line of argumentation supporters of the policy are 
intellectually inadequate subjects that are unable to recognize their real interests and thus 
manipulated as vote banks. However, the issue of caste has been consistently organized 
out of official state discourses of poverty in India.749 Colonial shame regarding the 
backwardness of caste, the imperative of national unity and Nehru’s vision of economic 
change and modernization as the preferred instruments to eradicate abhorrent social 
legacies combined to neglect the fundamentally social basis of poverty in India.750 Thus, 
arguments about how the reservation policy prevents the development of a meaningful 
approach to eradicate poverty effectively subordinate issues of caste categories and caste 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 David Mosse, “A Relational Approach to Durable Poverty, Inequality and Power,” 
Journal of Development Studies 46, no. 7 (2010):1156-1178.	  
750 Gopal Guru and Anuradha Chaudhary, “Who are the Country’s Poor? Social 
Movement Politics and Dalit Poverty,” in Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power, 
Politics, ed. Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004), 135-160.	  
255	  
discrimination within the debate.751 Concealed by these discourses are historical 
contestations over the meaning of the quota, in particular, the quota as a demand for 
equitable power sharing in the nation-state and the quota as an expression of the principle 
that public institutions should reflect the various communities within the nation. In this 
way, reservations can “be framed as a guilt driven concession being made by a majority 
that ‘owns’ the nation”752, which sustains the overarching sense that the policy is 
tolerated but ultimately abhorrent.  
 By attending to the ways in which these different meanings are concealed and 
rendered illegitimate, my dissertation clarifies that the limits to tolerance of the 
reservation policy are not staged at the question of the appropriate subject. The presumed 
moral imperative that prevailed in the case of quotas for SCs and STs during the 
Constituent Assembly Debates is often taken as the basis for adjudicating the claims of 
other population groups. The expansion of the framework to include OBCs and Muslims 
is thus opposed by underlining the exceptional historical circumstances that made 
reservations justifiable for SCs and STs. However, in Chapter 1 it was seen that members 
of the Constituent Assembly continually expressed ambivalence about the purposes that 
reservation for these subjects would serve in the nation-state, stating their preference for 
their complete elimination. The dominant discourse in the Assembly connected 
reservation to the argument that the backwardness of SCs was primarily economic. As 
economic disadvantage was redressed SCs would no longer be “different” and would 
assimilate into the Hindu community. Moreover, the socio-economic location of the SCs 
made them intellectually and politically inadequate. As such their expression of interests 
that were different from those of the “majority community” was not only intolerable but 
also impossible. It was due to their vulnerability to manipulation by self-serving political 
leaders like Ambedkar and Jinnah that some SCs were unable to recognize Caste Hindu 
benevolence. In Chapter 2, I discussed how the figure of the middle class, educated 
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  For discussion on the relationship between caste and poverty see ibid.; Mosse, “A 
Relational Approach.” On the relationship between political economy, poverty and caste 
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Scheduled Caste came to organize opposition to reservation as a justifiable resentment 
against those who benefitted from their caste identity at the nation’s expense. The 
numerous forms of anti-reservation practices that had developed in the early decades of 
the post-colonial nation-state – from non-implementation, the formation of anti-
reservation worker’s organizations and the harassment and humiliation of Dalits in 
universities and government offices - illustrates an overarching sense of disdain towards 
the policy regardless of the subject in question. As such, while a key argument against the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report was that there was no historically or 
morally legitimate basis for the extension of reservation to OBCs, anti-reservation critics 
drew extensively upon their impressions of SC students and workers to argue that the 
policy filled prestigious public institutions with unqualified, underperforming people. 
Similarly, the Mishra Commission Report, while assigned the task of determining 
whether religious discrimination should be addressed through separate categorization 
within the reservation framework, approached its mandate by calling into question the 
use of caste criteria in any of the existing categories. The Commission argued that a 
single list of beneficiaries should be compiled based on “transparent” economic criteria. 
The petitions of Dalit Muslims and Christians to be recognized as Scheduled Caste by the 
state had been rejected in numerous court cases and opposed by political parties. Its swift 
approval by the Mishra Commission was reconcilable to its position that all caste 
categorizations are ultimately unreliable and politically motivated. Finally, although the 
anti-reservation protests organized at AIIMS in 2006 were a response to the provision of 
quotas for OBCs in higher education, they generated an atmosphere of hate that increased 
the vulnerability of all “reserved category” students to harassment and violence.  
Caste Privilege, Colonial Knowledge and Indian Nationalism 
That the conflation of anti-discrimination principles with economic welfare 
measures can be mobilized to discredit the claims to reservation for any category of 
subjects indicates the broader processes of which these debates are a part. My argument 
identifies debates about reservation as a site through which caste prejudice is reproduced 
and caste privilege is naturalized. According to Deshpande, a principal way in which the 
reservation framework naturalizes caste privilege is through the notion of the non-
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reserved or general category.753 By defining caste solely as a source of disadvantage and 
vulnerability and not as a form of privilege and advantages, the Constitution made 
possible a “presumptive castelessness.”754 That is, it did not require upper castes to “give 
up” their caste identity. It simply assured them that they would be presumed casteless as 
long as they did not explicitly invoke their caste.755 Prior to the debates over the Mandal 
Commission OBCs were also included within the general category. However, as 
Deshpande points out, the negligible presence of the latter in public institutions meant 
that the general category had always been effectively comprised of upper castes. The 
general category does not coincide with the general population. Rather, “it is a substitute 
that conceals the absence of a general population”.756   
My approach to studying debates about reservation contributes to understanding 
the discursive and representational practices through which caste privilege is generated. 
In his book on identity formation among Brahmins in Karnataka, Ramesh Bairy argues 
that the category Brahmin has retained coherence and unity of self; it is seemingly so 
self-evident that it needs no explanation or analysis.757 To understand how caste is 
reinvented in new and even antithetical circumstances, we must consider the myriad 
subtleties with which upper castes present themselves as secularized modern subjects 
shorn completely of the “abhorring” traces of caste, thereby arrogating themselves as 
spokespersons of the modern nation.758 Since the claim to casteless identity depends on 
not explicitly invoking one’s own caste location, I have found it instructive to examine 
how this secularized subject articulates the caste location of “others”. A prevalent 
argument against reservations that I have highlighted in the preceding chapters is that the 
beneficiaries of quotas are responsible for preventing the amelioration of widespread 
disadvantage because they monopolize policy benefits and prevent the development of 
social policies that would reach a larger segment of the population. “Lower castes” either 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 Deshpande, “Caste and Castelessness,” 32.	  
754 Ibid., 36.	  
755 Ibid., 37.	  
756 Susie Tharu et al., “Reservations and the Return to Politics,” SocialSciences.In, 
August 3, 2011, http://socialsciences.in/article/reservations-and-return-politics.	  757	  Being Brahmin, Being Modern: Exploring the Lives of Caste Today (New Delhi and 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 2.	  
758 Ibid., 15.	  
258	  
selfishly pose a hindrance to national development or they are part of the voiceless 
masses. Charting the debates over time shows the development of a discourse in which it 
is possible to lament caste based disadvantage and simultaneously, frame disadvantage in 
isolation from questions of discrimination and power relations. It has been argued that the 
translation of caste into the language of human development and disadvantage represents 
a secularization of caste categories. I have pointed to a parallel process, which is the 
secularization of caste prejudice. This can be seen in representations of the “reserved 
class” as parochial and undisciplined in the task of national development. Attending to 
the discursive production of caste privilege contributes to understanding how it is 
maintained despite fluidities in religious and ritual hierarchy.  
If the claim to casteless identity is integral to the naturalization of privilege, this 
claim depends upon a specific conceptualization of caste. I have argued that while 
opponents of reservation denounce the policy as a legacy of colonialism and its policies 
of divide and rule, they simultaneously rely upon colonial discourses of caste as static, 
pre-modern and antithetical to nationhood in order to position themselves as unmarked, 
casteless citizens. The claim to a casteless identity does not deny the existence of ongoing 
violence and discrimination, but rather, displaces them from the spaces inhabited by 
upper castes. The horrific atrocities inflicted on Dalits are thus bracketed from the daily, 
banal and subtle acts of discrimination and humiliation that shape the context in which 
they occur, and determine how and if legal authorities intervene, the amount of media 
attention they receive and the tenor of protest (if any) at different levels of society. My 
argument clarifies that the epistemological critique advanced within post-colonial 
scholarship can contribute to understanding ongoing forms of (upper) caste politics. The 
import of this scholarship is its attention to techniques of essentialisation and distancing 
in colonial knowledge practices and their role in the maintenance of power relations. 
Moreover, the tracing of how this form of knowledge was empowered over other forms 
by claiming scientific authority and objectivity.759 I have shown that a colonial 	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the attempts within colonial institutions to develop a systematized, trans-regional and 
objective conception of caste transformed its meaning and the ways in which colonized 
subjects understood and navigated their society. 	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understanding of caste continues to operate in debates about reservation, especially in 
structuring the representation of SCs, STs and OBCs as subjects that are incapable of 
self-transformation. When Dalit and anti-caste struggles to forge political consciousness 
and alliances among different marginalized groups are rejected as the rhetoric of self-
serving politicians, this rejection is based on an essentialist understanding of caste 
identities as irreducibly divided. Caste associations are framed as instrumental bodies that 
deny these divisions long enough to secure a greater portion of reservations. In Dalit-
Bahujan writings on the Mandal Commission it was argued that these discourses 
paralleled those of the colonial state about the inability of natives to govern themselves. 
The description of “lower caste” subjects as the principal agents of casteism in Indian 
society by “casteless” subjects” is indebted to colonial knowledge practices. The 
persistence of colonial discourse is also seen in assessments of social transformation that 
are premised on the essentially scriptural basis of caste.760 Contemporary arguments 
about the disappearance and irrelevance of caste in urban spaces (as in the argument that 
untouchability has disappeared in cities) define caste in terms of observable, scripturally 
sanctioned ritualistic practices. Similarly, despite the documentation of discrimination 
and segregation experienced by Muslims and Christians on the grounds of caste, their 
rights and status have been assessed against an original, textual interpretation of caste as 
an objectively Hindu institution. In both cases, the complexity and dynamism of 
discriminatory practices can be dismissed.    
A central concern in post-colonial studies is the relationship of Indian nationalism 
to notions of tradition and modernity. As essentialist representations of caste and religion 
(as signifiers of native tradition) were deployed to demonstrate that natives were 
incapable of self-rule, they also became a key site of struggle in imaginings of non-
colonial pasts and futures. Mani’s study of the debates between colonial officials, native 
social reformers and the religious orthodoxy on the practice of sati argues that tradition 
was reconstituted under colonial rule. Colonial officials and native elites shared the 	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assumption of textual hegemony, which was tied to their belief that Hindu society had 
fallen from a Golden age with the onset of Islamic tyranny. Over time the theme of 
glorious past/degraded present became crucial to nineteenth century indigenous 
articulations, both progressive and conservative, of specifically Hindu discourses of 
political and cultural regeneration.761 Partha Chatterjee’s influential contribution to this 
debate foregrounds the fashioning of a sovereign and superior realm of spiritual culture 
as a response to the humiliation of colonial domination. Chatterjee argues that much 
before it beings its political battle with the imperial power anti-colonial nationalism 
creates its own domain of sovereignty, the domain of the spiritual.762 Manu Goswami’s 
study of colonial state space and the nationalist re-signification of the state’s territorial 
borders also traces the restorative reading of Brahminical religious scriptures by anti-
colonial nationalists.763 These texts were selectively appropriated to contest colonial 
historiography and posit unity between an ancient past and a noncolonial future. This 
empowered the hierarchical and relational elaboration of the interlinked categories of 
Hindu (as true national), Muslim (as foreign, contaminating body) and India as Bharat 
(organic, authentic national space).764 
This scholarship illuminates the contradictions of nationalism as a modern 
discourse that re-constructs religio-cultural traditions which are then projected as organic 
and authentic. While anti-colonial nationalism aimed to unify the colonized population its 
selective use of tradition produced exclusions of gender, religion and caste. Nationalism 
was defined in Hindu, male, upper caste terms. The exclusions and contradictions of the 
nationalist project are largely explained in terms of the inescapability of colonial 
categories. Thus, in his analysis of the silence on caste in nationalist thought Aditya 
Nigam argues that the most problematic part of the enterprise of nationalism is that the 
reconstitution of selfhood, the aspiration for political liberation and self-determination, 
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was already being defined by the parameters laid out by the colonial encounter.765 Nigam 
suggests that the neglect of caste inequality was due to the transformation of the Brahmin 
under colonial rule into a “mutated nationalist”. Through the privatization of religious 
identity and the firm self-perception that he had transcended traditional caste 
socialization, the new Brahmin self became secular and modernist. The mutated 
nationalist insisted that all questions of internal reform of Hindu society be subordinated 
to the fight for independence. The exclusion of subaltern castes was thus a byproduct of 
colonized subjectivity: “this mutated upper-caste self too became, willy-nilly, a party to 
the suppression of the urge of Dalits for liberation.”766 It is as a blind spot of modernist 
anti-imperialist nationalism, rather than a practice of upper-caste identity, that issues of 
caste were marginalized. Thus, the critique of Brahminism by Dalit scholars is misplaced 
as it fails to recognize the violence of colonial modernity.767  
In the texts reviewed above the caste based exclusions produced by nationalism 
are identified but not explored in detail. The focus is on delineating the negotiations 
between colonial officials and native elites as the principal site through which the notions 
of tradition, modernity and nation acquire specific meanings. Nigam’s approach indicates 
the limitations of positing the colonial state as the determining interlocutor of the 
emergent nationalist subject, rendering marginal subjects non-conversant. The theory of a 
Hindu golden age, the positioning of scriptures as the essence of Hinduism and the belief 
in spiritual superiority vis-à-vis the West were as much a sign of privilege and dominance 
over other groups as they were a response to colonial humiliation. To explicate this 
process requires engagement with an alternate set of questions. For example, in what 
ways did coloniality shape encounters between modern, mutated Brahmins and marginal 
caste groups whose perceptions of self and society were also shifting? How was (upper 	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caste) anti-colonialism nationalism affected by the direct challenges posed by anti-caste 
thought?      
G. Aloysius argues that while regionally dispersed and uncoordinated, the post-
1857 period is replete with conscious, systematic and collective public action to 
challenge caste hierarchy.768 These include violation of caste norms, demands for civic 
equality, the development of alternative spiritual practices and myths of dignified origins 
and the establishment of journals. “Instead of meeting these struggles halfway and 
carrying them forward dominant castes tended by and large to sabotage them, arguing 
that they were inspired and abetted by the colonial state”.769 As such, it is not only that 
upper caste nationalists subordinated questions of caste inequality in the struggle for 
independence. Rather, nationalist discourse facilitated the trivialization of anti-caste 
arguments and actions. For example, as pro-British and designed to serve the individual 
ambitions of politicians with little connection to the “masses.” Ambedkar repeatedly 
linked annihilation of caste with the abandonment of scriptures, the Shastras, Shrutis and 
Vedas. The context in which he targeted these texts as foundational to the sanctioned 
degradation of stigmatized castes is one in which upper caste intellectuals had 
rediscovered and appropriated them in charting a course for the development of 
nationalism.  
As upper castes acquired secular power through a privileged relationship to 
colonial institutions they simultaneously participated in projects of religious reform. Dilip 
Menon notes that parallel to the creation of a pan-Hindu identity and the imagination of a 
unitary Islam in South Asia was the withdrawal of elites from a space of popular religious 
practices and quotidian interaction.  The sphere of abstract, intellectual religion was seen 
as constitutive of the fundamentals, and the sphere of everyday localized practices 
considered a corrupt set of accretions.770 The ability to secure dominance in colonial 
institutions required the re-negotiation of ritual and religious obligations, which were 
pursued at the level of the community. The initial stages of campaigns for caste reform in 	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the 19th and early 20th century were aimed at consolidating the predominance of the 
Brahmin community in state structures.771  For example, inter-dining and inter-marriage 
were promoted among Brahmin sub-castes only, in order to consolidate a more effective 
collective caste identity in colonial institutions. In his discussion of these changes at a 
cross-regional level, G. Aloysius argues that the colonial process of bureaucratization 
transformed the hitherto disparate and localized dominance of upper castes through 
structural unification.772 This suggests that the privatization of upper caste identity was 
related to the minimizing of practiced and perceived differences amongst sub-castes 
within the upper strata. The practices that enable identity to be privatized involve a 
homogenization and nationalization of Brahmin identity. According to Aloysius, this 
meant that nationalists had two levers of power: first, the national-secular organizations 
for the promotion of economic and political interests and second, religio-cultural 
organizations based on the traditional and the sacred – either reformed, revived or 
rediscovered.773 It is in this context that we need to consider the self-imposed limits that 
nationalists placed on their social reform programs vis-à-vis caste inequality. Therefore, 
an important area of future research is to evaluate specific religious reform projects for 
their effects on caste identification.     
 
Reservations, Affect and Historical Memory 
My project has attended to the role of affective discourses in articulations of 
distinct positions on reservation policy and their connections to historical memory.  
I pursued this mode of inquiry in order to understand how and why this policy has 
endured as a prominent site of social conflict. My approach assumes that emotive 
language cannot be separated from other forms of language; “language works as a form 
of power in which emotions align some bodies with others and stick different figures 	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together, by the way they move us”.774 The affective justifications for quotas as a 
compensatory measure to absolve societal guilt co-exist with an intense anger towards the 
policy and its beneficiaries, conjuring images of insulated elites, manipulated masses 
clamoring for the meager crumbs of reservations, and meritorious students denied the 
opportunities they rightfully deserved. This twinned structure of guilt and anger is 
sustained by the conflation of anti-discrimination measures with economic welfare 
measures in dominant discourses about reservation. The conflation is registered in a 
representative structure based on non-correspondence between those who benefit from 
reservation and the vast majority who suffer from caste related disadvantage. Hatred and 
resentment towards the “government Brahmin” is thus not only a result of the 
opportunities lost by casteless (upper caste) citizens. Resentment is articulated as a moral 
opposition towards the comforts enjoyed by a small reserved elite while the majority of 
the nation remains in unaltered backwardness. By enabling the sympathetic identification 
of upper castes with the “masses”, this representative structure offers a resolution to what 
Elizabeth Povinelli describes as the conflicting obligations to reason and moral 
sensibility. The ways in which individual and collective subjects performatively enact 
and overcome these moments of impasse are generative; they give rise to new social 
imaginaries.775 Such a generative moment was seen during Nehru’s speech in defense of 
the elimination of political rights for Muslims during the Constituent Assembly debates. 
Nehru welcomed this as a momentous occasion because it finally released the collective 
consciousness of the Assembly from the persistent unease of having to accept a provision 
that they knew in their hearts to be fundamentally wrong. Unfortunately, since 
reservations for SCs could not be eliminated Nehru asked the Assembly to reconcile 
themselves to it by shifting their perspective. They should not see it as a “caste” issue but 
as a sense of duty towards helping backward groups in society. In offering this 
perspective to the Assembly as a way for members to tolerate the provision, Nehru 
disconnected quotas from the autonomous politics of Ambedkar and re-framed them as a 
benevolent gesture.  
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In her work on the relation between pain and politics Laura Berlant claims that the 
production of national sentimentality maintains the hegemony of the national identity 
form. As a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference 
through affective identification and empathy, national sentimentality upholds the notion 
of abstract citizenship by certain appropriations of mass subaltern pain.776 In the 
Constituent Assembly Debates members argued that legal rights and protections were 
inferior to the forging of relations of love, trust and goodwill between majority and 
minority groups. Moreover, rights to representation amplified feelings of difference 
among minorities and thus threatened the possibility of these relationships to emerge. The 
Constituent Assembly Debates reveal how complex political trajectories among Muslims 
and Dalits were reduced to an effect of emotional resistance. Claims to political 
representation were translated as irrational feelings of mistrust, fear and suspicion of the 
benevolent majority. As Ahmed argues, the idealization of the social bond through affect 
translates historical and political relationships into a moral duty, which others fail. 
Importantly, this leaves no room for considering justice as the right to not enter into 
certain relationships, to reject the expression of sympathy.777  
The mobilization of guilt, shame, resentment and hate in dominant discourses 
about reservation is historically related to the contestations between institutionalized 
nationalism and anti-caste politics, which these discourses displace. The nationalists’ 
response to lower caste struggles that rejected the authority of the Congress was to 
delegitimize them as job-hunting, casteist, communal and pro-imperialism.778 The 
construction of anti-caste movements as a threat to national cohesion is an absent 
presence in debates about reservation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the vision of the post-
colonial state assumed that economic modernization and the inculcation of a scientific 
outlook among the population would inevitably lead to the transcendence of caste 
identity. Shashi Tharoor’s rendering of this trajectory in “Scheduled Caste, Unscheduled 
Change” illustrates the conversion of upper caste guilt into national pride through the 	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figure of Charlis. Tharoor attributes the ability of Charlis to become an IAS officer to the 
nationalist movement’s recognition that a unified opposition to the British could only be 
forged through an assault on caste hierarchy. However, the narrative of change ends with 
a precautionary note about the scions of privilege that continue to benefit from caste 
quotas and perpetuate divisive identities. Empowered by the reservation policy, these 
subjects have made India a more caste conscious society, something “the leaders of the 
anti-British struggle would never have imagined.”779 In Chapter 3 it was seen that the 
press coverage of the anti-Mandal protests portrayed upper caste students as defending 
national unity against the forces of caste and communalism, thus upholding the ideals of 
the independence movement.780 The Mandal Commission underscored the minority status 
of upper castes against the vast majority of the population that constituted the reserved 
categories. This brought to light the long forgotten “power sharing” or consociational 
argument for reservations articulated in anti-caste thought.781 The vociferous mobilization 
of bodies and texts to prevent the implementation of the Mandal recommendations drew 
from the historical association of power sharing and community representation with 
colonial governance. In turn, Dalit-Bahujan activists pointed out the resemblance of this 
argument to the colonial claim that Indians were essentially incapable of governing 
themselves. It is telling that at this juncture the Hindu Right’s call for sealing the fissures 
of caste through restoring the fundamentally Hindu basis of the nation had such a 
powerful appeal. Hindu nationalism named religious difference as the central fault line of 
Indian society through the construction of Muslims as essentially other – followers of a 
foreign religion, sympathizers of Pakistan and receivers of undeserved privileges by the 
Congress in the name of secularism. Post-partition writings of the Muslim problem in 
India that were reviewed in Chapter 4 reveal the longer history to which these 
representations belong.  The writings of avowedly secular intellectuals in post-partition 
India attributed the marginalization of Muslims to their emotional resistance to national 	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integration and modernization, thus constituting the community as a pathological 
affective formation.  This was an extension of the separate organization of Muslim 
politics in the colonial period, which was linked to the foreign origin of Islam. Thus, the 
tendency to view themselves as irreducibly different from other groups was framed as an 
essential quality of Muslim subjectivity. The anti-caste analytic applied by Pasmanda 
activists demonstrates that neither Hindu or Muslim elites envisioned an agential role for 
the majority of rural and working class Muslims in altering these conditions. They link 
the economic and political marginalization of the latter to the co-option of the Momin 
Conference, organized autonomously by Muslim weaver communities in the early 20th 
century, by the Congress after 1947.   
The rejection of upper caste affect is necessary for the articulation of anti-caste 
political thought. Ambedkar’s incisive critique of the notion of “untouchable uplift” 
clearly explains the implications of “sympathetic” social reform: 
 
It is usual to hear all those who feel moved by the deplorable condition of the 
Untouchables unburden themselves by uttering the cry, ‘We must do something 
for the Untouchables.’ One seldom hears any of the persons interested in the 
problem saying,‘Let us do something to change the Touchable Hindu.’It is 
invariably assumed that the object to be reclaimed is the Untouchables. If there is 
to be a mission, it must be to the Untouchables and if the Untouchables can be 
cured, untouchability will vanish. Nothing requires to be done to the Touchable. 
He is sound in mind, manners and morals. He is whole, there is nothing wrong 
with him. Is this assumption correct? Whether correct or not, the Hindus like to 
cling to it. The assumption has the supreme merit of satisfying themselves that 
they are not responsible for the problem of the Untouchables.782 
 
Individual and collective actions motivated by pity and guilt maintain caste based power 
relations by concealing the implication of caste Hindus in their re-production. In What 
Gandhi and the Congress Have Done to the Untouchables, Ambedkar described 
Gandhian social reform as a plan to “kill the Untouchables with kindness”. Ambedkar’s 
impassioned reading of textual Hinduism helped him build a new political community of 
Dalits, which mobilized itself as a nationwide movement through rage filled readings of 	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Indian history and culture.783 Self-respect was expressed militantly in the Dalit Panther 
movement as it rejected the patronizing view of Scheduled Castes as docile and 
compliant objects of reform. This redefinition of Dalit identity “valorized anger as the 
expression of a legitimate moral stand taken by the oppressed”.784 The movement 
developed a command of the language of outrage not only by publicizing their anger, but 
also by inspiring adverse reactions from nationalists, displaying their rightful ability to 
shock the conservative sections of society785. In the literature that emerged through the 
movement, attacks on Hindu scriptures and middle class lifestyles assaulted upper caste 
pity, provoking the contempt beneath its surface.  
Dalit literature illustrates the connections between affect, self-transformation and 
knowledge production in practices of community formation. Rejecting objectification 
makes self-representation integral to political assertion. Rodrigues argues that self-respect 
occupies a central place in Dalit-Bahujan thought and is regarded as a “pre-condition for 
other political claims and rights expressive of those claims”.786  The pursuit of self-
respect requires transformation of beliefs and practices that have treated people with 
contempt and humiliation; it cannot be engendered through the generosity of others.787 
Marathi Dalit literature was a medium through which activists that had benefitted from 
reservation in education expressed humiliation as a collective condition and sought to 
transform it into collective rage. The relationship between self-respect, knowledge 
production and community formation was also seen in Kanshi Ram’s efforts to politically 
unite disparate castes into a community of the Bahujan Samaj. Kanshi Ram argued that 
the Poona Pact had produced a class of Scheduled Caste stooges beholden to upper caste 
politicians. The cost of Gandhi’s assimilative benevolence was the perpetual 	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marginalization of autonomous Dalit politics. Thus, the significance of the Mandal 
Commission was its potential catalyzing role in the mobilization of Dalit-Bahujan 
communities.788 The prolonged spectacle of anti-reservation protests contributed to the 
building of political consciousness, as upper caste students polishing boots and sweeping 
in the streets blatantly attacked the self-respect of laboring communities. As privilege and 
prejudice were unabashedly put on display, the anti-Mandal agitations became a 
collective memory that facilitated anti-caste politicization. The actions of the protestors 
and their support in media outlets were presented as evidence that SCs, OBCs and 
religious minorities did not belong to the Hindu nation. Similarly, Pasmanda discourses 
link the marginalization of indigenous Muslims to their misrecognition as a religious 
minority community, thus challenging the notion that the national majority and minority 
are “Hindu” and “Muslim”. Ali Anwar and Masood Falahi have challenged the dominant 
narratives about Muslim history by revealing the institutionalization of caste 
discrimination as Islamic practice. The reputation of Syed Ahmad Khan as a great 
modernizer of Indian Muslims is dismantled as attention is drawn to the casteist, anti-
democratic character of his educational vision and his deliberate distancing of Ashraf 
Muslims from weaver communities in the aftermath of the failed anti-colonial uprising of 
1857. Ongoing attempts to forge different kinds of relationships across class, caste and 
religious locations presents a much more complex picture of reservation politics than 
dominant representations of an insulated reserved elite disconnected from the backward 
masses.  
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Caste and Race: Difference, Equality and Discrimination  
Sikhs may remain as such in perpetuity, so may Mohamedans, so may Europeans. Will 
untouchables remain untouchables in perpetuity? I would far rather Hinduism died than 
that untouchability lived.789 
 
In his engagement with Ambedkar over the status of Scheduled Castes, Gandhi 
posed the problem that continues to drive debates about group rights, difference and 
equality in multiple contexts. If the condition of equality is achieved when group 
differences cease to justify exclusion, realizing this objective requires that differences be 
invoked, stalling their transcendence. However, Gandhi also made a distinction between 
the value of religo-cultural differences that impart identity and belonging within a group, 
and the discriminatory difference that prevents entry into the group. This came to be 
registered in the separation of the rights of religious minorities from the policy of 
reservations in the Indian Constitution. Much before debates about group rights and 
multiculturalism gained momentum in Britain and settler colonial nation-states like the 
US, Canada and Australia, the Constitution had established a framework that recognized 
religio-cultural difference and targeted discriminatory difference. However, the 
contentious politics of difference and equality were not thereby resolved. As the debates 
about Muslim inequality initiated by the Sachar Committee Report demonstrate, the 
confinement of minority issues to (homogenized forms of) religion and culture obscured 
how discrimination and poverty affected diverse Muslim communities. On the other 
hand, anti-caste practices such as religious conversion, critical interrogations of Hindu 
scriptures and mythologies, literary activism and historical re-construction underscore the 
role of self-definition in struggles against discrimination.  As Beth argues, Dalit 
assertions in public space both constitute a claim to a separate cultural identity and to a 
position as equal citizens of the nation-state.790 This trajectory of group rights challenges 	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arguments in critical scholarship about the de-politicizing and de-historicizing effects of 
rights discourse and its production of atomized individuals.791 They show that the 
struggles of historically stigmatized groups for equal rights generate novel 
understandings of difference, commonality and personhood. The difference being 
asserted is a political claim. For Ambedkar, attacking discriminatory difference 
necessitated a fundamental re-definition of the religio-cultural group designated as 
Hindu. Anti-caste thought identifies the symbols and stories of Caste Hindu and/as 
nationalist culture as dependent on the subordination of Dalit-Bahujan communities. This 
emphasis on the relational production of difference shows the limits of group rights 
premised on the protection of culture as expressed in discourses of liberal 
multiculturalism. We must move beyond dilemmas of individual rights versus group 
rights in order to engage how historically produced inequalities are implicated in the 
production of cultural differences between groups.  
If debates about caste, minority and reservation are to be situated within 
comparative studies on the relationship between difference, discrimination and 
inequality, it is imperative to counter the ongoing representation of caste as a marker of 
South Asian exceptionalism. The identification of caste as a traditional Hindu institution 
has meant that there have been limited studies of the differences and similarities of caste 
practices and religious communities across national borders in South Asia.792  In 2001 
Dalit activists and transnational solidarity networks challenged the exceptionality of caste 
by campaigning to have caste discrimination internationally recognized as a form of 
racial discrimination at the International Conference Against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination and Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban. The Government of 
India opposed the campaign on the grounds that caste was a social institution and thus 
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could not be considered as a form of racial discrimination, as race was a biological 
characteristic. This position illustrates how the notion of caste as an exceptional, 
incomparable institution also involved the essentialization of race. Although the 
campaign efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in placing “caste” alongside race in the 
UN framework, the experience of Durban is hailed as a historic landmark for anti-caste 
activism as it raised the profile of caste discrimination within and beyond the borders of 
the Indian nation-state.793 
Balmurli Natrajan and Paul Greenough argue that Durban was significant for the 
study of struggles against inequality because it challenged the sociological convention 
that casteism and racism are different theoretical problems.794 They anticipate a “post-
Durban turn” in caste scholarship informed by the intellectual tradition of critical race 
theory. This requires theorizing caste within the language of social construction and in 
intersection with other structures of differentiation and inequality, such as class, gender, 
race and religion. Future comparative research must move beyond the question of 
whether or not caste/casteism is similar to race/racism and deepen our understanding of 
both sets of terms by attending to the global context of their productions. An important 
starting point for critical comparison is that even as Dalit activists advanced struggles 
against discrimination by drawing on the concept of racial discrimination, the recognition 
of racial inequality in the US has been consistently de-legitimized since the 1990s. In the 
1990s and early 2000s highly charged debates and widespread student protests marked 
the dismantling of affirmative action programs in the University of California system and 
the University of Michigan. This resulted in a series of assaults on affirmative action 
which coincided with efforts to control immigrant rights and restrict public support for 
welfare, undergirded by discourses of responsible individualism, colorblindness and post-
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racial America795. Neo-liberal economic restructuring has operated through racial logics 
in the US by demonizing black women’s bodies as “welfare queens” and criminalizing 
black poverty through mass incarceration, while announcing the arrival of a post-racial 
era. Moreover, the representation of South Asian diasporic subjects as “model 
minorities”, a projection that generalizes from the caste-class background of a particular 
section of migrants, has contributed to anti-black racism and the erasure of the specific 
histories of racialized communities. A significant parallel between the US context and the 
arguments I have made in this dissertation is that the erasure of the concept of 
discrimination from public debate has been integral to the dismantling of affirmative 
action policies. According to Kimberle Crenshaw the movement against affirmative 
action is not simply about eliminating a set of policies, but rather, seeks to install a 
particular orientation towards inequality itself – one that mandates the elimination of race 
and gender discourses rooted in distribution.796  
The trans-national circulation of discourses about caste has increased in the post-
Durban context, in large part due to Dalit civil society activism and campaigns among 
Dalit transnational advocacy networks across Europe and North America. The latter have 
prioritized proposals for affirmative action that draw upon the US experience of 
“diversity policies” such as supplier diversification in federal contracts. They are also 
engaged in lobbying foreign corporations to incorporate Dalit human rights within their 
corporate social responsibility programs. In the context of neo-liberal restructuring trans-
national networks are part of a complicated interaction between donors, development 
agencies, activists and the state.797 A second area of trans-national circulation is the 
growing interest in Dalit literature from major publishers in India, the US and France. 
However, this is in tandem with the popularity of South Asian creative literature more 
broadly, in which Dalit characters penned by non-Dalit writers figure prominently. The 	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operation of caste inequality in the realm of cultural production is evident from the ways 
in which non-Dalit portrayals of (lower) castes gain critical acclaim and reach larger 
global audiences than English translations of Dalit literature. The tenor of these works 
continues to be one of “empathy sans agency”.798 Finally, the UK has been the site of an 
ongoing campaign to include caste discrimination within equality legislation, a move 
opposed by the Hindu Council UK.  Networks of Ambedkarite Buddhist organizations 
and Ravidassi Sikh temples, organized through the platform Caste Watch UK, have 
documented how caste related harassment impacts their communities. An important 
challenge in this process has been to prove that discrimination is a result of caste 
specifically, as opposed to other categories of difference already existing within equality 
legislation.799  
If these developments are to be theorized the concepts of caste and race cannot be 
assigned to distinct geographical spaces. The global inequalities that structure Dalit trans-
national advocacy networks and international civil society organizations have been 
historically produced through a racialized division of labor. At the same time, Orientalist 
perceptions of the non-West critically influence the politics of reception of South Asian 
fiction. The documentation of Caste Watch UK also notes how these perceptions resulted 
in the failure of white subjects in positions of authority to take seriously grievances 
related to caste discrimination. Further research into the processes of translation that 
unfold in these sites should seek to understand how engagement with the concept of caste 
impacts perceptions about social difference and discrimination among development 
workers, reading publics and legislators in European and North American societies. 
Tracing how race and caste operate and condition each other in specific contexts requires 
understanding these concepts in terms of privilege as well as oppression. The circulation 
of and conflicts between multiple meanings crucially shape power relations and the 
struggles to alter them.  	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